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CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW aims at presenting a coherent and objective picture of cultural developments in the six Muslim Soviet Socialist Republics of Azerbaydzhan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirgizia and Kazakhstan. The subjects treated include history, geography, demography, the arts, education, irrigation and communications. In addition, the **REVIEW** analyses past and current Soviet publications on the countries bordering on or adjacent to these republics, namely Persia, Afghanistan, the Indian sub-continent, Tibet and Sinkiang. The subscription rate is Thirty Shillings per year, plus two shillings postage. The price of single copies is Seven Shillings and Sixpence, plus sixpence postage.

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The Index consists of two parts:

- I An index to articles arranged under subject headings, namely Borderlands, Editorials, History, Irrigation, Political and Cultural Affairs, Social Conditions, Books Reviews and Analyses, and the News Digest.
- II A general index of personal and geographical names, and subjects. In this index subjects (e.g. education, population) are given under the republic or country to which they refer.

. . .

It will be noticed that the text of the REVIEW contains some inconsistencies in the spelling of proper names; these are partly due to inconsistencies in Soviet publications. Every effort has been made to arrive at the most accurate spelling and, where the spelling in the REVIEW differs from that in the Index, the Index version should be taken as the correct one.

In the case of small places or new settlements, the oblast and/or republic in which each place-name occurs is as far as possible stated in the general index; in the case of the borderland countries, the name of the country is given beside the place-name.

The following abbreviations are used throughout:

Afgh.	for	Afghanistan
Azerb.	for	Azerbaijan
Kaz.	for	Kazakhstan
Kirg.	for	Kirgizia
Pak.	for	Pakistan
Sink.	for	Sinkiang
Tad.	for	Tadzhikistan
Turk.	for	Turkmenistan
Uzb.	for	Uzbekistan

In the Index references are made only to page numbers and not to issue numbers. In Volume VIII of CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW,

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
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
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

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- Borders of the U.S.S.R.
- Limits of Union Republics.
- Capitals of Union Republics.
- Railways.
- Canals.
- Canals under construction or projected.
- Sands.
- Main arterial road with pass.

Communications in Northern Kazakhstan



- Existing broad gauge railways.
- Broad gauge railways under construction.
- Narrow gauge railways under construction.
- Proposed broad gauge railways.
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- Motor road under construction.
- Proposed roads.



Fergana Valley

Scale 1 : 1.000.000

- Canals.
- Main roads.
- Towns with population of under 10.000
- " " " " between 10.000 and 50.000
- " " " " 50.000 and 100.000
- " " " " over 500.000

J.P. 1956.

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Abbreviations

Abbreviations used in the Review when referring to the Soviet Academies of Sciences, and to newspapers and periodicals etc. employed as sources, are as follows :-

AN/SSSR	Akademiya Nauk (Academy of Sciences) of USSR
AN/Az. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Azerbaydzhan SSR
AN/Kaz. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Kazakh SSR
AN/Kirg. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Kirgiz SSR
AN/Tad. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Tadjik SSR
AN/Turk. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Turkmen SSR
AN/Uzb. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Uzbek SSR
SAGU	Sredneaziatskiy Gosudarstvennyy Universitet (Central Asian State University)
BR	Bakinskiy Rabochiy
I	Izvestiya
KP	Kazakhstanskaya Pravda
KT	Kommunist Tadjikistana
KZ	Krasnaya Zvezda
NT	New Times
P	Pravda
PV	Pravda Vostoka
SK	Sovetskaya Kirgiziya
SU	Soviet Union
TI	Turkmenskaya Iskra
VVS	Vedemosti Verkhovnogo Soveta

CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

VOL. VIII, NO.1

EDITORIAL

The Borderlands Series of CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW was begun in 1956 with the declared object of affording "some insight into Soviet writing on the limitrophe countries of Soviet Central Asia". At first the series consisted of general reviews of the principal Soviet publications on these countries which have appeared since the Revolution, each country being dealt with in one or sometimes more than one issue. When these preliminary reviews were completed, it was hoped to keep abreast of current writing in all the countries by publishing in each issue detailed analyses of representative books and articles. In addition, in 1958 a News Diary was started which aimed at giving an indication of the course of cultural and economic relations between the Soviet bloc and each of the borderland countries.

Since the series was started Soviet interest in these countries - and in consequence the amount of Soviet writing on them - has greatly increased and this has necessitated some modifications in the planning of the series. These modifications, which are described in detail at the beginning of the Borderlands Section of this issue, are designed to make the best possible use of the available space in order to keep readers informed of the general trend of Soviet writing on the countries in question. Comment and interpretation will as always be kept to a minimum: for example, a considerable part of Soviet historical writing on India and Pakistan consists of denunciations of the British connexion; except in extreme cases, however, no attempt will be made to assess the accuracy of these denunciations.

. . .

The fact that CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW is criticized both for giving too much and for giving too little prominence to the Soviet point of view suggests that its claim to objectivity is well founded. We have recently received some interesting comments on the article "Recent Literature in Central Asia" in No.3 of Volume VII of last year. One correspondent felt that by simply citing official criticisms of current literature scant justice had been done to Central Asian writers. Among these there might well be a genius of the calibre of Pasternak whose works were ideologically unacceptable to the authorities, and were therefore condemned largely on technical grounds. The same correspondent took particular exception to the statement in the last paragraph that "there is no ideological crisis in Central Asian literature". He took this statement as implying that since the "thaw", Central Asian writers had composed their ideological differences with the Party. In fact, however, the article merely shows that current literature does not reflect any differences that may exist - a very different matter. What the article sets out to do - and this should perhaps have been brought out more clearly - is to examine the present official attitude to Central Asian literature. This it finds to be that current literature is ideologically passable, but technically unsatisfactory. Assessment of the artistic quality of Central Asian literature would be a different subject and a very difficult one, largely because, as readers of the many other articles on literature which have appeared in the Review will know, Central Asian writers are nowadays confined to themes and media which are not of their own choosing and are foreign to their national literary tradition.

. . .

A different kind of criticism comes from FAR EAST TRADE. This paper writes of CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW: "The asides of the expert almost overwhelm the data, and it is evident that at times the editors have allowed their personal inclinations to impair the 'objectivity' of research." The first part of this statement is simply untrue - a glance at any issue of the Review will show the small proportion of space devoted to editorial comment as compared with that giving quotations from or summaries of the original Soviet material. With regard to the second part it is noteworthy that the writer refrains from quoting any specific examples to support his allegation, and thus seems to be following the technique of levelling a general criticism when the facts do not allow a case to be substantiated. Or perhaps he is unfamiliar with Soviet writing on Central Asia and its borderlands and is unaware how prejudiced and how carefully angled much of it is. For instance, among the large number of references in Soviet historiography to the long-standing British connexion with

these regions, it is hardly possible to find one which is unaccompanied by violent and usually baseless recrimination. Objective research into material of this kind must necessarily include some indication of its bias and of the more serious inaccuracies and omissions which that bias involves.

. . .

We have noticed that Soviet references to CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW always relate to issues at least eighteen months old. This strongly suggests that our Soviet critics are making use of some centrally prepared digest of foreign publications which quotes out of their context passages considered suitable for propaganda purposes. Such digests are, of course, to be found in many countries and they are a steady source of misrepresentation.

In the Editorial to No.2 of Volume VII we drew attention to Kh. Sh. Inoyatov's extraordinary and completely unfounded statement that the Review denies the practical achievements of the Soviet regime in Central Asia. Mr. Inoyatov was no doubt relying on the standard official description of the Review as a reactionary magazine and had probably never seen it himself. In an article entitled "The International Significance of the Victory of Socialism in the Soviet East" in PROBLEMY VOSTOKOVEDENIYA No.5 of 1959 we now read something even more curious. We are quite correctly quoted as saying in CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW No.1 of Volume VI that: "The many delegations from Middle Eastern countries who now visit Central Asia have been shown developments which have convinced them not only that the material condition of the people there is much the same as that of the people of the rest of the Soviet Union, but that it is in many cases much better than the conditions prevailing in their own countries; it is in any case far better than they had been led to expect." But the author of the article claims without a vestige of justification that the Editors of CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW "bitterly complain" (gor'ko zhaluyutsya) of this state of affairs. Significantly he omits to quote the immediately following sentence which reads: "Realization that they have been misinformed about material conditions has caused them to ignore, or at any rate heavily discount, the well-substantiated facts about the cultural regimentation and political restrictions to which the peoples of Central Asia are still subjected.

. . .

The Central Asian Research Centre has now established contact with Universities or Academies of Sciences in all the Muslim Union Republics except Turkmenistan. In exchange for our own publications we are receiving a considerable amount of interesting and varied material. We were particularly glad to receive an immediate response to our approach to the Central Scientific Library of the Azerbaydzhan Academy of Sciences in Baku consequent on our decision to extend the scope of CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW to the Azerbaydzhan SSR. The present issue only contains one article relating to this republic, but we hope in future to be able to pay more attention to it now that we are receiving more material. Azerbaydzhan's proximity not only to Turkey and Persia, but also to the republics of Armenia and Georgia make it a study of special interest.

New newspapers in Turkmenistan and Kirgizia

A new newspaper, VYSHKA, is to be published in Krasnovodsk. It will be an organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan and will interpret life in Krasnovodsk, Nebit-Dag and Cheleken.

A newspaper called DEN SOOLUK (Health) is to begin publication in January in the Kirgiz language. It will include articles on longevity, sanitation, hygiene and the use of atomic energy in medicine and biology.

TI. 7.10.59, KP. 12.11.59

School uniforms in Turkmenistan

The new uniforms for schoolchildren in Turkmenistan include one for girls in Turkmen schools which preserves the traditional national form both in cut and finish.

TI. 11.10.59

Television in Tadzhikistan

A new television station at Stalinabad has begun transmissions which have been received in Tashkent and Baku.

KT. 5.11.59

THE PEOPLES OF CENTRAL ASIA :
CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

Part Two*

The Soviet Period Since 1945

The Soviet school has from the beginning been the main instrument used by the authorities for the imposition of standard Soviet culture on the peoples of Central Asia, especially in the rural areas. The great expansion of the education system since the last war should therefore have proved an important factor in the realization of the official plan. But, forty-two years after the Revolution, the Soviet school is still suffering from many shortcomings, some of which are the same, and in some instances manifest themselves almost as acutely, as in the early years of its existence, particularly in the country. Thus "polytechnization", introduced as early as 1930 and lately so strongly emphasized(1), is still neglected by many schools, though superficially much has been done to ensure its success. The teaching of languages still leaves much room for improvement. This is obvious in the case of Russian(2); for example, KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA of 4.1.58 complains that in many schools the standard of instruction is extremely low: Kazakh children start learning the language in the first class and six hours a week are devoted to it, making a total of 4,500 hours during the pupil's stay at school. If he learned only 4-5 new words per hour, he should by the end of his schooling have acquired a vocabulary of 18-20,000 words; but in fact when he leaves school, his idea of the language is very vague. This is not surprising since teachers of Russian frequently know little about the subject themselves. The situation is very much the same throughout Central Asia. In Tadzhikistan complaints are made that Russian textbooks for Tadzhik schools are bad and TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA of 8.1.59 demands that textbooks for VUZ should be translated into Turkmen since the majority of middle school graduates entering the Pedagogical Institute in Tashauz are unable to use Russian books. This is the more deplorable since popular slogans describe Russian as "the language of our elder

* Part One: The Tsarist Period and the Soviet Period to 1941, appeared in CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, Vol.VII, No.4.

brother" and as "the most powerful weapon of progress".(3)

The situation of other foreign languages seems to be just as bad, especially in the country schools. **KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA** of 7.8.58 says that although the graduates of Stalinabad middle schools can translate and read English fluently, the knowledge of that language which their country cousins possess is so poor that at the VUZ they have to start learning it and other foreign languages, from the beginning. There is a lack of efficient textbooks for the study of languages, for the existing ones are only too frequently a poor imitation of those used by Russian schools and do not cater for the requirements of the Central Asian student. The Tadjik Ministry of Education regards foreign languages as an unimportant subject.

Native languages are also neglected in many schools and complaints about this appear in the press. An example is provided by **PRAVDA VOSTOKA** of 31.8.57 which says that at some schools as many as 60 per cent of pupils show unsatisfactory progress in Uzbek. The lessons are dull and badly planned and many teachers read very little. They do not trouble to put into practice the rules of Uzbek orthography which were drawn up in 1955. The result is that forty-four school leavers, who in 1957 entered the philological faculty of the Central Asian University, "made 20-25 spelling mistakes each", presumably in their examination papers. The spelling in the republican newspapers also leaves much to be desired.

Another interesting point, so far as the teaching of languages is concerned, was the introduction of Uzbek into Russian schools in Uzbekistan in 1957.(4)

The Central Asians want to know more about the history of their country, but the Soviet school seems to neglect this subject, Kazakhstan - so far as can be ascertained - being the only exception. **KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA** of 24.6.58 says, "the fact that the history of our republic and of the Central Asian peoples is not taught in the Tadjik schools is the result of imitating too closely the curriculum of the Russian school". But the Kazakh Ministry of Education made an effort to satisfy this desire and in the autumn of 1958 the teaching of history was introduced into all the middle schools of the republic. It is difficult to say whether the Kazakhs are likely to be satisfied with this development - the event provided **KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA** of 19.6.58 with an occasion to philosophize on the usefulness of the study of history: "In order to become the real builder of Communism, youth should be equipped with leading Marxist-Leninist ideology, a knowledge of the history of their nation. . . and of the heroic struggle of their fathers and brothers for the establishment and consolidation of Soviet power and of the ideals of Communist society".

Kazakh children will now learn that "the whole history of the Kazakh people is permeated with the struggle of the toiling masses against foreign invaders and native oppressors - the feudal lords". The teacher's task is also clearly defined: his duty is to "show his students the historical roots of the friendship among the peoples of the Soviet Union and, first and foremost, of the indestructible friendship between the Kazakhs and the great Russian people, . . . the great progressive economic, political and cultural importance of the voluntary union of Kazakhstan with Russia. . . ."

The Soviet school is expected to wage an incessant war against religion, but this task is frequently neglected. This work should also extend to parents who teach religion to their children. The schools where the propagation of atheism is satisfactory are those which not only enlist the aid of science lessons to destroy the "legend of the divine origin of the universe", but also employ artistic means for the same purpose: they hold "atheist evenings" which start with a suitable lecture given by a teacher or an older pupil, followed by the recitation of poems ridiculing religion and an appropriate play performed by the school dramatic society.

Complaints about the low standard of "aesthetic education" of children are fairly frequent in the press. TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA of 10.6.58 finds the reason for this in the fact that pedagogical institutes do not teach the history of art, and the shortage of qualified teachers results in the phenomenon of geography or mathematics masters teaching art. Such neglect is caused by the "false idea which exists among us that it is impossible to teach the general public the principles of the visual arts since this is the privilege of the 'chosen'. This is an anti-Marxist conception. Marxist-Leninist aesthetics and Soviet art criticism teach that every normal man can be taught to draw". Rather unexpectedly, the paper ascribes the existing rubbish which passes for art, trashy music and bad taste in dress, to the failure to put this teaching into practice, though in fact its practical result seems to reduce art to the level of craft. [This will be illustrated in a later article of this series. -Ed.]

Finally, KOMMUNIST TURKMENISTANA(5) says that the country school so far has failed to civilize its pupils in the following respect: "It is necessary to improve the work of implanting in the pupils essential sanitary and hygienic habits and rules of civilized behaviour. . . ." TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA of 17.6.58 adds that many teachers are unfit to give an example to the rural population in this respect.

The most recent educational development in the Soviet Union including Central Asia is the so-called universities of culture, which were first mentioned in the Central Asian press in January 1959.

KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA of 17.7.59 thus describes their purpose: "The universities of culture are called upon to help students to carry out a very important command: to work and live after the Communist fashion. Communism does not only mean plenty in the material sense - it also means a high cultural level of the people and beauty in their mutual relations". As to the more practical side of the enterprise, the "universities" are open to the workers and intelligentsia alike and their task is "to give the toilers a minimum systematic knowledge of the Marxist-Leninist aesthetics, literature, music, theatre, art and in every way to raise the general cultural level of their students".

The "university" of Karaganda started in the Kirov club, but proved so popular that the club, which could accommodate 400 people, became too small, so four other "universities" were opened in the city and between them they have 1,300 students. The best local specialists lecture there and the range of subjects includes ballroom dancing, savoir-vivre and how to dress smartly. A similar establishment in Ust'-Kamenogorsk is the only one in Kazakhstan so far whose work is arranged in faculties of music, art, drama and Soviet literature. These subjects constitute the usual programme of the "universities"; but the one in Chardzhou, which is intended for young people, teaches also the principles of Communism and atheism. These establishments are not limited to the towns and the kolkhozes open their own "universities" and draw their lecturers from among the rural intelligentsia. For example, a full course at the "university" of the Memory of Il'ich kolkhoz in the Gur'yev oblast lasts two years and teaches painting, literature and aesthetics.

Though the "universities" are a recent creation, some of their activities have already incurred official disapproval and a critical article on their "superficial approach" appeared in PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN' KAZAKHSTANA, 1959, No.9 - see CAR, Vol.VII, No.4, p.372.

The press frequently discusses the "culture of the village" while urban culture receives hardly any attention beyond occasional discussion of some of its aspects. The fact seems to be that while the sovietization of culture is considered to have made reasonable progress in the towns, the villages still preserve a large degree of national individuality and thus continue to cause concern to the authorities. Official efforts to impose Soviet culture on Central Asian society are therefore much more evident and instructive in the rural than in the urban areas.

The problem of culture in the village is closely linked with that of books since the countryman does not have the same opportunity of contact with culture as the town-dweller. Here the situation is far from satisfactory. Though the number of new publications per year

increases annually(6), and in spite of official pronouncements that the cultural and economic standards of the kolkhozes keep growing and "the circulation of books in the village is a task of a great political importance"(7), the countryman often cannot buy the book he wants. This is because the book trade in the country is in fact even more neglected than other trades. Various groups of people are responsible for this. TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA of 14.6.58 complains that the republican Ministry of Culture publishes the Turkmen classics in such small numbers that they are not available in shops. KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA of 13.5.59 explains that it is the buyers of the rayon consumers' co-operatives (raypotrebsoyuzy) and managers of bookshops who influence the number of copies of books published, for the management of the two bodies responsible for the book trade in Kazakhstan, the Kazknigtorg and the Kazpotrebsoyuz, order books according to the requirements of the above-mentioned people. Another weak point of this system is that the representatives of the retail trade often order books of which they know nothing, this is particularly apparent in the case of Kazakh books. This branch of the trade is the most inefficient one - though Kazakh books constitute 70-80 per cent of the publications of the Kazakh State Publishing House (Kazgoslitzdat), the Kazknigtorg does not organize their sale properly for it has only 170 Kazakhs among its 1,500 employees. Another defect is that, though the number of bookshops in country districts is increasing, many of them are cold and dark and their roofs leak, so that part of their stock is wasted. This is also true of warehouses where books are kept. The distribution of books is thus made even more inefficient for in such places books lie in huge indiscriminate heaps on the floor. Thus in the warehouse of the Bayan-Aul rayon in the Pavlodar oblast, heaps of books are scattered among mattresses, saucepans and other domestic goods, among which hens are allowed to wander.

The distribution of books is slow and in some cases senseless. Thus in 1958 a well-known rice grower, Zhakhyev, had not yet heard of a book about his achievements which had been published in 1956, for 1,500 copies of it were held up in the oblast consumers' cooperative warehouse. Though all the republican newspapers assure their readers that the Central Asians can now read even the classics of Marxism-Leninism in their native languages, TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA of 13.3.58 denounces the Kul'tmag shop at Tel'mansk because many Turkmens who wished to buy the works of Lenin in their language could only find the twenty-fifth volume there. Nevertheless many bad bookshops carry out their sales plan for they stock their shelves with vodka. There are managers of village shops who resent selling books because it is a "small trade" with which they cannot fulfil their quotas. This seems to suggest that the small demand for books may be the cause of the trouble.

The book trade is, however, expanding. The Kazakh Consumers' Co-operative in 1958 sold eight times more books than in 1940(8), while in a rural region of Turkmenistan, the Takhta-Bazar rayon, books worth 218,000 rubles were sold in 1957, as compared with 87,000 rubles in 1954.(9) At the same time a large selection of books is available in the native languages. Here, according to the press, the crowning achievement is making the classics of Marxism-Leninism accessible to the Central Asians. Apart from these, between 1951 and 1956 Uzbek translations appeared of books in 18 Soviet and 16 non-Soviet languages.(10)

The largest group of people who are blamed for the unsatisfactory cultural standard of the village are the "cultural workers" (kul'tprosvetrabotniki). To this group belong librarians, travelling lecturers, managers of clubs and houses of culture and "agitators" of all descriptions. Though these people are responsible for disseminating Soviet culture in the village, their preparation for this important task is all too often inadequate. For example, TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA of 17.6.58 complains that over 500 of the cultural workers in the republic cannot even boast middle school education, while many of them are uncouth in their ways. There are cases of men dismissed from various establishments for their unsatisfactory attitude to work, who are subsequently employed by "cultural establishments" (kul'tprosvetuchrezheniya). In Tadjikistan the situation is similar: KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA of 1.8.59 adds to the list of shortcomings of these workers their low political standard, a state of affairs which seems all the more unsatisfactory when it is learnt that of the 180 people who have graduated from the republican training school for kul'tprosvetrabotniki during the past two years, many have taken up quite different work.

The scope of "cultural work" is very wide and some aspects of it would not strike the Western reader as being in the realm of culture at all. This can best be grasped from descriptions of failures and achievements. KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA of 18.7.57 warmly praises the Department of Culture of the Bulayevo rayon for the help it gave to the Gigant kolkhoz. When the cultural workers learned that the kolkhoz was one of the last in the rayon in its milk output, they arranged a special conference for the employees. Prominent milkmaids of the neighbouring kolkhozes gave talks there on their successful methods and the proceedings were made more appealing by a touch of humour. Results promptly followed: "The addresses made by the best workers, the sharp and mocking chastushki (kind of popular verse) about workers lagging behind stung the cattle-breeders of the Gigant to the quick. After the conference things improved and [Socialist] competition on the kolkhoz farms became more efficient. In the club and the Red Corners attractive posters are regularly displayed, bearing the portraits of

milkmaids together with descriptions of their professional experiences and announcements of [Socialist] obligations carried out. In a short time the Gigant kolkhoz captured the first place in the oblast for milk production."

But, understandably enough, complaints in the press of bad cultural work are far more numerous. The above-mentioned paper denounces one Baranova, the manageress of a kolkhoz club in the Poludino rayon. "How far she lags behind the requirements of life, one could see from a talk she gave on the square-cluster (kvadratno-gnezdovoy) method of sowing. . . The kolkhozniks asked her, "Will wheat, oats and millet be sown in our kolkhoz by the square-cluster method?" And the club manageress glibly answered, "Yes, wheat and barley will be sown that way, but millet - I think - not". [The manageress's not very heinous offence seems to have been that she slurred over her reprehensible ignorance about the millet. -Ed.] The paper concludes that abuses committed by cultural workers are the more unbearable at a time when the numbers of educated people keep growing in the country districts. TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA of 14.6.58 provides an example of a bad librarian at the Eighth of March kolkhoz in the Kunya-Urgench rayon, who does not even know how many brigades his kolkhoz has or with which kolkhoz it is engaged in Socialist competition; and he has no personal acquaintance with the local agronomist. Thus his library "lags behind life". There are also complaints of bad libraries which do not organize readers' conferences, lectures and debates. To this category belongs the rayon library at Shaul'der which is not attended by the majority of the local people including the secretary of the rayon Komsomol and the director of the Rayon Department of Culture.(11) KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA of 1.8.58 describes a library at Tadjikabad which in the course of the last two years lent out only 290 books, i.e. one book every three days, and this at a time when the number of rural libraries is steadily growing throughout Central Asia and many of them carry out their duties very well. For instance, SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIA of 10.9.58 speaks with approval of two libraries in the Stalinskoye rayon, because they organized lectures on "Ways of Increasing Milk Production" and "What is New in the Mechanization of Agriculture".

Another serious problem often neglected by the cultural workers is the organization and direction of kolkhoz dramatic, musical and other societies. The papers complain that these societies could do much to spread culture in the countryside, but many of them become active only at the time of important festivals and anniversaries, and, for example, in Turkmenistan, they do little to enlist the services of young native women. Cultural workers are also blamed for the bad organization of film shows in various rural districts. Films are shown seldom, sometimes the same film more than once. Films break, there is either no sound or it is not coordinated with the picture, which may be

shown upside down if the projector operator happens to be drunk. Nevertheless cinema-going keeps increasing throughout Central Asia. There is also some room for improvement in broadcasting, for although in Uzbekistan, according to PRAVDA VOSTOKA of 7.5.59, some 70 per cent of families have wireless sets, people complain of the generally poor quality of broadcasts, which also fail to publicize new industrial and scientific achievements.(12)

There is evidence that in some cases the rural population is beginning to respond correctly to this constant "cultural" pressure. Thus, KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA of 7.4.59 describes a Dungan kolkhoz at Kara-Kunuz in the Dzhambul oblast, which was once an ugly and neglected village, its obscurantism being symbolized by the mosque standing in the centre. But now the mosque is no more, its place is occupied by a comfortable house of culture, and the appearance of the village is improving. What is more, the kolkhozniks have come to believe that the name of their village, meaning "black beetle" is a striking anachronism, since it was only before the Revolution that the life of the Dungan people was black. So they have asked the authorities to let them change the name "so as to make it reflect the happy life of the Dungan people under the Soviet Government".

The Central Asian press gives the impression, possibly a misleading one, that Turkmenistan is still the most backward republic, as it was before the Revolution. For example, TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA of 17.6.58 says, "sanitary and hygienic habits are slow to take root in the village. The majority of the rural population live in old, unwhitewashed huts with earthen floors. Many kolkhoz men and women do not observe every day requirements of personal hygiene. . . . Some Soviet and Party officials try to justify these deep-rooted habits, harmful and incompatible with the Socialist way of life as they are, by calling them national customs and tradition."* But in some cases Komsomol members carry out satisfactorily tasks neglected by the cultural workers. The same paper of 14.6.58 describes how the Komsomol members of Kalinin kolkhoz in the Kirovsk rayon, are struggling to raise its cultural level: they have levelled the streets of the village, put the pavements to rights, tidied the sports grounds and whitewashed the

* The preoccupation of the authorities with the continued survival of old customs and traditions in Turkmenistan, especially in the rural areas, in spite of all efforts at sovietization, was noticed in the article "The Oil Workers of Nebit-Dag" in CAR, Vol.VII, No.4. That this preoccupation extends also to the written word in the Muslim republics is evident in the article "Soviet Muslim Literature and the Party Line" in this issue.

houses of the kolkhoz workers. Many of them have bought tables, chairs and other domestic goods for their homes. . ." Komsomol members are busy whitewashing the cottages in other rayons - this is apparently regarded as cultural work par excellence. Although there are complaints that village shops are badly supplied with furniture (13), "in the homes of Komsomol kolkhozniks more and more furniture, dishes and other necessary objects appear. Thus, for example, in the Kirovsk rayon alone young members of the rural intelligentsia and the Komsomol have bought 500 beds, 600 chairs and stools, 300 tables, 200 book-stands etc." This shows that until recently even the intelligentsia lived without furniture and to some extent still does so.

Notes

- (1) See "Trends in Education in Central Asia", CAR, Vol.VII, No.1.
- (2) See also "The Teaching of Russian in Central Asian Schools", CAR, Vol.V, No.1.
- (3) PV, 12.12.58.
- (4) Ibid., 25. 8.57.
- (5) KT, 1958, No.6, p.6.
- (6) See also "Publishing, Printing and Distribution of Books", CAR, Vol.II, No.2.
- (7) KP, 13. 3.59.
- (8) Ibid., 17. 3.59.
- (9) TI, 14. 6.58.
- (10) PV, 11. 5.58.
- (11) KP, 20. 8.59.
- (12) See also "Broadcast Services", CAR, Vol.II, No.2.
- (13) See also "Consumer Goods in Central Asia", CAR, Vol.VII, No.2, p.148


THE JOURNAL MOLLA NASREDDIN AND ITS
 INFLUENCE ON POLITICAL SATIRE
 IN REVOLUTIONARY PERSIA, 1905 - 11*

The following study has been compiled from two articles which appeared in KRATKIYE SOOBSHCHENIYA INSTITUTA VOSTOKOVEDENIYA, XXVII, 1958, namely, "50 Let so Dnya Osnovaniya Zhurnala 'Molla Nasreddin'" (The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Foundation of the Journal MOLLA NASREDDIN) by A. Sharif, and "Zhurnal 'Molla Nasreddin' i Persidskaya Politicheskaya Satira Perioda Revolutsii 1905-1911 gg" (The Journal MOLLA NASREDDIN and Persian Political Satire of the Revolutionary Period 1905-11) by V. Klyashtorina. References in the text are to page numbers of the relevant issue of KRAT. SOOB. I.V. It should be borne in mind that before the Revolution there was no administrative division of Russia known as Azerbaydzhan. The territory of the present Azerbaydzhan SSR was mainly occupied by the Baku and Elizavetpol guberniyas and the people were known as Caucasian Tatars or simply as Muslims. Azarbaijan, however, was and is still the name of the northernmost province of Persia.

. . .


According to the writer A. Sharif, in the early years of the present century the atmosphere prevailing in the Azerbaydzhani press was poisonous: "The young Azerbaydzhani bourgeoisie and landowners tried to utilize the printed word in order to strengthen their position. Zealously promoting the reactionary ideas of pan-Islamism and pan-Turanianism, they rallied all the 'Muslim brethren' under the green banner of the Prophet - the banner of Islam. These anti-national ideas which breathed hatred of mankind were intended to calm the increasingly acute class struggle among the Muslims themselves, to confuse the class-consciousness of the workers and peasants and to detach them from the Russian and international working-class movement.

* For details of the Persian Revolution see 'Persia' in CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, Vol.IV, No.3, pp.289-303, and No.4, pp.398-403.



Azerbaydzhan SSR

- State frontiers.
- Union Republic frontiers.
- Autonomous oblast' frontiers.
- Railways.



J.P. 1968.

The henchmen of the nationalistic bourgeoisie impressed on the toiling masses that every Azerbaydzhani worker and peasant first of all was a Turk and a Muslim and that he should struggle against non-Turks and non-Muslims, that is, he should forget about class struggle and become completely dependent on the upper classes from whose ranks emerged the 'fathers of the people'.

"They sought to inspire the reader with a servile admiration for the Tsar's 'power from God', but at the same time they extolled the Turkish sultans and Persian shahs. Enemies of independent thought and new ideas, they strove to destroy the influence of the progressive revolutionary ideas on the Azerbaydzhani people." (Pp.23-24)

In spite of the lip-service the press paid to the Tsar, the government resented its pan-Islamic and pan-Turanian propaganda and with a large measure of success sought to convert it into a "weapon for oppressing and enslaving the Azerbaydzhani people"(p.24).

The chief of these papers, the FEYUZAT (Blessing), was financed by a Baku millionaire, G.Z. Tagiyev and it described itself as a "literary, social and political illustrated Muslim daily in the Turkic (tyurkskiy) language". In fact its language was intelligible to hardly anybody in Azerbaydzhani - it was "an artificial speech of Constantinople solicitors and journalists", the champions of pan-Islamism. Its intellectual side was equally bad: "As regards literature and art, the paper in every possible way encouraged and popularized reactionary romantic poetry which diverted the attention of the toilers from the revolutionary aims of the present to the world of abstraction and scholasticism (sic). As for political and social problems, the paper in every way extolled the Turkish pashas and the Persian mojtaheds [higher clergy], propagated idealistic philosophy and lamented the fact that Lev Tolstoy had neglected to study Islam, the 'most perfect' religion." (P.24)

This short-lived newspaper (November 1906 - November 1907) did not differ from the other "bourgeois-clerical" periodicals of the "Baku reactionaries".

The honour of the Azerbaydzhani press was vindicated when on 7th April 1906 MOLLA NASREDDIN started publication at Tbilisi. Its founder and editor was Jalil Mamed Qulı Zadeh, a village teacher turned writer. From its very first issue the new magazine attracted general attention for "it sharply criticized the patriarchal-feudal society and its backwardness, ignorance, religious fanaticism and obscurantism; it unmasked the extortionate world with its brutal laws seeking to despoil and oppress the toilers, the violence and arbitrariness of both the tsarist autocracy and eastern despotism in

Persia, Turkey and Bukhara. The journal also mercilessly struggled against international imperialism which had enslaved the peoples of Asia and Africa and deprived them of their right to rule their own home".(P.23) Satire was its most formidable weapon in this campaign - its main features were cartoons, anecdotes, short stories and feuilletons, witty correspondence and humorous advice to the readers, while its simple language made it intelligible to the people.

All this provoked a violent reaction. The "dark forces of the then patriarchal-feudal Azerbaydzhan" united against it with the government censorship. Whole columns and even pages were removed from issues awaiting publication, some issues were confiscated and the editor fined. He and his contributors were cursed in the mosques by the clergy as enemies of Islam. Even newsboys selling the paper were frequently maltreated by the mob inspired by the clergy, while murderers, hired by Baku "capitalists", searched for the men who wrote for MOLLA NASREDDIN. Mamed Quli Zadeh received abusive letters from scoundrels threatening to murder him so that he sought safety far from the centres of Muslim population and he settled in the St. David quarter of Tbilisi, which was inhabited by Christian Georgians, Muslims having no access to it. This proved a wise measure; in his memoirs he wrote: "Once, for example, the kochi(1) who came from Baku to Tbilisi to look for me were unsuccessful. When in the second year of publication one of the issues carried an article on the question of women, my friends urged me to keep away from the streets for the people of Sheytan-bazar(2) had closed their shops and gone to search for me." (P.25) On their part the Persian mojtaheds officially declared that the murder of the editor of MOLLA NASREDDIN would be forgiven in this world and all sins of the murderer would be remitted.

In the first year of its existence thirty-nine issues of MOLLA NASREDDIN appeared and forty-nine in 1907 (in June the authorities stopped publication for three weeks). The third and fourth years were the most prosperous in the history of the paper whose fame now spread as far as Persia, Turkey, Egypt and India. In 1909 its size increased to twelve pages instead of the usual eight. But in the following year MOLLA NASREDDIN returned to its original size and ten issues less came out; this was caused by the fact that Mamed Quli Zadeh "began to treat his child with less enthusiasm"(p.26) and entrusted the editing to the young and inexperienced Mamed Ali Safarov. The year 1911 was a hard one, for a prominent contributor, the poet Sabir, died and only forty-seven issues were published. In the following year only a few issues appeared and the publication stopped in March, to be resumed only in January 1913. The poet Ali Quli Najafov was now its editor; this was probably due to the fact that Mamed Quli Zadeh was preoccupied with the writing of THE DEAD, a well-known Azerbaydzhani comedy. In 1913 only twenty-nine issues were published, two of which were confiscated,

and from the end of 1914 until 1917 publication ceased altogether. In 1917 Mamed Quli Zadeh managed to publish a few copies; thus ended the first and the most significant period in the history of MOLLA NASREDDIN.

In these years the paper enjoyed the cooperation of some prominent Azerbaydzhani authors. Apart from Mamed Quli Zadeh himself, its most important contributor was Sabir, a lyrical and satirical poet who owed his intimate knowledge of the life of the Persian and Central Asian people to his travels in their countries. The poets Ali Nazmi, Ali Quli Najafov and Mamed Said Urdubadi were his pupils and successors. Another member of this group was a well-known playwright, Abdurrahim Ahverdov.

The Muslim clergy and local businessmen were among the butts of MOLLA NASREDDIN, which sought to make the lower classes of society conscious of the grievances inflicted on them by the privileged groups:

"If you have decided to act - do as Islam allows:
Suffer the evils inflicted by your lord and you will be similar to
an ass!
Sow and mow, and the fat bek will know how to use your bread!
Be ignorant of your rights, sleep and entrust yourself to heaven.
Sleep, do not suffer, do not try to combat evil - accept it!
Are you in trouble, wretch? So what? Get used to it!" (P.28)

This subject does not exhaust the ideas spread by the paper - Sharif insists that MOLLA NASREDDIN also expressed the views of the "toilers of the East enslaved by the western imperialists"(p.29), but he omits to provide quotations to illustrate this point. Nevertheless, in his estimate of the role played by the paper in Tsarist Azerbaydzhan he shows that he is capable of some objectivity: "MOLLA NASREDDIN was not a proletarian paper and its contributors were neither of a proletarian origin nor members of the proletarian party. In view of their historical and social limitations, they did not and, indeed, could not point out the only correct way to save the toiling masses from oppression and exploitation. They did not spread the idea of a socialist revolution. But they often openly expressed in their paper their sympathy with socialist ideals, propagated the principle of a national liberation movement, turned the thoughts of the toiling masses in the revolutionary direction, and their work genuinely helped the revolutionary movement developing under the leadership of the proletariat." (Pp.29-30)

In the second half of the nineteenth century Persian literature became increasingly concerned with the problems of the every-day life of the country. Some Persian writers - Mirza Malkom Khan, Zain ul Abedin

Maragheyi and Abdurrahim Talib - were strongly influenced by the modern democratic and literary ideas of a prominent Azerbaydzhani philosopher and dramatist, Mirza Fathali Akhund (1812-78). Malkom Khan's plays were written with the direct participation and influence of Akhund who wrote to his Persian friend: "The days of GOLISTAN and ZINAT UL MAJALIS are over, now the people do not need such works any more. Now works like the drama and the novel are wanted; they are really useful and satisfy the requirements of the reader." (P.31)

The common literary tendencies became particularly apparent during the Persian Revolution of 1905-11. This was due primarily to the great popularity of MOLLA NASREDDIN in Persia. Persian literature of the period was marked by a considerable output of political poems and publicist prose. These patriotic poems and songs, discussions and feuilletons appeared in the rapidly developing press. One of these periodicals was a Tehran daily, SUR-E-ISRAFIL, which was strongly influenced by MOLLA NASREDDIN. Its satirical section, 'Charand-Parand', ("all sorts of stuff") published a series of feuilletons which reflected the events of 1907-8 in Persia.

The editor of SUR-E-ISRAFIL was Mirza Ali Akbar Khan Dekhoda, a learned philologist and author of political pamphlets, poems, feuilletons and articles, the majority of which appeared in his paper, Jahangir Khan Shirazi being his collaborator. Dekhoda's articles commented upon current events in the country, sharply criticized the "reactionary feudal regime" of the Shah, the arbitrary rule of the landowners and the bigotry of the clergy. At the same time they were full of "love and sympathy for the simple people": the oppression of the peasants, the poverty of the urban proletariat and the ignorance and down-trodden state of the Persian woman were among the most frequent subjects discussed by 'Charand-Parand'. In his earliest articles Dekhoda dealt with minor evils, like the bread speculation in Tehran in the spring of 1907, and attacked the "most violent reactionaries" - the gang of Babim Khan in Azarbaijan and that of Qavam Shirazi in Shiraz. But gradually the range of his subjects and his daring grew; for example, he pointed out that the new constitution and the majles (Persian parliament) were no practical gain to the country and that the majles members were worthless men; the conclusion was that "all these shahs, khans, courtiers and ministers, generals and landowners - they are nothing else but leeches sucking the blood of the people" (p.33).

This outlook of SUR-E-ISRAFIL made MOLLA NASREDDIN its natural ally. As the latter could not freely criticize the Tsarist government, it transferred its criticism to the governments of Turkey, Persia and the Arab countries and thus by implication condemned the regime at home. Almost every issue of MOLLA NASREDDIN from 1907 onwards carried

articles and satires on Persian problems, particularly on revolutionary events in Persian Azarbaijan. The popularity of MOLLA in Persia, especially in Azarbaijan, was great; the rebels of Tabriz and other towns knew the poems of Sabir by heart; they were turned into songs to which new couplets were added and a large number of imitations of Sabir's work appeared. The authorities considered MOLLA NASREDDIN a bad influence on the people and as early as 1907 Mohammad Ali Mirza, viceroy of Azarbaijan and the heir apparent, forbade the introduction and circulation of the paper. This produced protests strong enough for the majles to cancel the prohibition.

Soon SUR-E-ISRAFIL started to exchange courtesies with MOLLA NASREDDIN; for example, in February 1908 it wrote:

"O, morning breeze, in my name
Greet most warmly
The esteemed MOLLA NASREDDIN of Tbilisi." (P.34)

In turn MOLLA NASREDDIN expressed its approval of the views put forward in SUR-E-ISRAFIL; for example, it published a poem which said that the Persian constitution failed to ease the hard lot of the people and concluded:

"The traitors have many times betrayed our mother-country
And ISRAFIL loudly shouted about it." (P.34)

The two papers not only professed the same ideology, but even employed the same means of artistic expression. For example, in December 1906 Mamed Quli Zadeh published his story "Freedom in Persia", in which he described the naive reaction of an ignorant Persian worker, Karbalay Mamed Ali, to the grant of the constitution by the Shah. Mamed Ali had come to work in Russian Azerbaydzhan where he got himself another wife and his earnings were too meagre for him to send money to his first wife at home. In this situation he welcomed the constitution as a universal remedy. He said: "Today the consul gathered all the Persian subjects at the mosque. There we prayed for the Shah who had granted Persia a constitution. . . Now, please God, there will be enough money. All my countrymen greatly rejoiced and wanted to throw up their caps. They say that tomorrow the consul will gather us all and start to distribute the constitution among us." (P.35) Soon Mamed Ali sent a letter to Persia asking for his share of the constitution to be delivered to him.

A similar method was employed by Dekhoda in one of his feuilletons in SUR-E-ISRAFIL. Its hero, Azadi Khan, an ignorant, simple man, imagines religion as a material treasure, as Mamed Ali regarded the constitution: a molla, entrusted with money for safe keeping,

appropriates it and the people say, "faith [trust - vera] is lost"; a wife and daughter have been stolen from a poor man and again the people say, "faith is lost". This makes Azadi Khan wonder what faith is: in one case it is money and in the other women. But as he has neither of these, he sadly concludes, "I see now that, since I cannot get faith, I will surely go to hell". (Pp.35-36)

Dekhoda borrowed not only ideas but even technical tricks from MOLLA NASREDDIN. The following quotations serve to prove this point and at the same time provide an illustration of the satirical interpretation of current events which was common to both the papers. On the 21 April 1907 Mamed Quli Zadeh published in MOLLA NASREDDIN his feuilleton entitled "An Answer to a correspondent Damdameki (lit. fickle)":

"Damdameki, are you really mad - why did you not fear to write all that to me? Are you bored with your life? What would you say if I were to put your letter on the pages of the journal? Try to understand that the people of Baku would pelt you with stones and stop to buy my paper.

"Do consider whether I could write that owls have put their nests in the public reading rooms of Baku? Could I possibly write that the Baku philanthropic society does not interest anybody and its members are ignorant idlers? And that the streets of Baku are infested by begging Muslims, women and children?

"You just think, Damdameki, if I could write that on 9th April two distinguished Muslim town-councillors pointed their pistols at one another and exchanged dreadful curses. . .

"And can I announce in this journal that on 28 Safar Baku men in Bibi-Eybat [a quarter of Baku] smashed one another's heads so furiously that some of them are still bleeding? What is the matter with you, Damdameki - are you mad or what? Can I describe how in April Baku people put on donkeys the thieves who had come from various places and displayed them in the city, while they set free the local thieves who had been arrested, because they were kinsmen of the town-councillors?

"So consider, Damdameki, whether I could afford to describe in my journal all that which you want me to report. It is interesting how you would have to justify yourself if I really wrote all that."

For his part Dekhoda wrote in SUR-E-ISRAFIL, No.5 of June 1907: "If I wanted to write about all I know, I would write about various things. For example, I would mention that, if somebody examined the accounts of the British bank, he would find there over ten million

dollars belonging to the Persian government. I would write that the project of the Tabriz highroad, on which a Belgian specialist wasted five months' work and some thousands of tomans from the treasury of our wretched country, has disappeared from the desk of a ministry and ascended to heaven. Did I explain why forging documents, which is criminal everywhere, in Persia is encouraged and approved. . .? One cannot speak about this everywhere. My beard did not turn white in a flour-mill and I was not born today.

"Be assured, Damdameki, I will never write about all that. . . Why should it be my business that Nasr ud-Dowleh, son of Qavam, (3) boasted in the presence of Tehran worthies, 'I drink the blood of Muslims and I shatter the honour of Islam. I am the one who has subjugated and appropriated a tenth of the lands of the province of Fars. It is I who with rifle bullets and cannon fire have destroyed seventy-five men and women of the Qashqai tribe'. What is it to do with me that after this speech the Tehran worthies shouted 'Hurrah' and 'Long live Qavam'? You cannot jump over your own head. But on the day of the terrible judgement all that will be accounted for and they shall answer to us for all."

But in some cases MOLLA NASREDDIN borrowed ideas from SUR-E-ISRAFIL. For example, in July 1907 Dekhoda explained the participation of the old feudal aristocracy in the government by the fact that Persian women could not make themselves throw away old leaking pots and they instilled their love of old rubbish into their children who in turn grew up incapable of clearing the government of those lords. This was followed, in April 1908, by a feuilleton in MOLLA NASREDDIN, which said that the mental capacity of the Persians was lowered by the fact that they always wore kollahs [Persian hats] and did not take them off even at night; the author suggests that the majles should regulate the wearing of kollahs in order to protect the members of the government against mental decline.

The influence of Sabir's poems published in MOLLA NASREDDIN on the revolutionary poetry of Persia is also obvious. As Sabir could not freely comment on political events taking place in Russia, his satire frequently turned against the regime of Mohammad Ali Shah in Persia and that of Abdul Hamid in Turkey. The paper AZARBAIJAN, published at Tabriz, often printed Sabir's poems and answers to them. For example, when in 1907 the banished reactionary prime minister Atabek Azam came back to Persia without permission, Sabir in MOLLA NASREDDIN criticized the Persians that they had let him in. Some months later Atabek Azam was assassinated, AZARBAIJAN answered Sabir that now everything was all right. Sabir in turn wrote another poem, in which he pointed out that one assassination did not improve the situation since there were thousands of such Atabek Azams in Persia;

every six lines were followed by the refrain "Hushaby baby", which made the poem sound like a lullaby. This technique was borrowed by the poem "The Rulers and the People" which appeared in SUR-E-ISRAFIL of 28.2.1908, and until 1911 many poems appeared in Persian periodicals which were written in the form of lullabies and dealt with political subjects.

Sabir's method of attacking the authorities was also followed in Persia: early in 1909 MOLLA NASREDDIN published a satire entitled "I Am Selling", in which he described how the Shah was selling his country cheap - according to Klyashtorina - to "imperialists". (P.40) A month later a Persian paper, NASIM-E-SHEMAL, in a satirical poem described the head of the Tehran clergy, Shaikh Fazlullah, selling at an auction the whole of Persia as his merchandize:

کو خریدار خراج است خراج	حاجی بازار رواج است رواج
عرض و ناموس مسلمانان را	می فروشم همه ایران را
بخزید این وطن ارزان را	رشت و قزوین و قم و کاشان را
کو خریدار جراج است خراج	تزد و خونسار خراج است خراج

(Hajji, the sale is on, who will buy? Goods for sale! Goods for sale! I am selling the whole of Persia, with the honour and glory of all Muslims thrown in, and Rasht and Qazvin, Qom and Kashan. Buy this cheap country! Yazd and Khansar - the whole lot for sale! Who will buy? For sale, for sale!)

The above examples show that the Azerbaydzhani and Persian literatures had much in common in the years of the Persian Revolution, with the satirical approach to current events as their main characteristic. In that period their literature was represented chiefly by the press. New forms of prose writing - the feuilleton and lampoon - developed, while poetry was based, so far as its form was concerned, on the unwritten folk poetry: lyrical songs, satirical dialogues and couplets. These developments, as well as the ideology of Persian revolutionary literature, was strongly influenced by MOLLA NASREDDIN.

This was the first - and the greatest - period in the history of MOLLA NASREDDIN. The second came in the year 1921 when Mamed Quli Zadeh lived in Tabriz. In that year he managed to publish eight issues, but at the same time he accomplished something far more difficult, namely "he came to understand the historical significance of the Great October Socialist Revolution" (p.26). How genuine this "understanding" was it is difficult to say; anyhow, he returned home and between 1922-30 continued to produce his paper in Baku. It is stated that he diligently

applied himself to fighting "the remnants of capitalism and the enemies of the Soviet Union. . . propagated brotherly friendship with the great Russian People and the neighbouring nations".(4) In 1930, two years before his death, the magazine stopped publication; the reason is not stated but the fact that his biographical sketch in the GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA is not very detailed suggests that one should look for an explanation in the following statement:

"New conditions [after the Bolshevik Revolution] demanded a new approach, new content and new words. In spite of his brilliant publicist and satirical talents, Jalil Mamed Quli Zadeh did not always manage to answer to the requirements of this new life". (P.26)

Notes

- (1) "Kochi - hired bandits maintained by Baku oil businessmen to deal with the workers". (P.25, note 3.)
- (2) Muslim quarter of Tbilisi.
- (3) Qavam - a "feudal" lord known for his brutal acts against supporters of the constitution.
- (4) SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA, Vol.28, p.132.

Publication of a Kara-Kalpak epic

The Kara-Kalpak epic GARIB ASHIK, which has never previously been published, has been brought out by the Kara-Kalpak State Publishing House. It was prepared for publication by Kh. Tadzhimuratov.

PV. 12.11.59

S O V I E T M U S L I M L I T E R A T U R E
A N D T H E P A R T Y L I N E

This account deals with the more important articles on literature which have appeared in the daily and periodical press of the six Soviet Muslim republics during the period March-August 1959.

National form

As was noted in CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, Vol. VII, No. 4, pp.341-3, there has recently been a certain amount of agitation against "nationalism" in the Soviet Muslim republics. As dirt has been generally defined as "matter in the wrong place", so "nationalism" to Soviet officialdom is misplaced national feeling. Works which are "national in form" cannot be written by an author who has no national feeling and the need for a guide to the situations where national feeling is or is not in place, is, therefore, great.

There appeared recently in the authoritative theoretical journal of the CPSU, KOMMUNIST, two articles which in differing degrees set out to define, among other things, the place of the "national" element in literature, i.e. to define national form. These two articles are "Peculiarities of the Development of the Literatures of Socialist Nations" by M. Auezov and M. Fetisov in No.12 of 1959, and "Some Problems of International Education" by N. Dzhandil'din, in No.13 of 1959. The latter article, an abridged translation of which appeared in CAR, Vol.VII, No.4, is only partially about literature. Dzhandil'din, who writes mainly about Kazakhstan, states that nationalists "exaggerate the differences between nations and belittle the role of natural laws which lead to the drawing together of Soviet nations". For a culture to be original (samobytnyy), they say, it must be "free" from the influence of the cultures of other peoples. Dzhandil'din also says that too many young Kazakh authors "show their heroes - collective farmers, workers and even young people - always in national robes and headgear, old-fashioned long gowns and vests (kamzoly). These works contain also as obligatory features the yurt and meat cooked Kazakh fashion which the characters eat with their hands while sitting on the floor". Dzhandil'din's point is that this is an out-of-date picture of modern Kazakhstan; yet the question arises why do young writers perpetuate such a picture. The reason is to be found in

the theorists' insistence on two things: (1) that there are natural laws which lead to the "drawing together of Soviet nations", and (2) that a literary work must have a distinctive national form. Both Dzhandil'din and, as will appear, Auezov and Fetisov also, admit, or rather insist, that the process of the "merging" of Soviet nations has already begun in the USSR. A writer of whom the Party demands works of a distinctively national colour about a nation which is supposed to be rapidly losing its distinguishing national characteristics finds himself, therefore, in an obvious dilemma and, not unnaturally, looks for these distinguishing characteristics in the past.

There is, however, another side to the situation. As well as finding it technically difficult to solve the apparent contradiction in the Party's demands, many writers obviously resent the process of merging which they see in full swing around them. Auezov and Fetisov write of tendencies "to make a fetish of the old national literary forms, to idealize the past and campaign for a restoration of the old social system". In the field of literary history, they write, this tendency has led to attempts at the rehabilitation of undesirable bourgeois writers. "Nationalist survivals", they point out, are tenacious and "show themselves in various ways, now in the denial that national originality is enriched by the closest collaboration between fraternal peoples, now in attempts to implant contempt for another nationality, now in an anti-historical exaggeration of the actual value of individual items of the national cultural inheritance. Such tendencies can and do lead in practice to. . . throwing into relief that which serves to separate peoples." The Soviet writer, however, ". . . whatever national, original. . . colours he uses has as his vocation to clothe in images the thoughts and experiences of his nation which are close to the Soviet people as a whole".

The national element in literature, write Auezov and Fetisov, is based on the people's national traditions, which are a result of the process of development of that people in the circumstances peculiar to it. As a result they have "deep roots in the past". It would, however, be a mistake to conclude from this that they are fixed and changeless. On the contrary they are subject to "enrichment" from the national traditions and cultures of surrounding peoples. This is very noticeable, say the authors, in the case of language; the Kazakh language has borrowed not only words but syntactical constructions from Russian and has been made more flexible as a result.

This process of "enrichment" (which Auezov and Fetisov represent as being mutual, although it is to a great extent one-sided) is considered as being simultaneously part of the full-flowering of national cultures which is at present taking place in the USSR, and also part of the process which will end in "a single world-wide culture and

literature", to achieve which "all [the nations of the world] must pass through a lengthy stage of the development of their national, original cultures in accordance with historical laws". Thus the logical result of the full-flowering of national cultures is their disappearance in each other. Auezov and Fetisov assert that there is no contradiction in this - "it is a complex dialectical law".

The question arises what form this "merging" will take. Will Russian culture also lose its identity? A process which could be called "merging" is taking place in Central Asia at the moment but it appears to be taking the form of the russianization of the national cultures (to say this is not to say that it is a bad thing). This portion of Auezov and Fetisov's article contains a panegyric of Russian language and culture which does not suggest that it is envisaged that they should disappear. Also, as noted above, the process of the enrichment of the Central Asian languages has generally taken the form of assimilation, more or less complete, of Russian words and syntax. On the other hand the authors note that hitherto the term "national literatures" has not included Russian literature, and they obviously consider that it should. This suggests that in the future Russian literature and culture may be subjected to the same demands and critical criteria as the other literatures and cultures of the Soviet Union. The article, however, gives no definite answer on this point.

Although the moment of complete merging is in the future, that is, after the victory of communism, it is considered, as has been seen, to have begun already. The overwhelming effect of Russian culture on the indigenous cultures of Central Asia is represented as being part of a general process in accordance with historical laws (and therefore inevitable), a process, moreover, which affects Russian culture as much as any other. The truly "national" writer, therefore, acquiesces in and even welcomes the blurring and eventual disappearance of the language and culture of his people since their place will be taken by an international language and culture.

The problem of "contemporaneity"

Increased attention to contemporary themes is being demanded of Central Asian writers as of Soviet writers generally (see CAR, Vol.VII, No.3, p.256). In Kazakhstan at least that demand was understood to imply that historical subjects would in future be discouraged. This interpretation is supported also by an article in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA (19.3.59) in which A. Chakovskiy writes, "[let us suppose that] during the last war there appeared two books - both of them good - one on Dmitriy Donskoy, whose role in forming our ancient state and in

defending it from its enemies can hardly be overestimated, the other on our contemporary, a soldier or officer of the Red Army. . .Is not the latter hero who lives beside us an example more to be imitated?" The stress is here placed on a book's "inspirational" qualities. During the war everything was secondary to the task of defeating the enemy. Therefore the book which by force of example most promoted this end was the best book. The present situation is regarded as analogous to a war - the fight for the construction of communism - and the writer's role is to produce "militant works of a high moral character which excite the reader" (SK. 24.2.59) and to "show the moral sources of the heroism which is born in the battle for communism" (TI. 6.9.59).

Chakovskiy goes on: "How do I visualize a work on our time? It is a book about the Soviet Man of the period between the XXth and XXIst Party Congresses; on his complex, often agonized, ponderings connected with the unmasking of the cult of personality; on his belief in the power and wisdom of the Party; on his hatred of those who have tried to use the decisions of the XXth Congress to harm our system. . ."

Central Asian writers in particular have been prone to deal with the past and have achieved some great successes with such themes (Auezov's ABAY, Kerbabayev's THE DECISIVE STEP) and it is perhaps for this reason that Kerbabayev at the 2nd plenum of the Turkmen Writers' Union (TI. 13.6.59) defined contemporaneity (sovremennost') differently from Chakovskiy and, apparently, the Central Committee. Sovremennost', he said, is not merely topicality; in fact topicality is not essential. What is essential is "the spirit of the epoch". So, Kerbabayev's own novel THE DECISIVE STEP, although a historical novel, is "contemporary" because it is permeated with ". . . a modern writer's view of the world, a modern interpretation of the fates of its heroes and of the events of those distant years". (Kerbabayev did not explain how this made his novel different from a hundred other historical novels, or how it was possible at all for a modern author, when writing a historical novel, to avoid projecting his own modern point of view into the past.)

On the other hand, Kerbabayev went on, N. Pomm's recently published short story on the evils of opium smoking, RESURRECTED FROM THE DEAD, although it is set in the present day and has a "topical" theme is not contemporary because it has no educational value, is lifeless and artistically hopeless. The really "contemporary" work must serve the spiritual formation and communist education of the man of the new world. "From this point of view the best, most inspired books about the past of our country, about our great heroes, artists and scholars, about the formation of the new socialist world in battle

and labour, are indisputably necessary and essentially contemporary." Nevertheless with the next breath Kerbabayev says that readers have a right to demand to see the world of today reflected in literature and their demands must be met.

Kerbabayev is contradicting the Party line with his definition of "contemporaneity" since it would in fact permit Central Asian literature to continue using the same themes as before. He may mean that although the past as a theme is now less useful than the present it still has its uses. But, when faced with a choice between the more and less useful, what excuse can a communist writer have for choosing the latter?

In SK. of 19.2.59, D. Dzhumabayev deals with concrete examples of the attempts made by Kirgiz dramatists to write about modern themes in his article "In Search of the Hero of our Day". It was apparently remarked at the second Ten-Day Festival of Kirgiz Art and Literature in Moscow that not only were there few plays on modern themes but that those that existed were, as a rule, bad. K. Dzhanoshev's play, *IN ONE HOUSE*, on rural life is, says Dzhumabayev, worse than his earlier plays on historical themes. "[The play] has no sharp conflicts or philosophical generalizations. . . The characters are developed in insufficient depth." In *THE SHREW'S NOOSE* (Petlya stroptivoy) Dzhanoshev draws negative heroes with great skill. "Each of them has his own inimitable features." As to his positive heroes, although they "actively combat survivals of the past. . . the whole trouble is that the dramatist has not found such vivid colours. . . as for his negative heroes".

Also criticized were *THE HEART BEATS* (K. Malikov) for an unconvincing story, and *NARROW RAVINE* (T. Abdumamonunov) which, although it is a sharp, successful satire on certain "present-day phenomena", suffers from bad character drawing. On the other hand, M. Alybayev's *IT HAPPENED AT A SPA*, although its character drawing and reproduction of everyday speech are excellent, has no "deep development of the theme, or a wide background of the present day against which people with complex characters and high aspirations could be shown".

The difficulties against which playwrights have to struggle are illustrated in Yakh'ya Seidov's article on "Comedy and the Comic" in *LITERATURNYY AZERBAJDZHAN*, 1959, No.5. Having stated that comedy is in decline in Soviet literature in general and Azerbaydzhani literature in particular because authors have forgotten that it must be militant, must have a target, Seidov goes on to prescribe three such targets for Azerbaydzhani comedy: (1) Capitalism, or "how apologists of capitalism pronounce many high-flown and pathetic phrases about peace and the friendship of peoples. . . and at the same time

fan the flames of enmity and hatred between peoples and frenziedly prepare for war"; (2) political life in modern eastern countries, especially those which are "bound to the chariot of American imperialism"; (3) survivals of the past within the Soviet Union.

Seidov then deals with the comic hero. "Experience shows that a comedy written on the material of Soviet life and among whose characters the positive hero occupies a prominent place is, as a rule, a failure." His explanation of the reason for this comes to the following: in the past sympathetic comic heroes have, in general, provoked laughter by making other people ridiculous but have not been ridiculous themselves. This was only possible, however, because they were at odds with their society and mocked it by their behaviour. No such incompatibility is possible between a sympathetic hero and Soviet society as a whole, although individual "negative" aspects of it may be criticized as "survivals of the past". Consequently the hero of a comedy of Soviet life must be the object of laughter or mockery.

So Seidov's ideal comedy is one in which the positive hero does not occupy a prominent place and in which all the prominent characters are objects of laughter or ridicule but are not regarded as typical of Soviet society. It is, in the first place, difficult to see how a positive hero can remain "positive" in a play in which he appears at all if he does not occupy a prominent place. In the second place this definition seems to restrict the comedy of Soviet life to one theme - "survivals of the past", although Seidov had already said that comedy's subject-matter should not be so restricted.

Literary criticism

Much attention is paid to the role of the critic in the development of Soviet literature. In a recent article in LITERATURNYY AZERBAYDZHAN, 1959, No.5, K. Talybzade reviews and criticizes the work of Azerbaydzhani critics. He starts by defining the principles: "Our literary scholarship. . . has always striven to approach literature from the positions of Marxist-Leninist aesthetics and has furthered its development in the spirit of the Leninist principles of the party- and class-spirit of literature."

Not only were critics tackling new themes (the connections of literature with life, traditions and innovation, etc.), they were working harder. Between 1955 and 1958 each new novel, story, poem, play has had two, three or more critical articles written on it. Unfortunately, however, not all of them are good; "some are timid. . . toothless. Some critics deliberately. . . say nothing about weakness-

es and faults noticed in the work of this or that author. When this happens it turns out as a rule that the author in question is a well-known venerable writer." Young writers, Talybzade notes, are not treated so mercifully [except, perhaps, when there has recently been an outcry against unfair criticism of young writers, when the critics swing to the other extreme -Ed.].

In general Talybzade gives the impression of a literary criticism characterized by ". . . oversimplification, inability to understand a work's subject matter, figurative structure or composition, the replacement of analysis by an elementary retelling of the story". Some critics were said to be devoid not only of ability but of education. Talybzade's suggested remedies are: (1) to give experienced critics freedom to work; (2) to bring forward more young critics; (3) to be more demanding towards critics, especially young ones; (4) to reorganize the criticism and literary research section of the Writers' Union.

Although the tendency of critics, noted by Talybzade, to avoid giving offence to well-known or established writers is not confined to Azerbaydzhan there has been at least one case of the opposite type of criticism. K. Lagunov, in an article entitled "A Writer's Work must be Respected" (КТ. 15.3.59), reproaches literary critic I. Levshina for negative criticism of two pillars of Tadzhik Soviet literature - Rakhim Dzhahalil and Satym Ulug-zoda.

Of the former Levshina writes: "His heroes' characters are so primitive that it is impossible to name one profound, memorable image. Dzhahalil. . . does not think or feel with [his heroes] and so they leave his pen as pale philosophizing shadows." Of the writer's post-war stories she writes: "In spite of a variety of themes and the wide scope of the material. . . [they] are distinguished neither by profundity of thought nor by artistry of execution. They are contrived, without genuine conflicts, and 'edifying'."

Of Satym Ulug-zoda (who has been a writer since 1932 and has the Red Banner of Labour for services in the development of Tadzhik art and literature) Levshina writes (about his play MEN WITH RED STICKS, 1948): "The author has paid little attention to the characters of his dramatis personae." His RETURN is "a weak imitation of a story by Vasilevskaya" and "extremely weak - unfinished, primitive characters".

So entrenched in favour are these two writers that Lagunov refuses to consider Levshina's criticisms as anything else than unscrupulous.

Kazakh poetry

In a review of some of the twenty long poems (poemy) produced in Kazakhstan between 1955 and 1959 D. Abilev in SOVETSKIY KAZAKHSTAN, 1959, No.1, writes: "These poems differ not only in subject but in skill. . . but one common quality unites them - their authors' desire to show the high ethics and heroic deeds of Soviet people." "It is especially pleasing that almost all the poets write about the present day."

As a result of Khrushchev's theses on literature "poets are decisively freeing themselves from bare descriptiveness, schematism, wordiness, high-flown pathos", all of which characterized the poems of the 'thirties and some of the poems of a later period.

After remarking that "the creation of works on the glorious labour of workers and miners is very difficult for Kazakh poets", Abilev goes on to praise a poem of this type ENGINEER AKHAN AKTAYEV by Kh. Bekkhozhin. The hero is a Kazakh who, in spite of his father's unjust arrest and his own desertion by the girl he loves, does not lose his faith in justice. He becomes a mining engineer and finds out personally how hard a miner's work is. As a result he invents a labour-saving machine. At the end of the poem his invention is successful, his father is released and the girl he loves returns to him (no connection between these events is suggested).

Of this poem Abilev says: "[In it] are expressed the fates of men and of our country; labour and love, grief and joy are naturally interwoven. . .", which indicates that there is more in the work than has found its way into the summary.

Other works especially praised were A SONG ABOUT A SONG by D. Muldagaliyev on the poet Musa Dzhalil', and PORTRAITS by A. Tazhibayev which follows the fortunes of a Kazakh communist family from the Civil War to the present day.

In PV. 26.3.59, Izzat Sultanov reviews the recent Uzbek Ten-Day Festival of Literature and Art in Moscow. He notes the increased attention being paid to modern themes but stresses that it is still insufficient. There are as yet no books on the working-class or the Soviet intelligentsia, although such works should occupy first place.

The next step is to be "the creation of new large-scale prose works of significant social content" and the development of new forms such as science-fiction, tales of adventure and the satirical novel. Sultanov says that both short stories and short novels (novelly) were few in number and poor in quality.

The most highly praised works at the festival were STRONGER THAN THE STORM by Sh. Rashidov, A KARAKALPAK TALE by A. Mukhtov, STARS OVER SAMARKAND by S. Borodin, KARAKALPAK NOTEBOOK by Mirtemir and RUSSIA by Shukrullo. In spite of these successes Uzbek writers had been urged by their Moscow colleagues to write "more often, more boldly and better". Sultanov repeats their advice and reveals that "many of the works displayed at the festival could have been important literary achievements if they had not borne the noticeable imprint of lack of 'finish'. Even of the works which were highly praised. . . some contained definite artistic faults."

Although ABAY'S WAY by M. Auezov has become famous within the Soviet bloc and has also been translated into French, it is not generally known that its fame has spread further. M. Karatayev deals with this subject in an article entitled "The World-Wide Reverberations of the Kazakh Epic" in SOVETSKIY KAZAKHSTAN, 1959, No.6.

Kazakh literature, he writes, first became known to the outside world through the works of Dzhambul: "Many delegations visit Kazakhstan now from various countries. They all speak of Dzhambul with affection." Mentioning in passing that this became possible only through the medium of the Russian language, Karatayev proceeds to Auezov.

"The first to react to the epic novel on Abay were Nazim Hikmet, Mao Dun', Louis Aragon and Anna Zegers, the best writers in the world (sic), who express the thoughts and aspirations of progressive mankind." The only other example given of the novel's "reverberations" is a note from a Canadian magazine NORTHERN NEIGHBOURS which apparently published a translation of the first part.

T. Nazarova's book WITH A FIRM TREAD was given a long and extremely unfavourable review in SOVETSKIY KAZAKHSTAN, 1959, No.7, by G. Semenyuk. The book deals with the revolutionary period in Kazakhstan and is criticized for lack of knowledge of Kazakhstan and the life of its people, and of the history of the Revolution in Kazakhstan and, most important, for representing the kolkhoz form of agricultural community as having existed in Kazakhstan before the Revolution. "If we are to believe similar assertions of the author, writes Semenyuk, it appears that to achieve prosperity the Kazakhs had no need either of the class war or of the Revolution."

T H E 1 1 0 0 T H A N N I V E R S A R Y O F
T H E B I R T H O F R U D A K I

In October 1958 Tadzhikistan celebrated the 1100th anniversary of the birth of Abul Hasan Rudaki, the father of classical Persian poetry who wrote in Persian. Soviet scholars, who disregard the intellectual influence of Persia on medieval Tadzhikistan, emphasize with questionable justification that in the lifetime of Rudaki there existed a distinct Tadzhik literature. ZVEZDA VOSTOKA says, "classical Tadzhik and Persian literature in Persian was born amidst the struggle against the government of the country by the Arab caliphate".(1)

It is now generally accepted that Rudaki was born in 884 in the village of Pandzhrudak, Pendzhikent rayon, Leninabad oblast. The discovery of his birthplace has a history of its own. His pseudonym was obviously derived from rudak, meaning a small river, but this clue made it difficult to associate it with any definite place since rudak occurs very frequently in medieval Central Asian place names. The etymology of Rudaki's pseudonym and a careful study of his works convinced S. Ayni, a Tadzhik man of letters, that Rudaki's home was in some valley of the upper Zeravshan. In the 1930s Ayni joined an expedition which visited the mountain valleys east of Samarkand, an area particularly abundant in place names derived from rudak. There his attention was attracted by a much-revered old tomb at Pandzhrudak and the abundance of local legends connected with it. This evidence gives some ground for associating Pandzhrudak with Rudaki but, probable as it was, it was not conclusive and the known facts concerning Rudaki's life were seemingly too scarce to confirm Ayni's discovery. The final act of the romance was to take place some twenty years later.

Rudaki was born of poor parents and tradition says that he was blind from birth; but in spite of this disability he knew the Koran by heart by the time he was eight. His talent was surprisingly many-sided. He knew Arabic and his works testify to his considerable education, philosophy and logic included. It is particularly interesting to find that he imagined the earth to be a globe in motion. He was also a distinguished musician with a mastery of all contemporary musical instruments. As a boy of eight he began to write poetry which, according to a twelfth century historian, Muhammad Afi, "was of so subtle a character that the people regarded it with

admiration. Their love for him increased all the time, for the Lord had given him a beautiful voice and his singing bewitched human hearts".(2) In fact, Rudaki's songs are still popular in his native district. He was primarily a lyrical poet of very rich means of expression; with equal mastery he could compose a qasideh (ode), get'eh (short poem), masnavi (rhyming distichs) and other forms of verse, while the metre of some of his poems is that of contemporary folk-songs. He also created numerous metres which were subsequently adopted by other poets. The bulk of his work is impressive: according to an eleventh century poet, Rashid Samarqandi, it consisted of "thirteen times one hundred thousand lines"(3), of which only about two thousand lines are now extant. Since the second half of the nineteenth century much attention has been devoted to the task of discovering and identifying his poems; it has also been found that a number of poems, hitherto ascribed to him, were in fact written by an eleventh century poet, Qatran.

Rudaki's fame soon outgrew his humble surroundings and he was summoned to the Samanid court at Bukhara where he became a celebrity. In 1222 Aufi wrote: "Rudaki became a master of music and his fame spread all over the world. The son of Ahmad Samani, the Amir Nasr of Khorasan, was his particular patron and he rose high while his wealth increased even more. . .After him no poet was so rich and none could achieve such a great success."(4)

In 938 there was a sudden reverse in Rudaki's fortune when Amir Nasr dismissed Vazir Bal'ami. One of the reasons was Bal'ami's adherence to the Karmatian heresy which had a strong social flavour since it demanded equality for all people. Rudaki shared in the Amir's displeasure as Bal'ami's friend and co-religionist; his property was confiscated and he was driven away from the court. Some years afterwards, in 958, he died at Pandzhrudak.

At an appropriate moment, when plans for celebrating the 1100th anniversary of Rudaki's birth began to be made, Ayni's discovery was confirmed by Professor Mikhail Mikhaylovich Gerasimov, a sculptor and leading authority on reconstructing the appearance of the deceased from their skulls. In 1938 Ayni drew his attention to Rudaki and the Professor became interested in making the poet's portrait. This, however, was impossible, for the site of his grave was uncertain and its excavation would be offensive to the Muslims. It was not until 1956 that an opportunity of finding the grave presented itself. A preliminary step for the Professor was to study Rudaki's works for autobiographical details and the "Ode on Old Age" proved particularly informative. In it the poet mentions the simultaneous loss of his teeth, his blindness and poverty. Armed with these scanty clues,

Gerasimov arrived at Pandzhrudak.

In the old cemetery there, were three graves in which, according to local tradition, some distinguished men were buried. Two of them had already been excavated by archaeologists searching for Rudaki's grave and the Professor concentrated on the third. From local kolkhozniks he learned that once there was a tomb over this grave and this helped him to identify the right site. The grave, situated in the centre of this area, was found one metre under the surface of the ground and after its location was decided, he made the final excavation himself. The skeleton found left little doubt of its identity; its mouth was toothless and certain signs suggested that the man, who had died about the age 85-87, was blind. The problem of blindness is of special interest because of the light it throws on Rudaki's life. Traditionally he is regarded as a man who was born blind, but some of his works suggest that it was not so. His references to landscapes and the seasons of the year make it plain that a man able to describe so vividly subtle things like the interplay of light and shade and able to use picturesque metaphors must have personally seen, and not only felt or heard of his subject. For example:

"Rudaki ran his fingers over the strings and started playing the chang.(5)

And no sooner had he burst into song than his goblet bubbled
with wine.

If you, my friend, saw this stream that is dark and yet scarlet
You would take the liquid for molten ruby.

Essentially they are the same, though they differ in form,
For the crystal of ruby is hard and flows the crystal of wine.
You have hardly touched the goblet, yet your hand glows with
scarlet,

You hardly put it to your lips and lo! you are already drunk."(6)

Poems like this testify to a sensitivity to light and colour, which would be impossible in a man born blind. There are also direct references to his ability to see: "On my way to Nishapur I saw a beautiful village; I saw the sun begin to shine at dawn; All the time my gaze was fixed on the soft ringlets while my ears intensely listened."(7) This evidence seems to contradict the traditional view on Rudaki's blindness. Neither himself nor any contemporary source says he was born blind, but Nishapuri, a fourteen century historian, writes: "Towards the end of his life his eyes were put out."(8) It seems that the tragedy was connected with the unhappy end of Rudaki's career as a court poet. He still enjoyed the Amir's favour when he wrote, "I am a slave because of my comeliness which makes me resemble

Joseph the Fair".(9) It is obvious that a blind man, who moreover probably did not lack antagonists envying his success, would not have described himself in this manner without exposing himself to ridicule. Now the generally accepted view is that Rudaki's eyes were put out when he fell into disgrace and was expelled from the court. It is claimed that Gerasimov's research confirms this view, for his examination of the poet's skull has revealed a deformation of the occipital bone which accompanies blindness, because blind men hold their heads slightly bent backwards; also his bones show traces of violence and some ribs are broken, which might well have happened when this tall and strong man put up a fight to save his eyes. The Professor believes that Rudaki was blinded some 9-10 years before his death.(10)

The approaching anniversary of the poet's birth threw the authorities of Tadzhikistan into a frenzy of activity, the more so because it had been found, somewhat unexpectedly, that in spite of the centuries dividing this modern era from Rudaki's lifetime his works provided appropriate quotations on all aspects of contemporary life. "With the words of the great Rudaki, with his poems written over a thousand years ago the Tadzhik people wrathfully condemn the reckless incendiaries of atomic war; 'Wise men seek goodness and peace, but fools rush to war'."(11) Social references in Rudaki's poems make it possible to use them for propaganda purposes. As his works contain such simple statements of facts like "there are men on whose tables there are mutton and almond tarts, while others have not even barley bread"(12), he is now represented as a fiery champion of the oppressed classes.

On the occasion of his jubilee a monument was erected to him in the Moscow Square in Stalinabad and works of art were produced to order. The composers of Tadzhikistan and other "brother republics" put Rudaki's words to music and painters provided numerous portraits of him. Though Gerasimov's reconstruction of his features facilitated their work, its quality - so far as can be judged from reproductions in the press - is poor, and even the painting by M.R. Khoshmukhamedov, acclaimed as the best of all, is very conventional. Its title is "The Birth of a Song" and it represents Rudaki deep in thought, with a string musical instrument in his hands and an open book in front of him. The work of contemporary poets inspired by a sudden outburst of admiration for their great predecessor is hardly more distinguished. Tadzhikfilm produced a film version of his life, "The Destiny of a Poet" with a young actor, M. Aripov, in the title role. Rudaki's home has not been forgotten either: Pandzhrudak now boasts a new domed mausoleum built in stone and ferro-concrete while Pendzhikent has acquired a Rudaki Museum. A more valuable expression of this admiration of the poet is the publication of his collected

works in three volumes, for the first volume contains some hundred beyt (couplet) hitherto unknown, and identified by the staff of the oriental department of the Tadzhik Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Language and Literature.

In the autumn of 1958 at the Head Office of Industrial Co-operation an exhibition of souvenirs commemorating the anniversary was held. There one could see a plaster bust of the poet, a big portrait embroidered in silk, a scarf and medals bearing his likeness, also ashtrays, dishes, earrings for children and bracelets. There were also specimens of Tadzhik folk art - kerchiefs, skull-caps, clothes, carpets and pottery. Many of those objects were recommended for mass production, so that citizens supplied with the ashtrays representing their great poet can endorse the statement made by PRAVDA: "This celebration of the glorious jubilee of Rudaki inspires us, Tadzhiks, and all the Soviet people with a profound feeling of gratitude to the Party and Government who not only encourage the development of our modern culture, but carefully preserve the better part of the rich cultural heritage of all the nations of our multi-national mother country."(13)

Notes

- (1) ZVEZDA VOSTOKA, No.10, 1958 (subsequently ZV), p.210.
- (2) KT., 15.10.58.
- (3) Ibid.
- (4) ZV., p.210.
- (5) A string instrument similar to the zither.
- (6) ZV., p.212.
- (7) Ibid., pp.211-12.
- (8) Ibid., p.212.
- (9) Ibid.
- (10) An expert medical opinion states that 10 years is not enough to deform the occipital bone. The additional fact that the skull is toothless does not seem to prove that it is Rudaki's. -Ed. CAR.
- (11) KT., 15.10.58.
- (12) ZV., p.213.
- (13) PRAVDA, 15.10.58.

THE FRONTIER GUARDS OF KAZAKHSTAN

The following article is an abridged translation of a feuilleton entitled "Dozory Slushayut Tishinu" (The Guards Are Listening to Silence) by S. Mart'yanov and N. Rovenskiy, which appeared in SOVETSKIY KAZAKHSTAN, No.8, 1959. It describes the life of the guards at an unspecified frontier post on Kazakhstan's border with China. The romantic style of this item is strongly reminiscent of Kipling in his stories of the North-West Frontier of India under British rule. But whereas the frontier of British India was guarded by Frontier Militia and Frontier Force units composed entirely of Indian troops with a sprinkling of British officers, the Frontier Guards in Kazakhstan appear to be composed mainly of non-Kazakhs - Russians, Ukrainians and others. Of those mentioned in the present narrative it is noteworthy that a large majority, whether on active service or retired and settled in the local kolkhoz, are non-Asians: there are four Ukrainians, ten Russians, one Armenian, one uncertain and five whose names suggest Asian origin. The absence of additional information makes it impossible to say whether the national composition of the guards is coincidental or due to a deliberate policy of the authorities.

. . .

Here everything is strange: the KSP (kontrol'no-sledovaya polosa - frontier control zone) behind which lies another country, the infrequent watch-towers and the very narrow and hardly visible foot-path of the patrols. But the most unusual features of this land are its desolation and quiet. . . And yet nobody can cross the frontier unnoticed.

Listen to this story. One morning Private Aleksandr Dan'shin was inspecting the KSP. After the night's rain the weather was cool and bright. Suddenly he saw two hardly noticeable footprints partly washed away by water - so somebody had passed this way before the rain.

Dan'shin notified his post, marked the spot and quickly followed the footprints. After a while a mounted alarm group with an officer took over the pursuit. . . Yulybayev was the first to spot the trespassers. Far ahead his sharp eyes recognized two human forms

emerging and disappearing among the dunes. The guards spurred their horses and soon overtook two young men. . .

The combination of quiet and loneliness with vigilance and a constant state of readiness of the frontier posts is the most typical characteristic of the border.

We are driving to the post. . . Suddenly a village appears below in the valley of a small mountain river. What a village! One can hardly see the roofs of houses and kolkhoz buildings amidst the trees. We cross the valley and follow a twisting, clayey road leading to the post situated directly above the village. And again we feel as if somebody were playing a trick upon us: the post looks like something between a sanatorium and a model house of rest. The aryks (irrigation ditches) ripple coolly and caressingly and tall silvery poplars and elms rustle. . . In the stable behind the building horses placidly munch their oats and in the road a bleating kolkhoz herd is going to the mountains. A quiet, peaceful life. But then we notice an inscription "Place for cleaning arms" and a poster neatly placed on a tree proclaims, "Arms do not like jokes and do not forgive mistakes". Every night in the briefing room the commander of the post solemnly announces to the patrols going on duty, "The orders are to go and protect the frontier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," and the young patrol leader, his face suddenly grave, earnestly repeats the orders word by word.

In the frontier post two trends of our life are closely interwoven: the creative and peace-loving with the warlike and soldierly. These two trends unite in the life of any frontier guard.

When we were watching how competently, kindly but firmly, Junior Sergeant Al'bert Aydinov of Rostov handled his dog Botsman, we thought that he had spent his whole short life training watch-dogs. But we were mistaken - this intelligent young Armenian with his typically melodious voice is a senior "selector" (starshiy selektsioner - specialist in breed selection) and a poet. He corresponds with an Armenian literary gazette, GRAGAN TERT, and with a teachers' paper, USUTSCHAKAN TERT, which has published his poem "The Frontier". He still has a year and a half to serve, but he has already decided to obtain the diploma of an agronomist-selector - and to do so at Michurinsk.

At the post we met Private Aleksandr Oplachko. He comes from the Altay region and has spent all his life in the country. He had completed the fourth grade, worked in a kolkhoz where he operated a horse-drawn mowing machine and, before he was called up, he became a tractor driver. Then he was sent to the frontier and though he was

used to hard work and severe frosts, he has learned the frontier "wisdom" the hard way and used to get into trouble.

"Were you punished?" we asked.

"Indeed, yes," Oplachko admitted with embarrassment. . . "They drove cattle through the KSP and I did not cover up their tracks and I received a ten-day detention," he said and blushed. . .

"What are you going to do when you are demobilized?"

"I want to go to evening classes - it is a 'must'."

But not every man has decided his future - for example, Private Tereshchenko reluctantly said that he still had a long service to do and then he would see. We thought he was a mediocre, undistinguished man, but the commander of the post remarked with a knowing smile,

"Private Tereshchenko? Interesting young man. . . One of our better footprint experts. He has caught three trespassers and he will tell you much that is interesting."

Boris Machinin is young, of the same age as many of his soldiers. Only last year he graduated from a military college and before that he had lived in Leningrad and finished ten-year school. What has caused him to choose the difficult profession of a frontier officer?

"Ours is a 'frontier' family," he smiles, "one uncle is a lieutenant-colonel, another uncle is a senior lieutenant and my sister's husband is a frontier officer. So I follow them. . . And, you know, I like my work and I would never change it for any other. Now I intend to go to a military VUZ. . . Although I have finished military college with distinction and could have found myself a comfortable little post as an adjutant, I asked straight away to be sent to a frontier post. Life here is very interesting - as many personalities as there are soldiers."

Life at a frontier post is varied. Some hot-headed romantic might be surprised and even offended to hear that each post has a farm of its own. But Sergeant Major (starshina) Mikhail Fedorovich Grishanov proudly says that the post has a one-hectare garden, three pigs, two cows, two calves and many hens. Could frontier guards be indifferent to the appeals of the Party and the Government to increase the production of milk and meat?

We have noticed something new at the post, something that was not here two years ago - self-service shops for the soldiers. . . They supply all the men want: cigarettes, matches, sweets, eau-de-Cologne, notebooks, paper, envelopes. . . They are open all day and from time to time the stock is checked. Nothing is missing as a rule. . .

Once the manager of a neighbouring kolkhoz asked the soldiers' help in planting an orchard. Can you think of a more pleasant and gay job? In one Sunday they planted an area of nine hectares. An officer named Sorokolit particularly mentions Sergeant Kaytanov and Privates Il'chenko and Arduanov: the boys worked well and did not disgrace the post. Was it possible not to show them gratitude for such help? The kolkhozniks presented the soldiers with a hundred and fifty young trees and now the post has some four hundred trees - apricot and apple-trees of three varieties. . . One of the soldiers is responsible for each of them and the tree bears a label with his name. This small apricot, already at the fruiting stage, belongs to Anatoliy Il'chenko. It is not without pride that he tells us he has planted three fruit trees and two poplars at the post and they all grow. He is familiar with the job for at home, in the village of Ogiblyanka, Belgorod oblast, he and his brother planted a large orchard. . . Thus the frontier guards not only guard but adorn the Soviet land.

Naturally, not all the men serve as well as Al'bert Aydinov, Anatoliy Il'chenko, Anatoliy Tereshchenko or Aleksandr Oplachko. "There are sometimes unruly, careless and arrogant men," says Sergeant Major Grishanov. But their comrades quickly find a way to handle them: a Komsomol meeting and a satirical leaflet appear to be loyal supporters of the officers. . .

We should add that the soldiers like literature and every post has a library where the majority of the books are about frontier guards and their duties. There are also many classics and books by Soviet authors; they look much-read and they serve their readers well.

At one of the posts we went to a concert given by an amateur team. It was getting dark and the grounds were lit up with car headlights. One cannot say that the items on the programme were beyond reproach but the men who had to go on duty left with regret this impromptu club and envied a little those who had returned from the frontier and took over their seats. Appreciation of the artists was expressed loudly and sincerely, not because the audience was uncritical but because it was truly grateful to the people who had travelled many kilometres and were already tired.

One Saturday evening it was announced by the local broadcasting centre: "The Komsomol group of the post appeals to the senior pupils of the middle school to take part in the Komsomol Sunday (voskresnik - voluntary collective work on Sunday), the task will be to construct a wire entanglement along the State frontier."

The following morning village girls and boys began to gather on the frontier, which at this point passes right behind the village so that one can throw a stone into Chinese territory. The kolkhoz cows and sheep sometimes wander to the Chinese side and cause much trouble to the frontier guards - though the matter is not limited to cows and sheep. So it was decided to fence off the village from the frontier and replace the old derelict fence with a new wire one. Free hands at the post are not numerous and without the help of the local Komsomols the work could not be done.

Today the soldiers and pupils together have been digging pits, erecting poles and stretching wire. When the work was in full swing the manager of the kolkhoz arrived, a swarthy, energetic man, and smiling at the girls he joked:

"See this? Even with a stick one cannot make them weed our maize, but here they work with pleasure. . . Many frontier men have settled among us when they left the service. . . Petrov, Gamayunov, Stepanchenko, Kozlov, Ryzhov, Teslev. . . Some are now ordinary kolkhozniks, some tractor or lorry drivers. They have married and have homes of their own. And good chaps they are, my right-hand men in all undertakings!"

The kolkhoz is rich: last year its income was 5,780,000 rubles; each kolkhoznik received 8 rubles 50 kopeks in cash and a kilogramme of bread per working day.

Have the kolkhozniks ever detained frontier trespassers?

"Yes, Alzhambekov Dzhidabay caught one; so did Bekbasunov Amirzhan and Kuyantsev Mikhail Yakovlevich. Our people are always on the alert - they work in the fields or tend the cattle and watch what is going on around."

The officers listening to our conversation nodded assent. They know very well that the frontier guards are strong, for the population always gives them help.

Chinese posts guard the frontier just as strictly and efficiently. The close cooperation of the Soviet and Chinese frontier defenders ensures that the enemy will not be able to cross it to one side or the

other. An old Russian proverb "Let not friendship interfere with duty" (druzhba druzhboy, a sluzhba sluzhboy), does not fit here for the Chinese and Soviet soldiers share both friendship and duty. We were lucky enough to witness their cordial meeting under an arch of friendship inscribed "SSSR". Chinese officers, interpreter Fan' Ke-din' and commander of a control-transit station U Gun-chan, met our men like old and intimate friends: their broad and good-natured smiles and exclamations, "O!" meaning that here at last they had managed to meet, and hearty handshakes testified to those feelings. While the soldiers in the frontier guard-room were making arrangements for the crossing of a group of Soviet doctors into the Chinese People's Republic, we watched the highroad leading into China: one by one lorries drive up to our control-transit station, their wind-screens bearing the letters SU (Soviet Union). The lorries are loaded with winnowing-machines, saltpetre and ploughs. While the KPP (kontrol'no-propusknoy post - control-transit station) officer on duty carefully inspects the loads, we talk with lorry driver B.L. Bober who since 1955 has been transporting agricultural implements to China. His journey, though, is not far, since the delivery point, a small Chinese village, can be seen from the frontier.

Bober tells us about the joy and gratitude with which the Chinese receive the gifts from their Soviet friends. It is interesting that the Chinese frontier guards very superficially inspect lorries coming from us - so completely do they trust the Soviet KPP men.

The road is very busy: in half an hour's time two lorries have passed into China and one back.

At last the guards have settled all the details of the Soviet doctors' journey. We bid an affectionate good-bye to the Chinese, take their photograph and each of us picks one twig as a souvenir of our meeting. As our Pobeda car takes us away from the frontier, lorries with the SU inscription keep passing us all the time. . .

I R R I G A T I O N I N C E N T R A L A S I A

PART ONE

Water resources of Central Asia - Inter-republican irrigation networks.






This, the first of two articles on irrigation, consists of a general description of water resources (see also CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, Vol.V, No.3). The second article, which will appear in the next issue of CAR, describes existing and projected irrigation schemes.


. . .

Water resources of Central Asia

Central Asia is one of the most arid areas in the world, though it has a number of big rivers. None of them flows into the open sea; they either vanish into the sands or finish their courses in lakes, some of which are so small that they dry up in summer. From the point where the rivers descend to the plains, they lose much of their water in irrigation and evaporation. Only the biggest, the Amu- and the Syr-Dar'ya, reach the Aral Sea.

The rivers carry a large amount of sand and silt from the mountains, which they deposit along their lower courses thus continually changing the line of their banks - a good example is the Karakum created by the Amu-Dar'ya deposits. The amount of water in the rivers is controlled by the snows and glaciers in the mountains, so that the bigger rivers carry an increased amount of water twice a year: at the beginning of summer when the lower-lying snows dissolve and in the middle of summer, sometimes as late as August, when the eternal snows and glaciers high in the mountains melt.(1) Such are the Amu- and the Syr-Dar'ya, the Chu and others. The last mentioned carries between May-September 60 per cent of its yearly flow; the Naryn at its entrance into the Fergana Valley carries 70 per cent in the same period and the Zeravshan - 82 per cent.

-  Seas and lakes.
-  Subsurface salt-water reservoirs.
-  Subsurface fresh-water seas.
-  Boundaries of warm & hot water areas.
-  Research bases.



**UNDERGROUND SEAS
OF KAZAKHSTAN**

135 0 135 270 Km. approx.

J.P.

The rivers flowing from the Kopet-Dag have a different regimen. Since they collect their water from less high mountains without eternal snow, they depend on seasonal rains and reach their maximum level in spring, i.e. the rainy season coinciding with the melting of snow on the slopes. Eventually they disappear into the sands, except the Atrek which manages to reach the Caspian. Thus irrigation systems based on the rivers must be adapted to both their individual character and the requirements of the crops raised in the irrigated areas.

The most important rivers flow from the Tyan'-Shan' and the Pamirs. Most of the former's ranges are covered with snow and glaciers which feed many rivers, the largest being the Syr-Dar'ya, Ili, Chu and Talass. The Pamirs, though smaller in area, carry more snow and ice and this makes them the most important area in Central Asia from which the rivers rise. It is from here that the largest river starts - the Amu-Dar'ya.

The highland regions feed also the Artesian wells created by the rivers and springs which sink into the sands. Such underground "seas"(2) are scattered throughout Central Asia, even under the steppes and deserts and, though still little exploited, they offer quite fantastic possibilities of irrigation development. For example, three-fourths of the area of Kazakhstan, almost equal in size to Western Europe, is made up of steppes and deserts and it is reckoned that a mere tenth of Kazakhstan's subsurface waters, if properly used, would convert its deserts into flourishing oases. Artesian wells have been discovered in Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan. In Kazakhstan by April 1958 over 60 large "seas" had been located, some of them of impressive size: thus the Muyunkum "sea" covers an area of some 50,000 square kilometres and lies 300-500 metres under a sandy desert of the same name; a still bigger "sea", under the Kzylkum, contains 250 milliard cubic metres of water lying 80-300 metres under the surface. A recently discovered "sea", in the Akmolinsk oblast, under the bottom of Lake Kalmakkol', stretches 150 km. from east to west, its maximum width being 50 km. In Turkmenistan in the foothills of the Kopet-Dag there is an abundance of underground water. The same is true of many mountain regions of Tadzhikistan which now suffer from water shortage. The subsurface waters are subject to high pressure and often gush from the wells like fountains. Thus the desert and semi-desert lands, situated far from the rivers and hitherto regarded as uncultivable, can be irrigated by underground waters and the construction of wells is becoming as important as that of canals.

Another variation of the underground water resources, peculiar to Central Asia, are the so-called "returning" (vozvratnyye) rivers

which play an important part in irrigation. They are produced mainly by water used for irrigation which filters through the light soils, partly reappearing in the lower-lying areas in the form of streams and small rivers. In some areas the "returning" waters constitute up to 30 per cent of the total resources used for irrigation and even more in the Fergana Valley. Round the outlets of such springs form bogs which subsequently become salt marshes owing to the high evaporation rate. Thus in some arid regions agriculture depends on reclamation as well as on irrigation.

Inter-republican irrigation networks

Border territories are sometimes irrigated jointly by the appropriate authorities of the republics concerned. The Great Chu Canal, serving Kirgizia and the adjoining part of Kazakhstan, is a good example. The Chu is one of the problem rivers of Central Asia: In May and June, when the crops need water, the Chu does not provide enough; the rapid melting of glaciers in the second half of summer causes floods and much water is wasted in uncultivated steppes. To remedy this, the Orto-Tokoy reservoir has been constructed and by May 1958 its 52 metre high dam was almost finished. It lies nearly two kilometres above sea-level - the first dam of its size in the USSR to be situated so high. The reservoir, whose capacity is 500m. cubic metres of water, lies in a canyon of the same name through which the Chu flows. It regulates the whole flow of the river by returning its water back to the main stream below the dam when necessary. After the Chu has left the mountain zone, at the 110th and 140th km., two big barrages (vodozabornyye uzly) have been constructed and it is at this point that the Great Chu Canal starts. It consists of two separate parts, its total length being 245 km., of these over 57 km. are in the Dzhambul oblast of Kazakhstan where it will allow the present area of cultivable lands to be doubled. The Kazakh part was to be put into operation in 1958. The canal will be fully exploited for irrigation after the total of 2,300 km. of canals and 17,800 water-control structures have been constructed. Great areas of waste lands will be brought into cultivation and new orchards and vineyards will appear in the Chu valley.

Both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are interested in developing the Kyzylkum, 300,000 square kilometres of desert between the Amu- and the Syr-Dar'ya. The Kyzylkum can be used for agriculture and cattle breeding when they receive enough water. The attack on the desert opened in 1957 when the Kzyl-Orda dam on the Syr-Dar'ya was put under construction.(3) The reservoir will make it possible to irrigate millions of hectares of pasture and cultivable land on both sides of the river. The task of irrigating the Kyzylkum desert has been


greatly facilitated by the existence of the Zhana-Dar'ya, through which a large part of the Syr-Dar'ya water used to flow to the Aral Sea, but after 1816 the flow ceased. The Zhana-Dar'ya is over 500 km. long and on either side there are good grazing lands which until now could not be properly used because of the shortage of water. In December 1958 the Syr-Dar'ya waters once more began to flow through the Zhana-Dar'ya, and the extensive pastures in the Syr-Dar'ya, Teren'-Uzyak, Dzhalagash, Karmakchi and Kazalinsk rayons have been opened up for cattle breeding. The Zhana-Dar'ya is fed from the upper water of the Kzyl-Orda dam through a network of canals - first a new canal 6.8 km. long, then the bed of the Turangylsay (60 km.), Kur-Uzyak (10.3 km.), a new canal (3.8 km.) and finally the water reaches the reconstructed bed of an old stream (8.6 km.) through which it passes to the Zhana-Dar'ya and along it to the Aral Sea.

The Kurvan-Dar'ya is an offshoot of the Zhana-Dar'ya which did not dry up until after 1842. Now it will be employed for irrigation: special installations will be constructed at the point where it connects with the Zhana-Dar'ya and through them water will be directed into the Mayli-Uzyak through which it will reach the Kurvan-Dar'ya. The total length of this network will be 435 km.

At Tamyr-Bugut the Kurvan-Dar'ya irrigation network is joined with the southern water "collector" canal, 152 km. long, whose construction started in 1958. (4) It will collect superfluous irrigation water and will also supply pasture lands with water.

Along the Zhana-Dar'ya and part of the Kurvan-Dar'ya lie small areas which were cultivated before the two rivers went dry; there are old irrigation networks in a good state of preservation which now will be used again. Thus Syr-Dar'ya water will make productive a great part of the Kyzylkum.

Underground waters play a prominent part in the irrigation of the Uzbek Kyzylkum famous for their astrakhan lambs. In the Kenimekh rayon one kolkhoz, a pioneer in oasis irrigation (oazisnoye orosheniye), started an irrigated farm (polivnoye khozyaystvo) in 1952. By 1957 it already had 6 ha. of land reclaimed from the desert on which fruit and vegetables grew. Excellent results were also obtained in the oases created by the Pasture and Improvement Construction Trust round Artesian wells. These oases will in future differ little from villages in the irrigated areas and will greatly improve the conditions of work of the shepherds. A good example of the agricultural possibilities of the Kyzylkum is an oasis farm belonging to the Ayak-Kuduk sovkhoz. It is based on an Artesian well producing 18 litres of water per second. There are 11 ha. of cultivated land on which melons, maize and barley grow as well as



11,000 trees. But the local kolkhozes and sovkhoses receive no help from the rayon and Bukhara oblast authorities, and so long as land reclamation in the Kyzylkum depends on their individual effort, no important progress can be made. There is no general planning so the distribution of wells does not correspond to local needs and many wells pour out water which gets wasted in the sands and forms salt marshes.

The southern Golodnaya Steppe', in the south-east of the Kyzylkum, is divided between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In 1956 the Central Committee of the Party and the Councils of Ministers of the USSR decided that the steppe must be made cultivable and thousands of people came from all over the Union to carry out the task. In 1957 there were already six new kolkhozes which cultivated 19,000 ha. and a new town, Yangi-Yer, was started as the administrative centre of the steppe. Another important scheme under construction was the Southern Canal beginning at the Farkhad hydroelectric power-station; its

length is 90 km. and it is expected to irrigate 125,000 ha. in the southern part of the steppe. In the same year construction began of the Central water "collector" canal(5) which will remove underground salt water; the area protected by it will expand together with the growth of cultivated land. The disposal of subsurface waters plays a very important part in land reclamation, the more so because it will improve the condition of the cultivable land. The climate of the steppe will improve and fields will receive protection from the wind when forest belts have grown; the planting of trees started in the autumn of 1957.

The main schemes to exploit the Syr-Dar'ya for irrigation and electrification have been so far limited to its upper and middle course. There the Chirchik-Bozsuy and Farkhad hydroelectric power-stations have been built and in 1957 construction started of the biggest Central Asian "hydro-knot", (6) the Kayrak-Kum reservoir with the Friendship of Nations power-station. Further development in this area would eventually sharply decrease the amount of water in the lower course of the river (1,000 km. in length) and gravely affect agriculture in the adjoining rayons of Kazakhstan. Moreover, the water level in the Syr-Dar'ya varies very considerably from year to year and from one season to another. These difficulties will be solved by the Chardara reservoir in the South-Kazakhstan oblast. On the one hand, it will allow the hydroelectric power-stations and irrigation networks in the upper reaches of the river to be used to the best advantage, and on the other it will control the amount of water in its lower course, thus eliminating the danger of both floods and shortage. The Chardara "hydro-knot" will be completed in 1965; it will consist of a reservoir on the Syr-Dar'ya, with a capacity of 5.7 milliard cubic metres of water, a hydroelectric power-station and a dam 4.8 km. long, with a maximum height of 23.5 metres. It will irrigate 500,000 ha. in the Golodnaya Step', while in southern Kazakhstan 260,000 ha. will receive regular and 400,000 ha. estuary (limannoye)(7) irrigation. The area of pasture will increase by 2m.ha.

Southern Khorezm is divided between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan so that both republics are interested in improving the condition of the soil in this agricultural area. To this end the Ozernyy "collector" canal is being constructed and it is expected to be finished in 1963. It starts near Khiva, from salt Lake Ulu-shorkul', crosses 26 lakes and ends in the Sarakamysh depression (vpadina). It is 199 km. long, of these 139 km. are in the Tashauz oblast of Turkmenistan. It will collect superfluous surface and subsurface waters from the fields of the kolkhozes of eight Uzbek and four Turkmen rayons and thus protect them from salt; it will also cause over twenty salt lakes to dry up.

Sources

1. Central Asian press, 1957-9.
2. SREDNYAYA AZIYA. Akademiya Nauk SSSR, Institut Geografii, Moscow, 1958.
3. SREDNYAYA AZIYA: FIZIKO-GEOGRAFICHESKY OCHERK. E. Murzayev, Moscow, 1957.

Notes

- (1) This presumably refers to rain-fed freshets and floods in the winter: a surge in late spring from the lower snows and then another surge in summer. What is not clear is whether there is a period of uncomfortable shortage in late summer before the next rains begin.
- (2) The literal translation of the Russian word more (sea) has been retained, although it sounds out of place and romantic in English, where "reservoir" would be more usual.
- (3) KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA of 29.6.56 reported that the Kzyl-Orda dam had just been completed, but the same paper of 22.8.59 states that "two years ago the Kzyl-Orda dam on the Syr-Dar'ya was put under construction".
- (4) The exact meaning of the word "collector" (kollektor) is not clear. If it handles "superfluous" irrigation water it sounds like a drain. But drains do not normally irrigate "pasture lands", or any other kind of lands. It might be a kind of intercepting canal to catch minor flood-flows from wadis etc., which are "superfluous" in the sense that they want to get them under control and use to irrigate pasture lands on a broad flooding basis, rather than let them run to waste.
- (5) Here "collector" undoubtedly means a "drain" for the removal of underground salt water.
- (6) The Russian expression gidrouzel has been translated literally as "hydro-knot" since this conveniently conveys the meaning of a combination of installations comprising river-control and a hydroelectric reservoir.

- (7) The Russian term limannoye orosheniye (estuary irrigation) is defined in the GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA as a "single springtime watering of the soil to the depth of 1-1.5 metres or more achieved by retaining melted snow". Apparently what is meant here is that the all-round-the-year flow is enough to irrigate 260,000 ha. "regularly" and fully, while for the 400,000 ha. water can only be found for the season of greatest flow. If this is a correct interpretation, the distinction is between "perennial" and "flood-season" irrigation.

Turkmen Deputy relieved of duties

Deputy A. Sariyev, Vice-Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, has been relieved of his duties and replaced by Deputy N. Bayramov, previously Chairman of the Presidium of the Turkmen Republic Supreme Soviet. P. 31.10.59

Spelling of Kazakh place-names

An article in KP by the head of the Kazakh railways and a philologist complains that the names of many Kazakh railway stations are wrongly transcribed in the Cyrillic. Some are greatly distorted and others contradict Kazakh literary pronunciation and spelling. KP. 17.11.59

New Road Atlas of the USSR

A new road atlas of the USSR has just been published. The maps are on a small scale and show the roads existing on 1 January 1958. Railways, and many other details including hotels, are also shown. The atlas - ATLAS AVTOMOBIL'NYKH DORGG SSSR - has 75 maps, six of which are devoted to Kazakhstan. KP. 18.10.59

R E V I E W S

Archéologie Soviétique en Asie. By Grégoire Frumkin.
96pp; map; bibliog. ÉTUDES ASIATIQUES, Vol.XI, 1957-8,
journal of the Société Suisse d'Études Asiatiques.

This carefully prepared study provides an excellent and concise description of Soviet archaeological operations and writing. As such it will be found an excellent introduction and companion to the articles on the same subject which appear occasionally in CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW.

As Mr. Frumkin points out, Western archaeologists are sometimes inclined to minimize the importance of Soviet archaeology, partly because of their unfamiliarity with the Russian language. Another more serious reason is that Soviet archaeology is made to serve the ends of ideological propaganda and takes too ready-made a view of history for Western tastes. Nevertheless, Soviet work has an important contribution to make to existing knowledge and deserves far closer study than it has so far received.

Mr. Frumkin's study is divided into six chapters dealing with Armenia, Khorezm, Turkmenistan (Parthian Margiana), Bactria and Sogdia, the Pamirs, Tyan'-Shan', Fergana and Semirech'ye, and the Altay (the art of the Scythians). A useful geographical glossary, a bibliography, and a map showing the main historical and archaeological sites are appended.

NEWS DIGEST

The following items are taken from newspapers and periodicals received during the period 1 October - 31 December 1959. A list of abbreviations used will be found at the beginning of the Review.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND TERRITORIAL CHANGES

Administrative changes

Administrative changes are recorded in the following appointments only: First and Second Party Secretaries, Chairmen of the Councils of Ministers (Prime Minister), Chairmen of the State Planning and State Security Committees, and Ministers of Communications. The present holders of these offices in the republics are as follows:

Azerbaijdzhan

Akhundov, V.Yu.	First Secretary of the CC of the Azerbaijdzhan CP
Semichastnyy, V.	Second Secretary of the CC of the Azerbaijdzhan CP
Iskenderov, M.A.	Chairman of the Council of Ministers
Kardashev, A.V.	Chairman of the State Security Committee
Guseynov, T.K.	Minister of Communications

Turkmenistan

Karayev, D.	First Secretary of the CC of the Turkmen CP
Akulintsev, V.K.	Second Secretary of the CC of the Turkmen CP
Ovezov, B.	Chairman of the Council of Ministers
Pishchulin, D.I.	Chairman of the State Security Committee
Gusev, A.I.	Minister of Communications

Uzbekistan

Rashidov, Sh.R.	First Secretary of the CC of the Uzbek CP
Titov, F.Ye.	Second Secretary of the CC of the Uzbek CP
Alimov, A.A.	Chairman of the Council of Ministers
Zyyadullayev, S.K.	Chairman of the State Planning Committee
Byzov, A.P.	Chairman of the State Security Committee
Sharkov, M.A.	Minister of Communications

Tadzhikistan

Ul'dzhabayev, T.	First Secretary of the CC of the Tadzhik CP
Obnosov, P.S.	Second Secretary of the CC of the Tadzhik CP
Dodkhudayev, N.	Chairman of the Council of Ministers
Kakharov, A.	Chairman of the State Planning Committee
Tsvigun, S.K.	Chairman of the State Security Committee
Sayko, V.A.	Minister of Communications

Kirgizia

Razakov, I.R.	First Secretary of the CC of the Kirgiz CP
Churkin, V.N.	Second Secretary of the CC of the Kirgiz CP
Dikambayev, K.D.	Chairman of the Council of Ministers
Dyushaliyev, B.	Chairman of the State Planning Committee
Yermolov, I.G.	Chairman of the State Security Committee
Toropkin, A.G.	Minister of Communications

Kazakhstan

Kunayev, D.A.	First Secretary of the CC of the Kazakh CP
Rodionov, N.N.	Second Secretary of the CC of the Kazakh CP
Tashenev, Zh.A.	Chairman of the Council of Ministers
Mel'nikov, L.G.	Chairman of the State Planning Committee
Lunev, K.F.	Chairman of the State Security Committee
Noskov, A.A.	Minister of Communications

Territorial changesAzerbaydzhan

By decree of 3 December 1959 the following rayons of the town of Baku have been combined:

Dzerzhinskiy and Narimanov into the Narimanov rayon; Mashtaginskiy and Azizbekov into the Azizbekov rayon; Nizam and Stalin into the Stalin rayon.

VVS. 17.12.59

Tadzhikistan

By decree of 14 October 1959 the Pendzhikent rayon soviet has been combined with the Pendzhikent town soviet to which have been subordinated the village soviets of Amondara, Koshtepa, Sudzhina, Chimkurgan, Voru, Iory, Kolkhozchion, Magiyan, Kosatarosh, Shing, and im.Rudaki. The town of Pendzhikent has been included in the category of town of oblast subordination.

VVS. 29.10.59

By decree of 12 November 1959 the unnamed 6,852 metre peak of the southern spur of the Zaalayskiy khrebet has been named Moscow-Pekin. [Soviet and Chinese mountaineers recently made the first ascent. -Ed.] VVS. 3.12.59

Kirgizia

By decree of 26 November 1959 the Karakol' rayon has been re-named Przheval'sk, and the rayon centre moved from the village of Teploklyuchenka to the town of Przheval'sk. VVS. 3.12.59

Kazakhstan

By decree of 6 December 1959 the inhabited point at the construction site of the Chardara reservoir in the Keles rayon of the South-Kazakhstan oblast has been included in the category of workers' settlements and has been named Syr-Dar'inskiy. It has been subordinated to the Kirov rayon.

By decree of 12 October 1959 the town of Ust'-Kamenogorsk has been established as rayon centre of the Kirov rayon of the Vostochno-Kazakhstanskaya oblast. [Ust'-Kamenogorsk is given as the rayon centre of the Kirov rayon in SSSR: ADMINISTRATIVNO-TERRITORIAL'NOYE DELENIYE SOYUZNYKH RESPUBLIK, 1 January 1958, 9th edition, Moscow, 1958. -Ed.] VVS. 29.10.59

CONFERENCE

An All-Union coordinated conference of Turcologists was held in Ashkhabad from 19-22 October. Among the 200 taking part were linguists from the six Muslim republics of Soviet Asia as well as from Moscow and Leningrad. Daily reports of the conference appeared in TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA which also published a summary three weeks later above the signatures of N. Gadzhiyeva and F. Ashnin of the Institute of Linguistics of the AN/SSSR. The following is condensed from these reports.

The papers and the ensuing discussions provided a detailed analysis of the present position in the field of Turcology and outlined the main objectives for the future. E.V. Sevortyan, speaking on the first day of the conference, gave an account of achievements to date and stressed the need for scholarly work on the comparative phonetics and grammar of the Turkic languages and of the separate language groups within the Turkic family, and for the use of the comparative-historical method as being indispensable for reconstructing obsolete forms.

B.A. Serebrennikov, corresponding member of the AN/SSSR, spoke on the subject of the accumulated knowledge of scholars of Indo-European languages on comparative-historical linguistics, a subject, he asserted, for which Turcologists must adopt more up-to-date methods and make use of the experience of Indo-European linguists. This paper was followed by one from Z.B. Mukhamedova, corresponding member of the AN/Turk. SSR, who described the experience of producing essays on the history of the Turkmen language between the eighth and the eighteenth centuries, a task made difficult by the lack of ancient literary works which could be ascribed without hesitation to the Turkmen language. Mme. Mukhamedova was, however, able to tell the members of the conference that she had succeeded in giving a general outline of the history of the Turkmen literary language. Professor M.N. Khydyrov, of the Turkmen State University, spoke about a course on the history of the Turkmen language in which the main sources for study are literature, popular poetry, the data of dialects and related languages, and archaic forms. He particularly stressed the important place in such a study of popular destans (ballads) and the works of Makhtumkuli, Seidi and Molla Nepesa.

A.I. Iskakov, of the Institute of Language and Literature of the AN/Kaz. SSR, made several practical suggestions and was emphatic that the training of Turcologists should be improved. S. Akhally of the Turkmen Ministry of Education, devoted his lecture to the etymology of Turkmen words and affixes. Professor A.A. Demirchizade of the Institute of Language and Literature, AN/Az. SSR then spoke of the study of the history of Turkic languages in Azerbaydzhan, of the classification of Turkic languages and the formation of a literary language for national use (formirovaniye obshchenatsional'nogo i literaturnogo yazyka). He was especially critical of the classification of languages which he said was incomplete and sometimes had no definite scholarly basis. Another speaker, Professor Ye.I. Ubryatova of the Institute of Linguistics of the AN/SSSR, talked of the need for publishing historical studies of the Turkic languages taken individually, a comparative-historical grammar, etymological dictionaries and important works of literature. She denied that nothing had been done in these spheres; much had been done which remained unknown to scholars owing to the unsatisfactory state of publishing. Professor Ubryatova also spoke of historical research into the Yakut language. A. Dzhafera of the Institute of Language and Literature of the AN/Az. SSR was another speaker. He reproached dialectologists for giving in their works too few conclusions and generalizations which might be of use in studying the history of a language. He concluded by giving some interesting points of comparison between the Turkmen and Azerbaydzhani languages.

V.M. Nadelyayev of the Leningrad department of the Institute of Linguistics of the AN/SSSR discussed the dictionary of ancient Turkic languages now being prepared there. Work is expected to take four years and will cover the period up to the Mongol invasion. Professor N.A. Baskakov of the Institute of Linguistics of the AN/SSSR spoke against B.A. Serebrennikov's thesis, saying that methods suitable for studying western European languages should not be adopted mechanically for studying Turkic languages. Much of the summarized report in TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA was devoted, in fact, to this division of opinion, many of those taking part being reported as having supported Serebrennikov's point of view.

On the last day the conference unanimously passed a resolution which affirmed that the comparative-historical method was in practice the most useful one for studying various languages, among them the Turkic languages, but that it had important drawbacks. "The conference", write Gadzhiyeva and Ashnin, "stressed the need for strict observation of the principles of the comparative-historical method and for calculating the specific character of the Turkic languages." TI. 21-4.10.59; 14.11.59

DELEGATIONS

A Government delegation from the Yemen led by Prince Saif ul-Islam Abd ar-Rahman, brother of the King of the Yemen and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, arrived in Uzbekistan on 23 November. The delegation also visited Baku before leaving for Moscow on 28 November. PV. 24, 27.11.59; BR. 27, 29.11.59

Sarvat Okasha, Minister of Culture and National Orientation of the Egyptian Region of the United Arab Republic, and a group from the Ministry spent three days in Tashkent in November on their way to Moscow. PV. 29.11, 1.12.59

The Iraqi Minister of Education arrived in Tashkent on 2 October. A delegation from the Iraqi-Soviet Friendship Society arrived, also in Tashkent, on 10 November. PV. 3.10, 11, 13.11.59

The chairman of the Indian Government Committee of the Press, Manohar Lal Bhardvaj, and a delegation from the Indian Association of Solidarity of the Countries of Asia and Africa visited Uzbekistan in October. PV. 8, 13.10.59

An Afghan parliamentary delegation led by Mohammad Nowruz, president of the People's Council, stopped briefly in Tashkent on 4 November on their way to Moscow. On their return journey at the end

of November they stayed three days in Tadzhikistan and six in Uzbekistan.

The Afghan Minister of Social Works was also in Uzbekistan in November; he was shown the Great Fergana Canal and the Tuya-Buguz reservoir before leaving for Afghanistan on 12 November.

A delegation of leading Afghan journalists spent several days in Uzbekistan in November during their tour of the Soviet Union.

P.V. misc. dates 5.11.-1.12.59; KT. 22, 24.11.59

A trade delegation from the Sinkiang-Uygur Autonomous Region of China visited Kazakhstan and Kirgizia in October where, after discussions with trade associations, agreements were signed.

KP. 18.10.59; SK. 20, 25.10.59

TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

Azerbaydzhan

A new electrified branch of the Azerbaydzhan railway was opened on 6 November with trains running between Baglar and Bil'gya, a distance of 11 km. along the Caspian coast. BR. 7.11.59

In 1960 Ilyushin-18 turbo-jet liners will be flying along two new routes: Tashkent-Baku-Mineral'nyye Vody and Baku-Rostov-Kiyev-Leningrad. BR. 20.11.59

Uzbekistan

A 240 km. road from Tashkent to Kokand was opened to traffic on 26 November. It links the two towns via Angren and provides the fastest link between Tashkent and the Fergana Valley. PV. 18, 27.11.59

Work has begun on a new road from Takhta-Kupyr to sovkhos imeni Lenina in the Kara-Kalpak ASSR. PV. 27.12.59

Tadzhikistan

A road bridge over the Kafirnigan river was opened on 24 December. It replaces a ferry and pontoon bridge and greatly improves communications between the centre and the south of the republic.

KT. 26.12.59

A new road bridge was opened over the Dyushambe river in Stalinabad on 29 December. KT. 30.12.59

Kazakhstan

The railway lines between Kustanay and Tobol and between Tobol and Dzhatygara have been opened to continuous traffic. KP. 16.10., 31.12.59

A section of the new Central Siberian railway, that from Karasuk, Novosibirsk oblast, to Irtyshskaya, has been opened to working traffic. KP. 30.10.59

Construction has been completed on the 800 km. Alma-Ata - Frunze - Tashkent highway connecting the capitals of three republics. I. 21.10.59

The 200 km. road from Petropavlovsk to Mar'yevka is nearing completion. Main roads are being built in the Golodnaya Step', and hundreds of kilometres of hard surface roads have been built linking Kustanay with surrounding sovkhoses. KP. 20.10.59

An air route, from Alma-Ata to Moscow via Semipalatinsk and Omsk, was opened on 19 October 1959. Ilyushin-18s are the aircraft used, and there are special fast connections with Ust'-Kamenogorsk. KP. 18.10.59

T H E B O R D E R L A N D S O F S O V I E T
C E N T R A L A S I A

The great increase in the amount of Soviet writing on the Borderlands of Soviet Central Asia requires a redefinition of aim and method to be followed in the Borderlands Series.

The present aim is to keep abreast as far as possible of current trends in Soviet writing on the countries contiguous or adjacent to the Muslim Union Republics of Central Asia. These countries fall into three categories:

- (a) Those immediately bordering on Soviet territory, i.e. Persia, Afghanistan and Sinkiang;
- (b) large countries close to but not actually bordering on Soviet territory, i.e. India and Pakistan; and
- (c) other countries close but not actually contiguous to the Soviet frontiers, i.e. Tibet, Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan.

All the relevant material actually received by CARC in the form of books and articles in periodicals is recorded in the Centre's Bibliography of Recent Soviet Source Material on Soviet Central Asia and the Borderlands. But the limited space available in Central Asian Review makes it imperative to restrict the extent to which this material is analysed and commented upon. Accordingly, in future the scope of the Borderlands Series will be confined to the following:

- (a) Persia, Afghanistan and Sinkiang. Soviet writing on all aspects of these countries will be analysed and commented on as far as possible. (Reviews of books appear in the series "The Muslim Republics of the USSR" published regularly in the Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society.)
- (b) India and Pakistan. Analyses of and commentary on material on (1) Russia's past and present political, cultural and economic relations with the Indian sub-continent as a whole;

- (ii) the history of the British period; and (iii) all aspects of Soviet writing on Pakistan, i.e. including Soviet commentary on Pakistan's internal affairs.
- (c) Tibet, Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan. No analysis of material on these countries will normally be undertaken. At present the amount of this material is very small but a watch will be kept on it in case circumstances should require it to be handled.
- (d) Reviews and Notices. Reviews or notices of important books on all the above areas except those mentioned in (a).
- (e) In place of the News Diary hitherto included in the Borderlands Section, there will be a short feature entitled "The Borderlands in the Soviet Press". This will indicate the trend of Soviet reporting on current developments.

The main change in the method outlined above is that in future no attempt will be made to treat Soviet writing on the internal affairs of India where these have no bearing on Soviet relations with those countries. This includes all material on internal, political and social problems, and on art, literature, archaeology and linguistics. The importance and interest of much of this material is recognized and it is much regretted that its treatment in the Borderlands Series is not at present practicable.

The present issue contains an up-to-date survey of Soviet writings published since January 1958 on Afghanistan, Persia, Sinkiang, Tibet, Nepal, and the aspects of India and Pakistan defined above. Future issues of CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW will deal in greater detail with such Soviet material on these countries as has appeared during the intervening period.

A F G H A N I S T A N

Early Russian travellers in Afghanistan - The origins of Russo-Afghan trade - Afghan-Manchu relations - Afghan history through Afghan eyes - First reforms in independent Afghanistan - Ethnography - Modern Afghan literature - Soviet-Afghan relations

An introduction to Soviet historical writing on Afghanistan was given in CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, Vol.IV, No.2, pp.161-81. The general trend of such writing as outlined there, that "the villain of the piece is Britain and British imperialism" and that "the Tsarist government. . . had no evil designs on Afghanistan, whereas Britain's sole aim was to conquer Afghanistan, reduce her to a colony and thus penetrate into Russian Central Asia", has remained unchanged.

Of previous articles on Afghanistan which have appeared in CAR the most important are those on the Pakhtunistan question in Vol.IV, No.2, pp.187-92 and Vol.VII, No.3, pp.291-300. Other references will be found below.

An important Soviet symposium on Afghanistan, NEZAVISIMYY AFGANISTAN, which has only recently been received, will be reviewed in the next issue of CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW.

. . .

Early Russian travellers in Afghanistan

S. Nesterovich, in an article with the above title in ZVEZDA VOSTOKA, 1958, No.3, begins his survey with the visit to Balkh of Boris Pazukhin in 1644-50 and of Muhammad Isup Kasimov and Ivan Shapkin, members of the Russian embassy to Bukhara in 1675, who passed through Kabul on their way to India.

Of Vitkevich (1837-8) Nesterovich says that he was sent to oppose British economic and political penetration into Central Asia. He was well received by the Afghans and his mission "was crowned with success because he supported Dost Muhammad who had created a united,

independent state against the wishes of England".

Nesterovich admits that the diplomatic successes of Stoletov's mission (1878) were not great. However, the mission is said to have furthered Russo-Afghan friendship and to have proved to the Afghans that the Russian people was "noble, good and indulgent".

The aim of the article is to show the priority of Russia's relations with Afghanistan over those of any other Western country and also to imply that Russian interest in Afghanistan was dictated by the need to foil aggressive British intentions in Central Asia. (See CAR, Vol.IV, No.2, pp.161-81.)

The origins of Russo-Afghan trade

In an article entitled "From the History of Trade Relations between Afghanistan and Russia in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century", PROBLEMY VOSTOKOVEDENIYA, 1959, No.1, Yu.V. Gankovskiy shows that trade also was an element in Russian interest in Afghanistan.

Russian merchants, Gankovskiy writes, began to trade with Afghanistan in the 1750s using Bukharan and Khivan merchants as middlemen. The trade was in cloth, indigo, lapis-lazuli, precious stones and gold coins from Afghanistan, and in manufactured goods such as pots, knives, needles, mirrors and spectacles from Russia. Russian goods, Gankovskiy asserts, were able to hold their own against the cheaper British goods (which were brought by the easy route up the Indus) because of their high quality.

Afghan-Manchu relations

In 1758 the Manchus conquered Sinkiang and expelled the Muslim rulers of Yarkand, Kashgar and Aqsu. It was considered in St. Petersburg that Ahmad Shah Durrani, the King of Afghanistan, might be considering coming to the aid of his co-religionists against the Manchus, and that if this were so it would be in the Russian interest to offer him discreet help. Consequently an emissary, Bogdan Aslanov, was sent in 1764 from Astrakhan to Afghanistan to discover Ahmad Shah's intentions and to request that an Afghan envoy be sent to St. Petersburg to make more precise arrangements.

Yu.V. Gankovskiy in "Bogdan Aslanov's Mission to Afghanistan in 1764", SOVETSKOYE VOSTOKOVEDENIYE, 1958, No.2, describes this mission, making use of unpublished material from the Russian foreign policy

archives.

In the event, Gankovskiy writes, when Aslanov arrived in Herat he found that Ahmad Shah was on campaign against the Sikhs. The Muslim rulers of Kashgar and Yarkand, far from receiving any aid, had been assassinated by Sultan Shah in Badakhshan (which was later to be conquered by Ahmad Shah). No one in Herat had any knowledge of a projected campaign against the Manchus. Aslanov, therefore, was unable to fulfil any of his instructions and returned home. Gankovskiy asserts, however, that Ahmad Shah would have advanced into East Turkestan had it not been for his lack of success against the Sikhs.

Afghan history through Afghan eyes

The Afghan historian Sayyid Kasem Rishtiya's book AFGHANISTAN IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY, Kabul, 1951, is reviewed by Yu.V. Gankovskiy in "A New Work on the History of Afghanistan in the Nineteenth Century" (KRATKIYE SOOBSHCHENIYA INSTITUTA VOSTOKOVEDENIYA, Vol. XXVIII, 1958).

Gankovskiy considers the work valuable not only because it contains many little-known facts but because it considers Afghan history in the light of events in surrounding countries and "reflects its author's patriotism and hostility to colonialism and the British invaders".

On the crucial question of the alleged Russian threat to India (see CAR, Vol.VI, No.2, pp.205-28) Gankovskiy gives the impression that Rishtiya agrees that, as such a campaign was beyond Russian resources, British apprehensions were merely a shield for such aggression as the First and Second Afghan Wars. He later rebukes Rishtiya, however, for contradicting himself by saying that the First Afghan War was caused by Britain's "desire to bar Russian movement towards India", while agreeing that such a movement was impossible. There need be no contradiction here, of course, since Rishtiya may have supposed that the British would be less well informed about the Russian ability to invade than the Russians themselves. Gankovskiy, like all other Soviet writers, scouts this possibility.

First reforms in independent Afghanistan

R.K. Urmanova describes and evaluates King Amanullah's first series of reforms in "The Reforms of the Afghan Government in 1919-1925" (IZVESTIYA AN/UZB. SSR, 1958, No.2). She makes use of official Afghan publications and treats the subject from a strictly Marxist

standpoint.

Afghan backwardness at the beginning of the twentieth century, Urmanova writes, was largely due to the country's semi-colonial dependence on Britain which had been established by the Second Afghan War. The Third Afghan War had won political independence. The aim of the reforms was to safeguard this independence by setting up a strong central government and to win economic independence also by reconstructing the economy.

A strong central government was rendered essential, Urmanova writes, by the threat from Britain who would not tolerate a free, independent Afghanistan (especially one friendly to Russia) on the north-west frontier of India. The establishment of such a government was supported, she adds, by a new class of landowner, men who had received their land as a reward for their services but whose authority in that land had no tribal sanction. Such men derived their authority from the government and the government's strength was theirs. Some sort of economic reform was supported by the new Afghan trading bourgeoisie who had found that all trade, both exterior and interior, was in the hands of Indians.

There follows a description of the chaotic Afghan economy and of the reforms adopted, which is omitted here. Urmanova considers that the reforms were progressive in spite of their effect on the peasant. Amanullah's substitution of taxes in money for taxes in kind, establishment of private property in land and sale of State lands led to the pauperization and ultimate expropriation of the free peasantry. Amanullah's reforms, she considers, expressed the interests of the landowners and bourgeoisie who were their chief supporters. They are said to be progressive, however, because they represented the stage of primary accumulation of capital which, wrote Marx, "is no more nor less than the historical process of separating the producer from the means of production".

(For the Soviet view of Amanullah's fall see CAR, Vol.IV, No.2, pp.177-81.)

Ethnography

S.I. Bruk, "The Ethnic Composition and Distribution of Population in the Countries of South-West Asia", TRUDY INST. ETNOGRAFI I IM. MIKLUKHO-MAKLAYA, Vol.XXXIX (1958).

This article deals with the whole of South-West Asia and references to Afghanistan are scattered throughout. The author notes

that in countries where no census has been carried out (of which Afghanistan is one) the population data are approximate and are biased by attempts to show that the bulk of the population is nationally homogeneous. Bruk gives the population of Afghanistan as 12,000,000. Table 6 divides this figure into ethnographical groups (Semitic, Turkic, Iranian, etc.). These groups are then described in some detail in pp.93-107. Out of a bibliography of 84 titles, 11 (three of which are non-Russian) deal with Afghanistan. (See also CAR, Vol.IV, No.2, p.187.)

Modern Afghan literature

All the following articles except the last have two themes: to stress the aggressive policy of Britain towards Afghanistan and to contrast it with the disinterested friendship of Russia. This is done mainly by selection of examples.

For example N. Dvoryankov in "Molière in Kabul" (SOVREMENNY VOSTOK, 1958, No.3), a note on the newly-formed actors' school of the "Pokhyni Nyndare" theatre, director Muhammad Ali Rounak, mentions those plays in the school's repertoire which reflect the "national liberation struggle", and describes the admiration felt by Afghan student actors for Soviet actors.

T. Abayeva in "Afgan Folk-Literature" (ZV.VOS., 1958, No.10) devotes most of her article to the folklore of the First Afghan War and quotes verses on Shuja ul-Mulk which express the people's contempt for him as a British puppet. Abayeva also regards the Afghan-Indian (now Pakistani) frontier as an arbitrary one and describes how unity of folk-poetry was preserved on both sides of it by the powindah seasonal nomads who guarded the caravans which passed from India to Afghanistan.

N. Dvoryankov, again, in "The Folk-Poetry of Afghanistan" (SOVREM.VOS., 1959, No.2), a review of a volume of Pashtu couplets collected and translated into Persian and English by Abdurrauf Benava (Kabul, 1958), after a description of the couplet form and its subject matter quotes examples which illustrate the Afghan people's will to resist the British invader.

Only the last article, a review by A. Gerasimova of C.F. Girs' MODERN LITERARY PROSE IN PASHTU IN AFGHANISTAN, Moscow, 1958 devotes little space to British aggression.

Girs' book, which is the first Russian attempt to give a survey of Pashtu prose, ends in 1956. The author disputes his periodization

and calls his literary analysis weak. She also takes Girs to task for a too narrow definition of the term "educators" (prosvetiteli) as applied to Afghan writers. Girs applies this term to those writers of the fifties who see the root of all evil in the people's ignorance and hold that education will do away with all the troubles of Afghan society. Gerasimova, on the other hand, extends the term to include all writers who have taken active part in the "Active Youth" organization, i.e. Abdurrauf Benava, Nur Muhammad Taraki, Ghulam Hasan Sufi, etc., who want such things as the emancipation of women, the development of Afghan industry and the use of the wealth of the country for the benefit of its people.

Soviet-Afghan relations today

The tone of Soviet political writing on Afghanistan today is principally one of eulogy for Afghanistan's foreign policy and of self-congratulation on the Soviet Union's aid to Afghanistan and the satisfactory state of Soviet-Afghan friendship.

In INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, No.11 of 1958, L. Andrianov said that Afghanistan had rejected Baghdad Pact overtures for an alliance between Afghanistan and the Baghdad Pact powers: "The Soviet Union appreciates this attitude of the Afghan Government, which underscores Afghanistan's loyalty to the treaty of neutrality and non-aggression concluded by the USSR and that country more than 27 years ago." Similarly L.B. Teplinskiy in INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, No.6 of 1959, said that Afghanistan, "notwithstanding the pressure brought to bear by the United States and its satellites", had rejected proposals to join a suggested "union of Muslim countries", and had condemned the USA's own bilateral agreements with Pakistan, Persia and Turkey, as constituting a threat to peace in the Middle East and South-East Asia.

On the theme of Afghanistan's links with the USSR, Soviet writers claim that Afghanistan only won her independence in 1919 thanks to the Russian Revolution, which in the words of L.B. Teplinskiy "created a friendly Soviet state on the northern frontiers of Afghanistan". Soviet writers cite subsequent instances of Soviet friendship and aid for Afghanistan: the Soviet declaration of 27 May 1919 proclaiming unconditional recognition of Afghanistan's sovereign rights; the treaty of friendship between the two nations signed in Moscow on 28 February 1921 and subsequent treaties of 1926 and 1931; Soviet aid in the 1920s and 1930s, including laying a telephone line between Herat and Kandahar, construction of a power-station and a cotton ginnery in Herat and of ginneries in other parts of the country, and the construction of Kabul's first radio station; the

visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin to Kabul, and the signing on 18 December 1955 of a protocol extending the Soviet-Afghan treaty of 1931 until 1966; the signing of Soviet-Afghan agreements on 28 January and 1 March 1956 on a 30-year loan of 100m. dollars to Afghanistan for economic development, and on the construction of more than 15 major industrial projects; the visit of the Afghan Premier Sardar Muhammad Daud to the Soviet Union in October 1956, and the visit of the King of Afghanistan Muhammad Zahir Shah in July-August 1957; the visit of President Voroshilov to Afghanistan in October 1958; and the signing of a Soviet-Afghan trade agreement on 27 April 1959. A detailed survey of Russo-Afghan relations since 1919 is contributed by L.B. Teplinskiy to the symposium NEZAVISIMYY AFGANISTAN, Moscow, 1958, which will be reviewed in the next issue of CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW.

Soviet comment on internal developments in Afghanistan is entirely confined to the economic and social progress which may be expected from projects now under way and from the country's first five-year plan. It is difficult to find any reference to the political situation in the country. A guarded reference to political evolution appears in GOSUDARSTVENNYY STROY AFGANISTANA, by I. Aleksandrov and R. Akhramovich, Moscow, 1956. The authors say (p.45) that "despite their limited powers" local representative organs are gradually exerting more influence on State affairs; measures taken by the Government in this regard "show that the ruling circles cannot fail to take into account new trends in the country, but are furthering them only within such limits as will not affect the political and economic positions of the ruling classes". Evidently it is not Soviet policy at present to enlarge on this theme.

the country. About this event Ibragimova writes: "Alam, it is true, did not understand that Habibullah was afraid not of the feudal leaders but of the peasants [who had risen against the Manchus]. We, however, . . . by reading his MS. can come to this conclusion for ourselves." She also writes that Alam "shows clearly how the English bourgeoisie used feudal enmities in Sinkiang to enslave the country" but gives only one example - the sending of one Zakri-Ishan by Kashmiri feudal leaders to Khotan to overthrow Abdurrahman, one of the leaders of the rising, and seize power. Ibragimova sees the hand of Britain in this because "India was then completely under the influence of England who wanted to seize China also through the hands of Indian feudal leaders."

Ibragimova next gives short but not very informative notes on the writings of Mulla Bilal and MSS. Nos. B418 and D124 in the Institute of Oriental Studies of the AN/SSSR and of some Chinese sources.

A point of interest arises when she comes to deal with V.P. Vasil'yev's article "Chinese are New Russian Subjects", VOSTOCHNOYE OBOZRENIYE, 1894, No.2, where Vasil'yev says that the Russian forces who occupied the Ili valley area in 1871 "came not as conquerors but as liberators from tyranny". Ibragimova points out that although the occupation was progressive in that it, at least temporarily, improved conditions for the peasants, nevertheless it was an act of colonialism.

Russian acts of colonialism in Central Asia are usually justified on the grounds that (a) they brought the peoples of Central Asia into contact with the Russian people and (b) they enabled the peoples of Central Asia to participate in the October Revolution. It would be perfectly logical to argue from this that the Russians ought to have stayed in the Ili area and brought the benefits of revolution to the country 32 years before they in fact arrived. But China is a Communist state and naturally questions of past Russo-Chinese "contradictions" in Central Asia are not pressed.

D. Tikhonov in "Taxes and Tax Terms in the Uygur State (Ninth-Fourteenth Centuries)" aims at determining the types of land tax in use in the Uygur state as a preliminary stage in determining the character of land rent. The correlation between land rent and tax is established by Marx's dictum that where the state is the landlord there is no difference between rents and taxes. Tikhonov approaches the problem by studying the various uses of tax terms in original texts. He deals with the following terms: kupchur, kalan, alban, yasak, salig, tutun, bert, kaylalik, ur, basyk, kurut, sakin, kap, boz, tuntsui and kabas.

(Tikhonov's "Some Problems of the Interior Policy of Yakub Bek" was summarized in CAR, Vol.VII, No.4.)

Agriculture

An account of the importance of the Chinese Army in the economic life of Sinkiang was given in CAR, Vol.V, No.2, pp.145-52. Sabit Mukanov, the Kazakh poet and novelist, in an article entitled "A Trip to China" in SOVETSKIY KAZAKHSTAN, 1959, No.2, gives details of two collective farms founded and worked by soldiers.

The Victory farm near Aqsu was founded by the 5th Division in 1954 when 10,000 former soldiers worked on it. This number has now grown to 30,000. In order to irrigate 1,200,000 mu* of waterless land a 100 km. canal was dug from the Aqsu river together with 1,000 km. of irrigation ditches. As no Chinese machines able to do this type of work then existed Russian machines were used.

In	1954	the ploughed area was	3,000	ha.
"	1955	"	"	10,000 "
"	1956	"	"	16,000 "

The Shikhotsze farm between Urumchi and Kulja was founded by the 8th Division. It covers the same area and has the same number of workers as the Victory. Mukanov gives no details or statistics but describes the well-built houses with running water and sanitation, the gardens with fountains, clubs, schools, sports facilities, hotel, etc., where three years previously there had been a barren desert.

T.R. Rakhimov in "Successes in Solving the National Problem in the CPR", PROBLEMY VOSTOKOVEDENIYA, 1959, No.4, quotes the Chairman of the Sinkiang People's Committee, Sayfuddin Azizov, as giving the following data on the growth of agricultural production: in 1958 the irrigated area surpassed the total for the first Five-Year Plan by 6,610,000 mu, i.e. by 30 per cent. The gross grain harvest reached 200m. puds*, i.e. 57 per cent more than in 1957. Grain production per head of population in 1958 totalled 546.5 kgm., as against 223 kgm. in 1949.

* 15 mu = 1 ha.; 62.5 puds = 1 metric ton

Ethnography and Anthropology

An article by L.V. Oshanin, "The Anthropological Composition of the Population of Sinkiang and the Ethnogenesis of the Uygur People", appeared in TRUDY IN-TA ISTORII AN/KIRG. SSR, 1959, vyp.5. Oshanin gives population figures for the peoples of Sinkiang, but unfortunately quotes them from the GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA, Vol.39, 1956 (article: "The Sinkiang Uygur Autonomous Region") in spite of G.P. Serdyuchenko's criticisms and corrections of those figures in "The Classification of the Peoples and Languages of China", SOVETSKOYE VOSTOKOVEDENIYE, 1957, No.4, which were summarized in CAR, Vol.VI, No.1, pp.78-80.

On the question of Uygur migrations from Sinkiang to Russian Turkestan Oshanin adds little to S.I. Bruk, "The Ethnic Composition and Distribution of Population in the Sinkiang Uygur Autonomous Region of the CPR", SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA, 1956, No.2 (see CAR, Vol. IV, No.4, pp.433-4). After the Manchu conquest (c.1760) in order to replace the original Uygur population of the Ili valley, which had been almost completely destroyed during the conquest, the Chinese repopulated the area with Kashgari Uygurs from the cities of Kuchi, Uch-Turfan, Aqsu, Kashgar, Yarkand, Khotan, Nii and Kerii. Uygurs migrated to Russian Turkestan both from Dzhungaria and from Kashgaria because of Manchu oppression.

In ancient times, Oshanin argues, the population of Sinkiang was European in type and Iranian in language while the modern Uygurs are Turkic in language (although still predominantly European in type). However, as the Uygur race was formed in Mongolia it was presumably not only Turkic in language but Mongoloid in type. Oshanin therefore argues that as the Uygurs moved south they gradually assimilated the original population, replacing their language but only slightly affecting their features. He supports this thesis with 15 pages of anthropological measurements. There is a bibliography of 45 titles. (On the ethnography of Sinkiang see also CAR, Vol.VII, No.1, pp.84-92.)

General

S. Mashurov in an article entitled "Among our Friends", PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN' KAZAKHSTANA, 1959, No.9, reviews Kh. Abdullin's book on his visit to Sinkiang, ON THE ROADS OF SINKIANG. The book shows the benefits brought to Sinkiang and its Muslim inhabitants by Communism. Mashurov praises Abdullin for describing how the Uygurs' national songs and dances are flourishing as never before and for drawing attention, during his description of the kariz (a system of wells joined by underground canals), to the sufferings of the

peasants who had to build them "beaten by the whips of bays and sultans". "Now", the reviewer adds, "[the Uygur people] live freely and happily in the fraternal family of the peoples of multi-national People's China."

Abdullin, however, is criticized for giving an inadequate account of economic and cultural growth, the agricultural collectives and the role of the Party. "Reading the brochure", comments the reviewer, "you do not feel the heroism, the ferment with which the life of the liberated people is now filled."

Abdullin's conclusion that modern Uygur literature is in the process of formation meets with Mashurov's approval. Mashurov, however, does not like his further conclusion that Uygur literature will be able to reflect the "great social battle of the people" only when "the people of Sinkiang are able to write novels, trilogies, epics," but not at present.

T H E I N D I A N S U B - C O N T I N E N T

A general survey of Soviet writing on the Indian sub-continent up to the end of 1957 appeared in CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, Vol.V, Nos.1-4. Other articles on India and Pakistan appeared in Vol. VI, Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and in Vol.VII, No.3. The present article deals with Soviet writing up to the beginning of 1959.

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I. Russo-Indian Relations - II. The History of the British Period in India - III. The Mutiny - IV. The Mutiny to the Twentieth Century - V. The Twentieth Century - VI. Constitutional Reforms - VII. The Communal Problem - VIII. Partition - IX. Kashmir.

I. Russo-Indian Relations

Historical*

A review of K.S. Menon's THE "RUSSIAN BOGEY" AND BRITISH AGGRESSION IN INDIA AND BEYOND by S.M. Mirnyy appeared in SOVETSKOYE VOSTOKOVEDENIYE, 1958, No.6. Mirnyy quotes with approval Menon's argument, which was as follows: since in fact Russia was physically incapable of invading India, and since some highly-placed Englishmen, such as Lord Salisbury and Lord Northbrook, knew this, it follows that the "Russian bogey" was pure invention intended to cover British aggression in Central Asia. This conclusion is backed up by quotations from Englishmen who wanted to invade Central Asia and drive the Russians back to the Caspian. The main threat to British rule in India, Menon says, lay within India itself.

* For an abridged translation of O.F. Solov'yev's "Tsarist Russia's Attitude to India in the Nineteenth and Beginning of the Twentieth Centuries" (VOPROSY ISTORII, 1958, No.6) see CAR, Vol.VI, No.4, pp.448-64. The historical portions of the present article naturally deal with Pakistan as well as India. Material specifically on Pakistan will be reviewed in the next issue of CAR.

Mirnyy also approves of Menon's assertion that the British feared the appeal of Tsarism to the Indians as being "in historical perspective more reasonable" than British rule in India. The Russians, he asserts, treated their Muslims more justly and provided more positions of trust for natives - allowing Muslims to hold commissioned rank in the Russian army, for example. The latter half of this argument (which was also reported by Minayev in 1880, see p. 97) may be true. The "historical perspectives" of Tsarism, however (by which is presumably meant its overthrow by revolution in 1917), can have been visible to very few in the second half of the nineteenth century.

RUSSKO-INDIYSKIYE OTNOSHENIYA V XVII VEKE, Moscow, 1958, is a collection of documents compiled by T.D. Lavrentsova, R.V. Ovchinnikov and V.N. Shumilov and edited by K.A. Antonova, N.M. Gol'dberg and T.D. Lavrentsova. It is the first such collection covering the seventeenth century to contain approximately everything on the subject which has been discovered in the archives of the USSR.

The book's 260 documents comprise imperial charters regulating Russian relations with the East (including India), instructions to Russian officials and merchants setting out for the East, petitions, ambassadors' reports, customs records, etc. They throw light on the role of Punjabi and Marwari merchants as middlemen between the Russian and Far Eastern markets, on Indian settlements in Russia and on the "systematic attempts of the Tsarist Government in the seventeenth century to establish political and economic relations with India, to make use of Indian technical experience and to attract Indian craftsmen to Russia". The material is therefore of interest to students not only of Russian history but of Indian and eastern history generally in the seventeenth century.

The book is illustrated with replicas of some documents and equipped with a list of archaic terms and their meanings, indexes of geographical and proper names, and a list of all the documents with short notes on their contents. Documents in eastern languages are given in text and translation.

Besides its importance as a historical source-book this volume is valuable also as an indication of the high place occupied by Indian studies in Soviet oriental studies and of the impressive efforts which are being made.

P.M. Kemp's BHARAT - RUS, Delhi, 1958 (a book in English on Russian-Indian relations from medieval times to 1917 published by the Indian-Soviet Cultural Society), makes use of printed sources and documents. The above collection, however, contains many more

documents than were available to P.M. Kemp.

Contemporary

There have been few articles on Soviet non-economic aid to India or on Soviet-Indian cultural contacts. M. Matveyev in a short article in NEW TIMES, 1958, No.33, "Soviet Doctors in India", describes the work of the research and practical centre of the Soviet Alliance of the Red Cross and Red Crescent in Delhi of which he is the director. The account is factual and care is taken not to offend Indian sensibilities by suggesting that all the credit for the centre's work is due to Russians.

Two articles relate to cultural contacts. The first, "The Soviet Book in India" by V. Zhitnikova (SOVREMENNY VOSTOK, 1958, No. 9), gives an indication of the scope of translation of Russian books into English and the languages of India and mentions a mobile exhibition of Soviet books which travels from city to city. The second, "The Russian Language in India" by P. Barannikov (SOVREM. VOS., 1959, No.7), gives a factual account of the growth of interest in the Russian language in India. Previously, Barannikov says, Russian was inaccessible to the majority of Indians "in a country under British rule". Having stressed the importance of Russian as a scientific language Barannikov lists the places where it is taught (Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, Hyderabad, Cawnpore, Aligarh, Allahabad and Gaziabad) and reveals that the publication in Moscow of Russian-Hindi and Hindi-Russian dictionaries has been followed by the production of Russian grammars in Hindi.

The bulk of Soviet writing on Soviet-Indian relations is devoted to economic relations. Soviet-Indian trade is justified by Soviet writers on the hard-headed grounds that it is mutually profitable. In M. Kocharyan's article on "Soviet-Indian Economic Collaboration" (SOVREM. VOS., 1959, No.7) Khrushchev is quoted as saying "we are not distributing charity". Here again an attempt is being made to avoid hurting Indian sensibilities. Another reason is given for Soviet aid to India in an unsigned article "Sound Basis" in NEW TIMES, 1959, No.10, on the visit to India of a Soviet governmental delegation led by A.A. Andreyev. Here it is emphasized that Soviet-Indian friendship rests on India's foreign policy: India shares with the USSR "a common desire to promote universal peace". Consequently, the article states, the USSR is interested in building up India's national economy in order to strengthen her international position.

Although Soviet writers admit the profit motive in Soviet

economic relations with India, they do not admit any similarity to the trade and aid of the Western powers. The difference is that Soviet trade and aid is profitable to both parties.

In a general article entitled "Soviet-Indian Economic Relations" in the symposium NEZAVISIMAYA INDIYA, Moscow, 1958, A.A. Kutsenkov brings out this point. Soviet-Indian economic ties, he says, are a continuation of the traditional friendship of the Russian and Indian peoples made stronger by India's peace-loving foreign policy since 1947. The USSR, asserts Kutsenkov, is unlike capitalist countries in that it is not interested in exploiting the people of India. Economic relations between India and Britain are still regarded as "imperialist" because India is still a "dumping ground for surplus produce", most of which she does not need. The USSR, on the contrary, sells India only what is necessary for her expanding economy. The activities of "British and American monopolies" in India Kutsenkov describes as follows: when buying raw materials they artificially lowered the price by temporarily stopping purchases; buying the raw materials at these artificially low prices they made huge profits, because they sold their manufactured goods in India at artificially high prices. Kutsenkov adds that in so far as India depends on Western countries for equipment, raw materials and technical aid this process of exploitation continues. In this connection again Soviet trade is profitable because it breaks the Western monopoly in India.

Kutsenkov goes on to describe Soviet technical aid to India, especially in oil prospecting which, he says, the British had not carried on because they wished to preserve India as a market for Middle Eastern oil. He also contrasts the 2.5 per cent interest rate on Soviet long-term credits for the Bhilai steel works with that of 7.5 per cent on the British credits for the Durgapur works.

S.A. Mikoyan in a review of NEZAVISIMAYA INDIYA in SOV. VOS., 1958, No.6, criticizes Kutsenkov for not bringing out the point that Soviet credits to India are advantageous not only in themselves but because they force capitalist countries to offer similar terms and so give India a double advantage.

In an article in VNESHNYAYA TORGOVLYA, 1959, No.2, entitled "An Important Stage in the Development of Soviet-Indian Economic Relations", G. Velikiy, writing about the Soviet-Indian Trade Agreement of 16 November 1958, besides producing all the arguments given above, points out that the agreement is beneficial to India because: (a) it provides for a "clearing system" and thus involves no expenditure of Indian foreign currency, and (b) it guarantees India both an export market and a source of necessary imports and thus protects her against the instability of the capitalist world market. Velikiy is

careful, however, to add the benefits (in the shape of necessary imports) which the USSR also derives from the agreement.

Finally there is a descriptive article on the Bhilai steel works ("India's Future", K. Perevoshchinov, SOVREM. VOS., 1959, No.4). This article emphasizes the great rise in the standard of living of the local population brought about by the construction of the works, the service done by the USSR in training Indian technicians (Soviet engineers, Perevoshchinov says, are unlike capitalist engineers in that they share both their experience and their technical "secrets" with their Indian subordinates, whether employed in the public or private sector); and lastly "the spirit of Bhilai", i.e. the good relations between Soviet and Indian personnel who not only work together, Perevoshchinov says, but live together like friends and brothers. In this, he goes on, the Russians are very unlike their supercilious Western counterparts at Rourkela (West Germans) and Durgapur (British). These good relations are all the more remarkable, he remarks, in view of the fact that the concept of "foreigner" was associated in the Indian mind with those of "invader", "colonizer" and "boss" and that the Russians had first to break down this barrier.

II. The History of the British Period in India

The Conquest

A recent book on the conquest has been K.A. Antonova's ANGLIYSKOYE ZAVOYEVANIYE INDII V 18-OM STOLETII, Moscow, 1958. Since the book is too large to be reviewed in full, Antonova's opinions on some points of interest are set out below.

Antonova stresses the contribution made by the plunder of Bengal to the British Industrial Revolution. The riches of Bengal gave a new impetus to the process of capital accumulation in Britain. In this respect Britain was in striking contrast with India, where the feudal system was not yet played out. Antonova supports this statement by pointing to the resilience of the Maratha dynasty which swiftly recovered from its defeat by the Afghans at Panipat in 1761, and to the rise, as a result of the temporary weakness of the Marathas, of the Mysore feudal dynasty in the south. This strength she attributes to the high productivity of agriculture aided by irrigation. Since almost all the produce went to the feudal rulers the agrarian system remained stable; the feudal rulers had no reason to want to change it and the peasants were incapable of doing so. Nevertheless, Antonova adds, the growth of the bondage of peasants and craftsmen to moneylenders and middlemen and a certain weakening of the caste system proves that India had begun to develop towards capitalism.

The development, however, was too slow to prevent Britain's victory.

When the interests of the factory owners came to predominate over those of the traders in Britain, and consequently in India, Antonova writes, India came to be regarded as a market for British manufactured goods and as a source of raw materials. "England's tariff policy was consciously directed at increasing the imports of British goods into India and reducing Indian exports to Britain" and thus led to the ruin of Indian workers and craftsmen.

In order to make Indian raw materials accessible railways were built. This led to the growth of capitalist industry. The development of Indian industry, however, was deliberately restrained by Britain in order to prevent India from becoming economically independent. Thus the Indian proletariat suffered all the disadvantages of the capitalist system with none of its advantages.

In a review of Antonova's book in PROB. VOS., 1959, No.3, N.M. Gol'dberg notes that Antonova disagrees with Reysner who held that on the eve of the conquest feudalism in India had begun to decay. Gol'dberg himself takes no sides and merely says that the problem has been insufficiently investigated.

Gol'dberg's main point of criticism of Antonova is that she has ignored certain developments within the Sikh, Maratha and Mysore States which had weakened the Mughul yoke and changed the balance of social forces in favour of the peasantry (Gol'dberg describes Sivaji of Maharashtra as "the leader of the Maratha peasantry"). These developments were: in the Sikh State, an anti-feudal and a liberation movement; in the Maratha State, a liberation movement; and in the Mysore State, an anti-feudal movement. These movements had strengthened the body politic of these states and enable them to put up a stiffer resistance to the British. Bengal, Gol'dberg points out, where there has been no such movement, fell an easy prey to the invaders.

This thesis does not seem to correspond with N.I. Semenova's estimate of the position within the Sikh state before the conquest given in GOSUDARSTVO SIKKHOV, Moscow, 1958.

Semenova draws the usual picture of disintegration and intrigue after Ranjit Singh's death and of the growing power of the army. The army she describes as a patriotic body composed of Sikh peasants in uniform and containing anti-feudal elements. For this reason, and because the army panchayats had in fact taken over control of the state, the feudal leaders wanted to weaken the army by sending it against the British. In this Semenova agrees with Western authorities. She goes

further, however, by asserting that the Sikh leaders brought about the First Sikh War in collusion with the British. The final crossing of the Sutlej by the Sikh army is represented as a "defensive measure" forced on the Sikhs after the British had fired on an inoffensive detachment which had crossed the Sutlej but which had already agreed to go back again.

In her description of the First Sikh War Semenova makes the most of the valour of the Sikh soldiers who, she alleges, were defeated more because of the treachery of their leaders than through any military virtues in their opponents.

The Multan rising which led to the Second Sikh War Semenova represents as having been fomented by the British; for example Captain Abbot is said to have set the Muslim population of Hazara against their Sikh ruler Chattar Singh. The Second Sikh War itself is described from the same point of view as the first.

From Semenova's picture of the Sikh state at the moment of conquest, therefore, it would be possible to argue that the anti-feudal struggle in fact weakened the body politic.

The Punjab land settlement which secured the sardars' estates and recognized the peasant as the owner of the land is represented by Semenova as a mere attempt to win support. Meanwhile, she says, the province was adapted to the needs of colonial plunder and was turned into a market for British goods and a source of raw material for British industry by the introduction of new crops, such as cotton and wheat, together with tax concessions to encourage their cultivation and by the irrigation of deserts. In order to disenchant any reader to whom these measures might at first sight seem progressive, Semenova adds that the first years of British rule in the Punjab brought increased taxes, ruin and pauperization because the attempt to encourage the production of export crops was too successful. The local markets were flooded and, the transport system proving incapable of carrying the produce elsewhere, prices fell and the peasants were forced to borrow in order to pay even the reduced taxes.

E.N. Komarov ("The Land-Tax Policy of the Colonial Powers and the Development of Agrarian Relations in the North-West Provinces of India in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century", *INDIYA: STAT'I PO ISTOR-II*, Moscow, 1959) considers that discontent among the peasants caused by their exploitation by the East India Company provided the main dynamic of the Mutiny. Komarov's long and detailed account deals with the nature of this exploitation. The following is a summary of his article.

At the turn of the eighteenth century the principal method of Colonial exploitation was high taxation, mainly affecting the peasantry. With the growth of industrial capital in Britain in the second decade of the nineteenth century new methods of exploitation appeared. India became a source of raw material and a market for manufactured goods. This second stage led to a change in the British agrarian policy, to the development of private property in land and to the expropriation of the peasant. (Although the peasant had been suffering expropriation during the first period also this was not natural, that is the result of the primary accumulation of capital, but artificial - the result of high taxation.)

In his description of the first stage of British exploitation Komarov gives the usual examples - the expropriation of peasants by zamindars, tax-farmers, the use of torture as a means of collecting taxes, the increase of 43 per cent in taxation between 1807 and 1818 and the consequent destruction of productive forces leading to the famines of 1803-4, 1812-13 and 1825.

Even the second stage, however, Komarov writes, led to no relief for the peasants, for the British tried to raise taxes also as a means of paying for the exploiting of the country by British capital (i.e. of paying for roads, railways and irrigation). The tax settlement of 1833 was based on over-assessment and led to further expropriation of the peasantry, while the reduction in the assessment made in 1855 mainly benefited the large landowners who had replaced the rural communes.

A general article by I.M. Reysner in NEZAVISIMAYA INDIYA, Moscow, 1958, covers "The Basic Stages of the Battle for Freedom of the Peoples of India from the Beginning of the British Conquest to 1947". Rather than split Reysner's article up between the various periods into which this paper is divided it has been decided to include it in full here (except for the period of the Second World War and after, on which he adds little to other accounts).

Reysner says little about the conquest. Suraj-ud-Dowleh, Nana Farnavis, Hyder Ali, Tipu Sultan and Ranjit Singh are regarded as "prominent Indian leaders who tried to unite the country and repel the foreign invaders". Reysner considers, however, that unity was impossible because there was no economic unity and perhaps no national consciousness either except in Maharashtra and Mysore.

The Mutiny, which affected as well as feudal leaders and sepoys "the broad masses of the peasants and craftsmen of North and Central India", was the result, Reysner considers, of a temporary alliance brought about by a common hatred of the British between elements which were separated by national, religious and class differences. The unreliability of its feudal leaders, the disunity of India which allowed the British to use Sikhs and Gurkhas and the sepoys of Madras and Bombay against the Mutineers, and finally the rebels' lack of national consciousness and of democratic ideas which could have "joined and cemented the popular forces", brought about the failure of the Mutiny.

On the question of the Indian bourgeoisie Reysner breaks with past Soviet historians who had concentrated on the "contradictions" between the Indian bourgeoisie and the Indian masses while ignoring the "contradictions" between the Indian bourgeoisie and the colonial régime. The Indian bourgeoisie, he says, "while defending in its own interests the independent economic, political and cultural development of India, could not avoid making democratic demands for the liquidation of national oppression, racial discrimination and the despotic government of the British bureaucracy, and it thus played a progressive role in the liberation movement. It was for this very reason that the people supported the Indian bourgeoisie." Although the National Congress was at the beginning "subjectively loyal" to the British the essence of its demands was "objectively revolutionary".

At its foundation the Congress had no appeal to the masses and was aimed rather at influencing public opinion in Britain. The workers, craftsmen and "advanced peasants", Reysner writes, were first united with the Indian bourgeoisie under the influence of the Russian revolution of 1905-7. Their leadership, however, was divided. Reysner considers that the moderates lost popular support by their policy of collaboration with the authorities, while the extremists, led by Tilak, mistakenly made no attempt to organize the proletariat and even antagonized the people by their policy of terrorism.

Congress, led by Gandhi, finally became a mass party under the influence of the October Revolution and the 1919 Amritsar massacre. Civil disobedience's mass quality paralysed government; but on the other hand Reysner considers that the limitation of the campaign to non-violent means hindered the awakening of class-consciousness among workers and peasants. However, he writes, by 1928 both worker-peasant parties and Communist groups existed, the latter uniting to form the Communist Party of India "by the 1930s". [Reysner here postdates the formation of the CPI which R. Palme Dutt shows in INDIA TODAY to have been in existence in 1921. -Ed. CAR.]

III. The Mutiny

(See also CAR, Vol.V, No.1, pp.78-79.)

Reysner (op.cit.) gives a general assessment of the Mutiny and Komarov (op.cit.) deals with agrarian discontent in the North-West Provinces as one of its causes. There are only two articles on the Mutiny itself.

M.I. Semenova in "The Punjab during the People's Rising in India, 1857-1859" (INDIYA: STAT'I PO ISTORII, Moscow, 1959), notes the importance of the province to the British who had to be prepared to deal with four possibilities: a revolt of the frontier tribes, Afghan intervention, a Sikh revolt and finally a sepoy mutiny. She understandably makes more of the local disorders than is normal with British historians. She admits, however, that the Punjabi peasantry, far from sympathizing with the sepoys, often hated them as an army of occupation. Also the Sikhs had no reason to desire the restoration of the Mughuls which was the mutineers' proclaimed aim.

Semenova gives the following further reasons why there was no rebellion in the Punjab:

- (1) The transformation of the Punjab into a market and source of raw materials for British industry was only beginning.
- (2) Although a high money rent had been introduced, the agricultural commune (obshchina) had been preserved, commune-members had retained their land, certain leaseholders had been given a protected rent and leaseholders of commune land were allowed to continue paying rent in kind. This, together with the tax reductions of the late 'fifties, restrained the peasantry. (See also Semenova's GOSUDARSTVO SIKKHOV, above.)
- (3) The peasants were unarmed.
- (4) The simplifications of the tariff system had promoted trade and won over the traders.
- (5) The British had strong allies in the Jagirdars and the Pathan khans.

British and Indian historians frequently concur in the view that the success of the Mutiny would have been a step backward in India's development as it would have re-established feudal rule. L.R. Polon-

skaya takes issue with this view in "The Social and Political Views of Fazl Haqq" (SOV. VOS., 1958, No.1).

Fazl Haqq was one of the "feudal intelligentsia" whose activities, Polonskaya writes, "objectively" reflected the people's desire for freedom from foreign rule and for national consolidation and thus had immense progressive significance. After the beginning of the Mutiny at Meerut Fazl Haqq went to Delhi where he became a member of the Padishah's Durbar. He was arrested in 1859, tried and sentenced to death. The sentence was commuted to one of life imprisonment and he died in 1870 on the Andaman Islands. Polonskaya quotes in her article from two books on the Mutiny which Fazl Haqq wrote during his imprisonment.

Fazl Haqq's view of the British, as given by Polonskaya, was that they had ruined India's economy and wanted to replace Islam and Hinduism with their own faith.

On the question of Fazl Haqq's opinion of the Mughuls Polonskaya does not deny that he envisaged the restoration of Mughul rule after the Mutiny. She quotes his writings to prove that he "finally understood the inability of the feudal rulers to head the fight against the British". She does not consider what his opinions might have been had the Mutiny succeeded.

However, the "progressiveness" or otherwise of Fazl Haqq's views in themselves is irrelevant from Polonskaya's point of view. They were "objectively" progressive because they favoured India's national independence, which was a first condition for the development of new social-economic relations in India, including the development of capitalism. Even if the Mutiny had succeeded and had been followed by a strong feudal state, it would have been a "progressive" development because the subsequent "anti-feudal battle" would have taken place in conditions far more favourable to the Indian people than in the event. Foreign rule, Polonskaya writes, although it brought some elements of bourgeois development was finally a bar to progress and conserved the most repulsive survivals of feudalism as essential to the existence of colonialism.

IV. The Mutiny to the Twentieth Century

(See also CAR, Vol.V, No.4, pp.410-19.)

Economic

(Both articles in this section are from INDIYA: OCHERKI EKONOMICHESKOY ISTORII, Moscow, 1958.)

S.A. Kuz'min in his article "The System of Land Tenure and the Land Tax Policy of the British Colonial Administration in Sind in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century", has set himself the task of showing why the British in Sind during the first 30 years after the conquest (1843-73) to a certain extent disregarded the interests of colonial plunder. He explains this by Sind's strategic importance as a place d'armes for the further assimilation of north-west India and the Tribal Belt.

The zamindari land settlements in Bengal and elsewhere, Kuz'min writes, had alienated the peasants by depriving them of the ownership of the land in favour of the former tax-farmers, the zamindars, while the ryotwari system applied in Madras and the Bombay Presidency had alienated the jagirdars by bringing them down to the level of simple peasants vis-à-vis the East India Company. In the north of India the alienated classes had opposed the British during the Mutiny. The British policy in Sind, therefore, was to avoid alienating any section of the population by preserving the status quo. Since in Sind the land was owned by zamindars, who paid rent to jagirdars who in turn paid it to the ultimate landowner, the State, the British based their policy on a recognition of the existing rights of the zamindars and jagirdars. They thus, at the cost of a certain loss of revenue, made these classes their allies in further aggression.

By the 'seventies, however, the British position in India was firm and the colonial exploitation of Sind could begin. This exploitation took the familiar form (see above) of transforming Sind into a source of cheap agricultural raw material, a market for British goods and a sphere for the application of British capital. For these purposes, writes Kuz'min, the British found small and medium sized holdings more profitable.

"The agrarian legislation of the colonial powers in Sind," Kuz'min concludes, "was . . . one of the component parts of the policy of the British colonizers which had as its aim the enslavement and imperialist exploitation of India."

L.I. Reysner in "The Role of the Workshop in the Development of Certain Branches of Factory Industry in the United Provinces of India at the End of the Nineteenth and First Half of the Twentieth Centuries", deals with the influence of British industry on Indian industry.

Not all branches of the United Provinces' domestic industry, he writes, were completely destroyed in the course of India's transformation into a dumping ground for British goods. Some, such as the industries of glass making and the production of sugar, were allowed to change over to factory production methods because they did not directly compete with British industry. At the turn of the century and even earlier some domestic industries in the United Provinces had attained the level of capitalist production, with its characteristics of division of labour, mass production and the concentration of power in the hands of large producers. These branches of industry were only one step from the factory system.

The development of factory production, writes Reysner, received no support from the colonial powers and had to compete with foreign manufactured goods. Consequently development took place most swiftly during periods when India was less inundated with cheap western goods - during and immediately after the First World War and during the slump.

The example of the United Provinces, concludes Reysner, proves that not all branches of Indian industry were brought into the country by the West. Some of them grew out of local domestic industries. The rule of British capital could not prevent this development. Nevertheless India's colonial position retarded this development by comparison with other, non-colonial, countries.

Political

An interesting document was published in PROBLEMY VOSTOKOVEDENIYA, 1959, No.3, "A New Document by I.P. Minayev on India in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century". This is the first publication of Minayev's description of his visit to India in 1880 which was recently discovered in the USSR's Central State Archives of Military History.

Minayev found India disturbed. Indian belief in British invincibility had been shaken by the Afghan War and Indians had been irritated by the Arms Act, the abolition of the import duty on foreign cotton goods and the Licence Tax. Minayev writes that the Indians had not only come to believe British outcries about the Russian threat but had begun to prefer the Russians to the British as

being less tyrannical. Minayev also mentions the grievances of the peasants, including the 3.1/2 per cent salt tax. The upper classes of Indian society, he says, resented the cost to India of British rule, the salaries and pensions of Indian Civil Servants, the interest on railway loans, etc., and the impoverishment of their native art and culture.

The population of the principalities, Minayev wrote, especially the Brahmins, considered that their princes were being taught by their British tutors and Residents nothing but "manly sports" and to despise their religion and the ways of their people.

On Britain's side, however, Minayev noted that India was ethnographically, religiously and socially divided, that there were strong British forces in the States, that the most discontented section of the populace, the peasants, were unarmed and without leaders and would not rise spontaneously, while the intelligentsia would be satisfied with compromise. He therefore concluded that the British could secure their position by making concessions to "that part of Indian society which, while it does not like the British, admits that their dominion is for the time being essential for India", i.e. the intelligentsia.

V. The Twentieth Century

Soviet writers find the phenomenon of the Indian Army puzzling. As if unwilling to believe that a predominantly native army could remain loyal in a country which they habitually represent as seething with discontent and perpetually on the point of revolution they normally write not of the Indian Army but of the "Anglo-Indian Forces", giving the impression that both British and Indian units were part of one and the same organization in which the proportion of British to Indian soldiers was at the least one to three, rising at times to one to two. They also make the most of any incidents of unsteadiness or disloyalty in Indian units. In this connection A.V. Raykov's "The Anglo-Indian Army and the National Liberation Movement in India, 1905-1907" in *PROB. VOS.*, 1959, No.2 (which, although it mentions the "Anglo-Indian Army", in fact deals only with Indian units) contains some interesting details from the confidential letters of Russian consuls in India.

Raykov describes the agitation among the Indian soldiers, who were "dissatisfied with the colonial regime" because of discrimination, low pay and bad food and treatment, which was carried out by Congress extremists who had chosen the false path of conspiracy and terror instead of trying to organize the masses. Raykov attributes to

this agitation seven incidents between 1907 and 1915.

1907: A soldier of the 89th Punjabis was court-martialled for an anti-British speech. Sikhs refused to fire on Punjabi peasants in Lahore and Rawalpindi.

1914: The 5th Light Infantry Regiment mutinied in Singapore on receiving orders to go to the European theatre of war. There was an attempted mutiny in Lahore.

1915: Courts-martial were held in several regiments in connection with attempted mutinies in Ferozpur, Lahore and Meerut.

The Russian Consul-General, Nabokov, reported that among the British of Rawalpindi there was fear of a mutiny in the Indian Army.

The most important incident reported by Raykov, however, took place in 1909 when a conspiracy was discovered in the 10th Jat Regiment in Calcutta. The Russian Consul in Calcutta, Arsen'yev, wrote first that 35 sepoys had been arrested. In a later letter, however, he wrote that the number involved was unknown and gave the following details: the 10th Jats had been detailed for guard duty at a Christmas ball to be given at the Residence of the Governor of Bengal, at which the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief were to be present. The conspirators had plotted to blow up the ball-room. They were betrayed and the regiment was immediately transferred to Hyderabad. All details of the conspiracy were suppressed.

Raykov admits that the nationalists were not very successful with the Indian Army, and gives as the reasons the superior strength of the British and their cunning in being able to use caste, religious and national differences within the Army in order to keep it under control.

T.F. Devyatkina, in "The Workers' Movement in India, 1918-1922" (INDIYA: STAT'I PO ISTORII, Moscow, 1959 - see also I.M. Reysner's article above), writes that it was during this period that the Indian working class, though few in numbers, showed itself to be one of the most progressive forces in India's social life. It differed from the other classes of Indian society both in its demands and in its method of battle - the strike. This method it contributed to the general anti-imperialist movement.

During the 1920s the demands of the Indian trade unions were mainly economic, but their battle was interwoven with the anti-imperialist battle of the bourgeoisie and intelligentsia. Politically the working-class followed Congress.

Congress, however, alleges Devyatkina, wanted only to use the workers' strikes, not to make them an integral part of the anti-imperialist battle. The independent political action of the workers of Bombay in 1921 in connection with the Prince of Wales' visit alarmed the Congress leaders. The development of the workers' interests showed the need for a working-class party. Such a party began with the organization of Communist groups in the 1920s. [Devyatkina, like I.M. Reysner, differs from R. Palme Dutt about the date of the foundation of the Communist Party of India. See I.M. Reysner's article above. -Ed.]

The most important recent Soviet book on the history of India has been NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA INDII, Moscow, 1959, which covers the period from 1917 to the present day. The book is illustrated and contains an extensive bibliography and indexes of geographical and proper names. Its great length (759 pages) makes it impossible to do it full justice here. The treatment given by the various authors to some subjects of interest is summarized in Chapters VI-VIII below.

VI. Constitutional Reforms

All constitutional reforms are regarded as having been wrung out of a reluctant British Government by the national liberation movement and as being concealed attempts at preserving the essence of British rule in India while changing its appearance.

So T.F. Devyatkina, writing in Section I about the Government of India Act of 1919, says that its main aim was to preserve the rule of British imperialism in India. Of the "diarchy" she says: "This deliberately confused system. . . in essence deprived the newly created organs of any chance of effective action." She draws attention also to the small electorate, the supreme power of the Viceroy and Governors and the irresponsibility of the executive. V.V. Balabushevich (Section II) writes that the Act "gave the upper layers of Indian society the most insignificant concessions, including the right to participate in the solution of second-class local problems," but was "used to strengthen British rule in the country".

A.M. Mel'nikov (Section IV) writing about the Act of 1935 says that the federal scheme "strengthened the union of the British ruling circles and the Indian feudal reaction" and "made it possible to make even wider use of the reactionary feudal forces in the battle against the national liberation movement". On the other hand he notes that the Princes and landowners were afraid that the federal scheme would make possible the development of certain democratic freedoms in British India which might then spread to the States.

On the question of Congress Ministries after the election of 1937 Mel'nikov simplifies the issue. In fact Congress authorized Congress Ministries only where they were assured that "the Governor will not use his special powers of interference or set aside the office of Ministers in regard to their constitutional activities" (All-India Congress Committee resolution of March 1937). The deadlock was resolved by the Viceroy's declaration of 22 June that all Governors would be anxious "not merely not to provoke conflicts with their Ministers. . . but to leave nothing undone to avoid or resolve such conflicts". Congress accepted office on this understanding while recognizing that the Viceroy's declaration "fell short of the assurances demanded". On the subject of the Viceroy's declaration Mel'nikov writes simply: "In these circumstances [a growing wave of strikes and peasant unrest] the British ruling circles were forced to yield to the National Congress, i.e. to agree not to resort to the Provincial Governors' special powers." He also asserts that in the interim the British had tried to form non-Congress Governments "relying on reactionaries, yes-men and bourgeois-landlord organizations." Such Governments were those of Fazl-ul Huq in Bengal and of Sikandar Hayat Khan in the Punjab.

A.M. D'yakov (Section VI) writes of the Pethwick-Lawrence Mission that while in India it did its best "through its network of agents (agentura) in the leadership of the Muslim League. . . [to prevent] Congress and the League reaching agreement on the future Constitution". He represents the liberty to be given to the Provinces to form subordinate unions as a firm proposition that there should be such unions, and states that this is a concealed form of partition. [D'yakov does not deny that it was in the Congress that dissatisfaction with the Pethwick-Lawrence plan was to be found. The question therefore arises, what did the Mission's "agents" in the League accomplish? D'yakov presumably means that the "British agents" induced the League to reject the plan after Congress had accepted it. -Ed.]

VII. The Communal Problem

(See also CAR, Vol.V, No.2, pp.186-94.)

Soviet writers consider that there was no communal problem in India except when the British provoked it as part of their "divide and rule" tactics. T.F. Devyatkina (Section I) writes that although the Khilafat Movement of the 1920s included Muslims of all classes the majority of them were not interested in religious questions and even thought that the movement was named after the Urdu word Khilaf ("against") and was directed against British rule in India. He maintains that the Muslim League at this time, and until the late 1930s, played an insignificant role in political life, the majority of Muslims following Congress.

V.V. Balabushevich (Section II) admits that there was some Muslim disenchantment with Congress leadership after the breakdown of the civil disobedience campaign, which enabled the British to provoke communal clashes. As a result organizations appeared aimed at converting Muslims to Hinduism and Hindus to Islam. The Muslim League is represented as an extremist organization analogous to the "Hindu chauvinists" of the Hindu Mahasabha. "The broad masses - Hindus and Muslims - had little interest in these quarrels."

In the period 1928-33 (Section III) L.R. Gordon-Polonskaya considers that although there were "contradictions" between the British and the Muslim landowners and bourgeoisie, which found expression in the League's refusal to collaborate with the Simon Commission, yet "that which united [them] was stronger than that which held them apart. With the support of the most reactionary Muslim circles the British colonizers managed even to give an anti-Hindu direction to the activity of independent Muslim groups within the national bourgeoisie." This led to the breakdown of the attempts of Congress to find a common platform with the League.

Up to 1937, A.M. Mel'nikov writes (Section IV, 1934-39), neither the League nor the Hindu Mahasabha had any mass following. After the election, however, the British wanted to split the anti-imperialist movement into Hindu and Muslim parts and the activities of the League and the Hindu Mahasabha made this easy for them.

In spite of the growth of anti-imperialist feeling among the Muslims, writes Mel'nikov, the League managed to increase its numbers by recruiting petty-bourgeois Muslims in the towns, and used their anti-imperialist feelings for its own purposes. "While carrying on a policy of intensifying Hindu-Muslim discord the British imperialists

laid the responsibility for this discord exclusively on the Indians. At the same time they made the future status of India depend entirely on the solution of the communal problems."

Hindu-Muslim riots are represented in all cases as having been provoked by the British by means of their mysterious agentura. Cases where the police took sides or did nothing are pointed out as proofs. The possibility that the police themselves might have religious allegiances is not considered. A.M. D'yakov (Section VI) alleges that the use by the Calcutta rioters in 1946 of service fire-arms "witnesses to the fact that the police and armed forces supplied them with weapons from military arsenals."

VIII. Partition

(See also CAR, Vol.V, No.2, pp.194-204.)

As has been seen, the whole communal question is regarded by Soviet writers as a part of the British imperial policy of "divide and rule"; and it is maintained that Britain supported the Muslim League against Congress, which in turn involved support of the League's demand for Pakistan. The British supported Pakistan also because they hoped to use it as a military base in the future, and because the consequent Pakistani - Indian discord would enable them to pose as an "impartial arbiter" and "preserve the possibility of interfering in the political life of India" (A.M. D'yakov, Section VI).

On the problem of the States no mention seems to be made of Mountbatten's strong suggestion that they should join one or the other of the new Dominions. D'yakov, however, asserts that the door was left open for them to retain their former relations with Britain. "This was no accident. The British imperialists counted on turning certain of the States into bases within the new Dominions." Yu.P. Nasenko (Section VII) takes the same view and writes that the British hoped that the States would remain linked to Britain. The British supported the Nizam of Hyderabad, he says, because they "wanted to create a military base [there]".

IX. Kashmir

Soviet writing on Kashmir is still concerned mainly with the India-Pakistan dispute, in which the USSR supports India. The two articles to be dealt with add nothing to Y.Popov's "Kashmir - Artificial Issues" in NEW TIMES, 1957, No.10 and A.M. D'yakov's book INDIYA VO VREMYA I

POSLE VTOROY MIROVOY VOYNY, Moscow, 1952, which were analysed and discussed in CAR, Vol.V, No.3, pp.286-9. S. Mikoyan and L. Moskalenko in their article "The State of Jammu and Kashmir" in SOVREMENNY VOSTOK, 1958, No.6, like the earlier writers assert that the conflict grew out of British and American desire that Kashmir should join Pakistan, which was more subject to their influence than India. The invasion of tribesmen from Pakistan was organized by British and American officers in an attempt to force the issue. At this "pressure of public opinion" forced the Maharaja to appeal to India for help and to declare Kashmir part of India. No mention is made either of the fact that the Maharaja was a Hindu while three quarters of the population of Kashmir is Muslim, or of the promised plebiscite. The authors write that the partition of Kashmir along the cease-fire line has been preserved in spite of the determination of the people expressed by their representatives to remain in India. Failure in the talks between Pakistan and India on the future status of Kashmir is laid at the door of Pakistan and of America which has drawn Pakistan "into [its] system of military blocs which are following an aggressive course".

O. Grinyov in an article in INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1958, No.12 entitled "Who wants an International Police Force?" states that agitation for international police forces only begins when "armed aggression by the USA or some other Western Power, encountering stubborn popular resistance, suffers inevitable and complete defeat and its sponsors increasingly lose prestige and become internationally isolated." Kashmir "is India's internal affair and can and should be settled by her alone". To send even an international police force to Kashmir would only be a manoeuvre by some Western Powers to fan hostility between India and Pakistan and to exert pressure on Nehru.

Kashmiri Literature

A short article on this subject by U. Rustamov appeared in ZVEZDA VOSTOKA, 1958, No.10 - an issue devoted entirely to the Tashkent Afro-Asian Writers' Conference. Rustamov starts with a short sketch of Kashmir's ancient culture and literature and mentions the role played by British scholars in the study of Kashmiri.

Rustamov is mainly concerned with poetry of social criticism whose origin he traces to the beginning of the twentieth century "under the influence of the national liberation movement in the East". Three poets of this type are given special mention - Ghulam Ahmad Mahjur (1888-1952), Abdul Ahad Dar Azad (1902-48) and Dind Nath Nadim (1916-).

Mahjur, Rustamov writes, sang of the liberation of man, of the brotherhood of peoples in general and of those of India and Pakistan in particular. During the disturbances of 1931 he took a revolutionary and patriotic line. Dar Azad is stated to have become during the 'thirties and 'forties "the standard bearer of social and political revolution" and to have raised his voice against religious fanaticism. Nadim's poetry was rescued from mysticism by the national liberation movement in Kashmir. He now supports Kashmiri political independence and a radical land reform.

N E P A L

There has been little Soviet writing on Nepal and what there is seems to draw exclusively on printed sources. None of the work under review gives the impression of being based on personal observation.

The most important work published during the period under consideration (1958-9) has been I. Red'ko's *NEPAL*, Tashkent, 1958, which draws largely on the press of India and on books by British and Nepali writers. The British books, Red'ko asserts, are written with the intention of disguising the character of Britain's colonial policy in Nepal, while the Nepali writers, although they give a true picture of Nepal's battle against colonialism, express the interests of the bourgeoisie and the young national intelligentsia.

Red'ko says that the British, in the person of the East India Company, were at first interested in Nepal only because it had trade links both with India and Tibet, and the Company hoped to use Nepal as a stepping-stone towards trade with Tibet. Desire for Tibetan trade grew with the financial crisis of 1770 brought on by the Bengal famine, and the first official mission was sent to Tibet in 1774. The 1792 trade agreement with Nepal and the attempted agreement of 1801 are both to be interpreted in this light.

Nepal showed resistance and the war of 1814 was fought to force her to submit. The border incidents were mere excuses. Red'ko explains the high degree of independence granted Nepal by the Treaty of Segauli by asserting that the Company, which had been able to conquer India because it was divided, could not conquer a united Nepal.

Unable to gain its ends by conquest the Company resorted to intrigue and supported the Rana clan against the anti-British statesman of the time, Thapa Bhim Sen. Jang Bahadur Rana was a British puppet.

Nepali support of the Company in the Sikh wars and the Mutiny gave the British the idea of using Nepal as a source of cannon-fodder for her colonial wars while governing the country through the Ranas. The recruitment of Gurkha soldiers was arranged by a deal which "secured a supply of cannon-fodder for the English colonial armies and unbounded exploitation of the masses by a handful of Nepali feudal lords".

Red'ko denies that the Ranas brought stable government. "On the contrary, . . . the battle for power. . . flamed up with new force" within the Rana clan.

Of the Nepali Congress Party, which became active after the Second World War, Red'ko writes that it represented the interests of the aristocracy and bourgeois intelligentsia and contained many class "C" Ranas and Rana exiles. These factors conditioned its policy which was to come to a compromise with the Ranas. On the other hand the volunteers who fought the State forces under Congress leadership were genuine patriots who thought that Congress policy was anti-feudal and anti-imperialist. When the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN), which was founded in 1949, called for a united front against feudalism and imperialism and the left wing of Congress threatened to join them the right wing hastily called for a cease-fire, thereby saving the Ranas from complete destruction and betraying their followers.

Red'ko gives a detailed account of Nepali politics between 1951 and 1957, drawn mainly from the Indian press. He avoids attaching too much importance to the CPN. It is said to represent the "progressive intelligentsia and the workers" but is mentioned very seldom.

In his summing up, however, Red'ko emphasizes that Nepal's revolution is still unfinished. The King's power is still great and democratic reforms are slow in coming. The State apparatus remains as it was under the Ranas.

The continued recruitment by Britain of Gurkhas is mentioned with indignation. No mention is made of the existence of Gurkha regiments in the Indian Army since the transfer of power. Red'ko asserts that the Americans, who would like to use Nepal as a base of operations against China, have sent spies into the country in the guise of missionaries, tourists, specialists, mountaineers, etc. These "spies" besides photographing the Nepal-China border also stir up feeling against India.

There have been three reviews of Red'ko's book: A. Malov's "A Book about Nepal's Rebirth" in ZVEZDA VOSTOKA, 1958, No.10; Yu. Gankovskiy's "A New Book on the History of Nepal" in SOVREMENNY VOSTOK, 1958, No.10; and L.R. Polonskaya's review in PROBLEMY VOSTOKOVEDENIYA, 1959, No.2. Of these only the last deserves attention. The others merely summarize the book and express more or less complete agreement with Red'ko on all points. Polonskaya criticizes Red'ko on a number of points. The most important are that he should have explained why the national liberation movement in

Nepal took place after those in the Indian States, made clear the influence on all Nepali political parties (except the CPN) of the Indian Congress Party, and finally given a fuller account of the peasants, proletariat and workers and of their role in the fight for freedom.

An article by B. Kudryavtsev in INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1958, No. 6, entitled "Nepal Today" covers the same ground as Red'ko. Like Red'ko he assigns the economic backwardness of the country to British dominion and also agrees that Britain's only interest in the country was as a source of cannon-fodder. Unlike Red'ko he mentions United States aid to Nepal and its extent, and alleges that it has led to "increased American influence in the country's economic and political life".

V. Senin in SOVREM. VOS., 1958, No.7, "A Country in the Himalayas", seems to regard the Ranas rather as "pro-British feudal lords" than as British puppets. He calls the settlement of 18 February 1951 a "victory of the progressive forces".

Nepal's ethnography has been dealt with by N.R. Guseva in "The Population of Nepal", SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA, 1958, No.5. The author gives details of the dress, housing, religion, occupation, customs, economic status, etc., of the Newars, Gurkhas, Bhotis, Sherpas and Tharus. The sources are Russian and English books, and books published in English in India and Nepal, none more recent than 1953.

The historical sketch adds nothing to Red'ko. Recruitment of Gurkhas is mentioned and it is stated that when after the Second World War "the colonizers tried to use them to crush the liberation struggle of the peoples of South East Asia. . . progressive organizations [in India and Nepal] to a considerable extent achieved satisfaction of their demand [that Gurkhas should not be recruited for such purposes]."

T I B E T

The Soviet view on events in Tibet, as one might expect, corresponds faithfully to that of China. An analysis of Soviet treatment of events up to 1954 is given in *CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW*, Vol.VI, No.1, pp. 59-75; this covered Soviet writing up to 1957 and the following survey brings it up to date. Soviet writers believe, or profess to believe, that during their period of domination in Asia the British had colonial ambitions in Turkestan and needed Tibet as a springboard from which to stage aggression. This line is followed by, among others, B.P. Gurevich in his book *OSVOBOZHDENIYE TIBETA*, Moscow, 1958. He says that the Peking Conference of 1886, the Younghusband Expedition of 1903-4, the Calcutta Trade Agreement of 1908, the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 and the Simla Convention of 1913-14 were all stages in this policy of aggression. Gurevich notes that "although in all these treaties and agreements. . . England formally acknowledged China's suzerainty over Tibet in fact the British colonists carried out a different policy".

The Tibetan people, already oppressed by their own feudal lords and clergy, found themselves doubly oppressed after the establishment of British influence and therefore opposed the British as a matter of course. On the other hand those members of the upper classes who opposed the British did so only because they wished to be left to exploit the Tibetan people undisturbed. In addition to being anti-British the Tibetan people were pro-Chinese. They shared Chinese culture and traditions, and Tibet had always been part of China.

After the Second World War British colonial ambitions in Tibet were inherited by the USA, whose intention was to use the country as a base from which to crush Chinese Communism and turn China into a colony. Forced by the necessity to defend themselves against growing Anglo-American provocation the Chinese invaded Tibet in 1950.

A point requiring elucidation is Gurevich's reference to British provocation in Tibet after the transfer of power in India. He has in mind the fact that after 15 August 1947 the British Mission in Lhasa suffered a change of name to the Indian Mission but no change of personnel. He implies that this mission carried out espionage and provocatory activity after the transfer of power but without the knowledge of its new master, the Government of India. The fact that the Government of India inherited British interests in Tibet and

regarded the British treaties as valid and applying to India is attributed by Gurevich to "the influence of exterior imperial forces who still held in their hands some important levers of the political and economic life of the new Dominion". This argument, however, could hardly be applied to explain Indian acceptance of the McMahon Line in the present dispute.

Ye. Leonova, reviewing Gurevich's book in an article entitled "The Establishment of the People's Power in Tibet", SOVREMENNY VOSTOK, 1958, No.6, criticizes him for giving no details of "the historical, traditional connexions of Tibet and China, their unity of culture, political interests, way of life and customs." She herself, however, gives no more details than Gurevich.

The Tibetan Uprising of 1959

A short survey of Soviet press reports of this event appeared in CAR, Vol.VII, No.2, pp.202-3. A PRAVDA article of 30 March was reprinted in NEW TIMES, 1959, No.14. As this article was summarized in the survey mentioned above it will not be dealt with here.

As might be expected the periodical press does not differ from the daily press in its treatment of the uprising. K. Krutov, "Imperialist Adventure", INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1959, No.5, and B.P. Gurevich, "The Collapse of the Imperialist Plot in Tibet", SOVREM. VOS., 1959, No.5, both attribute the rising to the machinations of imperialist agents, both of the USA and Kuomintang, with the help of the feudal nobility and Buddhist clergy and assert that the Chinese armed forces enjoyed the help and support of the Tibetan people. Gurevich gives some details of Chinese aid to Tibet between 1951 and 1959 without which, he asserts, the Tibetan people were in danger of dying out. Tibet is again affirmed to be a part of China, and foreign protests are "interference" in China's internal affairs.

In a later article in MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, 1959, No.6, "The Provocateurs have Miscalculated", Gurevich attacks Western attempts to raise the Tibetan question in UNO and their hopes that India might raise it. To counter this possibility he makes use of quotations from the Indian press, especially one from JUGANTAR which draws an awkward parallel between Chinese action in Tibet and Indian treatment of the Nagas. The ultimate aim of American diplomacy, he asserts, is to draw India into SEATO.

Geography

TIBET by B.V. Yusov, Moscow, 1958. This book, a physical geography of Tibet, contains sections on relief, climate, hydrography, flora and soil, fauna and the physical geography of the various regions of the country. The bibliography, which contains 124 titles and covers both Russian and Western works, contains also 13 works of Chinese geographers.

Linguistics

A long article on this subject by Yu.N. Rerikh "Basic Problems of Tibetan Linguistics" appeared in SOVETSKOYE VOSTOKOVEDENIYE, 1958, No.4. The article is purely factual. In it Rerikh names the various dialects of Tibet, gives the areas in which they are spoken and lists some peculiarities. Among other themes dealt with are the question of Tibetan pronunciation in the seventh and eighth centuries (which he studies on the basis of Tibetan transliteration of Sanskrit words) and the problem of the creation of a new literary language which should be as near as possible to the spoken language and be able to deal with modern themes.

T H E B O R D E R L A N D S
I N T H E S O V I E T P R E S S

Below are reviewed reports on the Borderlands countries appearing in Soviet newspapers received during the period 1 September - 31 December 1959.

Indian-Chinese relations

In the Soviet press the Indian-Chinese border incidents and the dispute between India and China were treated in the most carefully objective manner. Both the Chinese and the Indian accounts of the incidents were given, and the official statements and communications of both sides were reported. No Soviet press comment as such was published, but a Tass statement of 9 September which appeared in newspapers complained that Western political circles and newspapers had launched a "noisy campaign" trying to exploit the dispute and drive a wedge between China and India and to prevent the lessening of international tension. The statement expressed regret at the frontier incident, involving two countries with which the USSR enjoyed the most friendly relations, and expressed confidence that China and India would settle the misunderstanding in the spirit of the traditional friendship between their two peoples.

PRAVDA (24.11.59) noted that Nehru had denied any possibility of a change in India's foreign policy as a result of the Indian-Chinese dispute. Later (10.12.59) PRAVDA noted that Nehru had reaffirmed India's devotion to the "five principles" of peaceful coexistence and her resolve not to join any military blocs.

Indian-Soviet relations

The foremost Indian topic in Soviet newspapers throughout this period was the progress of work on the Bhilai steel works being built with Soviet aid under an agreement concluded on 2 February 1955. In the second half of December, in particular, newspapers published lengthy articles and full-page features on the progress achieved and on its significance for India's economy and for Soviet-Indian friendship. On 30 December newspapers published a message of congratulations sent to Nehru by Khrushchev on the completion of Bhilai's second Marten

furnace, blooming mill and continuous rolling mill and the consequent start of rolled steel production.

Soviet participation in the World Agricultural Fair, which opened in Delhi on 11 December, was another subject that received considerable notice in the Soviet press. The exhibits in the Soviet pavilion were described at length, and their lessons for Indian and eastern agriculture in general were emphasized. The President of the Soviet Chamber of Commerce, M.V. Nesterov, was quoted as saying: "The participation in the Fair of countries with different social and economic systems will visibly demonstrate which road of agricultural development the socialist or the capitalist, is the more successful and offers the brightest prospects."

The Indian Communist Party

The only aspects of Indian Communist Party activity reported in the Soviet press during this period were those relating to foreign affairs. Soviet newspapers reported (22.9.59) the Indian Communist Party statement on the tenth anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic, calling for closer Indian-Chinese friendship in the face of attempts by reactionaries to exploit the Indian-Chinese frontier incidents; the Party's declaration on the October Revolution anniversary praising the domestic and foreign policies of the Soviet Union (PRAVDA 9.11.59); and the resolution of the Party conference held in Meerut expressing support for attempts to reduce international tension, including the Indian Government's own efforts in this direction (PRAVDA 15.11.59).

Pakistan's defence preoccupations

Occasional articles on Pakistan published in the Soviet press during this period depicted the Pakistani Government and press, and President Ayub Khan himself, as last-ditch opponents of any relaxation of international tension. IZVESTIYA (1.12.59) said that President Ayub Khan had been trying to frighten the West by recent statements of his about alleged Russian and Chinese plans to advance to the Indian Ocean; and a Pakistani newspaper had published an article demanding more arms for Pakistan and her CENTO allies. TRUD (4.10.59) denounced as fabrications Pakistani newspaper allegations that Soviet and Chinese aircraft had been flying over Pakistani territory, operating from airfields in Afghanistan, and that Russians held key posts in all departments of the Afghan Government. PRAVDA (5.10.59) said that Pakistani newspapers had published a sensational story about the Soviet Union and Afghanistan having concerted "a secret plan for drawing the Muslim countries into the Communist bloc". All these

"provocative" stories, the Soviet newspapers maintained, were being used by Pakistan to maintain the cold war atmosphere and to justify the "aggressive" posture of the CENTO and SEATO alliances.

Soviet accounts of Persian policy

The Soviet radio attacks on the Persian Government found only a slight reflection in the Soviet press. Earlier in the year the Shah's rule was described as a "reign of terror" (PRAVDA 3.7.59); but by September the tone of Soviet articles had become more moderate, and A. Ermolayev's long article "A Bankrupt Policy" in IZVESTIYA of 2 September, deplored the economic effects of Persia's defence commitments and the alleged deterioration of living standards, set an example which was followed in subsequent months, particularly in the Central Asian press. The only solution for Persia, it was maintained, was a return to the policy of neutrality and "non-participation in aggressive blocs".


Soviet-Afghan relations

The most publicized event in Soviet-Afghan relations during this period was the visit of an Afghan parliamentary delegation to the USSR at the invitation of the Supreme Soviet. (For details see pp.57-58.)

KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA of 21 November published an account of a visit to Afghanistan by a large group of Soviet tourists led by Z.Sh. Radzhabov, corresponding member of the Tadzhik Academy of Sciences. According to Radzhabov they were the first Soviet tourists to visit Afghanistan.


THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
OF
KAZAKHSTAN, KIRGIZIA, TADZHIKISTAN,
UZBEKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN AND AZERBAIDZHAN

100 0 100 200 300 Km.



- Borders of the U.S.S.R.
- Limits of Union Republics.
- Capitals of Union Republics.
- Railways.
- Canals.
- Canals under construction or projected.
- Sands.
- Main arterial road with pass.

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CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

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Abbreviations

Abbreviations used in the Review when referring to the Soviet Academies of Sciences, and to newspapers and periodicals etc. employed as sources, are as follows :-

AN/SSSR	Akademiya Nauk (Academy of Sciences) of USSR
AN/Az. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Azerbaydzhana SSR
AN/Kaz. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Kazakh SSR
AN/Kirg. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Kirgiz SSR
AN/Tad. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Tadzhik SSR
AN/Turk. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Turkmen SSR
AN/Uzb. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Uzbek SSR
SAGU	Sredneaziatskiy Gosudarstvennyy Universitet (Central Asian State University)
BR	Bakinskiy Rabochiy
I	Izvestiya
KP	Kazakhstanskaya Pravda
K	Kommunist
KT	Kommunist Tadzhikistana
KZ	Krasnaya Zvezda
NT	New Times
P	Pravda
PV	Pravda Vostoka
SK	Sovetskaya Kirgiziya
SU	Soviet Union
TI	Turkmenskaya Iskra
VVS	Vedemosti Verkhovnogo Soveta

CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

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EDITORIAL

From the findings so far published it seems that the 1959 census will provide fuller information about the nationalities of Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan than the 1939 census, although perhaps not so full as the 1926 census. There are still some important lacunae, which may perhaps be filled later. Thus, for instance, although about 99 per cent of the population of the RSFSR is covered by the statistics given, less than 88 per cent is accounted for in Kazakhstan. This is perhaps due to the fact that the repatriation of the Chechens, Ingush and others who have been living in Kazakhstan since 1944, is still not complete. On the other hand, 418,000 Chechens and 106,000 Ingush are now shown as living in the RSFSR.

The new census gives a much clearer idea of the extent of non-Asian (Russian, Ukrainian and Belo-Russian) settlement in the Muslim republics. The figures are as follows:

Uzbekistan	1,189,000
Kazakhstan	4,884,000
Azerbaydzhan	515,000
Kirgizia	761,000
Tadzhikistan	290,000
Turkmenistan	284,000.

This gives a total of 7,923,000 out of a total population in the six Muslim republics of 26,676,000.

The 1959 census shows a marked increase in the Turkic population of the USSR as a whole. In 1926 this was 17,193,741 (including the Yakuts, Chuvash and a number of smaller nationalities). In 1939 the total was 19,753,934, allowing for a 20 per cent increase in the

smaller nationalities not mentioned in the 1939 census. Making a similar allowance for small nationalities still not mentioned in 1959, the total of the Turkic Peoples in the USSR is now 23,202,000.

. . .

During 1958 and 1959 a number of articles appeared in Soviet periodicals about the forthcoming XXVth International Congress of Orientalists which is now to be held in Moscow next August. Most of these articles contained pointed references to the preoccupation of Soviet orientalists with "the collapse of imperialism" and "militant anti-colonialism". This naturally gave rise to some apprehension lest the Soviet hosts at the XXVth Congress should try to depart to some extent from the traditionally academic character of the Congress. As if to allay such apprehension, VESTNIK AKADEMII NAUK SSSR, No.1 of 1960, contained a brief article by B.G. Gafurov, the director of the Institute of Oriental Studies in the Academy, setting forth the aims of the coming Congress. This article was in marked contrast to previous articles on the subject and contained no mention whatever of colonialism, imperialism or any other theme with a political slant. It ended, however, with the following passage: "None of the Soviet scholars intends, of course, to force his own point of view on any of the foreign scholars or on the Congress as a whole. There can be no question of this. At the same time, Soviet orientalists do not conceal and do not intend to conceal the fact that in all their research work, and in their very approach to the various problems of orientalism, they are governed by Marxist-Leninist methodology and consider this methodology to be the only correct one."

. . .

During and immediately after the XXth Party Congress held in February 1956 the attention of Soviet orientalists was drawn to the mistakes they had made in underestimating the part played by the national bourgeoisie in the struggle for economic and political independence in eastern countries. It was pointed out that these mistakes had resulted in the dialectical conception of the dual nature of the national bourgeoisie being replaced by a one-sided conception of it as the faithful ally of imperialism in the struggle against the working masses. From such a stand-point the political activity of the national bourgeoisie could only be represented as a series of vituperations, betrayals, and demagogic manoeuvres. Since the XXth Party Congress there have been several indications of a further change in the Soviet attitude towards countries outside the USSR in respect of what the

Party regards as "bourgeois nationalism". A useful summary of the present line can be found in a recently published pamphlet called **OBNOVLENNYY VOSTOK** (The Changed East) by I.Y. Podkopayev. It reads as follows:

"The history of the post-war years provided convincing evidence of the fact that among the many-sided revolutionary processes taking place in the east, two lines could be clearly distinguished in the development of the nationally independent states - one under the direction of the proletariat and its advance guard, the Communist parties, and the other under the control of the national bourgeoisie. Where the proletariat is in control of a state, it uses its commanding position to carry out sound social changes which have everywhere undermined the basis of the control of foreign capital and internal reaction, and have cleared the way for a swift forward movement on the road to socialism. The development of countries where the state power is in the hands of the national bourgeoisie under whose control political independence was achieved is different. Here, even after the imperialist yoke had been done away with, the capitalists and landowners aim at profiting as far as possible at the expense of the workers. While the progressive forces in these countries aim at going along the road of socialist progress and the reinforcement of national independence against the wishes of the imperialists, the internal reactionary forces, often instigated from outside by the imperialists, pursue a directly opposite policy. The state structure in these countries is naturally quite different from the state structure which has been established in countries of the socialist type. But as N.S. Khrushchev showed in his concluding speech at the XXIst Party Congress, although these states are not socialist, they cannot be treated in the same way as the states of the imperialist system. Having acquired national independence as a result of their struggle for freedom, they wish to go their own way, by-passing the capitalist stage of development, in order to finish with the colonial yoke and to rebuild their society on new foundations. It is precisely for these reasons that many statesmen of the sovereign states of the East are well disposed towards the socialist countries. Not only do they not regard them as antagonists and opponents of their aspirations towards the construction of the new life, without the imperialists and without the colonial yoke, but they are establishing with them the most friendly relations."

A particularly interesting feature of Mr. Podkopayev's pamphlet is that in enumerating the People's Democracies of the East he makes no mention whatever of the Mongolian People's Republic.

. . .

VESTNIK AKADEMII NAUK SSSR, No.12 of 1959, gives details of the establishment of an Institute of Africa as part of the Academy's Department of Historical Sciences. The tasks of this Institute are described as including "the study of the development of African countries which have gained independence; the political and economic situation in African colonies as this is developing during the collapse of the colonial system of imperialism, and the struggle of the oppressed people for national liberation; the peasant and labour movements in African countries; the study of the contradictions and new forms of colonialism among the imperialist powers; and the exposure of reactionary ideological trends." Dr. I.I. Potekhin, the well-known Soviet expert on African affairs, has been appointed director of the Institute.

For the purpose of analysing the now considerable Soviet output on Africa, CARC is shortly adding an African section to its monthly MIZAN NEWSLETTER. It is hoped to start this new series in June this year.

. . .

One of the matters on which Kazakh writers are sometimes at variance with the Party authorities is the extent of the part which the Kazakhs themselves should or do in fact play in the affairs of their republic. An instance of this recently came to light in an article called "A Vigorous Programme of Action" in PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN' KAZAKHSTANA, No.1 of 1960, on the subject of the new lands campaign. It appears that a certain Shamshatov recently wrote a brochure called "The Struggle of the Party Organization of Kazakhstan for the Mastery of the Virgin Lands" in which "he confuses his readers by cruelly distorting generally known facts. In defiance of the truth, he tries to show that the mastery of the new lands in Kazakhstan began, not after the historic plenum of the Central Committee of the KPSS in 1953, but apparently a long time before that." The article goes on to say: "By this very statement I. Shamshatov casts aspersions on the enormous part and the self-evident organizing activity of the Central Committee of the KPSS under the leadership of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev, the originator of the virgin lands plan. I. Shamshatov tries to present the all-nation

assault on virgin lands as 'a purely Kazakh' phenomenon; but it is well-known that the former leaders of the republic not only failed to exercise themselves in the mastery of the new lands but actually resisted the realization of this vast agricultural and political enterprise."

In this connexion, it is of some interest to recall that at the time of his dismissal Mr. Khrushchev described Shayakhmetov, the Party First Secretary, as an honest official but too weak to be left in charge of such an important republic. There was never any suggestion that he had "resisted the realization" of the virgin lands campaign.

The article concludes with an apology by the editors for their "most serious mistake" in publishing in No.11 of PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN' (1959) a favourable review of I. Shamshatov's "vicious brochure".

. . .

On 11 March 1960, the Central Asian Research Centre received a visit from Mr. K.M. Abdullayev, President of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, and a well-known geologist. Mr. Abdullayev spent over an hour in the Centre. He was introduced to all the members of the staff and was shown the Centre's publications in which he displayed considerable interest. He was able to carry away an impression of the wide scope of the Centre's activities, including as they do linguistics, and cartography.

During his visit of several weeks to the United Kingdom, Mr. Abdullayev delivered an informal address at St. Antony's College Oxford on the Uzbeks and other peoples of Central Asia. After his address, he answered a number of questions and those present were impressed with the wide range of his knowledge and with the vivid picture which he gave of developments in Central Asia.

T H E D E V E L O P M E N T O F
H I S T O R I C A L S T U D I E S I N A Z E R B A Y D Z H A N
I N T H E S O V I E T P E R I O D

Medieval history and archaeology - Modern and current history -
General historical studies - Difficulties of historiography -
History of the Party.

The present article is an attempt to trace the growth of the study of the history of Azerbaydzhane as carried out in the Republic itself. The source material used consists of two articles by A.S. Sumbat-zade, the vice-president of the Azerbaydzhane Academy of Sciences, published in VOPROSY ISTORII during 1957 and 1959,* and of certain articles in KOMMUNIST and the Azerbaydzhane press on the history of the Party.

. . .

Before the Revolution there was no territorial division of Russia known as Azerbaydzhane, nor were the Azerbaydzhane recognized as a distinct nation or community. They were usually referred to as Caucasian Tatars, Musulmans of the Caucasus, or simply as Muslims. (See CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, Vol.VII, No.2, 1959, p.133.) The study of the history of Soviet Azerbaydzhane and of the Azerbaydzhane of the Soviet Union did not therefore begin until after the Revolution with the founding of the Azerbaydzhane State University in 1920. The Oriental Faculty of this University then began to teach the history of the country.

* 1. The Development of Historical Science in the Azerbaydzhane SSR during the Soviet Regime - VOPROSY ISTORII, No.11, 1957.
2. Historical Science in Azerbaydzhane between the XXth and XXIst Party Congresses and prospects for the future - VOPROSY ISTORII, No.10, 1959.

In 1923 a society for research into and study of Azerbaydzhan was founded, and became an important centre of local historical studies. The Institute of the History of the Party, attached to the Central Committee of the Azerbaydzhan Communist Party, was set up in 1928 and devoted itself in the first place to the translation and publication of the "classics of Marxism-Leninism". The codification and publication of local historical sources was the concern of the Azerbaydzhan State Scientific Research Institute founded in 1929 until the latter's embodiment in the Azerbaydzhan department of the Transcaucasian branch of the All-Union Academy of Sciences. Historical research and the publication of historical works was further extended in 1935, when a special Azerbaydzhan branch (filial) of the All-Union Academy was established, later, in 1945, to become the separate Azerbaydzhan Academy of Sciences. According to Sumbat-zade historical and related studies are now mainly concentrated in various institutes of the Academy of Sciences and particularly those of history, oriental studies, language and literature, architecture and art, and philosophy. The history of the Party continues to be studied in the special institute created for the purpose.

To the brief survey of the historical work carried out by the Academy of Sciences which follows, there has been added a short account of the recent work done by the Institute of the History of the Party.

Medieval history and archaeology

In view of the antiquity of Azerbaydzhan, archaeology is an important branch of historical research. In 1926-7 archaeological expeditions were working in the Nakhichevan' ASSR and the autonomous oblast of Highland Karabakh. Excavations were carried out in the Mil'skaya Step', Mingechaurl and the Khanlar rayon. At Mingechaurl fourteen occupation levels were discovered showing that the site was inhabited from the second millennium B.C. until the Middle Ages. The earlier excavations led to the identification of a number of ancient cultures and gave some background for determining their mutual relationship and chronological setting. This provided a framework for subsequent research, whose scope widened with the growth of the number of archaeologists in the country. Considerable progress has taken place since the last war; results obtained from the excavations of Mingechaurl are being published and excavations of Kyul'tepe in the Nakhichevan' ASSR are going on. The examination of the pictures engraved on the rocks of Kobystan near Baku is progressing. They were discovered in 1939 and are believed to include work executed at various times between the end of the Stone Age and the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries A.D. A number of works on ancient Azerbaydzhan have been published but the history of Atropatene (fourth to second


centuries B.C.) and Transcaucasian Albania is still largely a blank.

In the 1920s and early 1930s works on medieval Azerbaydzhan began to appear. One of the pioneers was Bartol'd, who gave a series of lectures at the Azerbaydzhan University. At the same time work started on the publication of historical sources which were to serve as a basis of more thorough research; oriental source materials are still being published. Archaeology also plays an important part in the study of medieval history and the excavations at Kabala, Old Gyandzha (Ganjuh), Oren-kala, the palace of the Shirvan shahs at Baku and other sites have yielded important information on the life of medieval Azerbaydzhan. The study of numismatics is also being extended.

The interpretation of medieval history reflects the Marxist interests of the historians. Priority is given to social and economic history, and particularly to that of the ninth to thirteenth centuries, which period, according to Sumbat-zade, is "noteworthy owing to the expansion of feudal economy and culture in the countries of Central and South-West Asia". (VOP.IST., 1959, No.10, p.124.) But religious history of the same period is neglected, as well as of the seventh and eighth centuries when Azerbaydzhan formed part of the Arab caliphate. The seriousness of this omission is emphasized by Sumbat-zade; in his early article he comments that "the medievalists of our republic are faced with the task of further widening and deepening their research into the development of the early feudal and medieval towns, particularly between the ninth and the beginning of the thirteenth centuries, the history of class struggle in medieval Azerbaydzhan and of the culture of the Azerbaydzhani people. Special interest is attached to the work on dividing feudal relations in Azerbaydzhan into periods." (VOP.IST., 1957, p.215.)

Modern and current history

As regards modern and current history, the chief subjects of research are the "unification" with Russia together with the political and economic background serving to justify the need for it; conditions in Tsarist Azerbaydzhan regarded from the point of view of the inevitability of the Revolution; the Revolution itself together with the Civil War; and finally, the happiness and tremendous achievements of the Azerbaydzhani people under the benevolent Soviet Government. The propaganda value placed upon history is shown by the special attention devoted to the occupation of the country by the British, Germans and Turks in 1918-19. The "foreign occupation" theme was particularly emphasized during the last war: "During the war", says Sumbat-zade, "the attention of the historians of our republic was absorbed by the history of the centuries of heroic war waged by the Azerbaydzhani people against foreign invaders. Our historians, Z.I.



Azerbaydzhan SSR

State frontiers.

Union Republic frontiers.

Autonomous oblasts.

Railways.



J.P. 1968

Ibragimov, Ye.A. Tokarzhevskiy, I.A. Guseynov, M.A. Kaziyev, Z.I. Yampol'skiy, P.N. Valuyev and others, produced works devoted to the valour and bravery of the Azerbaydzhanis in their struggle against foreign invaders in the Middle Ages, and to the years of the united revolutionary struggle of the nations of our country against Tsarism, landowners and capitalists, amidst the flames of class battles of 1917-1920 and in the days of the Great Patriotic War. These works have helped to inspire the toilers of Azerbaydzhan, and above all our youth, with the spirit of whole-hearted devotion to our socialist country and the Communist Party." (1957, p.209.)

The writing of such works was aided by the publications of historical sources, their character largely conveying the purpose which they were to serve. Very important among these is the two-volume set of documents edited by I.P. Petrushevskiy in 1936(1), which throws light on the agrarian problems and the colonial policy of Tsarism in Azerbaydzhan.

After the war, according to Sumbat-zade, the historians' interests remained very much the same: "Much attention was paid to the history of the union of Azerbaydzhan with Russia and its significance for the Azerbaydzhani people. Some aspects of this problem were dealt with in [university students'] theses. Although their authors correctly estimated the progressive historical value of the union of Azerbaydzhan with Russia, their unmasking of the colonial policy of Tsarism in Azerbaydzhan was unsatisfactory. Many works and articles of our researchers dealt with the social and economic history of Azerbaydzhan in the nineteenth century. One of the main fields of our historians' researches was the study of the revolutionary struggle in Azerbaydzhan at the turn of the nineteenth century. Between 1946 and 1950 the Azerbaydzhan branch of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism alone published sixteen volumes of Trudy (Miscellaneous Studies), a considerable number of which were devoted to this problem." (1957, pp.211-12.) These activities were further encouraged by the need to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the first Russian Revolution and the fortieth of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1955 and 1957 respectively - for which, says Sumbat-zade, the historians prepared with "tremendous enthusiasm", their main theme being "the history of Soviet Azerbaydzhan, the heroic struggle of the Azerbaydzhan toilers for the triumph of the Soviets and the participation of the Azerbaydzhani people together with the other peoples of the Soviet Union under the leadership of the Communist Party in the construction of socialism and the gradual transition to Communism." (1957, p.212.) The anniversaries were marked by the increased output of such works as Kh.O. Alimirzoyev's SOVIET AZERBAYDZHAN - THE CHILD OF THE GREAT OCTOBER REVOLUTION; but in spite of this Sumbat-zade complained in his 1957 article that "too few fundamental works on revolutionary struggle in Azerbaydzhan have

been compiled and published" (p.216).

The "union" with Russia continues to be one of the main subjects of interest. A major work on it recently published was written by G.B. Abdullayev:(2) commenting on it Sumbat-zade writes: "The author. . . conclusively proves that as early as the second half of the eighteenth century quite a strong tendency of the Azerbaydzhani people to join fortunes with the Russian people became observable. The disintegration after the death of Fatali-khan of Kuba of the political union he had created (Kuba, Derbent, Baku, Shemakha, Sal'-yan etc.) and the resumption of the Persian invasions from the middle 1790s rendered the joining of Azerbaydzhani territory with Russia a pressing necessity." (1959, p.125.)

According to Sumbat-zade, the agrarian situation in Azerbaydzhan at the turn of the nineteenth century has received much attention in the past few years, its various aspects - particularly the significance of the "peasant reform" of 1870 - being more critically analysed. But he considers that the economy of Azerbaydzhan at the beginning of the present century as well as the history of its industry, transport and towns, require further investigation. In addition, some problems relating to the working-class have not been adequately dealt with, for the historians, as a rule, are interested chiefly in revolutionary movements and the class war and they neglect the material situation and the process of formation of the working-class, particularly in the provinces. Another neglected field of study is the history of the Azerbaydzhani multi-national bourgeoisie, which is important for a better understanding of the revolutionary and post-revolutionary period. One of the shortcomings - inadequate knowledge of the struggle of Azerbaydzhani toilers for the triumph of socialism and the gradual transition to Communism - has lately been remedied as a result of the campaign against survivals of the personality cult and dogmatism initiated by the XXth Congress of the Party in 1956. (1959, pp.127-8.)

General historical studies

In the development of historical studies a stage is inevitably reached which requires their synthesis in the form of a more or less authoritative general history. The expansion of historical research outlined above provides a background of this process in Azerbaydzhan. The first works of this type, by Ye.A. Pakhomov and V.M. Sysoyev, appeared in Baku in 1923 and 1925 respectively(3); apart from their various weak points which could hardly be avoided in view of the fact that historical studies were only beginning to develop at that time, the authors "frequently did not observe Marxist methodology". In 1928 another general history, by R. Ismailov, followed(4), but instead of pointing out its shortcomings due to the still inadequate knowledge of

history, Sumbat-zade believes that its most important fault is that "this work reflects bourgeois nationalist ideas" (1957, p.209). Another attempt was made in 1941 but this time the fault was its low standard of scholarship.(5) In 1946 the Institute of History of the republican Academy of Sciences produced another general history but again it proved inadequate(6); although it contained considerable factual material, like its predecessors it did not cover the Soviet period, and had a number of methodological errors and other serious though unspecified shortcomings. Thus the task had to be undertaken once more and in 1954 a two-volume draft (maket) was produced. It was the first work of its type to include the Soviet period and although it dealt with a number of important subjects including the heroic struggle of the national masses of Azerbaydzhan against foreign invaders, the century-old connexions of the country with Russia, the struggle for the victory of the Soviet regime and the participation of the Azerbaydzhanis in the construction of socialism, there were factual mistakes as well as "erroneous appreciation of numerous vitally important problems of the history of Azerbaydzhan, transcribed from some monographs and other works" (1957, p.213). Now at last a three-volume history of the country edited by I.A. Guseynov, Sumbat-zade and others is being produced. The first volume, published in 1958 and covering Azerbaydzhani history from antiquity up to the "union" with Russia, represents a "Marxist-Leninist elucidation" of the subject which has so far escaped serious criticism. But Sumbat-zade comments: "It is, however, necessary to state that the historians of Azerbaydzhan do not pay enough attention to the study of Soviet Azerbaydzhan and the problems of the present time. One of the examples of this attitude is, first of all, the fact that the collective of authors and the editorial board of the three-volume history of Azerbaydzhan have ignored all the dates set for the preparation and publication of the third volume which should deal with the history of Soviet society in Azerbaydzhan. This is the more regrettable because in the coming year, 1960, the Azerbaydzhani people will celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the establishment of the Soviet Government in the republic." (1959, p.132.)

Difficulties of historiography

Sumbat-zade's two articles throw considerable light on the difficulties under which historians in Azerbaydzhan, as elsewhere in the USSR, must labour. The interdependence between historiography and the frequent anniversaries it must honour naturally lowers the quality of the former, as regards both scholarship and technical standards. Historical literature is also adversely affected by its long-term planning as if it were an industry: thus Sumbat-zade gives a long list of works to be published, some as late as 1965 (1959, p. 132), though it is likely that some of them have not yet been started

by the historians to whom they are assigned. Whether such planning takes into account the individual needs and difficulties in preparing each of these works, factors which are bound to affect the time allowed for their production, it is difficult to say. Yet another inevitable complication is to be found in the need for the historian to adapt his interpretation to the Party resolutions - for example, he must re-interpret various problems of recent history because the XXth Party Congress has condemned dogmatism and survivals of the cult of personality. It is no doubt for this reason that scholars, such as those engaged in the preparation of the three-volume history of Azerbaydzhani, prudently resort to the interpretation of the country's more distant past and remain insensitive even to the approaching fortieth anniversary of Soviet rule in their republic.

History of the Party

Research into the recent history of Azerbaydzhani is clearly a delicate task and offenders may suddenly find themselves the object of attacks not only by the local but even by the all-Union press. This fate befell a number of works recently published by the Azerbaydzhani Institute of the History of the Party. The approach of the storm was heralded by the plenum of the Azerbaydzhani Central Committee in June 1959 which in rather general terms declared that "all Party, trade union and Komsomol organizations are required to improve their conduct of international education of the toilers and particularly youth and decisively oppose even insignificant manifestations of nationalism and chauvinism wherever they appear. Lectures and debates must be held more frequently on the Leninist nationalities policy of the Communist Party, friendship of the Soviet peoples and the great achievements of the brotherly Soviet republics. It must continually be impressed on the workers that the Azerbaydzhani people owe all their successes to the wise leadership of the Communist Party and the fraternal help of the great Russian people and other Soviet peoples." (7) From this the next step was to put under scrutiny the work of the Institute as one of the most important sources of correct opinions and V. Yu. Akhundov deplored the fact that "interpretation of the history of the Azerbaydzhani Communist Party and the revolutionary movement in the republic is not free from distortion of historical facts or from lack of objectivism in explaining the historical role of individual persons." His speech also revealed that escapism was not limited to historians since "in the work of some writers, painters and composers a tendency is evident to depart from contemporary subjects and idealize various aspects of the past." (8)

The Institute of the History of the Party, attached to the Azerbaydzhani Central Committee, since its foundation in 1928 until recently limited its activities to the publication of the "classics of

Marxism-Leninism" in the vernacular. Recently, however, it has made an attempt to satisfy better the requirements of the Party and has published a number of works, some in association with the republican Academy of Sciences and the Board of Archives (Arkhivnoye upravleniye). It is curious that though some of these works were published as early as 1957, for example NOTES ON THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT OF THE AZERBAYDZHANI PROLETARIAT, no objection seems to have been made to them until 1959, when they were suddenly attacked at the Azerbaydzhani plenum and denounced in such authoritative periodicals as the official journal of the Soviet Central Committee, KOMMUNIST (No.14), and PROBLEMS OF THE HISTORY OF THE KPSS (No.5). The criticism was faithfully repeated and even added to by the Azerbaydzhani Central Committee and reported in BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY (the organ of the Communist Party of Azerbaydzhani). The first volume of the HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF AZERBAYDZHAN (author not given), and NOTES ON THE HISTORY OF THE STRUGGLE OF THE AZERBAYDZHANI COMMUNIST PARTY FOR THE VICTORY OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT by M.S. Iskenderov (director of the Institute), both published in 1958, have been found particularly offensive. The following is a brief summary of the main points of criticism contained in KOMMUNIST and BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY.

Although the criticism in both papers is broadly speaking on the same lines, the Communist Party of Azerbaydzhani is plus royaliste que le roi, and is much more outspoken than the KPSS, which even sees some merit in Iskenderov's work. The main point of difference is that whereas the KOMMUNIST article says that Iskenderov's book properly connects events in Azerbaydzhani with those outside it, and shows how the local Party organizations carried out the directions of all Party Conferences and the Central Committee, and propagated the great ideas of Lenin, the BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY article says exactly the opposite. Both articles find that there are manifestations of nationalist narrow-mindedness, distortions of historical truth and idealization of various aspects of the past. Both books give an inaccurate description of the social and economic situation of Azerbaydzhani at the turn of the nineteenth century, and exaggerate the capitalist development of the Azerbaydzhani village. The last-mentioned error results in the pre-revolutionary backwardness of the country being understated and consequently the benefits derived from the Revolution.

Iskenderov is charged with failing to associate the history of the Revolution closely enough with the situation in the whole of Transcaucasia and does not show clearly enough the effort of the Bolsheviks to organize the toilers for the purpose of the common revolutionary struggle. Both criticisms emphasize the failure of the Azerbaydzhani Institute of the History of the Party to do justice to the work of "distinguished Bolsheviks" such as Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, Shaumian, Dzhaparidze, Knunyantz, Mirzoyan and Kirov (with the

exception of Kirov, all these are Georgians and Armenians, although this fact is not mentioned), and its over-glorification of Nariwan Narimanov, an Azerbaydzhani, who, KOMMUNIST points out, committed many mistakes in realizing the nationality policy of the Party.

The official Party view is that both these books minimize the role of the Baku proletariat and the Russian working-class in the struggle to establish proletarian dictatorship in Azerbaydzhan. The nationalist interests of the authors of both books make them depart from the principal of proletarian internationalism in the working-class movement, and this results in their exaggeration of the independent role of the Azerbaydzhani Hemmat Party. Neither Iskenderov's book nor the History show the extent to which Transcaucasian workers, whatever their nationality, were united in the revolutionary struggle.

These official criticisms of the Institute of the History of the Party make it abundantly clear that the only correct interpretation of the history of the revolutionary period is one which show Azerbaydzhan as an indivisible part of Transcaucasia, attached for better or worse to Russia. The unpalatability of this notion to many national historians is no doubt one reason why they feel more comfortable when when dealing with the more remote past.

Notes

- (1) KOLONIAL'NAYA POLITIKA ROSSIYSKOGO TSARIZMA V AZERBAYDZHANE V 20-60kh GG. XIX V.
- (2) IZ ISTORII SEVERO-VOSTOCHNOGO AZERBAYDZHANA V 60-80kh GG. XVIII V. Baku, 1958.
- (3) Ye.A. Pakhomov, KRATKIY KURS ISTORII AZERBAYDZHANA, Baku, 1923; Sysoyev, NACHAL'NYE OCHERK ISTORII AZERBAYDZHANA, Baku, 1925.
- (4) ISTORIYA AZERBAYDZHANA, Baku, 1928.
- (5) ISTORIYA AZERBAYDZHANA; author not given.
- (6) OCHERKI ISTORII AZERBAYDZHANA.
- (7) BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 25.6.59.
- (8) Ibid., 11.7.59.

I S L A M I N A Z E R B A Y D Z H A N

The Soviet attitude towards the Muslim religion as practised in Azerbaydzhan has been the same as in other Muslim territories of the USSR. After stating, in the famous declaration of 5 December 1917, that Muslim beliefs and customs, national and cultural institutions, were to be forever free and inviolate, the Soviet regime proceeded to pursue a policy of implacable hostility to Islam not only on account of its supernatural beliefs, but because of its way of life which militated against material progress and productivity. With only occasional lapses, such as during the Second World War and for a time during 1955 and 1956, anti-Islamic propaganda has been steadily maintained. It has, however, varied considerably in quality and intensity: it began with crude and violent denunciations and ridicule of Muslim beliefs and customs; this, however, was early disapproved of by Lenin, who advocated the exploding of what he regarded as religious fantasies and superstition by scientific argument and demonstration.

Islam reached what is now the Azerbaydzhan USSR in the middle of the seventh century. As elsewhere, it quickly ousted the existing religion, in this instance Zoroastrianism, but retained many of its superstitions and part of its mythology. Its development, however, differed in some respects from that in Central Asia. It was more inclined to fanaticism, partly because of the presence of Shiism and the violence associated with the Shii observance of the month of Moharram, and partly because of the close proximity of the Christian nations of Armenia and Georgia. Even before the Revolution, the more fanatical practices of Islam were disapproved of and condemned, not so much by the Russian rulers of Transcaucasia, as by the more enlightened element of the Muslim population. A pioneer in this respect was EKNINCHI, a periodical which began publication in 1875, and this was joined later by another magazine, MOLLA NASREDDIN (see CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, Vol.VIII, No.1 p.14); but the traditional beliefs and practices of the population were difficult to suppress, and they survived to become an embarrassment to the Soviet regime.

The Soviet-Muslim rapprochement following on the declaration of 1917 did not last long. In 1922 the Commissariat of Nationalities divided the Muslim peoples into several categories according to their disposition to accept atheistic propaganda. The nomadic peoples were believed to be most suitable owing to the absence of religious

fanaticism among them, while those with a large bourgeoisie, such as the Uzbeks, were found to be the least susceptible; the Azerbaydzhani occupied the fifth place after the Volga Tatars, Bashkirs, Kirgiz and Crimean Muslims.

The resistance of some republics to atheism was acknowledged in early Soviet legislation. The 1923 constitution of Azerbaydzhani included a clause concerning the separation of Church and State since the country was then part of the Transcaucasian Federation, but this clause was not modified by special decrees as it was in Armenia and Georgia. Voting rights were not uniform throughout the Soviet Union; while in the Christian republics the clergy could neither vote nor be elected, in Azerbaydzhani a special decree conferred this right on the mullas.(1) Muslim religious courts were not suppressed in Turkmenistan and the Caucasus until 1927 and this was the prelude to a general attack against religion in the ensuing period of collectivization and industrialization. It is interesting to note that a textbook on literature by Shaik, an Azerbaydzhani poet and teacher, which declared that "culture imbued with atheism is the greatest evil for mankind" continued to be used in the Azerbaydzhani schools until 1927. It was then attacked at the XVIth Party conference by Ali Gaydar Karayev(2), who played an important part in the sovietization of the country. Karayev was liquidated in the purges of the 1930s.

Anti-religious propaganda had a difficult task before it. School-children covered their ears in order not to hear atheist harangues, and many Party members attended all religious services. Some teachers included religious knowledge in their lectures and there were peasants, especially in the Nakhichevan' ASSR, who either refused to take confiscated land or returned it to the rightful owners because they considered it immoral to accept illegally confiscated property. Such incidents were reported by the Azerbaydzhani press of 1928.(3)

As regards Muslim religious ceremonies, observance of Moharram was particularly difficult to suppress and the campaign against it was at its height in 1925-8, with the press as its main instrument. It is necessary in this connexion to remember the significance of Hosain in the Shiite cult - to swear by Hosain or his brother, Hazrat Abbas, was more than to take an oath in Allah's name. Thus the Bolsheviks had to destroy the belief in Hosain's sanctity, and the battle of Kerbela was exploited to interpret the origin and early history of Islam in purely materialistic and economic terms. Popular stories about the battle, which mixed fact with fiction, were now employed by the Bolsheviks to destroy its religious significance - for example, it was popularly believed that Ashura, the tenth day of the month of Moharram, lasted seventy-two hours - to emphasize Hosain's suffering - and this point was much ridiculed by "scientific atheists". Before the beginning of

Moharram special courses for propagandists were held in order to instruct them how to enlighten the population, and satirical periodicals, including MOLLA NASREDDIN, devoted their whole attention to the coming event. The campaign could boast a measure of success - thus ZARYA VOSTOKA of 25.7.25 reported that mourning processions in Gandzha had become much smaller, while on 12.8.25 BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY added that attendance at mosques had dropped by 50 per cent and there were no street processions in Baku. But the same paper of 3.8.25 stated that some old Party members had attended the Moharram ceremonies and said they had no idea that this was incompatible with their Party membership. The campaign widened in the following year when women began to take part in the activities of the Society of Atheists. By 1929, so far as can be inferred from the press, the most spectacular forms of mourning had largely disappeared, although some processions were held even in the Baku area and a procession at Bala Oglan, Kubin province, turned into an anti-Soviet demonstration. The authorities interpreted it as an attempt to help the mullas who were embittered by the confiscation of their "surplus bread", and the leader of the procession, Molla Daniar, was shot and twelve other men sentenced to forced labour.

Other religious observances were also attacked, though not as violently as Moharram. Chief among them was the fast of Ramazan (ninth month of the lunar year). Although the Koran excused the sick, travellers, children and pregnant women from this duty, the Bolsheviks condemned it outright, apparently because "in the Soviet republics, where human work and strength have a high value, such a harmful practice as orudzh (fast) cannot be tolerated any longer, for here the obligation of workers is clear: to develop our industry and to increase production in order to free us from the supremacy of foreign industry and not to bow before world capitalism." (K. 4.3.27.) Other religious feasts were also condemned, particularly Kurban-Bayram commemorating the sacrifice of a ram by Abraham ("that heritage of idolatry and paganism encouraged by the mullas" involving mass sacrifice of rams at Mecca) and Nauruz-Bayram which in fact was a pre-Islamic spring festival to celebrate the beginning of the new year.

The Azerbaydzhan branch of the Union of Militant Atheists (SVB) had been set up in the last months of 1924, and in the following March an SVB organization was set up in Baku in order to "unite all class-conscious workers and peasants in an active campaign to bring about the spiritual liberation of the workers from the narcotic of religion and to replace it with a scientific, materialistic outlook." (BR. 14.4.25.) But the SVB did not achieve any noticeable success, although its members kept increasing so that by the end of March 1926 these numbered between 1,200 and 1,400. The Azerbaydzhanis evidently gave it little support since by May of the same year only 25 of them had completed its three-month anti-religious courses. (K. 9.5.26.) It was not until the

second half of 1928 that it could expand its activities in the countryside. The number of its native members also kept increasing and in 1927 the SVB could boast 25 per cent of Azerbaydzhanis (12 per cent in 1926) among its 3,000 members, and there were 36 of them among the 73 people who had completed the atheist courses. (K. 29.5.27.) After a large increase of membership in the early 1930s, the SVB seems to have declined in the following years and on 12.4.1937 BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY complained that "in a number of establishments, sovkhozes and kolkhozes, atheist cells no longer exist and the chairman of the Azerbaydzhani SVB, Khuluflyu, has turned out to be an enemy of the people". (BR. 12.4.37.) He was promptly liquidated. The contemporary press reveals that the situation was much the same throughout the Soviet Union. Literary anti-religious propaganda also left much to be desired and the Azerbaydzhani press criticized its quality: books and pamphlets were few and original works constituted a very insignificant proportion, for they were mainly translations unsuitable from the point of view of Muslim needs, with the exception of theoretical discussions on the nature of religion.

In 1921-2 the Komsomols had begun to close mosques, apparently with the authorities' approval, but such measures were condemned by the XIIIth Congress of the Party in 1924. Soon afterwards announcements began to appear in the press about the conversion of mosques into schools, clubs and other public institutions. The process was speeded up during the general attack on religion in the later 1920s; thus in 1928 in Shemakha 13 of those "nests of owls, centres of obscurantism", as they were officially branded, were demolished and the material used to build a theatre while in the Agdash rayon 36 mosques were turned into cultural establishments. (K. 30.12.28, 4.2.29.) This was allegedly done at the request of the Azerbaydzhani workers, but in KOMMUNIST of 19.10.29, S.M. Efendiyev, chairman of the Azerbaydzhani Central Committee thus described the campaign: "Instead of conducting a well-planned and normal struggle against religion, it all comes to the confiscation of mosques. On one occasion something like socialist competition was launched in the villages, namely 'who will confiscate the most mosques'." (K. 22.10.29.) But the process went on until the last war, the chief mosques of Baku, the Taza-Pir, Memedli, Khadzhi Baba and Kasim-bey preserving their religious character until 1935.

In 1928 a direct attack on Islam started under the leadership of Mustafa Kuliyeu, the well-known Commissar of Education. This campaign, described as a "cultural revolution", had the following objects: eradication of all religious sentiments among the Party members, extension of the anti-religious activities of the Party, reorganization and further development of the SVB, intensification of the struggle against the kulaks who upheld religion in the countryside, and the improvement of atheist instruction in the schools and of atheist

literature.

In June 1928 the press began to publish Kuliyeu's report on "The Cultural Revolution and Islam" where he "scientifically" refuted the dogmatic side of Islam. He also conducted public debates in which the mullas were invited to defend their beliefs; but most of them did not attend and their absence was ascribed to the barrenness of these beliefs.

At the same time the wearing of the Caucasian fur hats by men and of veils by women was condemned by Kuliyeu, and in October 1929 Efendiyev thus criticized the measures taken against the offending garments: "All these enforced reforms carried out by police measures, have created a very bad situation. Instead of destroying the medrasahs and maktabas which still survive in some parts of Azerbaydzhan (Zakataly okrug), our Peoples' Commissariat of Education forbids men in fur hats and veiled women to enter theatres. . . We are faced with the tremendous task of liberating the Turkic women (tyurchanki) and combating religious fanaticism; but our struggle against these manifestations has too often been conducted not by means of culture and enlightenment but by administrative measures. . . This [confiscation of mosques] together with the forcible unveiling of women and the solemn auto-da-fé of the peasant fur hats (in the Lenkoran' district), the unwilling substitution of a red kerchief for the veil and a cap for the fur hat - 'reforms' which the peasants could not understand - has produced discontent and passive resistance among the backward peasantry, and this has enabled the mullas and kulaks to mobilize dark forces against the Soviets." (K. 22.10.29.) He said further that in spite of all the propaganda, polygamy still flourished in the country, and marriages of minors and forced marriages, weddings before both the civil authorities and the mullas and other "survivals" were still practised. The press denounced some rayons whose population was particularly hostile to the anti-religious measures and in the Zakataly rayon the chairman of the rayon executive committee, a keen opponent of superstition, was assassinated.

After 1932-3 the attack on religion became less severe, only to be resumed in 1937 when a new wave of measures against the Christian and Muslim clergy started. The anti-religious campaign was called off during the last war but on 23.6.54 PRAVDA proclaimed the end of the truce which at one time had been necessary owing to the external situation. In a decree of 10 November 1954 it was emphasized that the campaign was to be continued on scientific lines.

The present position of religion in Azerbaydzhan is difficult to ascertain. Articles in the press are concerned chiefly with two problems: to represent the clergy as disreputable characters who, in

order not to work for a living, prey upon the credulity of the backward part of the population, and to ridicule the "mad fringe" of religion in the form of gross superstition which in fact can be associated with Islam as much as with any other creed or with no religion at all. Articles concerned with reasoned argument against the supernatural are few compared with the two types mentioned above and they usually contain some stereotyped political argument about religion - often a variation of the theme that "throughout the history of mankind religion has been used by the ruling classes to enslave and oppress the workers" and to this same end it is now employed by the enemies of socialism.

BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY of 14.12.58 criticizes the poor quality of the scientific-atheist propaganda in Azerbaydzhan and points out that the Baku branch of the Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge, founded in May 1956, has not achieved much success so far. "Our scientific-atheist propaganda is not systematic and does not consider the requirements of the listeners; in some establishments and kolkhozes it is not carried on at all and it has no clear plan. . . Our propaganda does not competently and convincingly show how harmful religion is to the task of building Communism and it lacks a clear and factual method of proving that the revelations of science concerning the evolution of nature and society are irrefutable." These shortcomings are found to be largely due to the bad organization of the Baku branch of the Society: it does not choose proper topics for its lectures and only four of its lecturers can discuss such an important problem as the class nature of Islam. Many rayon scientific-atheist sections work very badly if at all - for example, no lectures are given in the settlements of the Apsheronkiy peninsula where religious ceremonies are quite frequent - while some rayons still do not have scientific-atheist sections of the Society. In the Il'khychy village (Khachmas rayon) even young people take part in the Moharram processions and observe Ramazan. (BR. 14.10.59.) In Baku itself propaganda is more efficient. Public lectures are given regularly, the scientific-atheist ones constituting 30 per cent of all those delivered during a period of eleven months (BR. 17.12.58), but their quality should be improved. In libraries, schools and clubs popular exhibitions are open to show the anti-scientific nature of religion and films of this type are demonstrated. But the higher educational establishments of the city do not do enough of this propaganda and some of the agitation stations (agitpunkty) neglect it. The same is true of the atheist education provided by crèches, schools, tekhnikums and VUZ. The Azerbaydzhan State University organizes scientific-atheist lectures both in its lecture rooms and in three students' hostels, but its work is hindered by the fact that some of its students, particularly the first year ones, are still "enslaved by religious superstitions" for which their families and the schools they come from are to blame.

The failure of atheist propoganda is responsible for the fact that superstitions still flourish, particularly in the country areas. Thus in the Safaraliyev rayon rumour spread that on the Pir-ilan mountain there lived a white viper which could cure all human illness. In order to secure its favour there had to be left on the mountain an offering consisting of a cake baked with the milk of a cow which had had one calf, together with a sum of money. In return for the latter a handful of herbs could be picked which would cure all human ills. People began to flock there from all over the Dzheyran-Chel'skaya steppe, the number of the supernatural inhabitants of the mountain meanwhile growing to two in their imagination, for it turned out that there was also a hairy black viper with a fiery tongue. It was not safe to ridicule the "miracles" for a local shepherd swore that one Mamed Ali of El'dara was punished for his disbelief by being fatally bitten by the white viper. (BR. 4.1.59.)

Some villages of the Kedabek rayon are hotbeds of obscurantism: in the village of Novo-Ivanovka there are five Christian sects, each with a house of prayer, and seven kilometres away, at Novo-Saratovka, the situation is the same. Local Muslims are also active: in 1958 the kolkhozes suffered from prolonged drought followed in the autumn by hailstorms. In these circumstances a "message from the Imamzade" (shrine) appeared in the form of a letter saying that the Imamzade demanded sacrifices in order to avert the coming plague; everybody who had received the "message" had to make and distribute seven copies of it. It also reached the Tautz rayon where in the Sabir kolkhoz it so profoundly impressed one Kara, an illiterate man with a shady past, that he became a mulla and now no funeral or Moharram procession can be held in the rayon without his competent help. During Moharram part of the population stop work in order to take part in the procession and the clergy can even induce women to burn themselves to death. (BR. 12.12.58.)

The case of Kara mentioned above is typical of the attitude of the press to the clergy and other people associated with religion: if the religion they represent cannot be destroyed, let the people see how disreputable the religious leaders are. The cult of the white viper was fostered by various women who told fortunes from coffee grains, and the result was that the Pir-ilan was littered with rags in which people had brought their offerings; but the offerings themselves promptly disappeared. Ali Allakhverdi ogly Ragimov, a lawyer by profession, wanted an easy living and had become a Baptist. By intrigue he supplanted a Russian woman, head of the Kirovabad Baptists, and himself became their "holy father". (BR. 19.5.59.) Magomed, the mulla of the Kirovabad mosque, used to be a cobbler; he knows little about religion and is invariably drunk while preaching in his mosque. Mir-Mamed Seidov and Aziz Babayev, mullas of the Nus-

Nus mosque at Ordubad, have extorted large sums of money from the faithful. (BR. 14.10.59.) There are even female mullas - Khadzhar Safarova of Baku is very popular with women who visit her in large numbers, particularly on religious feast days; she reads for them passages from the Koran which contain extravagant promises to the "humble" and on days of mourning she sheds tears with them. She charges 10-20 rubles for a "seance" and she appreciates such inventions of science as the radio or the tape-recorder. If she is too busy (for she "goes on tour" to various rayons), she puts the tape-recorder on and her clients piously listen as it recites, Bismillah arrahman arrahim. (BR. 26.9.59.)

Typical of this campaign of denigration of the Muslim clergy, and of the many charlatans who represent themselves as clergy, is the September issue of a satirical magazine called KIRPI, which is highly praised in BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY of 30.9.59. The cover of this carries a caricature showing the hypocrisy of the "modern mullas" who extort gifts from their flocks, while on the back is a picture showing "one of the Faithful" - a hooligan, speculator and drunkard whose lugubrious countenance is assumed in order to camouflage his sins. The issue contains some of Sabir's anti-clerical verses and various articles designed to unmask the moral decrepitude of the mullas. One in particular describes how a mulla invented a new "holy place" in order to extract gifts from his parishioners, his victims including the head of a kolkhoz and the headmaster of the village school.

It is not easy to reconcile the state of affairs apparently still existing in the relatively advanced republic of Azerbaydzhan with the Soviet claims to have eradicated illiteracy and to have advanced far beyond the primitive cultural conditions still prevailing in non-Soviet eastern countries. Two explanations of this contradiction are currently advanced by Western students of the Soviet-Muslim republics. One is that cultural regimentation has produced in many Soviet Muslims a kind of split personality. Thus, for instance, a Muslim Party official may see nothing illogical in secluding his own wife and at the same time carrying on a vigorous campaign against the seclusion of women in general. Another theory is that the Muslims obstinately adhere to out-of-date superstitions and customs not so much because they believe in them as because they feel, perhaps subconsciously, that this is the only way left to them of opposing the unwanted Soviet campaign of modernization.

Sources

1. See text and Notes below.
2. ANTIISLAMSKAYA PROPAGANDA I EYE METODY V AZERBAYDZHANE.
Dzheykhun Khadzhibeyli, Institute for the Study of the USSR,
Munich, 1959.

Notes

- (1) P.V. Gudulyanov, OTDELENIYE TSERKVI OT GOSUDARSTVA. Moscow,
1926, pp.277-80.
- (2) KOMMUNIST (an Azerbaydzhani paper of Baku), 3.1.27.
- (3) BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 6.8.26; KOMMUNIST, 28.7.28.

New name for a mountain

By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tadzhik SSR of 19 January 1960 a nameless peak of the Kukhi-Frush mountains, 4545 metres above sea-level, has been called Julius Fuchik, after the Czech national hero. I. 20.1.60

Excavator for Ethiopia

The first machine built in Azerbaydzhan to be sent to Ethiopia is a mechanical excavator (mekhanicheskiy yamokopatel'). Before being sold there it is to be exhibited in Addis-Ababa. In the first quarter of 1960 Azerbaydzhan is to send equipment of various kinds to six international fairs and exhibitions. BR. 24.1.60

THE KAZAKH EPIC wins a medal

KAZAKHSKIY EPOS (The Kazakh Epic), published by the Kazakh State Publishing House of Literature, won for Yevgeniy Sidorkin, who designed it, a bronze medal at the Leipzig International Exhibition of the Art of the Book. KP. 21.1.60

I R R I G A T I O N I N C E N T R A L A S I A

PART TWO

Part One of this article, which appeared in the last number of CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, gave a general description of the water resources of Central Asia. The following part describes major irrigation works which have been completed within the last three years or are still under construction. In some cases, however, it is difficult to decide whether the work described refers to the present or the future (for example, the Irtysh-Karaganda Canal), while in others schemes previously described as completed appear to be still in progress.

As is to be expected in areas where rapid development is in progress many of the places where construction is proceeding are too small to be mentioned in existing maps. Wherever possible some indication of their whereabouts is given.


A list of articles on irrigation in Central Asia which have previously appeared in CAR, and which may be of help to readers as in some instances they go into greater detail of individual projects (for example, the Karakum Canal), is given at the end.

. . .

I. Turkmenistan


The Karakum Canal

In February 1959 the Amu-Dar'ya waters reached the Murgab oasis through the first sector (400 km. long) of the Karakum Canal. Some of the obstacles to the efficient working of this sector (see "The Progress of the Kara-Kum Canal, 1957-8." CAR, Vol.VII, No.1), have now been solved. One of them is that of silt and sand. The Amu-Dar'ya carries 250m. cubic metres of deposits per year and 8m. of these enter the canal. This is why the canal starts in the form of three wide branches, which



 Completed.
 Under construction.
 Projected.

KARAKUM CANAL



are more difficult to block up. A quarter of the deposits is detained in these branches and seventeen excavating pumps continually remove it. The rest of the silt settles in the Kelif lakes so that after Lake Chaksak, the last of them, the water of the canal is clear. Three of the lakes have already ceased to exist owing to the deposits. This is good because in the large area of the Kelif lakes much water is lost in evaporation. To remedy this it is also intended to narrow and straighten the bed of the canal, for at present the situation is that only a third of the Amu-Dar'ya waters enters the Murgab oasis, the rest being lost in irrigation, evaporation and filtration. The last takes place mainly in the sector below Lake Chaksak where the canal crosses an area of sand.

The maximum width of the canal is 50 metres but the part which passes through the Kelif lakes is much wider. The Kelif Uzboy is in fact the bed of an old tributary of the Amu-Dar'ya, the Balkh, which has been swallowed up by the Karakum so that only eight lakes connected by narrow channels remain. Now that the Amu-Dar'ya water has returned to them, life has reappeared on the lakes, which are overgrown with reeds and water-plants and swarm with birds. But the water plants are a serious problem: in the spring of 1958 the water nearly reached the Murgab delta, then turned back owing to the masses of water plants in the canal. One of them is a type of pondweed which, if allowed to spread, can stop the flow. Tractors were employed to pull it from the bed of the canal and special floating cutting machines were used. This proved very expensive and the following alternative method has been devised. In Chinese rivers there lives a species of fish, belyy amur (ctenopharyngodon idella), which feeds on water plants. Its peculiarity is a very short alimentary canal so that in summer an adult fish eats a kilogramme of plants per kilogramme of its own weight a day, and some specimens weigh 40 and 50 kilogrammes. In 1959, 100,000 young fish were to be imported from China and it has been calculated that by the summer of 1960 they will consume the same amount of plants per day. Not only will they clear the canal, but pisciculture will develop at the same time.

In the course of the present Seven-Year Plan (1958-65) work will start on the second sector of the canal (140 km.), between the Murgab and the Tedzhen. It will irrigate 100,000 ha. in the Tedzhen oasis and flow on towards the foothills of the Kopet-Dag.

Reservoirs

Sary-Yazy: In the coming years the irrigation network connected with the first sector of the Karakum canal will be completed. At the same time all works connected with the Sary-Yazy reservoir, con-

structed in 1958 on the Murgab near the Sary-Yazy railway station, will be finished. The reservoir (capacity 250m. cubic metres) will be fed from the Murgab and serve to irrigate cotton plantations. Together with the Karakum canal it will allow the further development of agriculture in the Mary oblast, which will then become one of the more important centres of production of fine fibre cotton in the Soviet Union.

Tedzhen: The Tedzhen river carries 90 per cent of its annual flow in spring when the snow melts in the mountains. To remedy the shortage of water in summer, the Tedzhen reservoir was constructed in 1950. This preserved the spring flood waters for irrigation in the following months. But the reservoir is too small and already full of sand and silt, and much good land in the area still lies waste owing to the shortage of water. A second Tedzhen reservoir holding 180m. cubic metres of water is under construction, and this will enable cotton production to be developed in the Tedzhen basin. It is expected to be finished about 1961.

Khor-Khor: The river will also feed two other reservoirs. One of these is the Khor-Khor in the Serakhs rayon, which in April 1959 was reported as almost completed. The rayon depended on the Tedzhen for water and owing to shortage the local kolkhozes had to plant their cotton in the Tedzhen rayon, 160-70 km. from home. This meant that from early spring until late in the autumn the kolkhozniks had to work in another rayon and the transportation of machinery and fertilizers was very expensive. The Khor-Khor reservoir will enable them to grow cotton in their own rayon and the kolkhozes in the Tedzhen rayon will have more arable land.

Khan-Khauz: The other reservoir is the Khan-Khauz, between the Murgab and the Tedzhen, which will be connected with the Karakum Canal. The canal carries the same amount of water throughout the year while the irrigation networks in the Murgab-Tedzhen zone need it mainly in spring and summer. As regards the Tedzhen, the two Tedzhen and the projected Pulli-Khatum reservoirs are not enough to keep the flow under control, especially in years particularly abundant in water. A "hydro-knot" above the first Tedzhen reservoir will direct the superfluous spring floodwater to the Khan-Khauz reservoir, which will also be fed by the winter flow of the Karakum Canal. Thus the canal and the Tedzhen will be fully exploited for irrigation. The Khan-Khauz will hold 1,300m. cubic metres of water, allow the irrigated zone to be expanded to 200-250,000 ha. and enable pisciculture to be started on a large scale; sovkhoses specializing in breeding waterfowl will also be founded. The reservoir will be completed during the next ten years.

II. Tadzhikistan

The Kayrak-Kum "hydro-knot"

The Friendship of Nations (Druzhba-Narodov) Kayrak-Kum hydroelectric power-station on the "Tadzhik sea" (Kayrak-Kum reservoir) (see Part One of this article, CAR, Vol.VIII, No.1, p.49), plays an extremely important part in the further development of irrigation in northern Tadzhikistan. The reservoir feeds twelve networks irrigating the lower-lying districts of Tadzhikistan and in the next few years the cultivated area will further expand in the Samgar and Dal'verzin regions as well as the lands on the lower reaches of the Khodzha-Bakirgan where the construction of canals is going on. In June 1956 the Soviet Tadzhikistan Canal in Dal'verzin began to function. A new administrative rayon - Matcha - has been set up in the newly reclaimed lands to which the inhabitants of the old mountain settlement of the same name have moved. For the first time in their history they have begun to plant cotton, vegetables and melons, and their success is apparent when the income of the Matcha kolkhozes in 1956, about 3m. rubles, is compared with that in the following year - 11m. rubles.

Between April 1958-May 1959 the Samgar pumping station on the Kayrak-Kum reservoir came into operation. It raises water to a height of 56 metres to irrigate the Samgar region. About the same time the Khodzha-Bakirgan floating pumping station was put into operation; it raises water to 51 metres and drives it to the last part of the Great Fergana Canal. It irrigates the Leninabad rayon where 10,000 ha. of waste land will be reclaimed. Previously the Great Fergana Canal irrigated the Leninabad and Kanibadam rayons in northern Tadzhikistan, but now all its water will be used by the latter rayon, the former being irrigated from the Kayrak-Kum. The Samgar region will be fully reclaimed after 250 km. of canals and 860 installations have been constructed. Eventually the Samgar pumping station will raise water to 134 metres and irrigate 10,000 ha., while the Khodzha-Bakirgan station, when completed, will pump water to the level of 120 metres and irrigate 23,000 ha. of new land; it will also adequately supply with water the kolkhozes of the Leninabad, Proletarsk and Nau rayons as well as the Lyaylyakskiy rayon of Kirgizia.

Reservoirs and canals

Muminabad: The Kulyab and Aral rayons in southern Tadzhikistan used to suffer from a shortage of water, for the Yakh-Su and the Kyzyl-Su rivers had very little water in summer while, on the other hand, there was a considerable wastage in spring. In 1957 work started on the Muminabad reservoir for conserving melted snow. It lies in a

hollow of the same name and is surrounded by the mountains except on the north-western side where the Obi-Shur, a tributary of the Yakh-Su flows through a deep canyon. A dam 1,338 metres long and up to 35 metres high has been constructed on the Obi-Shur and its reservoir holds 24m. cubic metres of water. It is fed from the Obi-Shur and the Obi-Surkh, another tributary of the Yakh-Su, via the Kylyulyu Canal which is 12 km. long. In the summer of 1959 the Muminabad reservoir was for the first time used to irrigate the cotton plantations of the local kolkhozes.


Dagana-Say reservoir and canal improvements: The Ura-Tyube rayon has good land and its grapes are very well known, but large areas lie waste owing to the shortage of water. The Bazandor Canal, fed from the river Dagana-Say, irrigates only 1,200 ha. The situation will be remedied by the new Dagana-Say reservoir near the village of Ganchi. A new dam is being built at the point where the Bazandor Canal joins the Dagana-Say and the reservoir will hold 3.5m. cubic meters of water. It will irrigate over 11,000 ha. of kolkhoz fields. The Bazandor Canal will carry enough water to irrigate 6,000 ha.; the existing Yukoroganchi Canal will be widened and extended to 12 km.; it will be fed from the Dagana-Say reservoir and irrigate 1,000 ha. instead of the present 120. The Gaz Canal will also receive water from the reservoir and irrigate 2,000 ha. Other irrigation networks will also be constructed in the Ura-Tyube and Shakhristan rayons, with the result that 28,000 ha. in the former and 6,000 in the latter will receive water; 70 per cent of the area will be put under orchards and vineyards.

Little Beshkent Canal: The Beshkent steppe in the Shaartuz rayon has very good soil which lay waste until at the beginning of 1959 reclamation started with the construction of the Little Beshkent Canal. By the end of the year this will already irrigate 2,000 ha. of virgin land. Reclamation will go on and by 1961, 5,000 ha. will have been brought under cultivation and irrigation will extend to 8,000 ha. of pasture.


III. Uzbekistan


The Great Fergana Canal

In 1957 the sector of the Great Fergana Canal between Kuygan-Yar and the Yaz"yavan break (sbros) was widened, with the result that 100 cubic metres of water per second instead of the former 70 began to flow through it. This allowed more water for 30,000 ha. of arable land in the Fergana oblast. In 1958 widening started between the Yaz"yavan break and the Pervomayskoye partitioning installation (peregrozhiyayushchee sooruzheniye) in the Kuybyshevo rayon, a distance of 43 km.



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 Specially drawn for the Central Asian Re





By 25 February 1959 work was to be finished and in the following summer rayons in the Fergana and Kokand region were to have adequate water supplies. The widening is to continue and 100,000 ha. of waste land will be brought into cultivation during the current Seven-Year Plan. The amount of water will be further increased when a 15 km. canal, started in 1958, begins working. It starts at Uch-Kurgan and will feed both the irrigation networks in the Namangan oblast and the upper part of the Great Fergana Canal.

Amu-Karakul' Canal

Along the Zeravshan lie three fertile oases: Samarkand, Bukhara and Karakul', but the river cannot adequately irrigate them, particularly the Karakul' oasis. In 1959 construction began of the Amu-

Karakul' Canal which starts on the Amu-Dar'ya above Chardzhou railway bridge and crosses the Kyzylkum in the north-eastern direction towards Karakul', a distance of 54 km. It will carry 50 cubic metres per second of the Amu-Dar'ya waters, which is enough to irrigate 25,000 ha. of arable land in the Alat and Karakul' rayons as well as 15,000 ha. of waste land which is to be reclaimed.

The Kokand "hydro-knot"

The rayons in the Kokand region have very fertile soil which could not be adequately exploited owing to the shortage of water. The rayons depend on the river Sokh which does not provide enough water during the growing season. A solution has been found in the construction of the Kokand "hydro-knot" which collects all the Sokh water for irrigation. Construction started in 1957 with the erection of a dam and by March 1959 the "hydro-knot" was completed. It has a sedimentation reservoir which occupies an area of 20 ha. and can accommodate 640,000 cubic metres of deposits so that it will be usable for 25 years. The "hydro-knot" feeds the left- and right-bank canals. Water flows through the former at the rate of 120 cubic metres per second and enters four main canals which irrigate the Gorskoye, Frunze and Uzbekistanskiy rayons. The right-bank canal serves a wider area: its four branches water the Leningradskiy and Buvaydinskiy rayons and feed the Great Fergana Canal. The Kokand and "hydro-knot" will eventually irrigate over 60,000 ha.

Reservoirs

In the Chirchik-Angren basin irrigation will improve with the completion in 1960 of the Tyuya-Buguz reservoir (originally due to be ready in 1957 - see CAR, Vol.V, No.3, p.280). It will supply the cultivated lands with sufficient water from the Angren and allow 20,000 ha. to be reclaimed.

In the Surkhan-Dar'ya oblast the main source of water is the river Surkhan-Dar'ya which, again, floods in spring and has too little water in summer. In 1958 a reservoir to collect the floodwater was started near the Kzyl Oktyabr' railway station. It will hold 900m. cubic metres of water, its area being 64 square kilometres, and irrigate 150,000 ha. Cotton plantations will appear in what is now desert.

In the neighbouring Kashka-Dar'ya oblast the Chim-Kurgan reservoir is being built to regulate the flow of the river Kashka-Dar'ya. The oblast will be given additional water from the Zeravshan via the new Iski-Angar Canal. Work will probably be finished in 1960-1.

Other projects

In Khorezm and Kara-Kalpakia the Amu-Dar'ya causes great damage every year when it bursts its banks and dams, flooding fields and pastures in the adjoining rayons. The situation will be considerably improved by the straightening of the river-bed. At Yesbergen-Chaganak, where the river makes two big bends and destroys the dykes in summer, ditches are being dug through which it will flow. A cut 4 km. long, will replace the present 25 km. bend of the Amu-Dar'ya.

Underground waters also play an important part in the irrigation of the region: in the Fergana valley alone their utilization has made cultivable 50,000 ha.

IV. Kirgizia

General

In 1957 the press discussed the shortcomings in the irrigation of Kirgizia. The rivers of the republic provide water for the irrigation of the Fergana, Chu and Talass valleys as well as the higher-lying mountain valleys and the Issyk-Kul' basin. Their annual flow reaches 60 milliard cubic metres, of which only 15 per cent were used for irrigation. But even this amount was not used to the best advantage: in 1956 of the 1,155,000 ha. covered by irrigation networks only 816,000 ha. were adequately watered while the total area of pasture, 1m. ha., had no water thus hindering the expansion of cattle breeding. Underground waters, also, were largely neglected. Moreover, in the irrigated area much water was wasted by unnecessary flooding which injured the crops and caused deterioration to the soil; it became saturated and this affected a number of fast-growing sovkhoses in the Frunze oblast, the zone of the Fourth Party Congress Canal in the Osh oblast and the rice-growing kolkhozes in the south of the republic. But by 1959 the situation seemed to have improved: the plan of irrigation works was carried out by 103.6 per cent and the total cost was 126m. rubles.

Canals and reservoirs

The Isfana valley in the Lyaylyakskiy rayon has 3,500 ha. of cultivable land but only 500-700 ha. could be used as the existing Tuya-Dzhayloo Canal did not provide enough water. A canal has been constructed at a height of 3,200 metres to divert the river Sary-Kungey to the valley. It crosses a steep slope, flows under the Kok-

Bel' pass making a 400 metre waterfall. Five kilometres further it joins the Tuya-Dzhayloo Canal. It will enable the local kolkhozes to reclaim thousands of hectares for the cultivation of vegetables and tobacco.

In the autumn of 1957 the Otuz-Adyr Canal in southern Kirgizia was completed. It is 43 km. long and the main canals alone, which it feeds, reach a total length of 265 km. and irrigate 7,000 ha. of reclaimed land. At the same time the Bazar-Kurgan reservoir on a spur of the Fergana range was completed. It is fed from the river Kara-Ungur and holds 20m. cubic metres of water which irrigates thousands of hectares in the Bazar-Kurgan and Leninskiy rayons.

The rivers Kurshab, Ak-Bura and Aravan-Say flow parallel to one another from the Alayskiy range and irrigate the cotton plantations in a number of rayons of the Osh oblast and the Andizhan oblast of Uzbekistan. Sometimes in summer one or another of them does not provide enough water. In 1958 the three irrigation systems were connected: now when the Ak-Bura cannot adequately irrigate the lands lying between it and the Kurshab, the latter provides water, to which end the Otuz-Adyr Canal fed from it has been widened, while the shortage of water in the Aravan-Say is relieved by the Ak-Bura water via the Gul'bagarinskiy Canal. In spring the latter floods the surrounding land and apart from the damage, much water gets wasted. In 1958 construction started on a dam in its middle course at the point where it flows through a narrow canyon. The reservoir will both irrigate the arable lands and enable many thousands of hectares to be reclaimed.

Other projects

Livestock breeding is an important branch of the economy of Kirgizia, the development of which is constricted by lack of water. Measures being taken to overcome this and expand herds, flocks and fodder crops include the following:

Issyk-Kul' region: In 1958 a start was made to the sinking of artesian wells which should bring into use 12,000 ha. of pasture. In the Archaly region of the Tonskiy rayon two canals, six and 13 km. long, are being built in order to bring 1,000 ha. under fodder crops.

Karavan rayon, Osh oblast: Herds which winter in the valley of Kyzyl dzhar will be considerably increased when the water pipe-line now under construction is finished; it lies 1,100 metres above sea level.

Southern Kirgizia: In 1958 in the meadowlands of the Batken, Lyaylyakskiy and Naukatskiy rayons, wells were being bored so that

flocks could be increased and fodder crops irrigated.

V. Kazakhstan

General

The exploitation of underground waters is particularly important in Kazakhstan as two-thirds of its territory have no surface water, though in fact it is practically everywhere under the surface (see CAR, Vol.VIII, No.1, p.45). Until recently exploration was in a deplorable state owing to lack of central planning. For example, the Alma-Ata region has big artesian reservoirs of fresh water whose total capacity reaches 270m. cubic metres, but in 1958 the city was still suffering from a shortage of good water. At the same time it could boast over 20 hydrogeological organizations attached to various ministries and departments, each working independently with the result that in some rayons exploratory wells were drilled a couple of metres from one another, each by a different authority. In Semipalatinsk the Ministry of Geology and the Protection of Mineral Resources had been entrusted with exploration of underground waters and at the same time another organization, the Kazgiprogorssel'stroy, was preparing to start prospecting. It took seven years to sink over twenty exploratory wells in the area of the Kyzylkum - far less than planned - though the same work could have been done in a year with more efficient planning. In 1957 it was intended to bring water to 6.5m. ha. while in fact only 2.4m. ha. received it - and at the same time a large number of republican and local authorities were concerned with a problem of watering pastures. Thus in the South-Kazakhstan oblast there were 2.4 ha. of pasture per sheep and only 1.4 ha. were watered while three organizations were in charge of such work in the oblast. There was no cooperation among them with the result that, for example, in the Karl Marx kolkhoz in the Arys' rayon a cluster of five wells were sunk near to one another while there was no other well within a radius of 25 km. The hydrological authorities were also making grand plans which were not carried out.

This unsatisfactory situation lasted until the early months of 1959 when the Kazakh Hydrogeological Trust was set up. It has united all such organizations, hitherto subject to regional geological boards, for the purpose of a coordinated all-republican hydrographic exploration. This will not only speed up the work but very considerably reduce its cost. The result will be seen in the coming years.

Though the exploration of the underground "seas" leaves much room for improvement, a good deal is being done to use the known water resources for irrigating pastures. The press complains, however, that


this is not enough and that large areas of good grazing land still cannot be used. In 1958 the situation was that of the total of 160-170m. ha. of pasture over 80m. ha. were not watered, and only 25-30 per cent of pasture in the deserts and semi-deserts was used. Huge areas of the Ustyurt, Naryn sands, Kyzylkum, Transural steppe, lands bordering upon the Urals and those between the Karakum and the river Sarysu, Bet-Pak-Dala, lower reaches of the Chu and Sarysu, Balkhash region as well as the southern and south-eastern parts of the Aktyubinsk, Kustanay and West-Kazakhstan oblasts lie waste. In the previous two years over 8,000 wells had been drilled bringing water to 12.4m. ha. of pasture-land, but the reclamation of pasture is far behind the needs of the developing cattle breeding. At the same time watering places created a few years ago often go out of use because the cattle have been removed elsewhere, while the newly-watered grazing lands are overcrowded with animals, with the result that after a year of exploitation they cannot be used again for several years.

Irtysh-Karaganda Canal

The route of the Irtysh-Karaganda Canal has at last been fixed. It has been taken into consideration that in 1960 the Karaganda coal basin alone will need 25 cubic metres of water per second and this has helped to determine the alignment of the canal. Starting at the village of Yermak (Pavlodar oblast) on the Irtysh, it will flow towards Ekibastuz, join the river Shiderty and follow the river valley to Karaganda. This route will make it possible to provide with water the coalfields of Ekibastuz, Kuushoky, Borly and others, the Boshchekul' copper mining region and the Kodzhanchad mining area, as well as the kolkhozes and sovkhoses along the course of the canal. Its total length will be 500 km. and the pumping stations will raise the water to the height of some 450 metres. (See also CAR, Vol.V, No.3, pp.278-9.)

The Kushum-Ural network

The river Kushum flows into the Ural, but it has changed its course and the lands bordering the old course have turned into desert. In 1957 in the Transural steppe construction started of a large Ural-Kushum irrigation network. The old, dry bed of the Kushum is being widened to serve as the central canal of the system and is to become a real river, five metres deep and 50 metres wide; 120 cubic metres of water per second are to flow at its starting point. The canal starts near the village of Bol'shoy Chagan and has four reservoirs along its route; they jointly hold 232m. cubic metres of water. The main canal is to be 400 km. long while the total length of the canals of the network will total 2,000 km. The main canal and the reservoirs will feed



five irrigation networks serving over 1m. ha. of arable land, and some 50,000 ha. of meadow land. It will allow the kolkhozes of the Zelenovskiy, Chapayevo, Furmanovo and Taypakskiy rayons to double or treble the numbers of their cattle. Work began on the first part of the network in 1957 - the Dungulyukskiy "hydro-knot" with a great reservoir on the Kushum and the Taypakskiy Canal, which will irrigate 300,000 ha. (See also CAR, Vol.V, No.3, p.279.)

Arys-Turkestan Canal

No mention of the progress of this canal has been seen in the Central Asian press since the first section of the Bugun' dam was completed in 1957. (See CAR, Vol.III, No.3; Vol.V, No.3, p.282, and Vol. VI, No.2, p.200.)

Reservoirs

In the Dzhabul oblast in 1957 work started on a reservoir which will irrigate 50,000 ha. of waste land, mainly for sugar-beet. The Ters-Ashchubulak reservoir on the river Ters will hold 150m. cubic metres of water; its dam is 2 km. long and 32 metres high. It will feed the irrigation network of the rivers Asa and Talass.

Water from the river Churbay-Nura started to flow into the great reservoir of the Karaganda hydroelectric power-station in September 1959; the dam across the river is 3 km. long and its capacity 375m. cubic metres. It will provide with water the new coal-mining centres Tentekskiy and Shakhanskiy, and irrigate 25,000 ha. of reclaimed land which is to be put under vegetable crops.

Sources

1. Central Asian Press, 1957-9.
2. "Vozvrashcheniye Dzheykhun", by Yu. Polkovnikov. VOKRUG SVETA, No.6, 1959.
3. VESTNIK AN/SSSR, No.1, 1960, pp.53-54.

Note

For additional information on irrigation in Central Asia see:

- CAR, Vol. II, No.3, The Kara-Kum Canal Project
Vol.III, No.3, The Arys-Turkestan Canal
Vol. IV, No.1, Irrigation Scheme for Central Kazakhstan
(The Irtysh Project)
Vol. V, No.1, The Golodnaya Step'
Vol. V, No.3, Irrigation in Central Asia
Vol.VII, No.1, Progress of the Kara-Kum Canal.

FOOD TRADE AND PUBLIC CATERING
IN CENTRAL ASIA*

I. Changes in Eating Habits - II. Food Consumption,
Supply and Distribution - III. Supply and Sale of
Alcohol - IV. Public Catering.

I. Changes in Eating Habits

Russian influence on Central Asian diet and eating habits is perhaps less than on some other aspects of life; it is none the less considerable, particularly in the larger towns. Part of the growing demand for such foodstuffs as potatoes, noodles (lapsha), various kinds of porridge (kasha), and tinned foods is partly attributable to the great increase in the number of Russian and non-Asian settlers. There is no doubt that these foods are becoming part of the staple diet of the indigenous population. In the towns mass produced bread from the "bread factories" (khlebokombinat) is beginning to replace the traditional flat bread-cakes baked in primitive clay ovens heated with cattle dung. Another sign of the times is that the Muslims' religious objection to alcohol seems to have disappeared; there is at any rate no mention of any such objection in the source material used for this article.

Although the native housewife adheres to the traditional dishes, she adapts the available Russian foods to suit Central Asian taste and in some places, particularly in the towns, she prepares them on the modern gas cooker instead of the old-fashioned clay stove or open fire outdoors. But national dishes themselves are threatened with extinction and, although some grocery shops keep Central Asian delicacies, complaints are made in the press that they are not nearly as numerous as they should be.

* The reader is also referred to "The Food Industry in Central Asia", CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, Vol.IV, No.1.

The main danger to traditional cooking is represented by the considerable development of all sorts of canteens, domovyye kukhni producing hot meals to be taken home, and prepared foods. All this is of considerable importance since, according to Lenin, it greatly assists the emancipation of women by making them equal to men in political, social and economic life. (TI. 13.8.59.)* The result is that the native student and worker, particularly in town, eats in canteens attached to his place of work, which more often than not cook only Russian food and where he must eat at the table and use cutlery. There are catering establishments where he can feel more comfortable but his working hours make it difficult to use them frequently. One may infer from the available source material that Central Asian eating places, with the exception of the chaykhana (tea house) are far less numerous than the various Russian establishments: restaurants, canteens (stolovyye) and a host of minor places like kafe, bufety, zakusochnyye, chaynyye, pel'mennyye and others. Central Asian food is prepared in shashlychnyye specializing in shashlyk (mutton roasted on a spit) and "restaurants of national dishes", but the most popular place is the omnipresent chaykhana whose watchword is the Central Asian proverb declaring that a man must drink tea in order to be strong. (PV. 14.8.58.) The chaykhana, particularly in the countryside, is the centre of local social life from which women are excluded by an unwritten law. If it has not been "cultured" by the introduction of tables and chairs, wireless, newspapers and portraits of notables, the Central Asian can feel at home there, sit on the ground with his legs folded underneath him and pour bitter green tea from a brightly decorated china pot into a shallow cup without a handle.

II. Food Consumption, Supply and Distribution

Consumption

Consumption keeps growing throughout Central Asia. In Uzbekistan during the seven years before 1958 the sales of meat had grown 2.1 times, sugar - 2.7, porridge - 5.1. (PV. 22.5.59.) In Turkmenistan increased sales of meat, butter, milk and dairy products are particularly marked: on 23 October 1958, compared with the same day in 1955, 85 per cent more of these goods were sold. In the first half of 1959, compared with 1958, 81 per cent more meat was sold. (TI. 25.10.58, 18.8.59.) In the Karaganda oblast in Kazakhstan two years of the Sixth Five-Year Plan witnessed a spectacular growth of sales, as against 1955: milk

* List of abbreviations will be found at beginning of CAR.

3.5 times, butter twice, sugar - 75, meat products - 60, vegetable fats - 30, potatoes and vegetables - 25. (KP. 13.5.58.)

In practice, however, this progress is far less impressive but it is only in the field of retail trade that the anomalies of "planned economy" become evident. Thus in Uzbekistan, a country with a very well developed agriculture, the sale of potatoes and vegetables per head of the population are one half, and of fruit 5 times less, than the other republics. (PV. 22.5.59.)

Kazakhstan is an agricultural and cattle-breeding supply and distribution country and borders upon two seas, but frequent complaints are made in the press that bread, fish, milk and dairy products are very hard to obtain - for example, milk is very irregularly supplied and in insufficient quantities to the shops of the big, industrial city of Leninogorsk while the presence of white cheese in them has been recorded only once and even then the cheese was mouldy and expensive. (KP. 13.12.58.) At Vishnevka (Akmolinsk oblast) the dairy was closed in 1957 with the result that the inhabitants are forced to keep cows. Instead of organizing milk supplies, even local notables like the secretary of the rayon committee of the Party, the public prosecutor, the judge and the director of the oil mill are found among the cow and goat owners. (KP. 28.9.58.) Shortage of bread affects not only the virgin land dwellers, but the inhabitants of many long-established settlements, like those of Zhilaya Kosa on the Caspian shore: there are a bakery and a shop in the village but their staff get drunk and neglect their duties, with the result that the people have to abandon their work and travel many kilometres in search of bread. (KP. 13.11.58.) As for fish, in many shops and canteens it is a very rare delicacy - even at Gur'yev, a fish-canning centre on the Caspian shore, fresh fish is obtainable only from the "speculators". The manager of the No.82 shop declared in April 1958 that he had received no fresh fish since the previous October. In other shops there are salted herrings from the Atlantic but no Caspian fish. This is because the trading organizations regard the retail fish trade as unprofitable: they either sell fresh fish outside the oblast in order to save trouble or send it away to be salted since fresh fish is 50 per cent cheaper. (KP. 17.4.58.) In Turkmenistan the situation is very much the same: fish dishes are difficult to obtain in the canteens of the rayons near the Caspian, and also in the Chardzhou and Mary oblasts bordering upon the Amu-Dar'ya and the Murgab. (TI. 13.8.59, 1.4.59.)

The shortage of milk and occasionally of bread, as well as the bad quality of the latter cause frequent complaints in the Central Asian press. In the new sovkhoses of the Bukhara, Fergana and Kashka-Dar'ya oblasts there are "frequent stoppages" in bread supplies (PV.

16.5.58), while in Kirgizia (Tonskiy rayon) bread and bread products supplied by the Naryn and Przheval'sk bread kombinats are in fact shapeless pieces of raw or burnt dough. (SK. 26.4.58, 8.7.59.) In Ashkhabad the quality of and trade in bread products needs improvement: in the first four months of 1959 alone the food inspectors rejected over 14 tons of bread and the same happened to 24 tons of stale bread rolls and bread at the No.3 "bread factory", the total loss being 70,000 rubles. Bread in the shops is always stale because its dispatch from the bakeries is delayed and transport is bad. There are only three specialized bread shops in the city, but on the day they were inspected by a team sent by TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA, there were no bread rolls at the No.1 shop, while on the counter of the No.51 shop a dry and misshapen "spring-time cake" was displayed. (TI. 24.5.59.)

In these circumstances the isolated cases, when foodstuffs are not only available without difficulty but even delivered to the customers' homes, are regarded as the last word in progress and reported in the press: thus in the northern suburb of Frunze a special van delivers milk while in May 1959 bread deliveries started in the southern suburb. (SK. 27.5.59.)

Fresh vegetables and spring greens are difficult to obtain. In June 1959 they were still unobtainable from the State shops in Turkmen towns and the authorities of the vegetable-growing regions blamed it on "autumn errors" and promised to supply them in 1960, but only in the spring, although in Turkmenistan they can be grown almost all the year round. The greengrocery trade is badly organized and even in Ashkhabad itself there is no proper greengrocer's shop, while small vegetable shops sell only dried potatoes, dried fruit and tomato puree. (TI. 2.6.59.) The kolkhozes round Tashkent grow only cabbage, so that in 1958 there was so much that nobody knew what to do with it.

"Speculators"

In such circumstances the "speculators" have a large field of activity. They provide Naryn, where there is a shortage from official sources, with vegetables which they bring from Tokmak, Bystrovka and Przheval'sk and, naturally, they charge higher prices than the inefficient trading organizations. Free enterprise of this kind obviously has certain advantages for people who might otherwise be entirely deprived of such commodities as milk, fresh fish and vegetables. The authorities, however, are quite uncompromising in their condemnation of "speculators" as exploiters and parasites.

III. Supply and Sale of Alcohol

Although it is officially stated that drunkenness is a survival of the past, the need to open "sobering-up stations" (vytrezviteli) throughout the Soviet world testifies to the contrary. With the help of the Soviet trade network, the Central Asians seem to have developed a strong taste for alcohol and, together with the European settlers, are found among the patients of the vytrezviteli - in spite of the "prophylactic action of the police against drunkenness". Thus the Ashkhabad city vytrezvitel counts some lecturers of the State University and the Medical Academy, as well as musicians from the State Orchestra among its patrons. This seems hardly surprising when it is learnt that an agitator, sent to the Geok-Tepe wine factory to lecture against drunkenness, got drunk after the lecture and had to be carried away as a result. (TI. 23.3.58.) In Alma-Ata, Baykadamov, a composer, gets drunk almost every day and starts trouble, but the police regard this as an "innocent joke" and the Ministry of Culture ignores the matter. (KP. 9.7.59.) It can be said without exaggeration that the retail trade system encourages drunkenness. In Kirgizia, for instance, many public catering establishments do not trouble to prepare good food, since the sale of vodka is an easier way of achieving their sales target. In 1958 the plan of public catering in the republic was carried out by 105.4 per cent, of which "food" sales constituted 95 per cent and only 33.7 per cent of this represented cooked dishes. (SK. 8.7.59.) In Alma-Ata some grocery shops have been converted into wine shops and until late in the evening they are besieged by crowds of thirstypatrons who consume their purchases just outside the shops and create disturbances into the bargain. (KP. 9.7.59.) At Kansay in Tadzhikistan the soft drinks stalls sell alcohol. (KT. 11.7.59.) In some parts of Khorezm unofficial bars seem to be strangling the chaykhanas: at Khazarasp there are three eating places which stock only vodka and wine as does the local chaykhana. The authorities do not object to this and Karimov, the secretary of the rayon committee of the Party, declares that "the day of the chaykhana is over in Khorezm". Khazarasp is the oblast centre of the vodka trade: the managers of the canteens say that they seldom provide cooked meals; it is inconvenient and when the plan needs pushing up, they deal exclusively in vodka.

In Kazakhstan the situation has become so bad that in July 1959 the passing of a special law against drunkenness and the home-brewing of alcohol was considered. In the Dzhabul, Alma-Ata, Akmolinsk, Kokchetav and North-Kazakhstan oblasts the number of those prosecuted for home-brewing is over two-thirds of those dealt with by the republican courts for this offence, while the Dzhabul oblast alone boasts the majority of all the republican home-brewers amongst its

inhabitants. Cases of death following consumption of home-brews are recorded. The "industry" flourishes particularly in the countryside and various local dignitaries engage in it. The head of the loading department at the Atrasab railway station, literally "irrigates" the neighbouring villages with his produce at 60 rubles per litre. Sometimes the trading authorities cooperate in home-brewing - for example, a watchman of the Urnek sovkhos cooperative shop was given a quota of sugar fixed at 70 kg. per 200 litres of home-brewed beer; the same proportion was used by the deputy manager of the rayon consumers' cooperative. (KP. 11.7.59.) It is not clear why this risky home-brewing should be necessary if trade in alcohol is among the most efficient branches of the official retail trade.

IV. Public Catering

General complaints

Although there are efficient grocery shops and public catering establishments whose suggestion books are full of praise poured out by the appreciative customers, they gain far fewer mentions in the press than the bad ones. This is natural enough since bad service always attracts more attention than good. But the frequency of the complaints and the fact that they are very much the same in all the republics suggest that bad shops and canteens are by no means exceptional. The most common shortcomings are five in number: (a) in many towns there is a shortage of milk and fresh vegetables, even in summer; (b) bread and bread products are often of inferior quality; (c) it is very difficult to get cold, soft drinks in the hot season; (d) many canteens reach their sales target by selling vodka; (e) bad and "uncultured" service of the workers: many shop assistants and waitresses are discourteous and cheat the customers - they illegally raise prices, give wrong change or pretend to have none. They give short weight and reduced helpings in the canteens.

Plans for improvements

On 20 February 1959 the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the USSR passed a resolution concerning the further development and improvement of public catering. This affects also Central Asia where the number of restaurants, canteens etc., in spite of constant expansion, is stated to be still very inadequate, not only in the provinces but even in the republican capitals. In 1957 the Uzbek Consumers' Cooperative bought for its catering establishments as compared with 1953 four times more meat, 10 times more potatoes, five times more vegetables, 30 times more milk and over five times more eggs; at the same time the number of catering establishments

had grown by 79 per cent and 568 canteens and tea-rooms had been opened in the countryside. (PV. 16.5.58.) In Turkmenistan between 1957-9, 70 catering establishments were opened in country districts, and in October 1958 the republic had 820 such establishments - 150 more than in 1955. On 23 October 1955 they sold 10,000 meals and on the same day in 1958 - 17,000. (TI. 7.8.59, 25.10.58.)

The authorities believe there are five ways of carrying out the resolution of 20 February 1959: the consumers' cooperatives and individual catering establishments should devote more attention to producing their own foodstuffs, mechanization of labour, lowering the prices of meals and increasing their quality and variety, increasing the amount of foods produced by mechanized "kitchen-factories" for the canteens and grocery trade and finally, introducing "progressive methods of trading".

The first point is regarded as an important step towards lowering the cost of meals and making them more varied, but it is not clear why, with all the kolkhozes and sovkhoses producing vast quantities of food for the State, the catering establishments should have to extend their activities to horticulture, cattle-, pig- and poultry-breeding and even to fish-ponds. In all the republics complaints are made that very many canteens do not prepare fish, vegetable and milk dishes - i.e. they suffer, like the grocery trade, from a shortage of these foods. Whatever the reason may be, the result is that more and more canteens begin to keep pigs, rabbits and poultry while the republican trading organizations do the same on a large scale. The Tadzhik Ministry of Trade has founded a cattle-breeding and horticultural sovkhos which supplies the catering network of Stalinabad (KT. 6.5.59); and the Uzbek Consumers' Cooperative in 1958 had 26 cattle and poultry farms and a number of orchards. (PV. 16.5.58.)

Mechanization and "progressive methods"

Mechanization of labour and efficient "kitchen-factories" will decrease the cost of preparing meals, reduce the numbers of staff employed by individual catering establishments and so lower the prices of meals and attract people to the canteens. But the "kitchen-factories" are few in number and still do not produce enough, and in some cases the larger catering establishments themselves produce prepared foods not only for their own use but also for smaller canteens and grocery shops. Their kitchens are being mechanized by the introduction of modern labour-saving devices, but here, as in other branches of trade, the authorities are very inefficient. Although refrigerators are essential in the Central Asian climate, many canteens have to do without them while they are either held up in the

central warehouses or stand useless in the kitchens because there is nobody to repair them.

The progressive methods are three in number: selling in advance coupons for meals in order to avoid queues in the canteens, opening "buffets without a salesman" where the customers take the food they want and leave the money, and self-service canteens made even more attractive by the introduction of slot-machines selling food and drink. Self-service is enthusiastically described in the press as the last word in progress. TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA of 23.9.59 in an article called "Quickly, Comfortably and Well" describes the work of the Firyuza, the new "automatic café" in Ashkhabad. The article describes in detail the working of this self-service café from its "fully mechanized" kitchen to the hot-counter, pointing out the advantages to the customer of having hot food and no waiting. PRAVDA VOSTOKA of 27.2.58 describes another self-service restaurant in the Kuybyshevskiy rayon of Tashkent and also emphasizes that meals are obtained there without waiting. This latter article, which is illustrated to show precisely how the system works, adds that since self-service was introduced the daily turnover has increased from 2,500-3,000 to 4,500-5,000 rubles. The publicity given to the first appearance of these "progressive" canteens and restaurants shows the justifiable pride taken in the arrival of self-service in Central Asia.

The "progressive methods", however, are as yet not widely used, as one can gather from the attention devoted to such individual canteens by the press. But there are also old-fashioned eating places whose work is very efficient. For example, in Tadzhikistan the hungry man's paradise is not, it seems, the capital whose catering system is freely denounced by KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, but the small town of Kulyab. Its catering workers are so eager to please that they even invite passers-by to enter their canteens and tea-rooms, which, the reader is told, is by no means contrary to the "dignity of the employee of Soviet trade" but even a "symptom of esteem for man". And there is good reason to invite him in since the catering establishments have a wide selection of good food. Kulyab's Turkmen counterpart is not Ashkhabad, where there is much to criticize, but Deynau, a small town in the Chardzhou oblast, whose canteen, it seems, can satisfy even the most fastidious taste. (TI. 8.5.59.)

. . .

As can be seen from the foregoing, complaints about the food trade and catering arrangements in Central Asia are numerous and bitter. They relate to mismanagement, short supply, overcrowding in canteens, bad

service, poor cooking, excessive sales of alcohol, dirt, and speculation of various kinds. The curious complaint was even made that in the Tashauz oblast of Turkmenistan "there is not a single cook with higher or middle school education" (TI. 7.8.59). In spite of all these shortcomings - and perhaps to some extent because of them - it cannot be denied that food is becoming more varied and plentiful and that public catering is expanding and possibly growing more efficient. Regret at the passing of the old, simple diet and eating habits may be natural and even justifiable and the apparent increase in the use of alcohol is to be deplored. But the importance now attached to good management, nutrition and cleanliness cannot but be beneficial to the people. There may be some doubt about the speed with which the Soviet Union as a whole will achieve the highest standard of living in the world, but there can be no question that considerable progress has already been made in Central Asia.

French honour for Mr. Kh.M. Abdullayev

Kh.M. Abdullayev, President of the Academy of Sciences of the Uzbek SSR has been elected a member of the French Geological Society. PV. 1.1.60

Branch of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences opened in Nukus

A Kara-Kalpak branch (filial) of the Academy of Sciences of the Uzbek SSR was opened in Nukus on 20 February 1960. There are departments of economics and of botany, laboratories of chemistry and the technology of building materials, of ichthyology and parasitology, an institute of history, language and literature, and a department of ethnography and archaeology. PV. 21.2.60

Officials of Central Asia to visit the USA

The governors of the States of the USA who visited the USSR last summer have invited a Soviet group to make a return visit beginning at the end of January 1960. Included in the Soviet delegation are D.A. Kunayev, First Secretary of the Kazakh CP, M.A. Iskenderov, Chairman of the Azerbaydzhan SSR Council of Ministers, and Kh. Dzhallilov, Chairman of the executive committee of the Council of Workers' Deputies of the Tashkent oblast. PV. 23.1.60

B O O K R E V I E W

PAN-TURKISM AND ISLAM IN RUSSIA. By Serge A. Zenkovsky.
 Harvard University Press (London: Oxford University Press),
 1960. 345pp. Maps; Bibliog.; Index. Price: 54/-.

CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW does not normally review books of other than Soviet origin, but it occasionally makes an exception for books of outstanding quality which bear closely on the Muslim republics of the Soviet Union. Mr. Zenkovsky's study clearly comes within this category: it is by far the most comprehensive and best documented account which has so far appeared in English of the struggles of the Turkic Muslim peoples of Russia for some kind of national expression.

The author has obviously encountered some difficulty in determining the factors common to the various movements, apparently aiming at political, judicial and cultural freedom, which developed among the Turkic peoples of Russia spread as these were over a vast area from the Volga to the Chinese frontier. There are in fact only two potential bonds of union among the Turkic peoples whether inside or outside Russia - the remarkable inter-resemblance of their languages (apart from such aberrant forms as Chuvash and Yakut) and Islam. The strength of the linguistic bond was limited before the Revolution by its restriction to the spoken tongues, since many of the languages had anyway no developed written form and the great majority of the people were illiterate. The bond of Islam, too, was barely operative among large sections of the Kazakh and Kirgiz nomads.

In his preface, the author explains that while his earlier opinion had been that "Turkic nationalism or 'Pan-Turkism' seemed to be the main force animating the minds and political efforts of Russian Turks", it later became evident to him that "their common attachment to the religion and culture of Islam" was "in many instances" a more important factor. In his Conclusion, he arrives regretfully at the opinion that whatever the coordinating factors might or should have been, they were in the event ineffectual. Indeed, he suggests that what he regards as the two parallel factors of pan-Turkism and Islam operated against each other - "the feeling of affiliation with the Moslem community obscured that of national identity."

Mr. Zenkovsky is unquestionably right in thinking that although Turkic national (if that is the correct word) efforts did not come to an end in 1920, the period of relatively free expression of political opinion did. He does not express an opinion on whether these efforts are still continuing today. Other writers on the subject maintain that they are, and the Soviet authorities themselves continue to inveigh not only against "bourgeois nationalism" or what they nowadays more often call localism (mestnichestvo) among the Turkic Muslims, but also against pan-Turkism and pan-Islam. By Western experts, however, the last two are generally thought to have lost all or nearly all their significance, at any rate for the Turkic peoples of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Zenkovsky speaks of the creation of autonomous republics as "an attainment for which a whole generation of Turkic patriots had fought". Although he adds that the actual status of the present republics could only frustrate Turkic national feelings, he makes no mention of the possibility of a united Turkestan which many Turks have always regarded as an alternative preferable to the parcelling out of the various peoples according to artificially contrived linguistic principles. Some readers may indeed feel that the treatment of the admittedly complicated question of Turkic nationalism is too vague to serve any useful purpose. Even so, no one interested in the history of Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Volga region will be other than grateful for Mr. Zenkovsky's skilful and objective marshalling and handling of such a wide range of source-material, much of which is difficult of access and has so far escaped scrutiny.

Restoration of Bukhara's ancient monuments

Under the current Seven-Year Plan over 21m. rubles will be spent on restoring Bukhara's ancient monuments, apart from sums allocated by local government offices or contributed by the Muslim Religious Board for Central Asia and Kazakhstan. The Ismail Samani Mausoleum (late ninth to early tenth centuries), the earliest of all burnt-brick structures in Central Asia, has been completely restored, and restoration work is being carried out on the Mir-i-Arab and Kukeldash madrasahs and the Khodzha Zaineddin mosque. SU. 1960, No.121

NEWS DIGEST

The following items are taken from newspapers and periodicals received during the period 1 January - 31 March 1960. A list of abbreviations used will be found at the beginning of the Review.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND TERRITORIAL CHANGES

Administrative changes

Administrative changes are recorded in the following appointments only: First and Second Party Secretaries, Chairmen of the Councils of Ministers (Prime Minister), Chairmen of the State Planning and State Security Committees, and Ministers of Communications.

Turkmenistan

F.A. Grisnayenkov appointed Second Secretary of the Central Committee in place of V.K. Akulintsev. TI. 19.2.60

L.P. Gladkov appointed Chairman of the State Planning Committee. TI. 6.2.60

Uzbekistan

G.F. Naymushin appointed Chairman of the State Security Committee in place of A.P. Byzov. PV. 27.2.60

Kirgizia

V.F. Stepkin appointed Second Secretary of the Central Committee in place of V.N. Churkin. SK. 28.2.60

V.D. Kulakov appointed Chairman of the State Planning Committee in place of B. Dyushaliyev. SK. 26.2.60

Kazakhstan

A.A. Arstanbekov appointed Chairman of the State Security Committee in place of K.F. Lunev. KP. 10.3.60

Territorial changesUzbekistan

By decree of 14 December 1959 the following rayons have been enlarged:

Namangan oblast (see below)

The Zadar'inskiy rayon has been attached to the Tyurya-Kurgan rayon, part of its territory being transferred to the Kassan-Say and Namangan rayons. The name Tyurya-Kurgan has been retained for the new rayon, the centre of which is now the village of Dzhamashuy.

Tashkent oblast

The Ordzhonikidze and Karasuy rayons have been combined under the name of Ordzhonikidze; the centre is the settlement of the same name.

Fergana oblast

The Yaz'yavan and Tashlak rayons have been combined. The name of the new rayon is Margelan (decree of 31.12.60), and the rayon centre is the village of Yaz'yavan.

By decree of 14 December 1959 the following rayons have been abolished:

Tashkent oblast

The Bayaut rayon, the territory being subordinated to the Yangi-Yer town soviet.

Fergana oblast

- (a) Buvaydin rayon, the territory being transferred to the Leningrad and Bagdad rayons. The centre of the Bagdad rayon has been transferred from Serovo station settlement to the village of Yangi-Kurgan.
- (b) Vuadil rayon, the territory being transferred to the Fergana and Alty-Aryk rayons.

- (c) Gorskoye rayon, the territory being transferred to the Uzbekistan and Kirovo rayons.

The centre of the Fergana rayon has been transferred from the town of Kuvasay to the village of Aval'.

VVS. 21.1.60, 28.1.60, 25.2.60

By decree of 25 January 1960 the following oblasts have been abolished:

- (a) Kashka-Dar'ya oblast, the territory being transferred to the Surkhan-Dar'ya oblast with the exception of the settlements of Mubarek and Karakum in the Kassan rayon which have been transferred to the Kagan and Navoi rayons respectively in the Bukhara oblast.
- (b) Namangan oblast: the town of Namangan, the Namangan, Naryn, Uychi, Uch-Kurgan and Yangi-Kurgan rayons have been transferred to the Andizhan oblast, while the Pap, Chust, Tyurya-Kurgan and Kassansay rayons have been transferred to the Fergana oblast. VVS. 18.2.60

By decree of 5 February 1960 the Shumanay rayon of the Kara-Kalpak ASSR has been abolished, the territory being divided between the Kungrad and the Khodzheyli rayons. VVS. 10.3.60

Kirgizia

By decree of 17 December 1959 the settlement of town type Chauvay of the abolished Uch-Korgon rayon, Osh oblast, has been transferred to the Frunzenskoye rayon in the same oblast. VVS. 7.1.60

By decree of 5 February 1960 the workers' settlement of Oktyabr'skiy has been brought within the boundaries of the town of Tokmak with which in fact it merges. VVS. 25.2.60

Kazakhstan

By decree of 16 December 1959 the inhabited point of the enterprise (sic) of Kokterek rayon, Dzhabul oblast, has been put into the category of workers' settlements and given the name of Aksuyek. VVS. 7.1.60

By decree of 16 February 1960:

- (a) The Burlyu-Tobe rayon of the Alma-Ata oblast has been abolished, its territory being divided between the Aksu, Andreyevka, Kapal and Karatal rayons.
- (b) The inhabited point at the Druzhba railway station, Alakul rayon, Alma-Ata oblast, has been made into a workers' settlement and named Druzhba.

VVS. 10.3.60

COMMUNICATIONS

Lanchow - Aktogay "Friendship" railway

A long article entitled "The Road of Head Winds" by A. Bragin on the construction of the "Friendship" railway between Sinkiang and Kazakhstan (see CAR, Vol.V, No.2, pp.153a-5, and Vol.VI, No.1, p.84) appeared in SOVETSKIY KAZAKHSTAN, No.10 of 1959. It is a "human interest" account and as such as concerned mainly with the life and difficulties of the railway's constructors; facts about the railway itself are few and there is no map.

According to Bragin there were two possible routes to Urumchi for the railway, one from Alma-Ata via Ili and Sayram-nor, the other from Aktogay. The first route led through mountainous country and was more than twice as long as the second. The second route, through the Dzhungarian Gates, was level and short but swept by strong winds capable of blowing down buildings and embankments and had the further disadvantage of by-passing Alma-Ata. The second route, however, was chosen; the prevailing winds blow along the line and so do not threaten the embankments while special wind-resisting buildings have been designed for the workers' settlements of Alakul', Koktuma and Dzhalanash.

Traffic along the Aktogay - Druzhba section of the line will be controlled from a centralized signal-box in Aktogay. The controller will be in constant radio contact with all trains in the section.

Kazakhstan

A section of the new Central Siberian Railway (see also CAR, Vol.VIII, No.1, p.59), that from Barnaul via Kamen'-na-Obi, Karasuk and Irtyshskoye to Kulomzino, a suburb of Omsk, is to be completed in

1960. Then the Irtyshskoye - Kustanay line is to be finished. The Peski - Kurgan branch is at present under construction. KP. 5.1.60

A new motor-coach service is to start shortly on the Alma-Ata - Frunze - Tashkent highway. The journey time is 16 hours, which is half the time taken by train. The new service will link the three republican capitals, Dzhambul and Chimkent. A taxi-cab service will also cover the same route. KP. 30.1.60

Hard-surface roads totalling 211 km. are to be built in 1960 in the Akmolinsk oblast. This includes an 86-km. Akmolinsk - Kurgal'-dzhino road, 71 km. from Yesil' to the grain sovkhos "Alma-Atinskiy", and 54 km. from Astrakhanka to Makinsk. KP. 20.2.60

Kirgizia

Starting on 1 February 1960 eleven-seater passenger helicopters have been covering the journey between Frunze and Lugovaya, the station on the main Novosibirsk - Tashkent, Akmolinsk - Tashkent railway. Flying at a speed of between 100 and 170 km. p.h., they do the trip in 50 minutes for 55 rubles. Before they were instituted it was necessary to wait nearly 24 hours at Lugovaya for train connections. SK. 31.1.60

DELEGATIONS

Afghanistan

A delegation of Afghan educationalists visited Tashkent in February. PV. 26.2.60

Young Afghan industrial workers have been gaining experience at a Baku motor-car repair works. BR. 5.3.60

China

A delegation of Chinese Turcologists spent ten days in Kirgizia and over a week in Kazakhstan during January. They were led by the Deputy Director of the Institute of Languages of National Minorities of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and included specialists in Uygur and Kirgiz phonetics and in the publication of national literatures. They paid particular attention to reforms of Kirgiz and Dungan script, problems of translating and publishing in the local languages the literature of other peoples, the study of the Kazakh and Uygur

languages, the production of dictionaries, the development of a national terminology, of the languages themselves and of their literatures. SK. 21.1.60; KP. 28.1.60

A delegation of the Chinese-Soviet Friendship Society, headed by Lyu Chan-shen, a member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, spent five days in Baku during February. BR. 18.2.60

Indonesia

An Indonesian trade delegation paid a visit to Tashkent and Baku during March. PV. 13.3.60; BR. 18.3.60

Iraq

A delegation of Iraqi trade union workers visited Uzbekistan in January. PV. 21, 23.1.60

Mongolia

A delegation of Mongolian Party workers visited Kazakhstan and Kirgizia during March. KP. 17, 23.3.60; SK. 24.3.60

A delegation of journalists from young people's newspapers in Mongolia spent six days in Baku on their way to Moscow during March. BR. 20.3.60

Vietnam (North Vietnam)

A Vietnamese political scientist was included in a North Vietnamese-East German delegation to Uzbekistan during February. PV. 7.2.60

FINE ARTS

Many unique manuscripts have recently come into the possession of the Firdousi Republican Library at Stalinabad, among them an original encyclopaedia, TARIKH-I-FARISHTA (The History of an Angel) compiled in the eleventh or twelfth century by an Indian writer, Mulla Muhammad Qasim Hindshah (?); a 1352 manuscript, well-preserved, containing the Indian writer Ziyai Birini's work on the Indian emperor and writer Fizuz Shah and his eight successors; a geometry in Arabic by the Persian astronomer Khwaja Nasreddin Tusi; Persian texts dating from 1585 of five complete works of Nizami Gandzhevi; and a copy of the poem YUSUF ZULAYKHA in the hand of the author Junaid Ullah Makhdum and dating from 1919. TI. 12.2.60; KT. 24.2.60

IRRIGATION

A 300-metre high dam is to be erected across the River Vakhsh halfway along its course at Nurek, Tadzhikistan. It will be the highest dam in the world, forming a lake 47 km. in length holding eight thousand million cubic metres of water. A hydroelectric power-station will be built there.

P. 13.1.60

NATIONALITIES POLICY

T. Ul'dzhabayev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Tadzhik Communist Party, addressed the XIIIth Congress of the Party on 4 February 1960. The text of his speech appeared in **KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA** of 5 February from which the following brief extract is taken:

"The rapidly developing industry and agriculture require a large number of technically educated and trained personnel with wide qualifications, and this increase ought to be met chiefly by the native population. This question has great political significance and requires constant attention on the part of Party organizations. It is necessary to say that in some places this is not understood, and they do not do enough to promote the increase of native trained personnel. In the Leninabad Silk Kombinat, for example, there were in 1958, 1,800 workers of local nationality, but today there are only 1,100."

ORIENTAL STUDIES

Striking evidence of the wide scope of Soviet oriental studies can be found in two recent announcements about forthcoming publications. The first is in a catalogue issued by the Oriental Literature Publishing House (Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoy literatury) associated with the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Moscow. This catalogue lists a total of 35 works divided into three series.

The first or "big" series, consists of critical editions and commentaries (sometimes with translations) of 19 major works in the Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Mongolian, Arabic, Persian, Egyptian, Sogdian, Turkish and Kurdish languages. These include a nine-volume critical edition of Ferdousi's **SHAHNAMEH**, and the text and translation of a recently discovered anonymous eleventh-century manuscript on the

Abbasid caliphate. The second or "small" series contains six works which include Khorezmi's MUHABBAT-NAMEH, Omar Khayyam's RUBAIYAT and MATHEMATICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL TREATIES, and some editions of Chinese and Korean works. The last series consists of translations of six works including Evliya Chelebi's SIYAHATNAMEH and the LAWS OF MANU.

All these 35 works are to be completed by 1964 and the majority of them by the end of this year.

The second project was announced in PROBLEMY VOSTOKOVEDENIYA, No. 6 of 1959. It is a series of brochures to be published by the same Oriental Literature Publishing House on the languages and groups of languages of Africa and non-Soviet Asia. Brochures on the following subjects are to appear by the end of 1961: Amharic, Ancient Uygur, Arabic, Arabic dialects of Central Asia, Aramaic, Assamese, Avestic, Baluchi, Burmese, Chinese, Chuang (Kwangsi Province), Hausa, Hindi, Indonesian, Japanese, Khmer (Cambodian), Korean, history of the Korean language, Kurdish, Languages of India, Languages of South China and South-East Asia, Luganda, Malayalam, Marathi, Mongolian, Mongolian languages and dialects of China, Pahlavi, Pali, Panjabi, Pashtu, Persian (Modern), Sanskrit, Siamese, Sogdian, Swahili, Tagalog (Philippines), Tamil, Telugu, Tibetan, Urdu, Uygur, Yagnobi (Pamirs) and Zulu.

Booklets on Soviet Muslim Asia

A series of booklets in English, each about 24 pages in length and with 12 pages of photographs (those on Azerbaydzhan and Tadzhikistan have only 8 pages of photographs), has been published by Soviet Booklets of London. The series is entitled "The Fifteen Soviet Socialist Republics Today and Tomorrow", and those which deal with the six Muslim republics, as presumably the other nine, are written by the chairman of the Council of Ministers in the republic in question. The author of KAZAKHSTAN, published in December 1959, is D.A. Kunayev, who has since been elected First Secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party.

Ed.- CAR

THE BORDERLANDS OF SOVIET
CENTRAL ASIA

AFGHANISTAN

The following analysis deals mainly with articles contained in a symposium called NEZAVISIMYY AFGANISTAN (Independent Afghanistan) edited by R.T. Akhramovich and published in Moscow in 1958. This is the most comprehensive work on Afghan affairs and history which has appeared in the Soviet Union of recent years and as such merits the detailed treatment here given to it. The Editors of CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW have aimed at showing not only the special approach of Soviet writers to Afghan history and problems, but also the extent of Soviet research and use of original source material, even if this latter aim may occasionally result in the inclusion of generally known facts.

For the convenience of readers, details of previous articles in CAR dealing with Afghan affairs are listed below:

Afghanistan: History, Current Affairs, Literature and Linguistics. Vol.IV, No.2.

India & Pakistan: II. The North-West Frontier Province - The Pathan Tribes. Vol.V, No.3, pp.295-312.

Relations between Britain, Russia and Afghanistan, 1872-80. Vol.VI, No.2.

British Policy in Central Asia in the Early Nineteenth Century. Vol.VI, No.4, pp.388-92ff.

Afghanistan: The Pashtunistan Problem. Vol.VII, No.3.
Afghanistan. Vol.VIII, No.1.

I. The Herat Rising of 1716-32 - II. Afghan Society under the Durrani - III. The State of Ahmad Shah Durrani - IV. The Finances of the Durrani Empire - V. Afghan-British Relations - VI. The Reign of Nadir Shah - VII. Soviet-Afghan Relations, 1917-58.

I. The Herat Rising of 1716-32

M.R. Arunova's article with the above title deals with what Soviet historians of Afghanistan regard as one of the first attempts at the formation of an Afghan State.

Before the formation of the Afghan State under Ahmad Shah Durrani, Arunova writes, the Afghans had been forcibly incorporated into various State formations, the last of which was the Persian Safavi State which at the beginning of the eighteenth century was in decline. A wave of dissatisfaction and revolt swept the country, affecting especially the conquered peoples. The Afghans not only had to acknowledge the supreme power of the Shah, pay taxes and supply soldiers but were also subject to religious oppression at the hands of the Shi'i clergy.

There were two attempts to set up independent Afghan principalities, writes Arunova, in Kandahar and Herat. In Kandahar, whose territory was inhabited by Gilzais and Abdalis, disturbances began in the first years of Husain's reign (1694-1722). In 1704 Gurgin Khan was sent to suppress the disorders. He did so with a brutality which still further alienated the people. In the revolt which followed, organized and led by Mir Wais who represented the interests of his tribe, the Gilzais, and of the Sunni clergy, Gurgin Khan was killed. Two military expeditions sent by the government in 1710-11 and 1713 to recapture Kandahar ended in disaster for the Safavi forces.

The following is a summary of Arunova's treatment of the Herat rising.

The territory of Herat was inhabited by Abdalis, many of whom had been deported there from Kandahar by Gurgin Khan. After his death they invited Abdullah Khan Sadozai and his son Asadullah to Herat to lead their rising. Abdullah and Asadullah were arrested, however, by Abbas Quli Khan Shamlu, the Safavi Governor of Herat. The resulting riots, in which not only Afghans but Uzbeks and Tajiks also took part, so alarmed the Safavi Government that they recalled Abbas Quli Khan and replaced him with Ja'far Khan Ustajlu.

Meanwhile Abdullah escaped, gained adherents and in 1717 besieged Herat. Ja'far Khan lacked reinforcements and the city was taken. The army sent under Fath 'Ali Khan Turkman to recapture it was destroyed by the rebels.

Between 1717 and 1719 the liberation movement spread to the tribes of Dagestan and to Kerman and Khorasan. The Arabs captured Bahrain.

In 1719 the Government made another attempt at retaking Herat. The 35,000 Government troops with artillery under Safi Quli Khan met 15,000 rebels at Kafir Qal'a and were routed. Disorder spread to all parts of the Safavi Empire. The Gilzais took Isfahan after an eight months' siege. Kerman, Fars and Persian Iraq fell. The Turks occupied the northern parts of the Empire.

Meanwhile within Herat a battle for power was taking place. Abdullah Khan had been succeeded as head of the Abdali tribe first by Zaman Khan and then by Muhammad Khan Afghan. After Muhammad Khan had failed to take Mashhad in 1722-3 power was seized by Zulfiqar Khan. He was opposed by Rahman Khan whose father he had killed. Their feud was so bloody that they were both forced to leave Herat and Muhammad Khan's brother, Allah-Yar Khan, was elected leader of the Abdalis.

At the Safavi court Nadir Quli Beg Afshar had obtained the favour of Shah Tahmasp (1722-32) and was preparing to fight the Turks and the Gilzais. In order to secure his rear, however, he had first to take Herat. Revolts in Astarabad and Mazandaran forced him to postpone his campaign against Herat for a year. The Abdalis used the time to close their ranks: Zulfiqar Khan was made Governor of Farah. In Herat they repaired defences, collected food and fodder and recruited men.


Nadir advanced against Herat in May 1729 with a force of 20,000 men with artillery. The Afghans met him outside the city. In the battle the Afghans had the advantage but had to retreat because Nadir called up fresh forces. The Afghans in their turn summoned Zulfiqar Khan from Farah and in order to gain time until his arrival pretended to treat for peace. On Zulfiqar Khan's arrival another battle lasting two days took place in which the Afghans were defeated. They were forced to sue for peace.

Nadir, on his part, was willing to make peace because of the threat of the Gilzais in Khorasan. His terms, therefore, were lenient as he did not want to drive the Abdalis, who had not been completely subdued, to a fresh rebellion and as he wanted their help against the Gilzais. The Abdalis had to pay tribute and free their prisoners. Allah-Yar Khan remained Amir but as Nadir's deputy. The Jamshid tribe, who were Shi'i Muslims, were removed to North Khorasan.

AFGHANISTAN



- International boundaries.
- - - Province boundaries.
- Sands.



In 1730, however, there were fresh disorders. The people were unable to pay the new taxes, the clergy were enraged at the favour shown to the Shi'is, and the feudal chiefs were enraged at being forced to share with Nadir the proceeds of their exploitation of the Abdali tribesmen. Husain, ruler of Kandahar, promised them support.

Allah-Yar Khan tried to restrain the Abdalis and was replaced by the more extreme Zulfiqar Khan who declared Herat independent and advanced on Mashhad. On the approach of Nadir, however, he retreated to Herat followed by Nadir who arrived in May 1731.

Saidal Khan Gilzai had come from Kandahar with a detachment of men and was in charge of the defence of Herat. The defenders made constant raids on the besiegers while all Nadir's attempts to take the city by storm were unsuccessful. He therefore decided to surround Herat and reduce it by starvation. Although the defenders' raids continued Saidal Khan lost hope of success and left for Kandahar taking his men with him. At this the Abdalis opened up negotiations with Nadir who was represented by Allah-Yar Khan. The Abdalis, however, still hoped for reinforcements from Kandahar and frequently broke off the negotiations which were terminated when Nadir's representative, Allah-Yar Khan, deserted and joined them.

Shortage of food within Herat was now critical and the defenders began to send out heavily armed foraging expeditions to collect food and fight their way back into the city with it. Although there were some successes the food shortage grew. Nadir, who had failed to bribe the leaders of the rebellion or to coerce Allah-Yar Khan by arresting his family, finally starved Herat into surrender in March 1732. The terms of surrender promised the defenders their lives and Nadir contented himself with exiling Allah-Yar Khan, nominating all the members of the city council, giving the post of governor to Muhammad Khan Mervi, one of his adherents, and deporting thousands of Abdalis to Khorasan.

The story of the Herat rising, Arunova writes, shows (a) the opposition of the Afghan people to foreign rule, and (b) that the people were the motive force of the rising. The feudal rulers, of course, also wanted independence but only because they would then be more free to exploit the Afghan people.

It is perhaps noteworthy that in this article Arunova, although she does not omit to point out that a class struggle was taking place among the Afghans or that the interests of the feudal rulers were not those of the people, yet puts a different emphasis on the Herat rising from that given in a book of which she and K.Z. Ashrafyan are joint authors - GOSUDARSTVO NADIR SHAKHA AFSHARA, Moscow, 1958. Here the

authors write: "In the period under discussion there frequently flared up, together with popular uprisings, feudal revolts of the nobility of a number of tribes", and go on to say that in these revolts the tribal leaders were making use of popular discontent with the political and economic situation. They further write: "It was in these years that the revolts of the feudal leadership of the Abdali tribe of Afghans took place in Herat under the leadership of Zulfiqar Khan (1730-31)."

II. Afghan Society under the Durranis

There recently appeared in Moscow a book entitled AKHMAD SHAKH - OSNOVATEL' AFGANSKOGO GOSUDARSTVA, a translation from the Persian of the Afghan historian Mir Ghulam Muhammad Gubar. The Russian edition was prefaced by a long and interesting article by I.M. Reysner.

Reysner welcomes Gubar's book because it gives a different point of view from that of such British historians as Sykes, Macmunn and Malleson who tend to ignore eastern sources and who "were first of all practical participants in British colonial policy who occupied themselves with the history of Afghanistan with quite definite aims in view. Hence their neglect of those pages of the history of this country which, although so important to the Afghans themselves, had no connexion with the three Anglo-Afghan wars or with British policy in the Middle East." Reysner, however, praises earlier British works, especially Mountstuart Elphinstone's "An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul. . ."

Owing to the comparative youth and inexperience of Afghan historical scholarship, Reysner writes, Gubar has not managed to give a complete analysis of his material. He has not given enough space to the history of Central Asia, India and Persia in the eighteenth century, when their history was closely connected with that of Afghanistan. Finally, he has assumed in his Afghan readers a general knowledge of the facts of the history and economy of Afghanistan in the eighteenth century, especially of the structure and inter-relations of the tribes, which the non-Afghan reader will not possess. In his introductory article, therefore, Reysner makes good these omissions. His sketch of the history of Central Asia, Persia and India in the eighteenth century has been omitted. A summary of his account of the social and economic structure of Afghanistan in this period follows.

The original cradle of the Afghan race was the Sulaiman Mountains. Over a long period the Afghans spread out over the right bank of the

Indus and the Ghazni plateau, assimilating a number of non-Afghan tribes such as the Turkic Gilzais (who were originally called Khiljis). During this process, which was accelerated by the Mongol invasions, some nomad tribes took to a settled way of life. This process of expansion was mainly finished by the sixteenth century. In eighteenth century Afghanistan there was a strong distinction between the full citizens - the members of the free Afghan tribes - and the dependent non-Afghan population (Tajiks, etc.) who were generally called hamsayas (vassals) or faqirs (subjects). The number of hamsayas on the territory of a tribe differed from tribe to tribe. They were a minority but not an insignificant one. They were, however, the most exploited section of the population and therefore economically the most valuable. The free Afghans owned inherited plots of land and paid few or no taxes. The hamsayas, on the other hand, were prevented from owning land and paid heavy taxes. They had limited rights and in some cases were serfs. They mainly worked on the land as share-croppers but were also craftsmen, traders and money-lenders. Some hamsayas were originally Afghans who had been defeated and subjected by other tribes. The free Afghan lived on his land or as a nomad. To trade (with the exception of the transit trade carried on by the powindahs, or nomads) was a disgrace. Any member of a free tribe who lost his plot of land (daftar) became a hamsaya. With the growth of property inequality among the Afghans, this began to happen more and more frequently and the term "hamsaya" ceased to denote the dependent, non-Afghan, population and came to have a class (soslovnyy) connotation. This was the situation in the middle of the eighteenth century. But the tribal system survived because, in spite of a sharp class struggle among the tribesmen, the tribe as a whole continued to face the hamsayas as collective owner of the land on which the latter worked. The position of the hamsayas among the nomad tribes is still unclear. In general it may be said that the Afghan tribal system was based on the exploitation of the hamsayas.

Among the Durrani (Abdalis) the land was the property of the tribe but, with the exception of the common pastures, was shared out among the members of the clan (rod), the lowest subdivision of the tribe (plemya). The shares were originally equal in size but came to be different with the passage of time as some were subdivided more than others. Chiefs and members of the clergy received larger shares than the other clan members. Vesh, or periodic re-allotment of land among clan members, had already ceased among the Durrani. By the middle of the eighteenth century land could be sold and had become private property.

The power of the Durrani tribal chief depended on his wealth (derived from war plunder) his success as a leader in war and on the support of his dependents. The chief had some judicial power in

competition with the tribal jirga. The members of the tribe, however, still kept their economic independence and their pride and they controlled the jirga, which had a democratic character. Among his own tribesmen, in fact, the chief was merely primus inter pares. His power was much greater over the hamsayas. This dual character of the power of the tribal chief had its counterpart in the power of Ahmad Shah who had much more authority in conquered territory inhabited by non-Afghans than at home.

Although the clergy were a privileged class whose land was tax-free and was worked by hamsayas or poor Afghans, they were not all favoured and the standard of living of the poor clergy was hardly any different from that of the ordinary tribesman.

Durrani society, therefore, had formed classes. The feudal, or exploiting, class had two sections, the gentry and the clergy. The mass of the peasantry were farmers or nomads and their poorer sections merged with the hamsayas.

Among the Gilzais the situation was little different. The power of their khans was less, there were fewer crafts and less trade. The other tribes also, although less developed than the Durrani and Gilzais, were at different stages of the development of a class society.

The Afghan State which was founded in 1747 was a feudal State. Although the leading role in its foundation was played by the Durrani it also answered the interests of the other khans who "needed a State apparatus, both to crush resistance within the country and to use in the conquest and plunder of neighbouring peoples. It was not by accident that the choice of the Durrani khans and clergy fell on the twenty-five-year-old Ahmad Khan who, in spite of his youth, had already shown himself to be a distinguished general and organizer, especially in the critical days after the death of Nadir Shah and during the return from Persia to Kandahar of the Afghan auxiliary force. The candidature of Ahmad Khan suited the Durrani khans not only because he was a well-known general and popular with the troops - he [also] belonged to the Sadozai clan [the clan from which the Durrani khan was always chosen]. . . which was extremely weak and few in numbers by comparison with the other clans and subdivisions of this tribe. Thus in the person of Ahmad Khan Afghanistan acquired a Shah who, although distinguished by the most noble birth, was of a clan which could not give him great support and who was therefore not dangerous to the leaders of the more powerful Durrani clans." Ahmad Shah could not retain his throne without the support of the Durrani khans and this is the reason for his "mildness" towards them which Gubar praises as condescension and mercy. The Durrani were free of taxation and had only to supply soldiers. The tribal leaders were "the real masters of the

situation in the districts and their only important obligation was military service", and even this obligation they fulfilled only in so far as was profitable to them. As Ahmad Shah could not control the khans or defeat them (since they provided the overwhelming part of his forces) he had to compromise and woo them.

III. The State of Ahmad Shah Durrani

"The Independent Afghan State of Ahmad Shah Durrani and his Successors", Yu.V. Gankovskiy. Gankovskiy quotes numerous sources. Of these (excluding the Russian sources) the most important, especially as regards the comparative power of Ahmad Shah and the Afghan tribal khans, are given at the end of this article.

Gankovskiy asserts that Ahmad Shah's Empire was not the first Afghan State formation; there had been the principalities of Akora and Teri in the sixteenth century and of Kandahar and Herat in the eighteenth. Only Ahmad Shah's Empire, however, covered the whole area inhabited by Afghans.

On the question of the stage of feudal development reached by Afghan society and on the dual nature of the Shah's power in Afghan and conquered territory Gankovskiy agrees with Reysner (above). He points out also the fact that the power of the Durrani khans was further reinforced by the hereditary nature of their appointments in the State administration, in the Army and the Court. The Shah still had the right to appoint officers but only from among the members of the appropriate clan (rod). The Shah also had the right to nominate the tribal khans, but here too his choice was limited to the khan-khel (i.e. the khans of the khel or tribe).

Although later, Gankovskiy writes, Ahmad's personal authority and the strength of his Guard grew to such an extent that he could afford to pay less attention to the Durrani nobility, he still never decided an important affair of state without consulting his jirga. The Shah's own authority derived largely from his being head of the Sadozais, the Khan-khel of the Durranis, so that it is possible to say that his power was supported and hallowed, and at the same time limited by "survivals of the tribal system".

After Ahmad Shah's death, when the military and economic basis of his power had been undermined by his failures against the Sikhs, feudal decentralization took place. Revolts occurred of the khans against the central power. Timur Shah (1773-93) tried to rule without considering or consulting the khans and was finally poisoned.

During the reign of Shah Zaman (1793-1801) the sardars (tribal leaders) plotted to limit his power by acquiring the right to elect and depose the Shah. Neither Ahmad Shah nor his successors was able to subdue the tribes and their khans. Even the Afghan lands, Gankovskiy concludes, did not compose a firm State unit.

Gankovskiy next gives a sketch of the administration of the Court, of the State and of the Army. A summary appears below.

The Court (Darbar)

All posts within the Court were hereditary to the Durrani khans. The Court ceremonial was modelled on that of the Court of Nadir Shah Afshar. There were many Persians and Indians (kyzylbash) among the courtiers of middle rank.

State Administration

(a) Central. The Administration was headed by the Shah's vazir or Chief Minister whose duties included control over the various departments and provinces, the maintenance of public order and security, and the selection of candidates for high office. This office was hereditary in the Bamizai khel of the Popolzai subdivision of the Durranis. Under the vazir were the departments of finance, justice and intelligence and the Shah's secretariat.

The last department (dar-al-insha, or divan-i-insha) is easily described. It was responsible for issuing the Shah's decrees (firman) and for carrying on the Shah's correspondence. It was headed by the Shah's secretary.

The Ministry of Finances (headed by the divan-begi or mustaufi) was responsible for the collection of taxes, both direct and indirect, the management of the Shah's domain (khalise), the control of the mint, the treasury and the stores of goods paid as taxes in kind, and for all State expenditure. The divan-begi was also responsible for irrigation and public works.

Although the Shah's privy purse and the State Treasury were not kept separate every effort was made to put as much as possible of income into funds in case of future need.

The Intelligence Section was headed by the kharkara-bashi who was also responsible for the postal services. "Various sources note that especially in the provinces conquered by Ahmad Shah and his successors all classes of society swarmed with spies."

Shariat justice was in the hands of the Muslim clergy. The capital and provincial judges were chosen by the Shah on the recommendation of the Court Imam.

(b) Provincial. The provinces (vilayet) were usually arranged on a tribal basis. There were three classes of province:

- (i) Those under the direct rule of the Shah, who appointed their governors. These were usually conquered territories not inhabited by Afghans.
- (ii) Vassal khanates and amirates. The Shah had no right either to appoint or to remove the rulers.
- (iii) The Afghan tribal areas which were considered independent and were ruled by the tribal khans and maliks.

The province was organized like the State. Its most important commanders were: the military commander (amir lashkar), the treasurer (divan), the administrator of khalise lands (mamur-i khalisejat), and the head of the customs service (mudir-i-gumruk). In the majority of provinces there were also fortress commanders (qaladar), chiefs of police (mirshab), irrigation officials (mirab), etc. The control of the centre over the provincial governor was loose. While the governor continued to pay his share of taxes to the central treasury he was allowed to do more or less as he pleased.

The power of the provincial governors was greatest in the third class of provinces, the Afghan tribal areas, which were ruled by the tribal khans. Here the khans were not only representatives of the Afghan State but were also members of the tribal feudal ruling class and thus "received the opportunity of using the whole might of the State apparatus of the young Afghan power for the enslavement of the free rank-and-file members of the tribe". The khans were responsible for the defence of their territory and so began to change from mere tribal rulers to territorial rulers. The tribal khan was nominated by the Shah from the khan-khel of the tribe and received a royal firman and the title of khan, sultan, sarkarda or malik.

In the vassal khanates the administrative system remained as it had been before subjection. The rulers of these states were usually bound to supply troops to the Shah's army and to pay a small tribute.

In all except the first class of provinces the control of the centre was weak. "So even in an administrative sense the territories conquered by Ahmad Shah did not represent a firm unit."

The Army

The Army was composed of the regular units, the khans' cavalry and the tribal levies. The regular units were: the Guard, a corps of Persian musketeers, the Shah's personal bodyguard, a detachment of field-police (nasakchi) and ancillary arms including artillery. The nucleus of the regular units was the Guards Cavalry. This unit was formed of non-Afghans who, as they had no connections with the Afghan population, were more likely to be faithful to the Shah. Seventy per cent of the armed forces, however, were irregular, i.e. the khans' cavalry and the tribal levies who, as noted above, owed allegiance primarily to their tribal rulers.

Although the Shah was Supreme Commander, executive command was in the hands of a Commander-in-Chief (sipahsalar).

The numbers of the Army varied. In 1748 Ahmad Shah led 30,000 men against India. At Panipat he led an army of approximately 80,000 men plus 250-300,000 irregulars. The tribal levies were loosely linked and sometimes did not obey the Shah's orders at all. The tribal system meant that the Shah's army was in effect a collection of small tribal armies.

The loss of the Panjab had a bad effect on the armed forces and Ahmad Shah's successors were much weaker than he. This, together with the growth of large feudal land-holdings among the khans and the process of feudal decentralization, caused the State to break up.

IV. The Finances of the Durrani Empire

Almost simultaneously with the above article Gankovskiy published a book, IMPERIYA DURRANI, Izd. vost. lit., Moscow, 1958, covering the same ground. Chapter 5 of this book, "Taxes and the Tax System: The State's Income and Expenditure", is here condensed.

The income of the Afghan State was derived from direct and indirect taxation, usually paid in kind. As the most important taxes were those on land, the various categories of land-holding in Afghanistan in the second half of the eighteenth century must be considered. State lands formed a large category which grew by conquest. By the end of the eighteenth century, however, they had mostly been given as jagirs to Durrani khans and their adherents. There was also the growing category of waqf lands granted by the Shah or other individuals to religious foundations. There were the privately-owned mulk lands which did not oblige the owner to carry out any kind of civil or

military service. He could bequeath or sell them or dispose of them as he pleased. Tax on these lands was paid by the owner who received rent from the peasants. Finally there were the lands of the village communities (Russian obshchina) and the tribal lands. The Afghan tribes had been freed by Ahmad Shah from many of the taxes imposed by Nadir Shah and both Durranis and other tribes paid only nominal taxes if any at all. This category of land, therefore, did not contribute much to the income of the Afghan State. In law the Shah was ultimate owner of the land and by virtue of this position levied a rent/tax from all the territory in his control with the exception of the jagirs and the land of some tribes which gave military service in lieu of taxes.

The most important taxes were the salesat, a tax of one-third of the harvest on irrigated land, and the kharaaj, a tax of one-tenth of the harvest on non-irrigated land. Both these taxes applied to all categories of land with the exception of waqf and Afghan tribal lands. In the case of irrigated lands, if the irrigation installations had been built not by the State but by private persons or by communities, then the salesat also could be reduced to one-tenth of the harvest. There were also taxes on water, paid either by the owner of the canal or, if the canal were State owned, by its users, and on orchards, paid either according to area or to the number of trees, vines, etc. Other taxes were the hearth tax, the cattle tax, the mill tax and taxes levied to maintain the army, the mirabs, the headmen and the kazis. All non-Muslims paid a "ransom tax" (jiziya). In the towns tradesmen and shopkeepers also paid special taxes. The State derived additional income from the exploitation of mineral resources, the farming of taxes and from customs duties and tolls. The taxes were farmed out sometimes to provincial governors but usually to Hindus. The original farmer would farm the taxes out in his turn until finally the collection of the taxes from each sub-district had been farmed. The evils of this system are well-known. There was a popular couplet in the Panjab which said: "What we have eaten and drunk is our own, the rest is Ahmad Shah's." The balance of the State's income was derived from the sale of offices, tribute from vassals, the income of the Shah's estates and of various State monopolies, the issuing of money, fines, confiscations and war-booty.

According to Dow in THE HISTORY OF HINDOSTAN, Vol.II, p.382, the total annual income at the end of Ahmad Shah's reign was 30m. rupees. Under Timur Shah it fell to 10m. rupees and under Shah Zaman to 6.7m. Under Shuja, however, it rose to 9m. rupees. The eastern, or Indian, provinces were both taxed more heavily and contributed a greater share of that tax to the central treasury than the western: on the basis of material collected by Gulam Sarvar in 1793-4 (H.R. Gupta, STUDIES IN THE LATER MUGHAL HISTORY OF THE PANJAB (1707-1793), Lahore, 1944,

pp.272-5) it can be shown that while the eastern provinces of Kashmir, Multan, Dera Ismail Khan, Dera Ghazi Khan, Shikarpur, Muzaffarabad, Attock, Indian Hazara and Sukkur paid a total of 7,120,000 rupees of which 3,801,000 or 53.3 per cent, were paid to the central treasury, the western provinces of Kabul, Peshawar, Jelalabad, Gorbend, Bangashat Ghazni, Kalat-i Gilzai, Charikar and Panjshir, Kandahar, Farah, Herat, Bamyan and Hazarajat paid only 5,338,000 rupees, of which the central treasury received 1,748,000 - 32.7 per cent.

Expenditure fell under the two heads of Army and Administration, the Army taking the lion's share. Gubar (AKHMAD SHAKH - OSNOVATEL' AFGANSKOGO GOSUDARSTVA, p.263) estimates Ahmad Shah's total military expenditure per year at 19m. rupees. This seems exaggerated. Shah Zaman's direct military expenditure did not exceed 1,850,000 rupees. Even if the income from the jagirs granted to maintain officers (4,200,000 rupees) is added, the total is still no more than 6,050,000 rupees. It is unlikely that military expenditure was any greater under Ahmad Shah.

Shah Zaman's administrative expenditure amounted to 5m. rupees annually. 2,370,000 rupees were spent on the upkeep of the Court (this sum does not include the contributions made in kind by the provinces and vassal states for this purpose). So called "charity" accounted for 283,000 rupees, most of which found their way into the hands of the Muslim clergy. On public works 210,000 rupees were spent. When these and other expenses are taken into account total expenditure at the beginning of Shah Zaman's reign was at the most 14.lm. rupees. Of this sum, however, only 4,610,000 rupees fell to the account of the central treasury; the remainder (67 per cent) was covered by the provincial budgets.

Gankovskiy quotes the following table to account for expenditure from the central treasury. His source is H.R. Gupta, op.cit., p.268.

<u>Object of expense</u>	<u>thousands of rupees</u>	<u>percentage of total</u>
Military expenditure	1,460	31.6
Shah's stables	150)	
Elephant houses	50)	8.4
Mules	80)	
Camels	110)	
Court expenditure	1,170	25.3
incl.harem 560, kitchen 220		
Shah's personal expenditure	1,200	26.0
Construction	210	4.5
Subsidies to Balkh and Akcha	185	4.2
	<u>4,615</u>	

Gulam Sarvar's figures, collected in 1793-4 (see above), give the total income of the central treasury at this time as 5,549,000 rupees. It was possible, therefore, to put away large sums in case of an emergency. According to Gulam Sarvar (H.R. Gupta, op.cit., p. 526) under Shah Zaman out of 6.7m.rupees 2.1m. were saved in this way.

Towards the end of the Durrani Empire, war, revolt and feudal disintegration brought about a decrease in the State's income. Trade was disrupted and the customs which had brought in 600-700,000 rupees at the end of the eighteenth century brought in only 25,000 rupees at the beginning of the nineteenth. Also the Durrani khans had been filching the State khalise lands; seventy-five per cent of these lands in the Kandahar province was in the hands of Durrani khans by the end of Ahmad Shah's reign. Thus the growth of the jagirdars' wealth took place at the expense of that of the State. This hastened the fall of the Empire.

V. Afghan-British Relations

The First Afghan War (See CAR, Vol.IV, No.2, pp.164-6.)

N.A. Khalfin, "British Expansion in Afghanistan and the Liberation Battle of the Afghan People in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century".

Afghanistan was important to Britain, Khalfin writes, from the point of view of both strategy and trade as it lay on the cross-roads of the routes joining Persia, Central Asia, India and western China. The British wanted "to turn Afghanistan into. . . an object of colonial exploitation and a military-political springboard for penetration into Central Asia". In pursuit of this aim British policy passed through three stages:

- (a) 1801-30, reconnaissance, spying and diplomatic intrigue;
- (b) 1830-9, as a result of an economic crisis in Britain intrigue was replaced by military action, leading to
- (c) the First Afghan War.

These activities were camouflaged by "all sorts of demagogical arguments and by a falsification of historical facts and documents which at times assumed quite crude forms". The "French threat" which was the original excuse soon gave way to the "Russian threat". Khalfin dismisses this theory in the normal Soviet style, arguing that it was

beyond Russia's power to threaten India and that the British knew this and only used the "threat" as a pretext. What the British wanted, he alleges, was to expand their Empire and "to extract immense profits from the exploitation and plunder of the peoples of the East".

As examples of British tactics during the first stage Khalfin gives the 1809 treaties with Persia and Sind, Mountstuart Elphinstone's mission to Kabul, the travels in the East of the "British agent" Mir Izzat-Ullah in 1812 and Moorcroft and Trebeck's travels in Afghanistan in 1820-5.

The 1809 treaties are characterized as a typical British application of the tactic of "divide and rule", since they made Persia an ally of Britain in case of a war with Afghanistan and gave Ranjit Singh full freedom of action to the north and west of the Sutlej, i.e. against Afghanistan.

Elphinstone's mission, writes Khalfin, was obviously not prompted by any possibility of an alliance between France, Persia and Russia. With Persia trying to subdue Transcaucasia any alliance between Russia and Persia was impossible. The treaty concluded by Elphinstone was "the first of a series of one-sided (kabal'nyy) agreements foisted by Britain on Afghanistan" and bound the Afghans "to defend the British invaders in India". The fact that at this time Britain had a treaty with Persia which enlisted Persian support against Afghanistan in case of war proves British duplicity, Khalfin asserts. Khalfin alleges that Elphinstone intrigued with the Afghan clergy while he was at the Amir's court. The researches of his staff into the economy, geography, etc., of Afghanistan are taken as proving aggressive intent.

With a crisis of overproduction in Britain, British policy in Afghanistan entered its second phase. The British manufacturing bourgeoisie wanted new markets in India, Afghanistan and Central Asia and a sign of their mood was their insistence on "the liquidation of the East India Company". [In 1833 the East India Company lost its monopoly of the China trade, having lost its monopoly in India, as Khalfin notes, in 1813. It continued to exist, however, and to collect revenue. - Ed. CAR.]

As examples of continued British reconnaissance in Afghanistan and its approaches, Khalfin gives Alexander Burnes' missions in 1831-3 to collect information on the navigability of the Indus and on the Panjab, Afghanistan and Central Asia, Carless and Wood's mission to the Indus, and Masson's journey to Afghanistan in 1835, and finally Burnes' mission in 1836.

The pressure of the British bourgeoisie at home, however, caused the British to support the attempt of Shuja, ex-Amir of Afghanistan, to regain the Afghan throne in alliance with Ranjit Singh (in 1832-4). This attempt was carried out, Khalfin writes, in accordance with a plan worked out by the British Political Agent at Ludhiana, Captain Wade, and was financed by Britain. In 1837 Britain intervened in the war between Persia and Herat and in 1841 captured the Persian market by means of a one-sided treaty which she forced on Persia.

Lieut. Vitkevich was sent to Dost Muhammad, the ruler of Kabul, as Russia's representative in answer to an appeal which Dost Muhammad had made to Russia, Britain and Persia to mediate between him and the Sikhs on the question of Peshawar, captured by the Sikhs in 1834. Alexander Burnes, who was already on his way, was made Britain's representative. Burnes' mission was both commercial and political in aim, Khalfin alleges: of his staff, Lieut. Leech of the Bombay Engineers had the task of carrying out military reconnaissance, Lieut. Wood of the Indian Navy of reconnoitring the rivers, and Percival Lord of investigating Afghanistan's natural resources.

Britain's determination to fan the flames of Afghan-Sikh enmity is shown, Khalfin writes, by the fact that although Burnes supported Dost Muhammad's claim to Peshawar he was rebuked by Macnaghten in a letter of 20 January 1837 and instructed to deliver an ultimatum that Dost Muhammad should give up his claim to Peshawar and break off all relations with Russia. Dost Muhammad's refusal meant the diplomatic failure of Burnes' mission, but this failure, alleges Khalfin, was deliberate and did not mean any failure in basic British policy.

Khalfin quotes Vitkevich's official instructions as follows: "Your main obligation. . . is to pacify the Afghan rulers (Dost Muhammad of Kabul and Kukhendil Khan of Kandahar), explain to them how useful for them personally and for the safety of their dominions it is for them to be in agreement and close connexion with each other in order to protect themselves against external enemies and internal revolts. [You must then] explain to them. . . the necessity of making use of the favour and protection of Persia." Khalfin goes on to recount how Vitkevich (whom he calls a "semi-official agent of Russia") promised Dost Muhammad Russia's help in a battle for the return of Peshawar. He says nothing, however, about Vitkevich's repudiation and suicide. Britain, he writes, made use of the episode to raise the "Russian bogey" and prepared to "force a war on the Afghan people". With this British policy entered its third phase.

In spite of the official British version of events which accused Dost Muhammad of intriguing with Russia against Britain and alleged that Burnes had advised invasion, a version which Palmerston supported

by falsified and forged documents, in fact, writes Khalfin, nothing could be further from the truth. Britain merely wanted to turn Afghanistan into a vassal state by installing a British puppet on the Afghan throne.

The original plan of attack, according to which Ranjit Singh was to provide the bulk of the troops, is represented by Khalfin as an attempt to weaken Sind. Khalfin quotes Sir Kerr Fraser-Tytler (AFGHANISTAN, p.107) as his authority for asserting that Ranjit "demanded" that "sugar be added to milk", i.e. that British troops also should take part, although Fraser-Tytler mentions no demand and represents the change of plan as being due to British initiative.

[Khalfin's account of military operations has been omitted.]

Khalfin ends his article by emphasizing the unanimous desire of the Afghan people to rid themselves of the British invaders, a factor in the British defeat which, he alleges, "British bourgeois historians" have "forgotten or not recognized at all".

The Second Afghan War (See CAR, Vol.IV, No.2, pp.167-9; Vol.VI, No.2, pp.205-28.)

M.A. Babakhodzhayev, "Britain's Aggressive Policy in Afghanistan and the Battle of the Afghan People for Independence in the Seventies of the Nineteenth Century".

Babakhodzhayev quotes numerous British and two Afghan sources. These are listed at the end of this analysis.

An article by F.Kh. Yuldashbayeva published in 1955 in TRUDY SAGU, No.LXVIII and entitled "The Russo-Afghan Demarcation and the Intensification of British Aggression in Central Asia and Afghanistan (1872-1880)" (see CAR, Vol.VI, No.2, pp.205-28) had as its theme the statement that "during the period 1869-80 the British Government's policy in Asia, from its base in India, was to absorb Afghanistan with the object of using that country as a base for aggression against Russia." Babakhodzhayev's article makes no mention of a projected British attack on Russia and considers that British actions in Afghanistan were simply part of the natural (although reprehensible) process of "imperial expansion". In other words the main aim of British policy was to reduce Afghanistan to the status of a vassal. Babakhodzhayev mentions the possibility of British aggression against Russia only as an explanation of Kaufman's rapprochement with Afghanistan and the Stoletov mission in 1877.

Whereas Yuldashbayeva's article made hardly any reference to Russian "imperial expansion" north of Afghanistan, Babakhodzhayev mentions the successive stages of the Russian advance in Turkestan and alleges that the British regarded this advance as a threat, not to India as they pretended, but to their own expansion into Turkestan. Babakhodzhayev carries no brief for the Tsarist Government, which by his own evidence having first declared that Afghanistan was outside its sphere of influence, then made use of Sher Ali in pursuit of purely Russian interests and abandoned him to the British. However, like Yuldashbayeva, he represents Tsarist imperialism as being in respect of Afghanistan less rapacious and more reasonable than British imperialism. In connexion with Abdurrahman's exit from Turkestan to Afghanistan in 1880 he writes: "The Tsarist Government, preferring to see as a neighbour to [Russian] Central Asia an independent Afghan State rather than a British colony. . . at the beginning of 1880. . . allowed Sher Ali's relative Abdurrahman to leave Turkestan for Afghanistan. . . The Tsarist authorities calculated that Abdurrahman, if he were confirmed on the Afghan throne, would hold to a Russian course or at least carry out a foreign policy which would be independent of Britain."

From 1869 to 1873, Babakhodzhayev writes, the British were forced by the aftermaths of the Indian Mutiny temporarily to renounce their aggressive plans in Central Asia. Instead they followed a policy of "friendship with the de facto Afghan ruler" which implied supporting now one, now another of the claimants to the throne in order to keep the country weak and divided. For this reason Mayo [appointed Governor-General of India in 1868] refused to conclude a treaty with Sher Ali at Ambala in 1869. At the same time the British favoured Afghan aspirations on the south bank of the Oxus (the aspirations, Babakhodzhayev hastens to add, not of the Afghan people but of "Afghan ruling circles"). They did this, he writes, because they wanted Afghanistan to expand as much as possible before annexation so as to make annexation more worth while.

On Russian expansion in Turkestan and on the delimitation of Afghanistan's frontiers Babakhodzhayev writes: "It is not surprising that the incorporation by Tsarist Russia of Tashkent (1865) and Samarkand (1868) and her further penetration deep into Central Asia called forth the disquiet of British ruling circles. In Russia's policy Great Britain discerned a direct counteraction to her own expansionist plans in the Middle East which counted on the maximum expansion of British colonial domains. These circumstances moved the British to begin negotiations with the Tsarist Government on the demarcation of spheres of influence between Britain and Russia in the Middle East.

"Tsarist Russia was occupied with the assimilation of the newly acquired territories in Central Asia and was not planning any annexation of Afghan territory. Therefore she proposed that Russia and Great Britain should combine to guarantee the independence of Afghanistan (more accurately, of the regions over which Amir Sher Ali's power spread) and should consider this territory a neutral zone.


"The British did not wish to renounce the idea of subduing Afghanistan and rejected Russia's proposal, declaring that it was essential to extend the border of the neutral zone 'to the north'."

Babakhodzhayev obviously regards the final settlement in 1873 as being brought about mainly by Russia who agreed to consider Afghanistan outside her sphere of influence and "in order to bring about a rapid solution of the Afghan problem agreed to recognize the power of the Amir of Afghanistan over the semi-independent areas of Badakhshan, Maimana and some other territories on the left bank of the Amu-Dar'ya."

Now that an agreement with Russia had been achieved, Babakhodzhayev writes, the British went over from polite assurances of "friendship" to diplomatic pressure on the Afghan Government. Northbrook's [Governor-General of India 1872-6] attempt to induce Sher Ali to receive a British representative in Kabul to receive information on the results of the Anglo-Russian negotiations and on the Seistan award failed, but Sher Ali agreed to send a representative to Simla. Here the British demanded the establishment of British representatives in Kandahar, Herat and Kabul. Sher Ali's representative, Sa'id Nur Muhammad refused, but Northbrook did not give up and in a letter reminded Sher Ali of the "Russian threat" and offered him aid against Russia in return for his acceptance of British control over Afghan foreign policy and of British agents in Afghanistan to watch the northern frontiers.

The failure of the Simla Conference, the Seistan award and the British refusal to recognize Sher Ali's younger son Abdullah Jan as the heir apparent made the Amir doubtful of British goodwill.

In 1874 Disraeli replaced Gladstone as Prime Minister and the "forward policy" replaced that of the "closed frontier". Salisbury, Secretary of State for India, wrote to Northbrook about the necessity of gathering information on Afghanistan of interest to the British Government, and proposed that he should "without delay. . . find some pretext to send a mission to Kabul" and insist that the Amir should receive it. Northbrook demurred and was replaced by Lytton who had full powers to defend the Indo-Afghan frontier by whatever means the circumstances demanded without considering the wishes of the Amir or the interests of his dynasty. In fact, writes Babakhodzhayev, this



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meant that he could put into execution Britain's aggressive plans in Afghanistan and camouflage his actions by reference to the non-existent "Russian threat".

Lytton demanded that Sher Ali should receive Sir Lewis Pellow in Kabul, and when the latter refused, pleading the impossibility of guaranteeing his safety, tried to frighten the Amir by references to a possible alliance between Britain and Russia who could then with impunity "wipe Afghanistan off the map". He gave the Amir the "choice between a voluntary acceptance of a British protectorate over Afghanistan or a British military attack", Babakhodzhayev writes.

Simultaneously the British began to encircle Afghanistan: in 1876 Chitral was subdued and in the following year Gilgit. The occupation of Quetta (1876), wrote John Lawrence [Governor-General of India 1863-8] in THE TIMES, was "the first step on the path to the occupation of Kandahar and Herat".

The draft treaty of 14 articles and seven secret articles which the British intended to propose to the Afghan side at Peshawar in 1877 gave Britain control over Afghan foreign policy, trade rights and the right to station British representatives on Afghan territory and thus, alleges Babakhodzhayev, "was not at all different from the one-sided agreements which Britain by threats, intrigue and every kind of trick forced on the Indian principalities, depriving their peoples of independence and sentencing them to colonial slavery." Negotiations broke down on the question of British representatives, and the Viceroy seized the occasion of the death of the Afghan representative Sa'id Nur Muhammad to break off negotiations. The report that Sher Ali had at the last moment sent an emissary with instructions to accept the British demands is dismissed by Babakhodzhayev who considers that Sher Ali was only manoeuvring to gain time.

It was at this time that a "lively correspondence" began between Sher Ali and General Kaufman, the Governor-General of Turkestan. Alarmed at this the British "decided to make use of the authority of the Sultan of Turkey who was considered the Caliph of all Muslims" to isolate Afghanistan from Russia. In 1877 the Sultan's emissary, Ali Hamid, proposed that Sher Ali should join Turkey, Britain and the khanate of Bukhara in an anti-Russian bloc. [As authority for the statement that this mission was sent on British initiative Babakhodzhayev quotes Girs' letter to Lord Derby of 12 September 1877 and the Afghan historian Fayz Muhammad, SIRAJ AT-TAVARIKH.]

The casus belli against Afghanistan which the British were looking for came when in 1878 "Tsarist Russia in circumstances of a sharp

aggravation of Anglo-Russian contradictions in the Near East and on the eve of the Congress of Berlin decided on a rapprochement with Afghanistan who was seeking Russia's support at that time against the approaching menace of British aggression". On 29 July 1878 the Stoletov Mission arrived in Kabul "to reinforce the friendship between Russia and Afghanistan and conclude a Russo-Afghan alliance in case of the occurrence of a war between Britain and Russia. It was planned simultaneously to send 20,000 Russian troops to the Afghan frontier." Russia hoped thereby to exert pressure on Britain during the Congress of Berlin and to keep the privileges received by her by the Treaty of San Stefano. However, by 29 July the Treaty of Berlin had already been signed and the Tsarist Government ". . . not wishing further to exacerbate its relations with Britain. . . refused to ratify the project of a Russo-Afghan alliance which had been approved by the Amir Sher Ali during the negotiations, and dispersed the Russian detachments which it had originally been planned to move to the Afghan border." In spite of this the British declared war.

Babakhodzhayev admits that the Russian Mission left Afghanistan only in February 1879, after Sher Ali's death [for differences of opinion in Russian sources on the dates of arrival and departure of the Stoletov Mission see CAR, Vol.IV, No.2, pp.167-9] and stresses that although the Russians did not give Sher Ali military support they tried to regularize the conflict. Kaufman wrote to the Amir begging him not to leave his country as the British had promised to preserve Afghanistan's independence.

Babakhodzhayev's account of the fighting is omitted. He accounts for the early Afghan failures by references to lack of numbers, bad leadership and equipment and the fact that the popular masses had been set against the Amir by feudal exploitation and high taxation. Only after they had seen their country occupied did they rally against the British.

The Third Afghan War

L.R. Gordon-Polonskaya, "Afghanistan's War for Independence and the Part Played by the Pashtun Tribes of the Border". L.R. Gordon-Polonskaya's non-Russian sources (mainly British) are listed at the end of this article.

Gordon-Polonskaya's account of British aims and policy in Afghanistan does not differ from that of other Soviet writers. Afghanistan was important to Britain "as the cross-roads of the most important strategic and trade routes between Central Asia, Persia, India and China". Only fear of Pashtun valour and of embroilment with Russia

prevented Britain from making war on Afghanistan in the 'nineties of the nineteenth century. The Durand agreement of 1893, however, was a continuation of British colonialism by non-warlike means since it separated large numbers of Pashtuns from Afghanistan.

Gordon-Polonskaya's article deals with the "national-liberation struggle" in three areas: Afghanistan, and the tribal and administered districts of the North-West Frontier Province. She notes that differences grew up between the two sections of the NWFP: while the settled tribes came under the influence of their more advanced neighbours in British India and passed into the period of the development of capitalist relations, developed a bourgeoisie, intelligentsia and proletariat and were influenced by the Indian National Congress, the independent tribes preserved such feudal survivals as the tribal system, periodic redistribution of land (vesh), the jirga, the tribal levies (lashkar), etc. and hindered tribal unity. On the other hand the presence of democratic traditions within some tribes, especially the Wazirs, gave a popular character to their battle against the British colonizers. The independent tribes, the author writes, caused trouble on the frontier from 1895 to 1914 because they were opposed to the Durand line which cut them off from Afghanistan. Both the administered and the independent Pashtuns supported Afghanistan's battle for independence as was shown by the disorders of 19 April 1919 in Peshawar.

In Afghanistan at the end of the nineteenth century great changes had been taking place: the development of capitalist relations had brought the formation of new classes, the growth of trade, the formation of an all-Afghan market and an increase in the urban population. The net result was the consolidation of the Afghan nation. There was an Afghan bourgeois-landowning intelligentsia which expressed the interests of "the new forces of Afghan society" and of Afghan nationalism. The influence of the Russian revolution of 1905 led to the Young Afghan movement which, although it was still far from the people and was expressed in religious forms, yet reflected the growing Afghan national consciousness. The October Revolution of 1917, which caused a wave of national liberation to spread over the East, brought the Afghan fight for liberation also into a new phase.

The Young Afghans, and even some of their ideological opponents, demanded full Afghan independence. Both Habibullah and, after his murder, Amanullah who was progressive and had the support of the Young Afghans, declared Afghanistan free and independent. Amanullah distributed leaflets in north-west India in which he declared himself against the Rowlett Laws and said that the peoples of India were right to revolt. He renounced all previous treaties with Britain but

expressed himself willing to sign new ones "based on the genuine equality of both sides". The British Government, however, refused to recognize Afghan independence. On 19 April there were disturbances in Peshawar (see above) and on 3 May a skirmish in the Khyber area. On 6 May British declared war on Afghanistan and what Gordon-Polonskaya calls a "general mobilization" began in India.

The Afghan plan was calculated on the help of the frontier tribes. Without this help, the revolutionary situation in India, and finally the friendly position of Soviet Russia, the Afghans would not have been able to carry the war on to British territory.

There were two fronts. On the first, that of Waziristan, the Afghan General Nadir Khan with the help of the tribes by 25 May had taken all the British military posts in North Waziristan and "in June 1919 in fact Waziristan was completely in the hands of the Pashtun insurgents and of Afghan regular and irregular forces". Operations on this front were facilitated by mass desertions of Pashtuns in British service.

On the Peshawar front, where the Afghan General was Saleh Muhammad Khan, the troops' poor state of readiness and level of equipment (both caused by Afghanistan's past semi-colonial status), lack of liaison between the regular forces and the tribes and the separatist tendencies of some tribes gave the British the advantage. They concentrated their forces against Jelalabad, won a battle against numerically inferior forces, destroyed Jelalabad from the air and bombed Kabul. At this point neither Britain nor Afghanistan wanted to continue the war, Britain recognized Afghanistan's independence and on 3 June 1919 an armistice was concluded. The status of the frontier Pashtuns was not affected by the terms of the armistice.

In Waziristan, however, operations continued. Nadir Khan continued to appeal to the tribes to help Afghanistan "to fulfil the tasks of the nation and Islam". In August a tribal deputation was received in Kabul and a jirga of Wazirs of North Waziristan and Wana, and of Mahsuds of South Waziristan decided on a large-scale assault on the settled districts.

[There follows a description of the effect of these events on the Pashtuns of the administered districts and on their national liberation struggle, here omitted.]

Finally, Gordon-Polonskaya repeats that Pashtun resistance in the NWFP and the participation of the independent tribes in the Afghan war was both a people's war and a war of liberation, and goes on to describe military operations in Waziristan in 1920-1. The story is told

in terms of brave, badly armed and outnumbered tribesmen who, although pitted against tanks and aeroplanes, forced the British to renounce their intention of including the tribal area in the administered districts.

VI. The Reign of Nadir Shah

N.I. Smirnov, "An Important Stage in the Independent Development of Afghanistan: the Home and Foreign Policy of the Government of Muhammad Nadir Shah, 1929-1933." (See CAR, Vol.IV, No.2, pp.177-84.)

Smirnov, like all the other Soviet writers whose works have been examined above, considers that Britain wanted to annex Afghanistan, which was needed as a base for aggression against the USSR. The British were concerned also because the existence of an independent Afghanistan threatened their position in India. The first part of Smirnov's article describes an alleged British attempt to overthrow the Afghan Government (Bachha-i-Saqao's rebellion) and the second part tells how Nadir Shah's economic reforms together with Soviet friendship strengthened Afghan independence.

Smirnov's treatment of the Bachha-i-Saqao incident does not differ from the normal Soviet line, which has already been fully described in CAR, Vol.IV, No.2, pp.177-84. Like the authorities cited there he regards the collusion or complicity of the British Government as "proved" by the arrival in the area on the eve of the rebellion of Col. Lawrence, "a specialist in the organization of all sorts of revolts and coups", who was (allegedly) masquerading under the name of Aircraftman Shaw. On the authority of the DAILY MAIL of 28 January 1929 Smirnov alleges a connection between the British envoy in Kabul, Sir Francis Humphrys, and Bachha-i-Saqao.

Bachha-i-Saqao, writes Smirnov, never united the country, and a continuation of his rule would have led to the disintegration of Afghanistan into a number of small autonomous states, which was what the British wanted. Bachha-i-Saqao alienated all classes in Afghanistan: the peasants because he had not reduced taxation, the merchants because home and foreign trade had almost ceased and they were subject to forced loans and requisitions, the intelligentsia because he had closed all secular schools, shut down the newspapers and recalled students studying abroad, and finally the southern khans, who lost some privileges to his supporters who came from the north.

The last straw, however, according to Smirnov, was the fact that he allowed the Basmachis to attack the USSR from Afghanistan; the

Afghan people saw in the USSR their friend and protector.

Nadir Shah's reign, in spite of the fact that it confirmed the role of the nobility and clergy, was beneficial, writes Smirnov, because it united Afghanistan under a central government, allowed Soviet-Afghan relations to develop in a spirit of friendship and collaboration (the Soviet Government confirming agreements between the USSR and Afghanistan and the Afghan Government expressing its willingness to expand Soviet-Afghan relations and disbanding those Basmachis who were on Afghan territory), and finally because it brought a measure of economic reform.

In 1929 the main cities of Afghanistan were damaged, the currency was inflated, the treasury almost empty. In 1930 Nadir Shah had recourse to a small interest-free British loan of £175,000 which served only to cover current expenses and provide for the keep and equipment of the Army.

The slump of 1929-33 hit Afghanistan hard. In 1932 the price of karakul was 30-50 per cent lower than in 1928, the price of livestock 40-60 per cent lower. Afghan traders in India, who dealt mainly in agricultural produce which made up 70 per cent of Afghanistan's exports, were being forced to sell at below market price.

The Afghan currency, which was on the silver standard, was badly affected when India went on the gold standard and dumped large amounts of silver on the market: the Afghani, which stood at 40 to the pound in 1929, fell to 53 to the pound in 1931 and 71 to the pound in 1933. The position was made worse by the Afghan Government's adulteration of the coinage and the growing trade deficit with India which caused a drain of currency abroad.

In this crisis the USSR helped Afghanistan by buying her products at higher prices than those offered by the capitalist countries. Afghanistan had a credit balance with the USSR.

The deficit with India, however, Smirnov points out, grew from 7.8m. rupees in 1923-4 to 38m. in 1933-4. This happened because the key positions in Afghan foreign trade and banking were in the hands of representatives of Anglo-Indian capital.

The Afghan Government, therefore, began to create a national trading capital by setting up joint-stock companies (*sherkat*). The *sherkats* had exclusive rights both in the importing and selling of industrial goods and in the production and export of agricultural raw-materials. The State had an interest in all of them and a controlling interest in the most important. The *sherkats* could and did deal direct

with foreign markets, by-passing India. State control allowed funds to be directed into light industry. The "Askhami" banking sherkat was reorganized into the Afghan National Bank, with a capital of 35m. Afghanis and 30 per cent of its shares State-owned. The Afghan National Bank had a monopoly in the buying of gold, silver and foreign currency for the State, the production and export of karakul and the import of sugar. By 1934 there were 20 sherkats with a total capital of 70m. Afghanis.

In 1931 Afghanistan received a constitution which Smirnov on the whole approves, although it concentrated all power in the hands of the Amir and preserved the power of the clergy and the shariat law, because it confirmed the advances made since 1919: "Although it established only a limited parliamentary system, nevertheless the changes in the structure of central and local organs of power witnessed to the gradual dying out in Afghanistan of out-of-date feudal institutions and the perfecting of State control."

Smirnov's conclusion is that during Nadir Shah's reign Afghanistan reinforced her independence, mainly because of the disinterested friendship of the USSR which, "faithful to the principles of Leninist foreign policy. . . respected Afghan sovereignty".

VII. Soviet-Afghan Relations, 1917-58

L.B. Teplinskiy, "Soviet-Afghan Relations during the 40 Years of the Existence of Independent Afghanistan".

This article is a list of the agreements, treaties, meetings, etc. of which Soviet-Afghan relations over the past 40 years have been composed, together with a commentary on them in the light of the contemporary situation both within and outside Afghanistan.

In the commentary two main aims can be discerned:

- (a) to represent the relations of the Soviet Union with Afghanistan as having been from the beginning based on the Five Principles, as they later came to be called;
- and (b) to show that Russia's friendly position has been of use to Afghanistan vis-à-vis Britain and later Pakistan.

All the examples of Soviet material aid to Afghanistan help Teplinskiy to achieve his first aim. It is sufficient here to quote such other examples as the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk which bound both signatories to respect the political and economic independence and

territorial integrity of Afghanistan and Persia; the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of 28 February 1921 of which Teplinskiy writes, "in all the history of international relations one can hardly find such an example of good will in a great power for a small state"; the negotiations for concluding an Anglo-Afghan Peace Treaty in 1921 and the Soviet rejection of the Curzon ultimatum of May 1923, of which Teplinskiy writes, "so, supporting each other and together resisting the attacks of the imperialists the Soviet and Afghan peoples strengthened their relations and gave an example of the peaceful co-existence of states with differing social and political systems"; the return of the island of Urta-Turgay (see CAR, Vol.IV, No.2, pp.176-7); and finally the Paghman Treaty of 31 August 1926 - "an example for the governments of those countries which really have the firm intention of living in peace and friendship with other countries".

On Soviet aid (mainly moral) to Afghanistan against British imperialism Teplinskiy refers to the Third Afghan War when ". . .the moral aid given by the Soviet Republic to the Afghan people and . . . its willingness to give the Afghan Government all aid, including military, reinforced the Afghans' faith in victory;" the Curzon ultimatum (already referred to); the Bachha-i-Saqao incident; and alleged British pressure on Afghanistan through Pakistan aimed at driving Afghanistan into the Baghdad Pact - economic pressure, which was countered by the Soviet-Afghan Transit Treaty of 28 June 1955. Teplinskiy's comments on Pakistan are largely confined to the problem of Pashtunistan. He contrasts the position of Britain and Pakistan on this issue with that of the Soviet Union on the question of the Amu-Dar'ya frontier: "This shows the Afghan people once again who is their real friend. . ."

The more important treaties, trade agreements, meetings etc., made between 1917 and 1953 listed by Teplinskiy are given below. Details of similar contacts made since 1953 have already appeared in CAR (see Vol.IV, No.2, pp.182-3, Vol.VI, No.1, pp.90-94 and the "News Diary" in subsequent numbers) and are therefore omitted here.

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|---------------|---|
| 1917 December | "The Address of the Soviet Government to all Muslim Workers of Russia and the East" recognized Afghanistan's right to independence and offered help against the British. |
| 1918 March 3 | The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (see above). |
| 1919 March | Note of the Government of the RSFSR to the Paris Peace Conference, calling on all states to bind themselves not to attempt to overthrow the Government of Afghanistan by force. |

- 1919 March 27 The Soviet Government recognizes the full independence of Afghanistan.
- 1919 Diplomatic relations established between Afghanistan and the RSFSR.
- 1920 May 8 The Afghan Government requests aid from the RSFSR and offers in exchange a trade agreement and a military alliance.
- 1920 September 13 The first draft of the Soviet-Afghan Friendship Treaty initialled.
- 1921 February 28 Treaty signed. The signatories agreed to respect each other's independence and not to enter into military or political agreements with third parties prejudicial to each other's interests. The RSFSR offered financial aid and free transit of goods bought by Afghanistan abroad.
- 1920 September 20 Soviet Note to Afghanistan on Afghan support of the Amir of Bukhara in his fight against Soviet forces.
- 1921 January 21 Afghanistan officially declares that she is ceasing to support the Amir of Bukhara.
- 1926 Return of the island of Urta-Turgay (Amu-Dar'ya) to Afghanistan. Soviet specialists help to build the Kushka - Herat - Kandahar - Kabul - Mazar-i-Sharif telegraph line.
- 1927 November 28 Agreement signed on a Tashkent - Kabul air service.
- 1928 August 31 The Paghman Treaty of Neutrality and Mutual Non-Aggression.
- 1928 May Visit of King Amanullah to the Soviet Union.
- 1928 June Soviet and Afghan missions given the status of embassies.
- 1928 - 1929 (Bachha-i-Saqao rebellion and the accession of Nadir Shah.)

- 1930 April 1 A meeting of the Soviet All-Union Chamber of Commerce attended by the Afghan Ambassador. The meeting was devoted to Soviet-Afghan trade relations.
- 1931 June 24 Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression. This treaty was the same in spirit as the Paghman Treaty but contained some new provisions: the necessity was stressed for a peaceful solution of problems and the freedom was emphasized of either side to enter into relations with third parties so long as those relations were not prejudicial to the agreement.
- 1932 April 3 Agreement on postal, telephone, telegraph and radio communications. Exchange of notes on the appointment of Border Commissioners to regulate border disputes.
- 1934 Autumn Soviet organizations take part in the Second International Trade Fair in Kabul.
- 1935 May 6 Soviet-Afghan agreement on locust control.
- 1938 May 26 Soviet-Afghan agreement on the control of agricultural pests and the diseases of cotton. During these years also Soviet equipment was sold to Afghanistan and Soviet foreign trade organizations cooperated with Afghan sherkats.
- 1936 April 26 A general agreement between Sovafgantorg and the Afghan National Bank.
- 1936 May 20 Agreement on corresponding relations between the Soviet Foreign Trade Bank and the Afghan National Bank.
- 1936 March 29 The Treaty of 24 June 1931 was prolonged for a further 10 years, "a new proof of the vigour and firmness of Soviet-Afghan friendship". (After the German attack on the USSR German and Italian agents in Afghanistan, writes Teplinskiy, began an anti-Soviet campaign.)

- 1941 October 11 A "friendly" Soviet Note to Afghanistan in which the USSR, relying on the 1931 treaty, demanded the cessation of anti-Soviet activity on Afghan soil and the expulsion of all German and Italian nationals.
- 1941 October 16 Answering Note in which the Afghan Government stated that it had decided to follow the advice of the Soviet Government.
- 1941 November Decision of the Loe Jirga that Afghanistan should maintain complete neutrality.
- 1946 July 13 The Amu-Dar'ya Afghan-Soviet frontier redrawn along the thalweg and not, as previously, along the Afghan bank.
- 1953 September Muhammad Daud's Government gives a fresh impetus to Soviet-Afghan relations.

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


Scenes from life in Afghanistan today—drawn by Anatoliy Kokorin during a recent visit and reproduced in *Inostrannaya Literatura*, No. 4 of 1959.





Scenes from life in Afghanistan today—continued.



P A K I S T A N

The Soviet Union's political and economic interest in Pakistan has hitherto been much less than its interest in India. This probably accounts for the comparative scantiness of Soviet writing on the former. Recently, however, two substantial publications have been received, on the basis of which it is possible to arrive at an estimate of current Soviet thinking on Pakistan's political and economic affairs. These are:

PAKISTAN: ISTORIYA I EKONOMIKA, Moscow, 1959, edited by A.M. D'yakov. This is a symposium of articles by different authors on political and economic problems of Pakistan.

PROBLEMY EKONOMIKI PAKISTANA by V.G. Rastyannikov and S.A. Kuz'min, Moscow, 1958. This solid and well-documented book consists of three chapters: two by Rastyannikov on the development of agriculture and industry, and one by Kuz'min on the positions of foreign capital and imperialist "contradictions" in Pakistan.

Both of these books are based almost entirely on English language source material.

Previous articles on Soviet views on pre-partition history of the Indian sub-continent appeared in **CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW**, Vol.V, Nos.1 and 2, and Vol.VIII, No.1; and on the economy of Pakistan in Vol.V, No.2, pp.170-3 and Vol.VIII, No.1. The problem of Pashtunistan will be dealt with in the next number of **CAR**; Soviet writing on this subject from the point of view of Afghanistan was reviewed in **CAR**, Vol.VII, No.3.

. . .

I. Four Nations in West Pakistan - II. The Question of General Elections - III. The Awami League - IV. Problems of Economic Development- V. Agriculture - VI. The Situation of the Working-Class.

I. Four Nations in West Pakistan

In his article "The National Composition of West Pakistan", in PAKISTAN: ISTORIYA I EKONOMIKA, Yu.V. Gankovskiy queries the official Pakistani "theory that all the citizens of Pakistan form one nation". Using the Marxist definition of a nation as "a historically established, stable community of people which has arisen on the basis of community of language and territory, a common economic life and also a common culture" (Stalin, SOCHINENIYA, Vol.2, p.296) Gankovskiy seeks to prove that the Pashtuns, Baluchis, Sindhis and Panjabis are four separate nations. He admits that they are in different stages of the development of capitalism and are affected to different degrees by "survivals" of feudalism and so are in different stages of development as nations.

Gankovskiy argues that, although 20 languages are spoken in West Pakistan, 97 per cent of the population speaks either Panjabi, Pashtu, Sindhi, Baluchi or Urdu. Of these languages the first four are spoken mainly in well-defined geographical regions, which shows that within these areas there is, besides community of territory, a common language and therefore a common culture. The fourth essential feature of a nation, a common economic life, occurs only during the process of the development of capitalism, that is to say in the case of Pakistan, at the present time.

Gankovskiy is in favour of the formation of four autonomous republics in West Pakistan organized on a linguistic basis - Sind, Pashtunistan, Baluchistan and the Panjab. He describes the nationalist movements in West Pakistan which have this as their aim as a "reaction against the fossilized administrative and feudal barriers left over from the time of British rule", i.e. as a continuation of the "national liberation struggle". The enemy now, however, is the Pakistani Government which has unified the four nations, no less arbitrarily, into a single province of West Pakistan. (On the national minorities of West Pakistan, see also CAR, Vol.V, No.2, pp. 174-85.)

Pashtuns

Gankovskiy's position on the question of Pashtunistan is shown by the fact that he calls them "Afghans" with "Pashtuns" in brackets and treats them as a part of the Afghan people. He does not carry this point of view to its natural conclusion, however, by suggesting that they should be joined to Afghanistan, presumably because he does not consider that the Pashtuns of Afghanistan and Pakistan have a common economic life. The following is a summary of what he writes on the Pashtuns.

According to the 1951 census there are 5,002,285 Pashtuns in Pakistan, living mainly in the former North-West Frontier Province and in the Zhob, Loralai and Quetta-Pishin districts of Baluchistan. They are also to be found in the Panjab, Sind, etc. Their language, Pashtu, although it has two main dialects, is a single language spoken by 10-11m. people in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

During the second half of the nineteenth century part of the east Afghan lands was "forcibly included by the British colonizers in their colonial empire". The Durand Line arbitrarily divided many Pashtun tribes into two. When the North-West Frontier Province was formed in 1901 the Pashtuns were further divided, some finding themselves in Baluchistan, while the Pashtuns of the hills and the plains were divided by the boundary between the administered and tribal areas. "All this definitely complicated the process of the formation of the Afghan nation", as did also "the separatist aspirations of some khans and the scattered nature and uneven level of the social and economic development of independent tribal groups of Afghans who inhabited enclosed mountainous regions with poor communications". The Pashtun tribes, therefore, entered the capitalist era accompanied by many survivals of the communal-clan system (obshchinno-rodovaya sistema).

Nevertheless in both Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier Province from the end of the nineteenth century capitalism began to develop, while in the latter area a national bourgeoisie and a proletariat appeared at the beginning of the twentieth century. At this time also the formation of the Afghan nation began, aided by the revolutions in Russia and by the 1919 war. This war, "in spite of the . . . treachery of individual feudal leaders who were in British service", displayed the solidarity with Afghanistan of the Pashtuns who rose as one man "from Chitral to Quetta". This rising was also a national liberation movement which was continued after the war by the Redshirts.

During the Second World War Pashtun nationalists demanded the creation of an independent Pashtun state - Pashtunistan "including all the north-western regions of British India inhabited by Pashtuns". The Pashtuns of the administered areas boycotted the 1947 referendum and were followed by the Pashtuns of the tribal areas also. The tribes which were willing to join Pakistan did so because of the influence of khans, maliks and large landowners who had "always been connected with the British colonial administration". [The same explanation is given of the tribes' participation in the invasion of Kashmir. Ed.-CAR.]

Abdul Gaffar Khan's "People's Party" (founded in 1948) demanded autonomy for the linguistic groups of West Pakistan and the creation of three "Socialist Republics". The Peasants' Party (Kisan Jirga) also

demanded Pashtunistan, together with the abolition of large estates. During agrarian disturbances this party was supported by the Pashtun proletariat by means of strikes. This worker-peasant movement was crushed with the arrest of 12,000 nationalists (including Abdul Gaffar Khan) and the centre of resistance shifted from the administered to the tribal areas. In 1949-50 "regional governments" were formed in the territories of the Afridis and Wazirs and in North Baluchistan. Recently there has been a tendency for the individual centres of the national movement to merge into one all-Pashtun national organization.

Among the Pashtuns of Baluchistan the movement for union with the Pashtuns of the North-West Frontier Province was expressed by the Vror Pashtun Party, which also demands political, economic and cultural equality for the Pashtuns of Baluchistan.

Both the Redshirts and the Vror Pashtun Party opposed the formation of the province of West Pakistan and demanded a "zonal federation on a cultural and linguistic basis" of the four autonomous units dealt with by Gankovskiy.

In the creation of a national market the Pashtuns are behind the Sindhis. They are hindered by the political and economic fragmentation of their territories and by survivals of their tribal organization. The Pashtun bourgeoisie and working-class are weak and few in numbers.

As a result of their past position of colonial dependance the Pashtuns are culturally backward. In 1951 there were 27,776 people able to read and write Pashtu. In 1956 only 17 magazines were published in Pashtu. In the tribal areas in 1955 there were only 310 schools with 25,000 pupils for a population of 2.6m.

However, concludes Gankovskiy, Pashtun national consciousness is well developed.

Baluchis

Gankovskiy begins his section on the Baluchis with a short description of their tribal organization and way of life. According to the 1951 census there were 943,049 Baluchis in Pakistan, mainly nomads. They are divided into 18 tribes (tuman), subdivided into clans (phara) and lineages (phalli). The power of the tribal chieftains (tumandar) is hereditary. The territory of the tribes is strictly defined and the tribal land is held in common and redistributed every 10 years. Gankovskiy hastens to add that "in fact, of course. . . this collective ownership only masks the omnipotence of the tribal leaders who have long been the largest landowners."

On the question of economic, cultural and territorial unity Gankovskiy according to his own testimony is on weak ground. The territory of the Baluchis, he says, is scattered, while they are in a minority of 34 per cent even in Baluchistan. The formation of a nation is hindered by the survival of nomadism. Between 1941 and 1951 the number of schools increased only from 80 to 230 with 18,276 pupils. According to the 1951 census only 5.6 per cent of the population was literate in Urdu or English and only 169 persons in Baluchi. Baluchi has been ousted as a literary language by Urdu, Persian or English and this has hindered the growth of a national consciousness. At the present rate of progress, notes Gankovskiy, "decades will be needed to liquidate illiteracy".

Economic development is in little better case. Insufficient money is being spent by the State. Nevertheless the development of class-differentiation among the Baluchis has begun. In the villages the growth of the exploitation and ruin of the peasants has brought about a peasant movement. A Baluchi proletariat has appeared in the towns (most of the 103,200 Baluchis in Karachi are workers). There is a Baluchi trade union, the Baluchistan Federation of Labour.

The Baluchi intelligentsia is weak and few in number; the national organizations contain also representatives of the bourgeoisie and landowners. However, the existence of a Baluchi national consciousness and a national movement was proved, Gankovskiy considers, by the demand, put forward in 1953 by the All-Pakistan Conference of Baluchis, for the liquidation of Baluchi cultural backwardness and the creation of a province of Baluchistan to include all the areas of West Pakistan inhabited by Baluchis.

Sindhis

In the case of Sind, Gankovskiy is on firmer ground since, as he notes, during its long history until its annexation by the British in 1843 Sind was frequently independent. This promoted the growth of the cultural unity and the consolidation of the Sindhi people. Sindhi literature appeared in the seventeenth century and was preceded by a rich folklore.

The British conquest, Gankovskiy writes, created the conditions necessary for the development of capitalist relations. Between 1843 and 1881 the population of Karachi grew from 14,000 to 68,000. Between 1847-8 and 1856-7 the turnover of the port of Karachi increased from 4,430,000 rupees to 14,210,000 rupees. At the beginning of the twentieth century irrigation works began to increase the production of cotton. By 1921, 11.4 per cent of the population of Sind lived in

the towns and a bourgeoisie, proletariat and intelligentsia had appeared. According to the 1951 census there were 3,990,000 Sindhis in Pakistan, living in Sind, Baluchistan and Karachi. 85 per cent of the population is occupied in agriculture.

The Sindhi nation, therefore, according to Gankovskiy, consolidated itself even further during the British period. Modern Sindhi prose appeared at the end of the nineteenth century and Sindhi has ousted the languages of the immigrant Baluchis, Rajasthanis, Arabs and Persians as a literary language as these immigrants themselves have been absorbed by the Sindhi community.

However, the development of the Sindhi nation was hindered by artificial administrative boundaries imposed by the British (Sind was part of the Bombay Presidency until 1935), by survivals of feudalism and by Hindu-Muslim hostility, which, again, was fostered by the British. Nevertheless the national movement grew until in 1935 it was able to force the British to make Sind an independent administrative unit.

The partition of India in 1947 harmed the Sindhi national movement by causing many Sindhi Hindus (9.5 per cent of the population) who predominated in the towns to emigrate to India. In 1941 of the town population 64 per cent had been Hindus, 33 per cent - Muslims; in 1951 the proportion had changed to Hindus - 4 per cent, Muslims - 93.7 per cent.

As examples of the discrimination of the Central Government against the Sindhis Gankovskiy cites the help given by the Panjabi group of the Muslim League to the Sindhi landowners against peasant demands for land reform, the separation of Karachi from Sind and the attempt to oust Sindhi in favour of Urdu in State institutions. In the last case, he notes, popular agitation resulted in the acknowledgment of Sindhi as a regional language to be used in courts, State institutions, etc. In 1956 it was agreed that 60 per cent of the programmes of Hyderabad Radio should be in Sindhi. In 1951 in Sind 300,000 people were literate in Sindhi.

Summing up Gankovskiy concludes that the people of Sind have a high level of national consciousness and that the process of the consolidation of the Sindhi nation is basically complete.

Panjabis

The West Panjab is ethnically mixed. The population in 1951 was 18,828,000 plus 1,823,000 in Bahawalpur. Of this total of 20,651,000,

20,200,000 are Muslims. Prior to partition the Panjab could be divided linguistically into two parts along the 74 degree line of longitude. To the east of this line the main language was Panjabi; to the west the numerous lahnda dialects (from the Panjabi lahand - "west") were spoken. The lahnda dialects, while related both to Panjabi and to each other, differ sharply from it and each other. As a result of population migration at the time of partition both lahnda dialects and Panjabi are spoken at the present time in West Panjab. Pakistani statistics make no distinction between them.

Gankovskiy quotes these facts to explain the slowness with which the peoples of the Panjab are merging into one nation. He gives as further reasons the fact that all the invaders of India came down through the Panjab bringing wars and frequent changes of rulers and hindering economic and cultural development, together with religious hostility between Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs and the preservation by the British of 13 Princely States.

There is still, he notes, no single literary language for the Panjab: because of "religious survivals and general economic and cultural backwardness" Panjabi, in spite of its rich literature, has been ousted by Urdu and Persian. Urdu is the language of the schools, universities and State institutions. In 1951, 1,514,386 people were literate in Urdu as against 35,554 literate in Panjabi. In 1956, 124 Urdu, 14 English and one Panjabi magazines were published. Consequently, Gankovskiy concludes, the Panjab lacks cultural unity.

On the other hand, in spite of its backward state prior to 1947, the West Panjab is at present one of the economically advanced areas of Pakistan. Modern industry and a bourgeoisie and intelligentsia are emerging. The bourgeoisie and intelligentsia have organized a Panjabi Culture Society to defend Panjabi against Urdu and to demand the use of the native languages of the Panjab in Panjabi schools.

Gankovskiy concludes: "Whether the people of the Panjab will merge into a single nation. . . or whether Pakistan's further economic and political development will lead to the national consolidation on the territory of the Panjab of a series of smaller nations, only the future will show."

In his summing up Gankovskiy emphasizes that the national movements of Pakistan are democratic and peace-loving in character because the national bourgeoisie which leads them is not only not connected with foreign capital, but wants to defend itself against its competition and is therefore interested in the creation of a national market. Gankovskiy

ends with the hope that the National Party and the National People's Party (founded in 1956 and 1957 respectively) will promote the development of the nationalist movements in Pakistan, and will bring about an increase in national self-consciousness and the liquidation of feudalism in economic and political life with the consequent rapid completion of the formation of the nations of West Pakistan.

II. The Question of General Elections

In his article "The Political Situation and the Problem of General Elections in Pakistan (1947-57)", in PAKISTAN: ISTORIYA I EKONOMIKA, V.N. Moskalenko examines the reasons for the deferment of general elections in Pakistan. During this period, he writes, the political situation in Pakistan was characterized by "frequent changes of government, party splits. . . intrigues, machinations, unprincipled compromises. . . and their repudiation at the first convenient opportunity, and by corruption in the State apparatus." The battle of the parties reflected the country's growing social and economic "contradictions". Nevertheless the bourgeois-landowner parties "had no programmes which would really correspond with the country's national interest and provide measures for improving the position of the masses" and they therefore "resorted to the most shameful demagoguery". The situation was influenced also by "the increasing penetration of foreign, in the first place American, capital". In such circumstances, writes Moskalenko, some political problems acquired exceptional significance. One such problem was that of the general elections.

Moskalenko begins his account of the problem with an explanation of why general elections were necessary. The country's law-making organ (the Constituent Assembly) he writes, was controlled by the Muslim League with more than 60 seats. There was a Hindu opposition with 12 seats. The other religious communities were not represented.

The Constituent Assembly had been formed in 1947 by the expedient of splitting the All-India Constituent Assembly into Indian and Pakistani portions. It had, therefore, been created in a non-democratic way. Moreover it was reactionary in composition. For these reasons popular demand for a general election with full adult suffrage was growing.

However, the results of the provincial elections in 1951, 1953 and 1954 showed the Muslim League that they might lose a general election. In the 1954 provincial election in East Bengal, for example,

the Muslim League received 10 places out of 309. In the same year the East Bengal Legislative Assembly was dissolved and the Communist Party proscribed. However, the Government was forced to make concessions also and on 24 October 1954 the Constituent Assembly was dissolved.

Although the Constituent Assembly had existed for seven years, Moskalkenko notes Pakistan was still without a constitution and without representative government. The Muslim League had aroused so much opposition by its move to unite West Pakistan into one province that it did not dare to hold elections, and the second Constituent Assembly, which came into existence in summer 1955, was elected not by the people of Pakistan but by the provincial Legislative Assemblies. Even so the Muslim League received only 25 out of 80 seats. When the Muslim League was split in April 1956 by the formation of the Republican Party it fell to third place.

The Government had announced that elections would take place after a Constitution had been worked out. Although the Constitution was introduced on 2 May 1956 still no elections followed, allegedly because of the difficulty of compiling voters' lists. Moskalkenko, while admitting the difficulty of this task, argues that there was sufficient time between 1947 and 1956 for it to have been completed and points out that the Census, which was a much more complicated task, had been completed by 1951. In fact, he writes, the real reason for the delay was that the ruling parties and "their foreign patrons" were afraid that they would lose power.

Preparations for a general election began in the second half of 1956 but were hindered by the "artificially created and artificially aggravated problem of the form of the elections". The question was should there be common voters' rolls or separate rolls on the basis of religion. Between 1956 and 1958 this question aroused passions which, writes Moskalkenko, "were being fanned by certain circles who aimed to profit by [them]".

The "democratic forces" of the country (the Communist Party, the Azad Pakistan Party, the Ganatantri Dal, the National Congress, the Federation of Untouchables, the United Progressive Party, the Awami League and the Republican Party) were for common voters' rolls. The question, however, even divided the bourgeois-landowner parties and consequently reflected a "contradiction" within this class.

The supporters of separate rolls, writes Moskalkenko, held that the "Two Nations" theory was valid within Pakistan also and that the Muslims of Pakistan needed protection against the "Hindu peril". They also argued that separate rolls would safeguard Hindu and minority rights. The opponents of separate rolls asserted that there was only

one Pakistani nation and that the rights of religious minorities should need no protection against the Muslims of Pakistan.

In fact, Moskalkenko considers, the "Two Nations" theory, which considers all Muslims to be one nation, is no more than an ideological justification of continued discrimination by the ruling classes of the Panjab against the national minorities of West Pakistan and East Bengal, since it regards them all as one homogenous nation of Muslims and deprives them of separate consideration of their social and national interests. It was also, he adds, an attempt to drive a wedge between the Hindus and Muslims of East Pakistan in order to weaken that province and keep it in its subordinate status. For this reason the people of East Pakistan rejected separate voters' rolls, although (Moskalkenko admits) "it has been proved in practice that in common elections [the religious minorities of East Pakistan] receive fewer seats than with communal rolls with reserved seats."

Moskalkenko stresses that although the parties which headed the nationalist movement mainly expressed the interests of the bourgeoisie and of a part of the landlord class they nevertheless enjoyed the support of the masses in so far as they made democratic demands, supported the free development of national languages and cultures and opposed national discrimination.

The bourgeois-landowner parties, Moskalkenko writes, made use of the question of the electoral system in order to strengthen their own positions; the Muslim League tried to rally the Muslim majority behind it; the People's League in East Bengal supported the common roll in order to gain the support of the Hindus (it was for this reason that it had changed its name in 1955 from the People's Muslim League). Moskalkenko scolds the Republican Party for showing a lack of principle and making use of the question in order to reinforce the positions of certain groups of landowners and trading and industrial bourgeoisie in West Pakistan.

The military coup d'état of October 1958, Moskalkenko alleges, was planned because the constitution had not given Pakistan's ruling circles the chance of carrying on their anti-national policy of membership of SEATO, the Baghdad Pact and acceptance of American aid under a smokescreen of parliamentary democracy, and they calculated that a military dictatorship would be more appropriate for this purpose.

III. The Awami League

In "The People's League Party", in PAKISTAN: ISTORIYA I EKONOMIKA, S.F. Levin describes the activity of the Awami League (the more usual title of the party) between 1951 and 1957. Special emphasis is laid on the period from September 1956 to October 1957 when the party was in office. The article is based almost exclusively on the contemporary Pakistani press.

Levin's article, which is factual and dispassionate in tone, gives an impression of the Awami League as of an ad hoc coalition of diverse elements which only worked tolerably in opposition. Besides the "contradictions" between the League's left and right wings Levin sees another in that the League was primarily a Bengali party and was at a disadvantage on the national stage.

From its foundation in 1951 to its prohibition in 1958, Levin writes, the Awami League had no official programme. Prior to 1953, in spite of its leaders' popular and superficially democratic demands, it was not a serious political force.

In 1953-4, however, Pakistan went through an economic crisis. The Awami League seized this opportunity to put forward a wide programme of reform, including radical agrarian reform, thereby increasing its mass following.

At the end of 1953 the Awami League took part in the foundation of the United Front of the Opposition Parties of East Pakistan. The United Front embraced various elements from the Communists to the right wing opposition. Its programme, the "Twenty-One Points", became from 1955 the official programme of the East Pakistan Awami League. This programme aimed at creating favourable conditions for the development of capitalism in East Pakistan and therefore reflected the interests of the Bengali national bourgeoisie; at the same time, however, it attracted the support of the people of East Pakistan who were interested in the eradication of feudal survivals and national discrimination. For this reason the United Front won a victory over the Muslim League in the provincial elections of March 1954. The most popular United Front party, because the most radical, was the Awami League.

From 1954 the Awami League began to gain influence in West Pakistan also, where its local organizations supported the Pashtun and Sindhi national movements and opposed the administrative unification of West Pakistan. In both branches of the party a left wing appeared.

When, as a result of the June 1955 elections to the second Constituent Assembly, the Muslim League formed a coalition with the United Front, the Awami League took no part as the terms of the coalition did not guarantee the "Twenty-One Points". Also, Levin adds, it was tactically advantageous to be in opposition at a time of growing economic crisis.

The Awami League's position in the 1956 debates on the Constitution was such as to secure it even further popular support. The speeches made by the League's leaders at this period are important because they played the part of the programme with which the party came to power. This "programme" comprised the following elements, among others:

1. "Islamic socialism", rather vaguely defined as "the liquidation of the capitalist economy", "the ending of the oppression of the workers", "a good life for all". Nothing was said about means. The demands which affected the interests of the ruling classes were capable of various interpretations.
2. Agrarian reform. The Awami League spokesman proposed to abolish the zemindari and jagirdari systems, mainly because they hindered the development of agriculture and caused absentee landlordism. These reforms, obviously, reflected the interests of the bourgeoisie and of those landowners who wished to develop their estates themselves. In order to gain peasant support they were represented as a liquidation of the landowning class in general, not merely of its privileged upper layer.

The League was supported by peasants because they hoped for a redistribution of land, lower rents and taxes, and guarantees of tenants' rights; by workers who had been promised the recognition of trade unions and the revision of pay-scales; by craftsmen who hoped for economic help from the State; by Bengali, Sindhi and Pashtun nationalists who expected that the Awami League would satisfy their demands; and finally by the bourgeoisie and the landowners who hoped that the Awami League would improve the food situation, widen the home market, defend the interests of the national industries against foreign monopolies, deal with the nationalities problem and overcome the political crisis.

The party itself was as varied as its supporters. The right wing, for example, regarded the party's more extreme demands as mere political stratagems, to be abandoned once power had been gained. These and other inconsistencies, however, remained hidden while the party was in opposition.

[Levin's description of the circumstances in which the Awami League came to power in East Pakistan and formed a coalition central government with the Republican Party is omitted.]

The Awami League was compromised by the coalition with the Republican Party which expressed the interests of the landowners of West Pakistan. The Republican Party opposed the proposals for agrarian reform contained in the "Twenty-One Points" and were joined in this by the right wing of the Awami League. Consequently practically no agrarian reforms were carried out.

The Awami League's most important failure in this field was its failure to do anything to improve the lot of the peasants. Not only did rents not fall, in some areas, as, for example, in Sylhet, they even increased. Suhrawardy's Government took steps to propagate improved farming methods and granted credits to encourage their use, but these methods could interest only the hereditary tenants and those few landowners who were developing their estates themselves. In spite of good weather and the absence of floods at the end of 1957 there was a food deficit in East Pakistan of 460,000 tons. As there was a food crisis in West Pakistan also food had to be imported. The price of foodstuffs and with it the cost of living rose. This rise in the cost of living caused the home market for the products of Pakistan's industry to shrink. Increased expenditure on food imports meant that the Government could not afford to increase its investment in industry, as planned, and led also to a decrease in exports of industrial machinery and raw materials.

Suhrawardy's Government was driven to invite foreign investment in Pakistani industry and to promise not to nationalize the property of any foreign company. This policy of dependence on foreign monopolies and American "aid" made it impossible for Suhrawardy to protect the interests of Pakistani industry against foreign capital. Foreign capital was not invested, as Suhrawardy had hoped, in heavy industry but, as before, in light industry, agriculture, transport and irrigation.

Finally it should not be forgotten, Levin writes, that Pakistan's economic difficulties were aggravated by her continued membership of SEATO and the Baghdad Pact which involved military expenditure beyond her means.

On the question of the national movements Levin writes that, although they are basically democratic (since they are opposed to national discrimination), they are also used by bourgeois-landowner elements for their own purposes. So, although the left wing of the Awami League was more interested in satisfying the democratic demands

of the nationalist movements, the right wing, led by Suhrawardy, was guided by the interests of the Bengali bourgeoisie. Consequently after the Awami League's accession to power the Bengali bourgeoisie received State credits, more import licences, increased economic autonomy and the recognition of Bengali as a State language. They did not, however, receive complete regional autonomy nor was discrimination against Bengalis in the State service ended. These concessions did not satisfy the mass of Bengalis or the Awami League provincial organizations. The left wing of the party continued to agitate for complete autonomy with only the armed forces, foreign relations and currency left to the central government. While the left wing remained firm the right wing, in order to maintain the coalition, was inclined to yield. This was one of the main reasons for the split in the party.

The Awami League was divided also over the question of national autonomy in West Pakistan, for, although only a minority of the party were opposed to national autonomy, they were supported by the land-owners, traders, industrialists and bourgeoisie, all the Islamic parties, the Republican Party, a large part of the Muslim League, a majority of the Army officers and the civil servants, and finally by the USA. Suhrawardy was faced with a choice between splitting the Awami League or breaking with the Republican Party. He tried for a time to sit on the fence and, while not coming out openly either for or against the administrative unification of West Pakistan, to prevent his provincial organizations from taking part in the Sindhi and Pashtun national movements. But finally in March 1957, he was forced to come out in favour of the unification. He thereby lost the support of the masses of West Pakistan.

Levin concludes his article with an account of the circumstances of the League's fall from power. He gives the following reasons:

The Awami League fell from power because it had lost popular support. The peasants were dissatisfied because there had been no re-distribution of land, the workers because not only "Islamic socialism" but even an increase in the standard of living had failed to materialize, and the craftsmen because they had not received the economic aid which the "Twenty-One Points" had promised. The League had been inconsistent in its treatment of the nationalities question in West Pakistan and had lost the support of the national movements. It had also aroused great resentment by its foreign policy. "To sum up, the Awami League had lost the support of the masses of the people."

Finally in 1957 it lost also the support of the national bourgeoisie, "that class on which it had mainly depended". The party's fall was made certain when sectional quarrels developed inside it, mainly on grounds of foreign policy.

IV. Problems of Economic Development

In PROBLEMY EKONOMIKI PAKISTANA, V.G. Rastyannikov and S.A. Kuz'min examine the problems facing the development of industry and agriculture in Pakistan. The authors maintain that the acquisition of State power by the landowners and trading classes in Pakistan has not ended Pakistan's subservience to foreign imperialism and the basic "contradictions" between imperialism and the people of Pakistan.

During the British period, the authors say, the areas of India which now form Pakistan were an appendage of Britain's economy, producing agricultural raw materials, and consequently inherited from the colonial period a weakly developed industry and a national economy in which agriculture, although extremely backward, occupied a disproportionate share. The new State of Pakistan had no economic basis for its independence and its first task, therefore, was to increase its productive forces as quickly as possible by industrializing the country and solving the agrarian problem. This is the only way open to Pakistan of creating a self-sufficient economy which could serve as a foundation for the preservation and reinforcement of the country's independence. "The transfer of State power into the hands of the ruling classes of the country, weakened the positions of British imperialism in Pakistan and created the objective conditions necessary for the solution of this problem." With independence imperialism lost its monopoly over the soil and mineral resources of Pakistan and its exclusive right of owning the largest irrigation installations, railway transport and communications. Imperialism also lost its monopoly in the fields of taxation, State credit and customs. The State apparatus ceased to be an instrument for the colonial plunder of the country. The new Government had the chance of carrying out an economic policy in the interests of the local ruling classes. The transfer of State power into the hands of these classes at the same time made it possible to set up effective control of foreign capital.

However, the authors' estimate of the extent to which the Government of Pakistan has succeeded in solving its problems is unfavourable.

The ruling classes of Pakistan, they write, are holding back change in agriculture, although the existing system of feudal land-tenure is the main impediment to the development of Pakistan's productive forces. By restricting the development of capitalism in agriculture, feudalism deprives industry of a market for the means of agricultural production and prevents the capital made by agriculture from being used in production. It moreover brings the rural masses to extreme poverty and prevents the growth of a home market for Pakistani consumer goods. Finally it is inefficient and is responsible for shortage of food.

During the 10 years of independence, the authors admit, there has been some development of industry and this has to a certain extent helped to overcome Pakistan's dependence on the developed capitalist countries for supplies of consumer goods. Pakistan is now supplying her own home market with, for example, cotton cloth and jute products. Cement, chemical and shipbuilding industries have been founded together with industries for processing local raw materials, and this has allowed the Pakistani bourgeoisie to acquire that part of the surplus value in these industries which was formerly the prey of foreign, mainly British, capital.

However, they add, industrial development has been lopsided. There has been no corresponding development of the basic industries - metallurgy, machine-tool construction and power. This has objectively increased the country's dependence on the imperialist powers for the means of production, industrial raw-materials, etc. Consequently the development of Pakistani industry along the lines followed to date cannot solve the basic problem of underdeveloped countries - the "contradiction" between imperialism and the people.

The power supply of Pakistan's industry, Rastyannikov and Kuz'min point out, is lagging more and more behind the processing industries. In spite of increasing industrial demand for metal and machine-tools there is no metallurgical or machine-tool industry. The agricultural system cannot satisfy the demand for food. Thus Pakistan's industry is growing, but disproportionately, which makes her economic situation not less but more complicated.

Because of the shortage of food an ever-growing share of the State's finances has to be spent on food imports, which leads to a reduction in State investment in industry. Thus industry and agriculture are closely connected.

The authors note that financial difficulties have led to the proposal that the Five-Year Plan should either be reduced in scope or spread out over a longer period.

They conclude that the basic problem is that of agriculture. The first thing to be done is to liquidate feudal landownership. This will undermine the positions of imperialism and facilitate Pakistan's liberation from imperialist dependence.

The authors admit that the bourgeoisie, with Government help, has ousted British capital from many spheres of Pakistan's economy, but point out that this has been compensated for by increased foreign investments in such spheres as, for example, insurance and credit. This, they write, is due to the general weakness of Pakistan's economy and

of its national bourgeoisie which is at present assimilating only the most profitable economic spheres, such as light industry and distribution. Consequently the Government has been forced to put even so important a branch of industry as oil into the power of foreign capital. The Government is prevented from making full use of the profits made in agriculture and trade because it depends on the support of the landowners and bourgeoisie. Consequently it has to turn for help to foreign countries.

The American monopolies, allege Rastyannikov and Kuz'min, dictate the conditions on which American aid is given and try to increase Pakistan's dependence on the imperialist plans of the USA.

Foreign aid, they conclude, although it may allow Pakistani ruling circles to solve some financial problems and to put off dealing with the agricultural problem, at the same time involves military collaboration and thus lays a fresh burden on Pakistan's economy. The experience of the past 10 years, they hold, has proved that Pakistan's economy cannot be propped up by resources from outside.

V. Agriculture

V.G. Rastyannikov's "The Technical Base of Pakistani Agriculture", in PAKISTAN: ISTORIYA I EKONOMIKA, is mainly concerned with analysing a basic dilemma which the author sees in Pakistani agriculture.

Agriculture, Rastyannikov points out, is Pakistan's most important industry, employing 75.5 per cent of the population. Most of the land, however, belongs to a small number of large landlords. Little land is owned by peasants and what there is is concentrated mainly in the Panjab and the former North-West Frontier Province. The existence of large landlords and the long period of British domination retarded the development of the productivity of Pakistani agriculture and kept it at a level characteristic of feudalism.

This is not to say, Rastyannikov goes on, that there have been no technical advances. The development of capitalist relations began during the British period and is continuing. Although the number of metal ploughs has probably decreased (Report of the Pakistani Agricultural Inquiry Committee 1951-2, p.20), such modern instruments as haycutters, sugar-cane presses, water-pumps and tractors have begun to appear (although East Pakistan is more backward in this respect than West). An industry for the manufacture of agricultural implements has also appeared, although it is still at the level of collectives of craftsmen working by hand. However, a considerable proportion of the

agricultural implements used, including all the machines and tractors, is imported. These machines are only used on peasant holdings when they are large enough and the peasants sufficiently wealthy, i.e. in the Panjab. Elsewhere they are mainly used by the large landowners. Even the large landowners, however, Rastyannikov notes, frequently make inefficient use of their tractors. One landlord, for example, used his tractor to plough all his land (which was rented out on the batai system to more than a thousand tenants) once every three years to get rid of weeds (Report to the President of the Board of Trade by the United Kingdom Industrial Mission to Pakistan 1950, pp.32-34). If the landowner does use them efficiently he puts out of work by expropriation more people than a capitalist agriculture can use as hired labourers. This leads to comparative over-population on the land. This same mission reported (p.36) that in order to plough a quarter of the farmed land of Pakistan at least once every three years more than 10,000 tractors would be needed. Pakistan has 4,000 of which no more than a third or a quarter are employed at any one time.

In fact, Rastyannikov states, Pakistani agriculture is still primitive. In 1945 only 2.2 per cent of all the ploughs used were metal. By 1957 the percentage had risen to four at the most. As the number of ploughs used grows, so the proportion of metal to wooden ploughs falls. In general in the "capital" of Pakistani agriculture, which is composed of land, seeds, draught-animals, machines and manual labour, even in large-scale capitalist holdings the last item still accounts for more than 50 per cent of the whole. The reason for this, the author points out, is to be found in the fact that in conditions of comparative agrarian over-population manual labour is so cheap that it becomes uneconomical to replace it with machines. Pakistani industry is developing too slowly to keep pace with both growing agrarian unemployment and the natural increase in population and therefore cannot alleviate the position.

Hence the dilemma facing the Pakistani Government, Rastyannikov writes. To allow the development of a capitalist agriculture by means of mechanization and the creation of large holdings would increase agrarian unemployment; to hinder such a development means to hinder the growth of the productivity of agriculture. It is for this reason that the Pakistani Planning Committee is opposed to the use of tractors except on virgin and fallow land and in protecting the land against erosion, etc., while the Government limits itself to publicizing chemical fertilizers, catch crops and improved seeds and to developing irrigation. Rastyannikov points out that an alternative is to hand in the example of Communist China where rural overpopulation was worse than in Pakistan and where "the liberation of the great revolutionary enthusiasm of the Chinese people" had increased

productivity. He describes the attempts of the Pakistani Government to increase productivity as "attempts to cure the disease without liquidating its causes".

VI. The Situation of the Working-Class

L.R. Gordon-Polonskaya in "The Position of the Working Class of Pakistan (1947-57)", in PAKISTAN: ISTORIYA I EKONOMIKA, touches the same ground as Rastyannikov and Kuz'min in the above article and book and gives an interesting analysis of the conditions of work and standard of living of the urban and rural workers of Pakistan.

The period, she writes, is characterized by the aggravation of "contradictions between the various classes which are striving to strengthen the country's economic independence and those forces which are objectively acting in the direction of preserving and reinforcing colonial dependence on the imperialist powers." As the working-class is the "most consistent and decided fighter for the country's independence" the path of Pakistan's eventual development will depend first and foremost upon the degree of development and unity of the working-class and peasants.

Pakistan, Gordon-Polonskaya writes, suffers from unemployment and a shortage of skilled workers. In 1955 out of 770,000 workers and employees of 5,000 undertakings 329,000 were unqualified(1) She inherited from the British a backward agrarian economy, and what industrial development has taken place since partition has been one-sided and has increased Pakistan's dependence on the imperialist powers. The foreign monopolies are preventing Pakistan from developing a heavy industry, and foreign investments, loans and "so-called 'aid'" are being directed by foreign powers, especially the USA, into the private sector since "the objective tendency [of the public sector] is to weaken economic dependence." It is for this reason that in 1957 the State owned an insignificant part of industry.

The structure of the working-class

According to the PAKISTAN STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, 1955, pp.25 and 183, writes Gordon-Polonskaya, the number of workers in small industries in 1955 was 1,175,707 and in factories approximately 400,000. In 1953, 46 per cent of the industrial proletariat worked in textile factories and a further 29 per cent in factories for the initial processing of agricultural raw materials. Only 15 per cent worked in heavy industry (the metallurgical and chemical industries and transport maintenance workshops, etc.)(2) Most factories are small. Workers

frequently change their place of employment. Agrarian unemployment means that the majority of poor peasants have to find seasonal employment in the towns. In 1950 seasonal workers formed 30 per cent of the total, being employed mainly in the tea, cotton and tobacco industries and in jute and sugar mills.(3) In 1953 of all workers in small enterprises 33 per cent were women and 11 per cent children. Women are to be found in especially large numbers among the seasonal workers; in 1950 women formed only 1.5 per cent of all adult workers with steady employment, but 18 per cent of all seasonal workers.(4)

The employment of seasonal workers and women and children drives down the wages of the permanent working-class and testifies to the comparative over-population existing on the land.

The agricultural crisis and the working-class

Gordon-Polonskaya accounts for the comparative agrarian over-population which she detects in Pakistan in the same way as Rastyannikov (see above). The expropriated peasants, whom industry cannot absorb, stay on the land as debt-ridden share-croppers. Even the peasants of East Bengal who had been given by British reforms hereditary rights to rent their land at a fixed cash rent were mainly poor peasants with 2-3 acres, insufficient to feed a family for a year. Even they can lose their rights and then become share-croppers on the same land. In both East and West Pakistan, writes Gordon-Polonskaya, the share-cropping system has become the main form of the exploitation of the peasantry. In its most usual form the peasant hires land, live-stock, tools and seeds and thus becomes little better than an agricultural labourer receiving his wage in kind.

The agricultural labourer is in an especially difficult position and, in fact, forms a semi-proletariat. It is he who seeks seasonal work in the towns.

So, according to Gordon-Polonskaya, the great majority of the peasants of both East and West Pakistan are miserably poor and, whether hereditary tenants or share-croppers, are little better off than the agricultural labourers whose ranks they will soon join as the process of the expropriation of the peasantry continues. This process is going on much faster than Pakistani industry can absorb the labour it sets free. This reserve of cheap labour naturally forces industrial wages down. Gordon-Polonskaya emphasizes that foreign capital is trying to preserve the semi-feudal features of the agricultural system which make this state of affairs possible.

Plantation workers

Plantation workers form a special class and Gordon-Polonskaya devotes a special section to them. She notes that a large number of the plantations belong to foreign monopolies.

There are, the author writes, three classes of plantation worker: the contracted worker, the worker who lives in a neighbouring village where he rents land, and the seasonal worker. The contracted worker is most numerous and Gordon-Polonskaya concentrates on him.

Before 1947, she writes, he was in fact enslaved by the terms of his contract. He is still enslaved, not now by the contract itself so much as by debt. To be allowed to leave the plantation the worker must first pay his employer the advance he received on recruitment plus the cost of recruitment (the money paid to the recruiting agent as commission and expenses). In 1947 this latter sum came to 100-120 rupees - a year's pay.(5) Not only is the contract system unfair and oppressive to the worker, writes the author, but it is economically undesirable since it ties the worker to his employer and prevents the creation of a free labour market.

Workers are paid piece rates, the author continues, all work done over the daily norm being paid for at higher rates. The norms, however, are excessively high and there is no limit to the length of the working day. The piece rates are extremely low, a man receiving seven annas per day plus food at a reduced rate of two annas, a woman six annas per day and a child four.(6) The workers are paid according to the truck system, receiving for part of their wage not cash but tickets which can be used only at their employer's store where, the author writes, the goods are dear and of poor quality. As the worker cannot leave the plantation his cash also has to be spent there. Fines and a charge for accommodation are deducted from his wage. Holidays and days lost through sickness are not paid and the work is so hard that sickness is frequent. In 1947 in the plantations of Silhet 24 per cent of the workers were absent daily. In Bengal the percentage was as high as 30.(7)

Consequently, concludes Gordon-Polonskaya, an adult plantation worker can barely feed and clothe himself but cannot keep his family. The death rate among the plantation workers is higher than among the surrounding population and their children are smaller and weaker than normal. Even when the workers are given small plots of plantation land to farm at a rent of from 10 to 15 per cent of the gross harvest this only serves to bind them closer to the plantation.

In the plantations also, therefore, feudal relations persist, although mixed with capitalist relations, and are diligently preserved by the planters, a great number of whom, Gordon-Polonskaya reminds us, represent foreign capital.

The industrial workers

As has already been noted the industrial workers live in conditions of falling wages and standard of living caused by comparative agrarian over-population. Between 1939 and 1947, writes Gordon-Polonskaya, the cost of living of qualified workers rose by 484 per cent, while wages rose only by 200-300 per cent. The comparable figures for unqualified workers were 350-400 per cent (cost of living) and 150-200 per cent (wages).(8) After Partition prices continued to rise. Wages, however, did not increase comparably. The wages of railway workers have not been reviewed since 1949. Gordon-Polonskaya quotes from the PAKISTAN TIMES of 7 May 1957 the statement that the official figures are misleading since their cost-of-living index takes into consideration only the bare minimum of goods and services, whereas if its scope is extended it shows an even sharper rise in the cost of living.

In 1950, the author writes, the average wage of an unqualified worker was 25-30 rupees per month, that of a qualified worker 60-100 rupees.(9) From this sum deductions were made which often came to 30 per cent of the total.(10) The same source gave a typical monthly budget of a worker's family containing the following items (all prices in rupees): food - 60, rent - 10, heating - 10, the rest (transport, education, clothing, etc.) - 15.8, total - 95.8. However, even a family two or three of whose members are working seldom earns more than 90 rupees per month. It is obvious that the average wage of an unqualified worker is not sufficient even to maintain his ability to work. A qualified worker can keep his family but not apprentice his children or give them any education above elementary level. The qualified railwayman or miner cannot do even this much.

From the above, Gordon-Polonskaya concludes that the wage of Pakistani industrial workers is down to the minimum, while that of agricultural workers is below it. Low wages lead to a shortage of qualified workers since the workers cannot afford to apprentice their children. "Such a wage-rate is possible only in conditions of dependence on the imperialist powers, which hinders the growth of the national economy and the solution of the agricultural problem, of comparative agrarian over-population and of a huge constant reserve of unemployed."

Nevertheless "the tendency is increasing in Pakistan for a new value of labour to be formed, one more appropriate to an independent country." Any increase in the value of labour would depend first of all on the character of the class war, and on the class-consciousness of the Pakistani proletariat. This tendency, however, is opposed by the influence among the workers of such bourgeois ideologies as "Muslim socialism" and "healthy trade-unionism" whose task is made easier by the scarcity of qualified workers, the small size of industrial enterprises, the fact that many workers maintain their connexion with the village and the constant influx into industry of former peasants. The trade union movement embraces only a small section of the workers and is very much affected by reformist tendencies.

"Pakistan's significant dependence upon the imperialist powers does much to determine the hard lot of the working-class. The enslaving forms of the USA's so-called aid and the competition of foreign capital and goods impels Pakistani businessmen to increase the exploitation of their workers in defence of their own profits. The proletariat of Pakistan also experiences its dependence on the imperialist powers directly in the form of military loans and expenditure. Also a part of the workers is subject to cruel exploitation in those industrial undertakings and plantations which continue to belong to foreign capital."

Notes to L.R. Gordon-Polonskaya's article

- (1) THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN, 1955-1960, Vol.II, p.463.
- (2) PAKISTAN STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, 1955, pp.28-31.
- (3) PAKISTAN LABOUR YEARBOOK, 1954, p.4.
- (4) Ibid.; PAKISTAN STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, 1955, p.24.
- (5) LABOUR INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE: REPORT ON AN ENQUIRY INTO CONDITIONS OF LABOUR IN PLANTATIONS IN INDIA. Government of India, 1950, p.27.
- (6) THE ECONOMY OF PAKISTAN (1950), p.134; PAKISTAN LABOUR YEARBOOK, 1954, p.31.
- (7) REPORT OF AN ENQUIRY. . . , pp.40-41, 83.
- (8) THE PAKISTAN TIMES, 14 August 1950.
- (9) Ibid.
- (10) Ibid.

T H E B O R D E R L A N D S I N T H E S O V I E T P R E S S

Below are reviewed reports on the Borderlands countries appearing in Soviet newspapers received during the period 1 January - 31 March 1960. The Editors regret that owing to the large amount of material it has been found impracticable to continue the coverage of Soviet reports on India.

A F G H A N I S T A N

Khrushchev's visit to Afghanistan

Khrushchev's visit to Afghanistan from 2 to 5 March was prominently reported in Soviet newspapers, which published the text of Khrushchev's speeches and of the Soviet-Afghan joint communique. In his speech of 2 March on arrival Khrushchev spoke not only of Soviet friendship and support for Afghanistan but also of the attitude of other countries towards Soviet-Afghan relations. He said that "malicious fabrications" about Soviet-Afghan relations had been spread in countries that were not cordially disposed towards the Soviet Union and Afghanistan; but the Soviet Union remained true to its Leninist policy of peaceful co-existence and international friendship, while Afghanistan resolutely pursued its policy of neutrality, strengthening its independence and cooperating with other countries in the interests of peace. In another passage Khrushchev said that Afghanistan was much concerned at the way in which certain circles in other States - States which had only recently acquired their own independence - were showing scant respect for the lawful national rights of other peoples, and were following a policy which differed little from the policy of those who had for centuries kept other peoples under the yoke of colonialism.

The Pushtunistan issue was directly referred to in the joint Soviet-Afghan communique issued on 4 March, in the following terms: "The two sides exchanged views on the fate of the Pushtun people and expressed their agreement that the proper and sensible way to lessen tension and to guarantee peace in the Middle East is to apply to the solution of this problem the principle of self-determination on the basis of the UN Charter."

Soviet newspapers gave a full account of the Afghan Premier's press conference of 7 March. In the course of this the Afghan Premier deplored Western reports that, in accepting aid from the Soviet Union, Afghanistan was falling under the influence of Communism. Afghanistan, he said, followed a neutral policy and accepted aid from any country provided that it was not accompanied by political conditions.

Soviet aid to Afghanistan

Soviet aid to Afghanistan was much in the news in connection with Khrushchev's visit, and in particular his inspection of two Soviet-built projects - the new Kabul airport, due for completion in 1962, and the Jangalak motor repair and spare parts works. The latter undertaking was the subject of an enthusiastic article in PRAVDA of 5 March by V. Mayevskiy, who called it "the firstling of Afghanistan's national industry" and explained how the first molten metal for castings was poured on the occasion of Khrushchev's visit.

In addition Soviet newspapers published articles on other aspects of Soviet aid to Afghanistan. BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY of 9 March published an interview with the geologist V.A. Frolov on Soviet oil prospecting activities in northern Afghanistan, in the Shibarghan and Maimana districts of Mazar-i-Sharif province. Frolov said that a test borehole in the Sar-i-Pul area, dug at the very outset of geological work in the area, had established the presence of oil of high quality, and a second borehole had yielded oil and gas; digging was continuing.

PRAVDA VOSTOKA of 12 March published an interview with A.V. Petrov, the chief engineer of the Jalalabad irrigation canal. Petrov explained how the canal, 70 km. long, will convey water from a dam on the Kabul river, at the Darunt gorge, and, passing through two tunnels one of which will be 7.5 km. long, will irrigate 32,000 hectares of land.

NEPAL

Soviet newspapers published in full the speeches made during the visit of Voroshilov, Kozlov and Furtseva to Nepal from 3 to 5 February 1960, and also the joint Soviet Nepalese communique issued on the conclusion of the visit (PRAVDA 6.2.60). This was a return visit for that of King Mahendra to the Soviet Union in June 1958.

On 18 February IZVESTIYA published an article by I. Klimov on the occasion of Nepalese National Day, under the heading "Sweeping away feudalism". Nine years ago, said Klimov, the Nepalese people had "swept away the despotic feudal regime of the henchmen of the British

imperialists which had ruled in Nepal for more than a century" and had set up a democratic State. Since then Nepal had made great strides in the development of her economy, under her first Five-Year Plan (1956-61). A law on agrarian reform passed in 1957 had the aim of liquidating the system of feudal land-ownership. During the past year a Constitution had been enacted and parliamentary elections had been held. The establishment of Soviet-Nepalese diplomatic relations in July 1957 had opened the way to political, economic and cultural co-operation between the two countries, and under a Soviet-Nepalese agreement signed on 24 April 1959 the Soviet Union afforded Nepal gratuitous aid to the sum of 30m. rubles for the construction of various undertakings, including a hydroelectric station, a sugar factory, a cigarette factory, etc. There were boundless possibilities for the further development of Soviet-Nepalese cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

In an article in PRAVDA on 28 March entitled "The Spirit of Bandung Triumphs", V. Karimov acclaimed the results of the Sino-Nepalese discussions in Peking, which led to an agreement on frontier questions and an agreement on Chinese economic aid to Nepal. The peace-loving public, said Karimov, had welcomed the results of the Sino-Nepalese talks, as of the earlier Sino-Burmese talks; they showed that the spirit of Bandung continued to win new triumphs.

PAKISTAN

Two items concerning Soviet-Pakistani relations were reported during this period - the exchange of friendly messages between Khrushchev and President Ayub Khan during the former's flight over Pakistani territory (PRAVDA 3 and 5.3.60), and the gift of three Soviet tractors to the Pakistani Ministry of Agriculture at a ceremony in the Soviet trade agency in Karachi (IZVESTIYA 17.1.60).

IZVESTIYA of 13 January noted that the Afghan Foreign Minister Sardar Muhammad Naim had returned to Kabul after a two-day visit to Pakistan during which he had talks with President Ayub Khan, and that he had "said that no agreement had yet been reached on matters under dispute and no early solution of these questions is expected".

Reports of the CENTO meeting in Lahore - the discussions of the Heads of State of Turkey, Persia and Pakistan which opened on 24 February - were published in Soviet newspapers under such headings as "Scheming in Lahore" and "The partisans of the cold war in Asia intensify their efforts".

PERSIA

A sharp warning about Persia's foreign policy was voiced in PRAVDA of 14 February in an article signed "Observer". This contrasted Persia's recent attitude to the Soviet Union with her attitude to the Western powers, and depicted Persia as rapidly becoming a "semi-colony" and a military appendage of the USA. It said that military bases in Persia had no strategic value for the West: "The Soviet Union, as is well known, possesses all the necessary means to wipe these bases off the face of the earth if aggressors dare to unleash a war." The article concluded: "In his blind hatred of Communism, dreaming of leading an alliance of all reactionary forces in the Middle East against the national liberation movement and against all Persia's peace-loving neighbours, the Shah drags his country further down the road to the abyss. Should he not pull himself up before it is too late?"


The effects of Persia's military expenditure on living standards in Persia remained a constant theme in newspaper articles. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA of 27 March, commenting on the proportion of military expenditure in the Persian budget, said that the Persian Government seemed oblivious of the fact that a campaign for disarmament was in progress in the rest of the world.

New alphabets for the Turkic languages of Sinkiang

New China News Agency announced on 10.2.60 that the proposal to use for the Kazakh and Uygur languages a latin alphabet of 26 letters plus eight special letters designed to meet phonetic requirements has been ratified by the People's Council of the Sinkiang-Uygur Autonomous Region. This supersedes the project reported in CAR, Vol.VI, No.1, pp.81-82. Ed. - CAR


THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
OF
KAZAKHSTAN, KIRGIZIA, TADZHIKISTAN,
UZBEKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN AND AZERBAIDZHAN

100 0 100 200 300 km.



- Borders of the U.S.S.R.
- Limits of Union Republics.
- Capitals of Union Republics.
- Railways.
- Canals.
- Canals under construction or projected.
- Sands.
- Main arterial road with pass.

Vol. VIII No. 3. 1960.



TASHKENT

CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

A quarterly review of cultural developments in
the six Muslim republics of the Soviet Union.

Issued by the Central Asian Research Centre in association with
St. Antony's College (Oxford) Soviet Affairs Study Group.



BUKHARA

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CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW aims at presenting a coherent and objective picture of cultural developments in the six Muslim Soviet Socialist Republics of Azerbaydzhan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirgizia and Kazakhstan. The subjects treated include history, geography, demography, the arts, education, irrigation and communications.

In addition, the *REVIEW* analyses past and current Soviet publications on the countries bordering on or adjacent to these republics, namely, Persia, Afghanistan, the Indian sub-continent, Tibet and Sinkiang.

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Abbreviations

Abbreviations used in the Review when referring to the Soviet Academies of Sciences, and to newspapers and periodicals etc. employed as sources, are as follows :-

AN/SSSR	Akademiya Nauk (Academy of Sciences) of USSR
AN/Az. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Azerbaydzhan SSR
AN/Kaz. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Kazakh SSR
AN/Kirg. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Kirgiz SSR
AN/Tad. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Tadjhik SSR
AN/Turk. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Turkmen SSR
AN/Uzb. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Uzbek SSR
SAGU	Sredneaziatskiy Gosudarstvennyy Universitet (Central Asian State University)
BR	Bakinskiy Rabochiy
I	Izvestiya
KP	Kazakhstanskaya Pravda
K	Kommunist
KT	Kommunist Tadjhikistana
KZ	Krasnaya Zvezda
NT	New Times
P	Pravda
PV	Pravda Vostoka
SK	Sovetskaya Kirgiziya
SU	Soviet Union
TI	Turkmenskaya Iskra
VVS	Vedemosti Verkhovnogo Soveta

CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

VOL. VIII, NO.3

EDITORIAL

The Russian administration of Central Asia during the Tsarist regime is a subject on which it has hitherto been difficult to obtain full and objective information. During the last century a number of books appeared in Britain dealing with the Russian conquest of Central Asia and some of these touched briefly on the Russian administrative arrangements. But the two most valuable of these books, Schuyler's *TURKESTAN* and Curzon's *RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA*, were written before 1890 and could therefore only describe the earlier stages of Russian administration, which was of a strictly military character. Many of the other works published in English were largely concerned with the alleged Russian threat to India and can hardly be described as objective. The latter criticism also applies to many works published in Russia, although not to the works of the great oriental historian Bartol'd, few of which, however, have been translated into English.

Soviet writing on the Tsarist period is voluminous and is important in the sense that Soviet historians have access to much archive material which is not available to the West. It too, however, can hardly be regarded as objective, since one of its main purposes is to show the great contrast between Central Asia under the Tsars and under the Soviet regime. Moreover, between 1937 and 1951 Soviet historiographical policy underwent a considerable change, with the result that many books written before 1951 by acknowledged experts are now officially condemned as inaccurate and unreliable. Since 1951 there have been further changes: emphasis is now sometimes placed on the inefficiency and corruption of Tsarist officials and sometimes on the general soundness of Tsarist policy and always on the benefits which accrued to the peoples of Central Asia from their association with the Russian people. There have no doubt been cogent political reasons for these changes of policy and shifts of emphasis, but the general impression conveyed by Soviet history of Central Asia in the Tsarist period is in no way clear or convincing.

For the student of Central Asia the appearance of Richard Pierce's *RUSSIAN CENTRAL ASIA 1876-1917* (Univ. of California Press, 1960) is a notable event. It seems to be the first book on the subject which has made impartial use of Tsarist Russian, Western European, and Soviet source material. The general picture which it conveys is convincing and reasonable. It makes no attempt to compare Tsarist with Soviet achievements; it does show, however, that the foundation of many of the projects and reforms successfully carried out during the Soviet period were laid by Tsarist administrators. Although Soviet critics can hardly accuse Mr. Pierce of minimizing Soviet achievements, it is unlikely that his book will give them complete satisfaction. Mr. Pierce describes his book as "a study in colonial rule" and he makes no bones about the facts of the Russian conquest. The present Soviet tendency is not to admit that Tsarist Russia owned any colonies and to substitute the word "incorporation" for conquest.

. . .

In the last issue of *CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW* mention was made of the decision by the Peoples' Council of the Sinkiang-Uygur Autonomous Region to use for the Kazakh and Uygur languages a latin alphabet of 26 letters plus 8 special letters designed to meet phonetic requirements. *DRUZHBА*, the journal of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Society, has now published (No.21, 20 May 1960) a short article on this subject. The article merely says that this decision has resulted from research carried out by experts between 1956 and 1958 and that it is expected that the old script will be replaced by the new one in from 3-5 years. No mention whatever is made of the linguistic conference held in Urumchi in August 1956, to which considerable publicity was given in the Chinese press at the time (see *CAR*, 1956, No.4, pp.444-5). At this conference it was formally decided that of the Turkic languages used in the Sinkiang-Uygur Autonomous Region, Uygur, Kazakh and Kirgiz were to be written in the cyrillic character and Uzbek and Tatar would be written in the same cyrillic script as that used by the Uzbek and Tatar peoples of the Soviet Union. During 1958 full details of the new alphabets were published in the Chinese press (see *CAR*, 1958, No.1, pp. 81-82) and from this it appeared that in fact Kazakh and Kirgiz would use exactly the same alphabets as used in the Soviet Union, while the Uygur alphabet would consist only of the 25 cyrillic letters necessary to fulfil the requirements of Uygur phonetics. It is interesting to speculate on the reasons for this change of policy. One practical consideration may have been that since the latin alphabet is in use for other purposes in other parts of China, it would be unnecessarily confusing to introduce a second non-Chinese system of writing.

The transliteration of Central Asian and Azerbaydzhani personal and geographical names is a constant source of difficulty to the Editors of the Review. In No.2 of Vol.II (1954) they explained some of their difficulties and the reason why they deviated in some respects from the system advocated by the British Permanent Committee on Geographical Names for Official Use and by the American Board on Geographical Names. In 1955, however, it was decided to adopt the latter system for all geographical names and for the transliteration of book and article titles.

It has recently been possible to examine some Soviet books of instructions on the rendering of geographical names in Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia and Azerbaydzhan. The Soviet authorities have decided against a system on the lines of the PCGN/BGN system, which transliterates languages not written in the latin character on a symbol-for-symbol basis, but makes no attempt at the phonetic transcription of languages using the latin script although with different phonetic values and additional diacritical marks. Thus maps of Persia printed in Britain and the USA have the names transliterated according to a fixed system while those of Poland and Turkey use exactly the same spellings as are used in those countries. In maps printed in the Soviet Union, on the other hand, no attempt is made to transliterate names in languages not using the cyrillic alphabet but instead a very broad and not always consistent system of phonetic transcription is followed.

The choice of phonetic transcription rather than transliteration as a means of rendering names written in a character other than one's own is perhaps a matter of taste: it facilitates pronunciation and memorization of names although it is less accurate and may permit ambiguity. What is less easy to understand is the procedure followed in writing non-Russian names in languages which use a modified form of the cyrillic alphabet. Why if the Turkmens pronounce and write the name of their capital Ashgabat (АШГАБАТ) does it have to be written on Soviet maps as Ashkhabad (АШХАБАД)? In some instances the Soviet version of Central Asian place-names is so different from the native way of writing them as to be barely recognizable, for instance, the Turkmen Esenguly (Эсенгулы) becomes Gasankuli (Гасанкули). The Soviet literature on the subject describes the Soviet method of spelling as "traditional". This does not, however, explain the present spelling of Ashkhabad rather than Askhabad used before the Revolution. Again, the Tadzhiks spell their capital Stalinobod, since 'o' is used to represent the long Persian ā sound. But on Soviet maps this has always been written Stalinabad; yet on these maps the same sound is written as 'o' in other names, for instance, Obi Garm which is simply the Persian Āb-e-garm - hot water.

The principles governing the Soviet system of transcription obviously deserve closer study than the Editors have yet been able to apply to the matter, and this will be attended to in a later issue. There is of course no question of changing the system of transliterating geographical names at present followed in the Review. The Editors are, however, anxious to arrive at a satisfactory differentiation between the spelling of personal names in the pre-and post-Russian periods, with reference not only to Turkestan and the Stepnoy Kray, but also to the khanates.

Atomic reactor in Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan is one of the four Soviet republics which possesses an atomic reactor. (The other three are the RFSSR, the Ukraine and Georgia.)

The staff of the Uzbek reactor includes Uzbek women amongst whom there is an engineer and a senior operator. SU. No.124, 1960

Higher education in Uzbekistan

In Uzbekistan today 81 persons out of every 10,000 have a higher education. There are now more college and university students in Uzbekistan per thousand of the population than in the United States or Britain, and more than twice as many as in France, Italy or the German Federal Republic. SU. No.124, 1960

Russian-Kirgiz dictionary

A pre-Revolution Russian-Kirgiz dictionary has been discovered in the Lenin library of Moscow. It is the work of T. Bokin an active organizer of Soviet power. T. Bokin worked on his dictionary from 1911 to 1914 while working as a Government immigration officer. The dictionary contains 2,000 words and is one of the most successful pre-Revolution dictionaries. KP. 22.6.60

T H E L I T E R A T U R E O F A Z E R B A Y D Z H A N

The present article is divided into two parts, dealing with Azerbaydzhani literature before and after the October Revolution. Each part consists of an analysis of the main Soviet writing on the subject, with brief editorial comments at the beginning and end. Except where otherwise stated, all the views expressed in the analyses are those of Soviet writers.

The Russianized spelling has been used for writers flourishing during the Russian period, i.e. after 1828. Otherwise the more conventional western spelling has been followed.

. . .

PART ONE

AZERBAYDZHANI LITERATURE BEFORE THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

Introductory comment - Origins and the language problem -
Early Islamic poets - The 13th-16th centuries - Fuzuli -
The 16th-18th centuries - Russian Azerbaydzhani - Editorial
comment.

Introductory comment

The main Soviet sources which have been consulted on the subject of the pre-Revolutionary Azerbaydzhani literature are: (a) IZ ISTORII LITERATUR SOVETSKOGO VOSTOKA by L. Klimovich, Moscow, 1959; (b) THE GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA, 2nd edition, Vol. I, 1949; and (c) ISTORIYA AZERBAYDZHANA, Vol. I, ed. I.A. Guseynov, A.S. Sumbat-zade, and others, Baku, 1958.

The Soviet approach to the pre-Revolutionary history of the literatures of all the Soviet nationalities is based on Lenin's theory of "two cultures within every national culture in the

conditions of antagonistic (sic) society". Lenin's theory helps to "estimate correctly the role of literature in the class struggle. . . This teaching of V.I. Lenin is of primary importance for Soviet literary studies in their assessment of the literary heritage, and in the campaign against 'the theory of the single stream' and the manifestations of bourgeois nationalism and cosmopolitanism."(1)

Klimovich believes that the Western "capitalists" ignored the literatures of the peoples of the Soviet East as long as they could, but that they finally had to admit their existence. He finds an indication of this change of attitude in the fact that the new ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM, started in 1955, contains articles on Akhundov and Adhari (Azeri) literature which were absent from the earlier edition. He adds that the Western press "which serves the interests of the bourgeoisie and colonizers" cannot be sympathetic towards the Soviet study of these literatures, and some of the articles it publishes "have nothing in common with science".(2) He applies the same criticism to some Tsarist scholars "who attempted to transplant to our country whatever served the interests of the 'Europa-Centrists' and colonizers". He gives as an example THE GENERAL ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF LITERATURE, by I. Sherr, whose ten editions published before 1905 stated that the Azerbaydzhanis had no literature.(3)

An important consideration in the study of pre-Soviet Azerbaydzhani literature is the fact that from the 11th century up to 1913 (with a brief interval from 1723-35), the whole of the territory populated by Azerbaydzhanis was either under Persian suzerainty or actually part of the Persian Empire. This naturally resulted in profound Persian influence on the language and literature of Azerbaydzhan, a fact which is admitted in the first edition of THE GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA (Vol.1, 1926) but which is nowadays largely ignored by Soviet writers.

Origins and the language problem

THE GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA seeks the origin of Azerbaydzhani literature in distant antiquity and ascribes it to the 7th-6th centuries B.C. when the Median legends recorded by Herodotus appeared. "These heroic and patriotic tales. . . were directed against Persian raids." It is also stated that "among the ancient monuments of Azerbaydzhani culture the AVESTA of Zoroaster. . . is included. It reflects the religious, philosophical and social views of the ancient Azerbaydzhanis."(4)

At the beginning of the 5th century A.D. the Albanian alphabet of 52 letters was already in existence and before the Arab invasion the

Azerbaydzhanis had created poetry of their own while in the 7th century Moisey of Kalankaytuk started compiling a history of the country.

In the 5th-7th and 9th-12th centuries Azerbaydzhani was repeatedly invaded by the nomadic Turks and their settlement there was accompanied by the growing importance of their language which gradually came to be accepted even by the native population. Before that a large number of languages or dialects was used, the most important of which were the Azeri and Arani. An Arab author, Ibn-Khaukal (sic), wrote that "originally I used to deny this [diversity of languages] until I saw for myself their numerous towns and that in each town there was a language of its own apart from Azerbaydzhani and Persian." (5)

Early Islamic poets

After the Arab conquest a number of poets appeared. Even those who lived in the 10th century in Baghdad and wrote in Arabic - Babakui Bakui, Pir Huseyni Shirvani and others - are claimed as Azerbaydzhanis. The same is said about the poet and scholar Khatib Tabrizi (1030-1108). Beside Arabic, the Turkic language of the nomads began to create its own literature and about the 11th century the epos DEDE-KORKUD, describing the life of the nomadic Oguz people, came into being. The epos was recited by generations of ashugs (bards) and finally was written down in the 15th century.

The court poets of the "feudal" lords specialized in composing panegyrics, odes, love and lyrical poems. The most famous of them was Khagani Shirvani (1120-1199), who served the Shirvan Shah Akhistan I, but in spite of this occupation his works "reflect particularly strongly the rebellious spirit of the poet and his indignation at the tyranny of the rulers, the hypocrisy of the clergy and social injustice." (6) Another celebrated court poet was Abul-Ula Ganjaevi, a "major representative of the feudal panegyric poetry". (7)

Nizami

The most prominent among the early poets was Nizami of Ganja (now Kirovabad) (1141-1203). He refused to become a court poet and spent all his life in Ganja where he composed some 20,000 couplets of lyrics and the famous KHAMSE ("five") consisting of "The Treasure-House of Mysteries", "Khosran and Shirin", "Leyli and Majnun", "Seven Beauties" and "Iskander-name". The last is particularly interesting to the Western student as one of the versions of the Alexander romance celebrated in medieval Europe. It contains an exposition of Nizami's social and political views - "a social Utopia, ideal society

where men do not exploit one another. They are neither rich nor poor; they all work collectively and the commodities of life are evenly distributed among them. In this blessed land the people live happily without state machinery and its instruments of coercion - the army, prisons etc."(8)

The story of Leyli and Majnun was a popular tale of two lovers parted by Leyli's marriage to another man. The fact that it drew Nizami's attention ("Leyli - a girl who bravely protests against the Shariat violating her human dignity"(9)), as well as the other subjects he dealt with, have caused the Soviet historians of literature to endorse him as "progressive" and a "great humanist" who struggled against religious superstitions and even "hoped with his truthful and inspired words, to induce them ["feudal" lords] to stop oppressing the people."(10)

The 13th-16th centuries

The Mongol invasion in the 1220s for a time disrupted the cultural life of the country and poetry of this period is permeated with pessimism. Sufi poetry was predominant in Azerbaydzhani literature of the 13th century and had strong pantheistic tendencies. This genre was represented by Shams Tabrizi, Maragaly Akhvedi and Mahmud Shabistari, the author of the celebrated FLOWER GARDEN OF SECRETS.

In the second half of the 14th century the Hurufi sect appeared. It "was directed, to a certain extent, against feudal and clerical oppression and the bloody invasion of Tamerlane."(11) Its views were disseminated by the poet Nesimi (died 1417) whose significance for the history of Azerbaydzhani literature is due to the fact that he was the first major lyrical poet to write a divan (collection of verse) in Azerbaydzhani. The vernacular became a literary language in the 13th century with the TALE OF YUSIF (1233) which subsequently became widely known in the East.

Nesimi's work was carried on by Qasim Anvar (died 1434) who participated in the Hurufi movement and wrote in Persian and Azerbaydzhani.

The creation of the Safavid state at the beginning of the 16th century was followed by a period of peace and prosperity in Azerbaydzhani which fostered intellectual life. At the beginning of the century the poet Habibi flourished at the court of Ismail I who was himself a poet of distinction. Both wrote in Azerbaydzhani.


FUZULI AS PROPAGANDIST




Thou dost fondly dream that by amassing wealth thou shalt become free



Alas, money will only circumscribe thy freedom still further



It is with silver not gold that the Monarch of the Golden Hand corrupts



He trains his armies to seize the lands of others

The above pictures reproduced from *Bakinskiy Rabochiy* of 10. 12. 58 are an attempt of a Soviet cartoonist, Oganov, to enlist Fuzuli in the service of anti-American propaganda.

Fuzuli

Muhammad Fuzuli (died 1556 or 1562) spent his life in Baghdad where his father had migrated from Azerbaydzhan. He was versed in various branches of science, knew Azerbaydzhani, Persian and Arabic and was familiar with the works of Nizami, Nesimi and other Azerbaydzhan poets.

Fuzuli is the author of three divans and thirteen major works, of which eleven are original and two translations. The most popular of these are LEYLI AND MAJNUN (a tale of Arabic origin, popular with various Eastern poets including Nizami and Navoi), BOOK OF SORROW and HASHISH AND VINE. The autobiographical BOOK OF SORROW is the earliest surviving specimen of Azerbaydzhani literary prose, in which the author described the corruption at the court of the Sultan Suleyman, the "Turkish invader". "Criticizing the despotism of the shahs and sultans, the poet, however, satisfied himself with merely calling upon the rulers to consider the feelings of the people."(12)

Fuzuli's most famous work is LEYLI AND MAJNUN. His version of the story proved superior to those of his predecessors and was widely read throughout the Near and Middle East and the composer Gadzhibekov embodied it, in 1908, in the first Azerbaydzhani opera of that name.

The pre-eminent position of Fuzuli in Azerbaydzhani literature is due to the fact that he considerably widened the range of subjects it discussed and proved that the vernacular was a proper vehicle for great literature. Soviet historians ascribe his greatness to the fact that he "convincingly ridiculed invaders", "expressed the most progressive ideas of the period" and that his works "reflected the thoughts and hopes of the broad toiling masses".(13)

The 16th-18th centuries

In the 16th century there appeared a number of authors of biographical collections and commentaries. The most prominent of them were Sam Mirza, Ibrahim Mirza, Ahdi Baghdadi and Sadiq-bek Afshar. Oral folk poetry fostered and developed by the ashugs also flourished. In the 16th and 17th centuries a number of popular heroic and romantic poems were created: ASHUG-GABIR, SHAH ISMAIL, and others. The most famous of them is KÖR-ÖGLÜ describing the activities of a hero of that name against the invading Turks. In the 17th century classical and folk motives came to blend together in the works of poets like Mesihi, Ghausi Tabrizi, Nishat Shirvani and others, but on the whole the period of Turco-Persian wars was not conducive to literary activity.

The most famous poets of the 18th century were Vidadi (died 1809) and Vaqif (1717-97). Vidadi's lyrics reflect his pessimism inspired by the war-stricken plight of his country, while Vaqif's poetry is full of the joy of life and praise of the beauty of his country and that of Azerbaydzhani and Armenian women. Vaqif was the chief vezir of the Karabakh khanate and favoured its Russian orientation.

Russian Azerbaydzhan

Soviet historians regard anti-Tsarist sentiment and all attempts at westernization and progress as being ipso facto revolutionary in the Soviet sense. "In the struggle against the colonial policy of Tsarism and the serf-owning landowners, the Azerbaydzhani people sought ideological support from the leading section of the Russian society - the revolutionary democrats. . . [The native intellectuals] came to appreciate Russian literature and the great Russian language and they understood that liberation and happiness of the Azerbaydzhani people could not be won independently of the revolutionary and democratic Russia."(14)

The earliest representatives of the new "realistic and enlightening" literature were Abbas-Quli-Agha Bakikhanov (1794-1847), Mirza Shafi Vazih (died 1852) and Ismail-bek Kutkashinli (1806-61). The most famous Azerbaydzhani author of the 19th century was Mirza Fatali (Fath Ali) Akhundov (1812-78).

Akhundov was educated at the Russo-Azerbaydzhani school at Nukha and in 1834 entered the service of Baron Rozen, the governor of the Caucasus. He worked as an interpreter and he developed a strong interest in the Russian language and literature (he particularly admired Pushkin) and came to believe that the Russian Muslims "should stop shunning the Russians under whose rule the safety of their life, property and honour are guaranteed, while their brethren in Persia and Turkey are in a deplorable situation and great poverty. But here the Muslims will amalgamate with the Russian people and the spirit of fanaticism and Muridism will die out."(15)

In the backward Muslim clergy Akhundov saw a serious obstacle to his country's progress: "You, preachers. . . deprive the people of all the earthly blessings, you keep them in an uninterrupted stagnation, you close their road to progress and all that is good in life and you invariably proclaim from the mosque pulpits, 'do not play musical instruments - it is sinful. . . do not go there - sinful; do not dance - sinful; do not watch dancing - sinful; do not listen to singing - sinful; do not play chess - sinful; do not play at backgammon - sinful; do not draw portraits - sinful; do not keep images at home -sinful.'"(16)

In his critical works Akhundov advocated the westernization of Azerbaydzhani literature. In 1862 he wrote: "Our prose writers and poets will begin, when literary criticism develops, to search for topics closer to life. Plots should be taken from real life and should be so rich that the reader can derive a lasting satisfaction from literature and the listener feel entranced."(17)

Politically, Akhundov showed himself to be a sworn enemy of despotism, "feudal" backwardness and religious superstition, which ideas he put forward in his propaganda work widely read in the East, **THREE LETTERS FROM AN INDIAN PRINCE, KEMAL-UD-DOWLEH, TO A PERSIAN PRINCE, DZHALAL-UD-DOWLEH, AND THE LATTER'S ANSWER.**

Akhundov lived at Tbilisi (Tiflis) where Rozen's offices were. In 1845 a Russian theatre was founded there, an event of great importance for his subsequent literary career. Under its influence Akhundov became the founder of Azerbaydzhani drama. Between 1850-6 he wrote six comedies which give very interesting information on Azerbaydzhani social life in the middle of the 19th century. (**MOLLA IBRAHIM HALIL - THE ALCHEMIST, MONSIEUR JOURDAN AND DERVISH MASTALI-SHAH, THE VEZIR OF LENKORAN, THE BEAR THAT KNOCKED DOWN THE ROBBER, HAJJI GARA and PLEADERS OF THE COURT OF TABRIZ.**)

In these plays Akhundov introduces a number of characters typical of Azerbaydzhani life. The alchemist Molla Ibrahim Khalil preys upon the ignorance of his customers - there is some evidence that he was a real person resident at Nukha where he included a number of local merchants and burghers and even Tsarist officials among his victims. He has much in common with dervish Mastali-shah who extorts money from ignorant women. They want to keep at home Shahbaz, who wants to go to Paris with Monsieur Jourdan, a botanist, and the women fear that there he will be lost to his betrothed, since girls in Paris go about with their faces unveiled. Mastali-shah promises them to use his magical powers to destroy Paris and a coincidence helps him: just then the revolution of 1848 breaks out and Louis Philippe flees the country, allowing Mastali-shah to triumph.

Another black character is Hajji Gara, a merchant whose name has become proverbial in Azerbaydzhan for rapacity combined with cowardice. This play which "contrasts the hard work of the Armenian and Azerbaydzhani peasants with the predatory activities of the beks and merchants"(18), is the most popular of all and is still played in Azerbaydzhani theatres.

Akhundov translated his plays into Russian and published them simultaneously with the originals. They were first produced in Russian in 1853 but on the Azerbaydzhani stage they did not appear until 1873,

the year of the foundation of the first Azerbaydzhani theatre at Baku. From 1880 translations began to appear in other languages, including Persian and Urdu.

The plays were a great innovation in oriental literature. They gave an accurate picture of the every-day life of the people and the author provided them with comments explaining how the characters should act - intonation, gesture etc. - details which are obvious to European actors but which were completely new in the East where the only species of dramatic representation were the passion plays depicting the death of the Imams.

Of a more ideological description was Akhundov's tale THE CHEATED STARS (1857), based on events which took place in the seventh year of the reign of Shah Abbas (1587-1628). The court astrologer announces that during the forthcoming approach of Mars to the constellation of Scorpio the stars will cause the ruler of Persia to die. To avert the danger to the Shah, artisan Yusif of Qazvin is placed on the throne, rules much better than the real Shah, but very soon dies. The author comments: "The foolishness of the stars astonishes me; they did not guess the Persians were cheating them. . . They made a poor man suffer, the innocent Yusif, and left the real ruler of Persia, Shah Abbas, alone. Then for forty years they watched with indifference his despotism, cruelty and fanaticism. . ." (19)

Between 1918-57 Akhundov's works were published in the Soviet Union in eight languages, totalling 372,000 copies. Considering that Akhundov has been officially approved for general consumption this seems unexpectedly low by comparison with the works of some other writers belonging to the Soviet national minorities. For example, during the same period Nizami and Navoi's works have appeared in seventeen languages each (838,000 and 570,000 copies respectively), while Shevchenko was published in forty languages to a total of 10,234,000 copies. (20)

Akhundov's literary traditions were carried on by Nadzhaf-bek Vezirov (1854-1926); educated at Baku and Moscow. During his student days at Baku in 1873 he helped his teacher, Zardabi, to produce one of Akhundov's plays, thus contributing to the foundation of the Azerbaydzhani theatre. In the same year he wrote a comedy, THE FLESH IS FOR YOU AND THE BONES FOR ME, and followed it in 1875 with A PICTURE OF HOME EDUCATION. In these plays he sharply criticized the old-fashioned, patriarchal education.

During his stay at Moscow Vezirov became acquainted with Russian literature and drama and developed a great admiration for the plays of A.N. Ostrovskiy which exercised such influence on his works that he

was sometimes called "a Muslim Ostrovskiy". Altogether Vezirov wrote fifteen plays describing the life of Azerbaydzhani landowners and businessmen. Among the most famous of these are THERE IS BUT ONE NAME (1891), OUT OF THE FRYING-PAN INTO THE FIRE (1895) and the TRAGEDY OF FAKHREDDIN (1896). After the establishment of Soviet power in Azerbaydhan he wrote, in 1922, a play significantly entitled THE BEGINNING OF A NEW AGE. Vezirov was also a distinguished publicist and wrote for the first Azerbaydzhani newspaper, EKINCHI, and subsequently for other papers. He condemned the idea of "art for art's sake" and demanded modernization of Azerbaydzhani education.

Azerbaydzhani drama was further developed by Mamed Quli Zadeh (1869-1932), Akhverdov (1870-1933) and Suleyman Sani Akhundov (1875-1939). Poetry of the period was represented by Abbas Sihhat (1874-1918). It had a strong romantic trend common to the early years of the twentieth century, and some of the poems were "reactionary". This, however, was redeemed by the author's very fine translations of Krylov, Pushkin, Lermontov, Gorkiy and other Russian authors.

An important role in Azerbaydzhani life and literature was played by the paper MOLLA NASREDDIN, founded in 1906. Its editor, Mamed Quli Zadeh, was a distinguished playwright and the talented satirist Sabir (1862-1911) published his poems in it (see "the Journal MOLLA NASREDDIN . . .", CAR, No.1, 1960).

During the Bolshevik Revolution the "revolutionary propaganda literature" in Azerbaydhan was opposed by a literature which "expressed the ideology of the nationalist bourgeoisie". It used "reactionary romanticism" as a means of expression and was represented by Guseyn Dzhauid (Husain Javid), Akhmed Dzhauid (Ahmed Javid) and others.

Editorial comment

Two points stand out in the Soviet treatment of pre-Revolutionary Azerbaydzhani writers. The first is the appropriation as Azerbaydzhani of writers generally regarded as belonging to other countries. The outstanding example of this is the poet Nizami. He was born in Ganja (now Kirovabad) while it was inside the Persian Empire; the vast majority of his work was written in Persian; and he is regarded by the whole world outside the Soviet Union as a Persian poet. In 1947, the 800th anniversary of his birth as that of an Azerbaydzhani poet was celebrated with acclamation in the Azerbaydhan SSR. It was similarly celebrated in Persia, where the Soviet claim to Nizami is much resented. The case of Fuzuli is somewhat different. Although he was born in Azerbaydhan while it was part of the Persian Empire and spent his whole life in Baghdad, he wrote mainly in Turkish and is considered as a Turkish poet

by the Turks. He also has been claimed as an Azerbaydzhani poet and his 400th anniversary was celebrated in the Azerbaydzhan SSR in 1958. The appropriation of Fuzuli does not, however, seem to have created as much irritation in Turkey as that of Nizami in Persia. A less important group of appropriated writers is that of Shams Tabrizi, Marageli Akhvedi, and Mahmud Shabistari, all of whom, as their names clearly indicate, originated from what is still Persian Azerbaydzhan.

The second point of interest is the emphasis laid on the political role alleged to have been played by Mirza Fathali Akhund (Akhundov) and the consequent depreciation of his significance as an imaginative writer of unusually entertaining plays. Soviet writers try to read all sorts of ideological meanings into these plays, but the fact is that they have been produced in Persia and to some extent in India for several generations without any such meaning being read into them.

PART TWO

THE SOVIET PERIOD

Ideological regimentation - Prose - Poetry - Drama -
The ashugs - Editorial comment.

The main sources used are the GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA, LITERATURNYY AZERBAYDZHAN, No.3 of 1960, and various articles in the Azerbaydzhani Press. It has, however, proved difficult to construct a comprehensive or even comprehensible picture of Soviet Azerbaydzhani literature since these sources habitually mention authors without their books and books without their authors. Their chronological arrangement, moreover, leaves much to be desired and it is difficult to discover what subjects predominated at various times.

Ideological regimentation

"The victory of the Soviets in Azerbaydzhani opened unprecedented possibilities for the development of national culture. Soviet Azerbaydzhani literature, managed by the Bolshevik Party, flourished and grew stronger amidst the struggle against bourgeois nationalism, pan-Turkism and the reactionary theory of 'pure art' [art for art's sake]. It united the writers who in the Socialist Revolution saw the realization of the cherished dream of the Azerbaydzhani national masses and of the whole of progressive mankind."(21)

Lenin believed that "it is absolutely necessary to leave wide scope to individual initiative and inclination, to thought and imagination as regards both form and substance,"(22) This was apparently taken to mean that "socialist realists" should describe "typical heroes of the Revolution and the Civil War, the leading builders of socialism. . . enthusiasm of the toiling masses, the class struggle of the proletariat and peasantry against the fiercely resisting enemies of the Revolution and the struggle of the old with the new in all aspects of life."(23)

The reaction of the writers to the new requirements was far from uniform. Some "right from the beginning sang about the Soviet Government and thereby created many valuable works" - to this category belonged M.S. Ordubady, A. Akhverdiyev, J. Mamed Quli Zadeh, Dzhafar Dzhaharly, Tagi Shakhbazi (Simurg), S.S. Akhundov and others. There were also some who "did not immediately understand and accept the Socialist Revolution and in the early years of Soviet rule they pain-

fully and hesitatingly sought their place in literature" - such were the poets Akhmed Dzhavad, Guseyn Dzhavid (who had supported Azerbaydzhani nationalists during the Civil War) and G.K. Sanyli. In the middle 1920s they finally "understood" the literary policy of the Party. Finally, there were poets and prose writers who "could not and did not wish to reconcile themselves to the Soviet Government," such were Ali Mansur, Almas Yildyrym, Dzhabar Efendizade and other "anti-national" authors.(24)

To ensure supervision by the Party, the writers had to be organized into a literary union which "would direct the authors' work and inspire them to create works needed by the people". There was no such organization before the Revolution and the "poets' unions" which until the end of the 19th century existed at Baku, Shemakha and Shusha, could not now serve as a model since "they were not official organizations and their activities were limited to reading poems".(25)

On 10 August 1922 a number of authors with the playwright Guseyn Dzhavid at their head proposed in the newspaper KOMMUNIST that a union of the writers of Azerbaydzhani should be founded and "almost all" writers and journalists responded to this appeal. This enabled KOMMUNIST to call a conference of the authors, at which the union was founded and S.S. Akhundov elected its chairman. The union, however, proved a failure and all it did during its two years of existence was to collect material for the literary page of KOMMUNIST, which was published once a week under the heading "Life creates national literature". This page very well reflects the still unsettled ideological state of Azerbaydzhani literature since it contains ideologically sound poems as well as "pessimistic poems of bourgeois poets and articles of a pan-Turkic character, written by bourgeois authors".(26) For example, the No.186 literary page (supplement to KOMMUNIST) of 1923 carried an article by Mukhiddin which stated that since Azerbaydzhani had no original classical literature young people should study Turkish literature. As such things were published with the knowledge of the writers' union, the union itself could not be tolerated by the authorities.

In 1925 in Baku a new organization was set up - the Literary Society with B.A. Talybly as its president. Ideologically it was far from uniform: amongst its members there were social and political activists like Rukhulla Akhundov, Gabib Dzhabiyev and Mustafa Kuliyeu, Communist writers like Ordubady, Tapi Shakhbazi and Talybly, "democratic" writers like J. Mamed Quli Zadeh, S.S. Akhundov and A. Shaig and, finally, poets and prose writers who wrote "anti-patriotic" works - Ali Mansur, Ismail Hikmet and others.

At the same time a literary circle attached to KOMMUNIST was set up. Its members prepared literary pages ('Red Pen', 'Young Pen') for newspapers and journals, and organized literary talks for workers and students.

In June 1925 the resolution "On the policy of the Party concerning belles-lettres" was published and became the programme for all Soviet, including Azerbaydzhani, literature, in the second half of the 1920s and early 1930s. It condemned bourgeois notions that literature should be "non-political, neutral" and pointed out that literature of a class society must be one of the struggling proletariat and peasantry. At the same time literary critics were called upon to supervise its orthodoxy by inexorably opposing counter-revolutionary tendencies in literature; but they were also told to "handle very tactfully the writers who might still be able to join hands with the proletariat." (27) After the resolution, "the ideological struggle on the literary front grew even more intense in Azerbaydzhan." (28) It resulted in the final victory of the "proletarian" writers and in 1926 the Union of Red Pens was set up with the poet Suleyman Rustam as its secretary. Unlike the Literary Society, it was very active not only in Baku but also in the provinces and branches were founded in Kirovabad, Nakhichevan', Nukha and other towns.

This organization, however, must have proved unsatisfactory for in 1928 at a writers' congress the AzAPP (Association of Azerbaydzhani Proletarian Writers) was set up. Its task was to enforce the Central Committee's resolution of 1925 and the "ideological struggle on the literary front" reached its final stage. Suleyman Rustam addressed the "bourgeois aesthetes" thus: "Stop singing - your voice sounds like a requiem!" Vurgun wrote a poem in 1928 against the poets "detached from life and foreign to the people" in which he put forward a rhetorical question: "Hey, you, poets wandering in the clouds, what do you see in serving the boundless sky?" (29) Thus in the early 1930s the ways of the Soviet and "bourgeois" poets finally parted.

But the AzAPP committed blunders in its work and it refused membership to Mamed Quli Zadeh, A. Akhverdiyev, S.S. Akhundov and others who now founded a rival organization - the Association of Soviet Writers.

The split ended when on 23 April 1932 the All-Union Central Committee issued a decree "On the reconstruction of literary and art organizations", whose purpose was to unite all writers supporting the Government and thus obviate the danger of the smaller organizations becoming detached from current political problems. Socialist realism was put forward as the basis of Soviet art and literature. The result of

this was the foundation of the Union of Soviet Authors of Azerbaydzhani which has henceforward enjoyed the monopoly of literature in the republic. From now onwards the ideological soundness of literature was assured, although it was "negatively influenced by I.V. Stalin's personality cult".(30)

The Union, however, did not escape criticism. On 8 June 1937 PRAVDA published an article significantly entitled "Hostile Designs"; it denounced a number of Azerbaydzhani writers and attacked the leadership of the Union. The Union now held a three-day conference at which the writers hastened to admit that PRAVDA was right and to put all the blame on the leaders of the Union, whose secretary was the poet Vurgun. He and the chairman, Shamilov, tried to defend themselves but their speeches "failed to satisfy" the audience since they "did not have courage to disclose the disgraceful things which were taking place in the Writers' Union."(31) Together with Dzhavid and Dzhavad, whose counter-revolutionary past had not been forgotten, they were denounced for a complete lack of vigilance as a result of which "agents of Japanese and German Fascism, Trotskiyists, national deviationists, Musavatists, pan-Turkists and all sorts of counter-revolutionary elements have crept into the ranks of Azerbaydzhani writers."(32) A purge in the Union followed but Vurgun managed somehow to escape the fate of his colleagues. In 1956 he died a natural death.

The events of 1937 were not the end of Vurgun's troubles. In 1948 he was again denounced as the president of the Writers' Union. In August the Azerbaydzhani Central Committee issued a statement "On the state of Azerbaydzhani Soviet literature and measures to improve it", which severely criticized manifold failures on the part of the Union: its leadership had failed to draw the necessary conclusions from the statement of the All-Union Central Committee on ideological problems; it did not try to suppress vices flourishing in the Union, such as lack of criticism and self-criticism, "amicable relations" (i.e. personal cliques) and petty intrigues. The training of young writers was neglected, as well as the supervision of the Union's magazines, particularly EDEBIYYAT GAZETI, and Party and political education. Owing to these shortcomings Azerbaydzhani literature was in a sorry state: it lagged behind life and did not satisfy the demands of the people, the thoughts and heroic efforts of the "toilers" had not been adequately described in literary works which were "dim ideologically, lifeless artistically and notable for their fanciful subjects". There were two main reasons for this state of affairs: (a) the majority of the writers had lost touch with the people, almost never visited factories, kolkhoses etc. and their idea of the political and cultural standards of the people were sadly out of date; (b) the writers were

"politically and culturally backward" and had but a vague idea of socialist-realist methods. All this made their works "ideologically weak", which was particularly obvious in Abdul'gasan's novel THE WAR, in which he showed his ignorance of the fact that the high moral standards and fiery patriotism of the people had been instilled in them by the Party even before the Great Patriotic War. Also the critics were blamed for their lack of vigilance and inability to apply the Marxist-Leninist theory of art to literature and, what is worse, they "camouflage reactionary and historically narrow-minded ideas" of the writers. (33)

By 1958 the ideological situation had considerably improved and BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY of 5.12.58 expressed satisfaction that the Azerbaydzhani writers were doing their best to contribute to Soviet literature - "the most advanced in the world" - but their efforts were somewhat marred by the fact that "a tendency is observable in the work of some authors to depart from the important problems of the present day, which is contrary to the splendid traditions of Soviet literature."

Prose

In the Soviet period poetry has yielded its previous predominance in Azerbaydzhani literature to prose. The Azerbaydzhani novel and short story are mainly of Soviet origin - very little fiction having been produced in the Tsarist period. The first Soviet novel was A. Abdul'gasan's YOKHUSHLAR (The Heights) published in 1930. Azerbaydzhani literature of the 1930s could be divided, according to its subject matter, into two groups: (a) Novels and stories about the Civil War which are still regarded as valuable ideologically and artistically. The first of these was Ragimov's SHAMO, first published in 1931 and still worked upon by the author so that by now it has developed into a three-volume saga. It describes the struggle of the Azerbaydzhani "toilers" headed by the Baku Bolsheviks against the Musavatists and Turks. (b) Novels and stories by Mekhti Guseyn, Abdul'gasan, Mir Dzhahalal, S. Ragimov, Enver Mamedkanly and S. Rakhman, describing the new socialist village and the Soviet man struggling for the new way of life.

The range of subjects widened during the Second World War. The spiritual and political unity of the Soviet people, their patriotism and self-sacrifice for the sake of their country were exalted in a number of works (Ragimov's MEDALLION, Dzhahalal's MY CONTEMPORARIES, Abdul'gasan's WAR, Guseyn's CALL and others) describing the struggle against the fascists. In this connection it is interesting to notice that Abdul'gasan's WAR, denounced in 1948 for ideological errors, was praised in the following year by the SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA because it

"truthfully shows events during the Great Patriotic War. . . the firm Stalinist friendship of the Soviet peoples".(34)

The Persian Azerbaydzhanis have not been forgotten. Mirza Ibragimov has produced some novels and stories (THE DAY WILL COME and others) on the struggle of the Persians and southern Azerbaydzhanis against the "Persian reactionaries and their British and American masters".(35)

The "problems of the present day" continue to predominate in Azerbaydzhani fiction. Among the most highly praised books are APSHERON and THE BLACK ROCKS by Mekhti Guseyn and Ibragimov's CONFLUENCE OF WATERS. Guseyn's books describe the Azerbaydzhani oil-workers; the first of them clearly shows that their "struggle for oil is not a struggle for existence and for the satisfaction of personal needs or interests, as is typical of the working-class in capitalist countries, but a struggle for Communism". A strong point in its official favour is the fact that Guseyn "more than our other prose writers has profitably learnt from the best traditions of Russian realism. . ."(36) The hero of CONFLUENCE OF WATERS is Rustamov, chairman of a kolkhoz on the banks of the Kura, who made a neglected kolkhoz flourish, then came under the influence of evil men and finally found his way back to righteousness. The highlight of the novel is "the profound optimism and the infinite faith in the creative powers of the people, with which the author deals even with the most difficult moments in kolkhoz life."(37)

Although it is emphasized that Azerbaydzhani prose has made remarkable progress, there is still much room for improvement. "It is impossible to ignore the fact that some of our prose works, particularly those dealing with the village, often strongly resemble each other. Primitivism and schematism are still going strong in the construction of artistic works and in the representation of conflicts, which constitute their subject matter. The personalities of many heroes are stereotyped (sozdayutsya po printsipu lobovogo resheniya). Prolixity, superfluous details and long-drawn out descriptions are a real scourge of our works. Many authors forget the immortal principle of the classics - that conciseness is the sister of talent."(38)

Poetry

Soviet Azerbaydzhani poetry markedly differs from the pre-Soviet for "intimate lyricism, previously so important in the works of many poets, has. . . yielded to political lyricism [sic] inseparably connected with the great achievements of the people, Party and Government. . . Our poetry, however, is not confined to describing

socialist developments, but it also sings about the heroic past of the Azerbaydzhani people and their struggle during the Civil War. Many poems are devoted to international subjects: they unmask the anti-national policy of the imperialists in the East and encourage the people to resist foreign invaders."(39)

Struggle against imperialism and fascism occupies a very important place in the poetry of the 1930s and reached its apogee during the Second World War. At the same time the range of subjects and political outlook is widened to include the problem of the oppressed Azerbaydzhani in Persia. Some poems, by virtue of their subjects, had to be done with particular pietism - thus Rasul Rza worked many years on his hagiographic piece about Lenin while Ragim devoted thirteen years to writing one about Kirov (THE IMMORTAL HERO).

Before the Second World War poetry quickly improved - so it is claimed - in quality as well as quantity. After a period of stagnation in the 1920s, probably caused by difficulties of ideological adjustment, the 1930s witnessed a steady expansion of poetic output. Thus whereas in the 1920s only one collection of poems was published (ALAMDAN NASHAAYA by Rustam), in the 1930s Vurgun, Mushfik, Rza, Ragim, Saryvelli, Khalil, Natig, Rafibeyli and others published volumes of collected poems.

After the war more peaceful subjects returned to poetry - the Five-Year Plans and various aspects of the life of the hard-working Soviet man, the builder of Communism. One of the most profusely praised poems is Vurgun's KOMSOMOL POEM posthumously published by Saryvelli, but regarded as new owing to its recent publication. Among the other celebrated post-war poets there are, beside the older generation (Rustam, Rza, Saryvelli and Dzhamil), Balash Azer ogly, Vagabzade, Ali Tude and Nabi Babayev. BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY of 4.12.58 summed up the state of Azerbaydzhani poetry thus: "We cannot complain of the small amount of poems, but it must be emphasized that in the field of poetry we still act but feebly to suppress imitation, narrow-mindedness (ogranichennost') and repetition. . . In many cases the poet lowers himself to the level of the reader with a debased taste."

Drama

Drama is a relatively recent branch of Soviet Azerbaydzhani literature since M.F. Akhundov is regarded as its father. The founder of Azerbaydzhani Soviet drama was Dzhafar Dzhaharly (died 1934) who in 1918-20 sided with the "bourgeois nationalists" and after the consolidation of Soviet power in Azerbaydzhani promptly repented of this deviation. He wrote a number of propaganda plays: in AYDYN (1922) and

OKTAY EL'OGLY (1923) he attacked the parasitism and false morals of the capitalist world, in SEVIL' (1928) he demanded full emancipation of the Azerbaydzhani woman, while ALMAS (1930) and YASHAR (1932) were devoted respectively to the problem of setting up kolkhozes and their subsequent success.

Vurgun was a playwright as well as a poet. In VAGIF (1938), on the life of an 18th-century poet of that name, he described the struggle of the Azerbaydzhanis against Persia; KHANLAR (1938-9) glorified the revolutionary activities of Stalin in Baku in 1907.

G. Dzhavid found it difficult to conform to the requirements of Soviet dramaturgy. In 1922 he wrote THE PROPHET in which he represented Muhammad as a positive character; this was followed by TAMERLANE, which in 1926 was disapproved by the authorities since the famous despot was described there as a hero. Subsequently he admitted his "mistakes" and produced a number of propaganda plays: TELLI SAZ emphasizing the great changes which had taken place in Azerbaydzhani during the first ten years of Soviet rule; THE PRINCE celebrating the consolidation of Soviet power in Georgia, and others.

Dzhabarly's best traditions are being continued by Mirza Ibragimov. His KHAYAT, on the action of the political department of the MTS (machine and tractor station) has reaped much triumph in the Azerbaydzhani Dramatic Theatre. Another of his plays, MAKHABBAT, illustrates the self-sacrifices of the Azerbaydzhanis during the last war. Now he is working on MADRID, a play describing the struggle of the Spanish people against fascism. In 1953 he wrote the libretto of an opera, THE FREE GIRL, whose subject is the struggle of the southern Azerbaydzhanis against Persia and her "western masters".

The poet Suleyman Rustam is the author of some propaganda plays. The first was CHINAZ-KHANUM ASLEEP, played at the Satirical Agitation Theatre in the early period of Soviet rule in the republic. Rustam commemorated the tenth anniversary of Soviet government in Azerbaydzhani with a drama called BLOOD FOR BLOOD, on the struggle for Soviet power in Azerbaydzhani. Subsequently in collaboration with G. Nazarli he wrote a comedy, FIRE, which in the 1930s enjoyed much success in the Baku Workers' Theatre.

Comedy is regarded as one of the most efficient propaganda methods and the early Soviet period saw the hey-day of Party-inspired comedy in Azerbaydzhani. At that time S.S. Akhundov, A. Akhverdiyev, J. Mamed Quli Zadeh and M.S. Ordubady mass-produced comedies on burning problems of national life. But subsequently Azerbaydzhani playwrights turned their attention to more serious plays and comedy has lost much of its former importance.

In 1958 the state of Azerbaydzhani drama was found to be not entirely satisfactory: ". . . The basic weakness of the latest plays is the feeble and unconvincing representation of the positive hero who only too often is turned into a mouthpiece expressing the author's ideas. . . The playwrights too often impoverish the rich and complex spiritual make-up of the Soviet people. . . In the last years very few interesting heroes and conflicts have appeared in the plays of Azerbaydzhani authors. . . [The form of the plays] is only too often very primitive."(40)

The ashugs (bards)

Ashug poetry is said to have developed remarkably in the Soviet period. The ashugs can be broadly divided into two groups: those who compose the text and music of their songs and those who only perform them.

A number of ashugs started their work before the Revolution and continued it in the Soviet period - Chaban Afgan, Guseyn Bozalganly, Mirza Asad, Veli and Sheyda Aziz. Their poetry is very interesting since it reflects the ideas of the people on both the old way of life and the impact of the Soviet order on it. They cooperated with the Government and their poems describe in glowing terms the happy life of the Soviet people: "From the very first days of Soviet rule the ashugs, expressing the thoughts and feelings of the Azerbaydzhani people, in their new songs and dastan (a popular form of ashug poetry used mainly to describe important political and social events), sing of their love and gratitude for the Communist Party and the great Lenin."(41) Other popular subjects are denunciations of fascism and colonialism, praise of the peace-loving policy of the Party and exhortations to the people and the frontier guards to be vigilant; this rather sharply contrasts with the old ashug traditions when love was the basic theme.

The authorities believe that ashug poetry would be more satisfactory if it were centrally controlled. In the 1930s the Azerbaydzhani Writers' Union had a special ashug section and it is believed that it should be restored.(42) In 1928 and 1938 ashug conferences were held. Just before his death Vurgun drew up a plan of organizing the ashugs but it did not materialize. The question still remains open.

Editorial comment

During the Soviet period Azerbaydzhani literature has developed considerably in respect of output and the adoption of new literary forms such as that of the novel. The range of subjects has been greatly extended to include topics arising from the modernization and

sovietization of Azerbaydzhani life. The written language too has been to some extent purified and made more intelligible to the people; it has at the same time offered robust resistance to attempts to russianize it. Finally, consequent on the growth of literacy, improved printing facilities and low costs, literature has now penetrated to all social groups.

In spite of this development the general quality of literature remains mediocre. While the central control militates against the display of any originality, the authorities never cease to complain of the use of stereotyped characters in fiction, of the drab similarity of many works and of the tendency of some authors to neglect current problems. It is apparently not considered that it is the very fact of regimentation which induces and perpetuates most of these shortcomings.

Notes

- (1) IZ ISTORII LITERATUR SOVETSKOGO VOSTOKA. L. Klimovich. Moscow, 1959, p. 21
- (2) Ibid., pp.32-33
- (3) Ibid., pp. 7-8
- (4) GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA, 2nd ed., Vol.I, 1949, p.467
- (5) ISTORIYA AZERBAYDZHANA, Vol.I. Ed. I.A. Guseynov, A.S. Sumbatzade and others. Baku, 1958, p.170
- (6) Ibid., p.165
- (7) SOV. ENC., Vol.I, p.467
- (8) IST. AZERB., pp.168-9
- (9) Klimovich, p.48
- (10) IST. AZERB., p.168
- (11) SOV. ENC., Vol.I, p.468
- (12) IST. AZERB., p.254
- (13) SOV. ENC., Vol.I, p.468
- (14) Ibid., p.469
- (15) Ibid., Vol.III, p.571
- (16) Klimovich, pp.134-5
- (17) Ibid., p.131

- (18) Ibid., p.135
- (19) Ibid., pp.138-9
- (20) Ibid., p.299, note
- (21) SOV. ENC., 2nd ed., Vol.I, p.470
- (22) Lenin, SOCHINENIYA, 4th ed., Vol.X, p.28
- (23) SOV. ENC., Vol.XL, p.182
- (24) LIT. AZERB., No.3, 1960, pp.99-100
- (25) Ibid., p.100
- (26) Ibid.
- (27) SOV. ENC., Vol.XXX, p.280
- (28) LIT. AZERB., No.3, 1960, p.101
- (29) Ibid.
- (30) SOV. ENC., Vol.XL, p.182
- (31) BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 14.6.37
- (32) Ibid.
- (33) Ibid., 22. 8.48
- (34) SOV. ENC., Vol.I, p.471
- (35) Ibid., Vol.XVII, p.260
- (36) BR., 21. 4.59
- (37) Ibid., 30.11.58
- (38) Ibid., 8.12.58
- (39) LIT. AZERB., No.3, 1960, p.102
- (40) BR., 8.12.58
- (41) Ibid., No.11, 1959, p.100
- (42) Ibid., p.103

T H E K A Z A K H S A N D P U G A C H E V ' S R E V O L T

During the past 25 years the official Soviet views on the attitude of the Kazakhs towards their original incorporation in the Russian Empire have undergone a considerable change. During this period three histories of Kazakhstan have been published: OCHERKI PO ISTORII KAZAKHSKOY SSR (Outline of the History of the Kazakh SSR) by M. Vyatkin (Moscow 1941); ISTORIYA KAZAKHSKOY SSR (Alma-Ata 1943); and ISTORIYA KAZAKHSKOY SSR, VOL.I (Alma-Ata 1957). In addition there have been long articles on Kazakh history in the two editions of the GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA (Vol.30 of 1936, and Vol.23 of 1953), as well as articles on different episodes of Kazakh history in learned journals.

A clear statement of the official line in 1936 can be found in the first edition of the SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA where the notion that the Kazakhs voluntarily submitted to incorporation in the Russian Empire is described as "an obvious lie" (yavnaya lozh'). The historical editor of the First Edition of the GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA up to 1932 was M. Pokrovskiy, whose theory of the "absolute evil" of Tsarism was not finally discredited until 1937. In his History published in 1941, Vyatkin takes a somewhat indeterminate line: while discounting much of Pokrovskiy's theories, he continued to speak of "Tsarist colonialism" and spoke favourably of Kazakh resistance to it. Vyatkin's theories naturally communicated themselves to the 1943 History of the Kazakh SSR, in which he was a collaborator. In 1951, the theory of "the lesser evil" which had replaced Pokrovskiy's theory of the "absolute evil" was in its turn replaced by the theory developed by Professor Nechkina, who maintained that the Tsarist conquests and the incorporation of Central Asia in the Russian Empire were in fact a "positive good". One of the results of this change was that the 1943 History of the Kazakh SSR came under a heavy fire of criticism. A new History of the Kazakh SSR was ordered and when this eventually appeared in 1957 it was seen to differ from the 1943 history in a number of respects (see CAR, 1957, No.4, p. 353). In particular, the theory of the voluntary submission of the Kazakhs to Russian rule described as "an obvious lie" in 1936 and attributed to "Great Power chauvinists and Kazakh bourgeois nationalists" was now found to be historically correct and any suggestion of conquest, coercion or colonization was and still is strongly repudiated.

The so-called "Peasants' War" of Yemel'yan Pugachev (1773-5) has always been regarded by the Soviet regime as "progressive" in the sense

that it demonstrated the peasants' hostility to the Tsarist regime and to feudalism. That the Kazakhs were involved in the revolt has been universally recognized, but views on the extent of their involvement and the significance attached to it have varied with the passage of time. In the 1936 Encyclopaedia article, the participation of the Lesser Horde in Pugachev's Revolt is given as providing a refutation of the "voluntary submission" theory. In both the 1943 and the 1957 Histories, the Kazakhs' participation in the Revolt are given as the earliest manifestation of the understanding of the fact that their fate was inseparably joined with that of the Russian people. As will be seen later, the 1957 History tries to prove its point by showing that during the Revolt the Kazakhs confined their attacks to Russian posts and military personnel and left the peaceful peasants alone. Whatever the truth may be, it is plain that whereas in 1936 the official line, as given in the First Edition of the Encyclopaedia, was that the Kazakhs' participation in the Revolt proved their opposition to union with Russia, the later, and apparently the current, line is that it proved exactly the contrary.

Vyatkin, formerly accepted as the outstanding authority on Kazakh history, was evidently regarded as mainly responsible for the errors in the 1943 History since he was singled out for strong criticism (see CAR, 1955, No.4, pp.269-76), and did not collaborate in the 1957 History. One of the principal sources used by him in the chapter on the Pugachev Revolt in his OCHERKI PO ISTORII KAZAKHSKOY SSR (1941) is an article by A. Chuloshnikov entitled "The Kazakh-Kirgiz Nomadic Hordes and Pugachev's Rebellion 1773-1774" which appeared in NOVYY VOSTOK, No.25, 1929. This is a scholarly article well-documented from contemporary sources; it discusses the subject dispassionately and refrains from propaganda and the use of Marxist phraseology. It was not mentioned in the 1943 and 1957 Histories, but it seems likely that it is nearer to the facts than anything which has been written since. It is therefore of some interest to examine it in the light of the accounts given in the two Histories. Although the latter to some extent support their versions of the events with quotations from the original sources, comparison with those provided by Chuloshnikov reveals that they have been carefully chosen with a view to justifying the conclusion, identical in both Histories, that as early as 1773 the oppressed Kazakh masses associated their dreams of freedom and social justice with the struggle waged by the Russian workers against Tsarism and feudalism.

I. The Background - II. Chuloshnikov's Account - III. Current Line

I. The Background

In the 18th century, on the eve of the Pugachev Revolt, the Lesser Horde found itself fully exposed to Russian pressure. It occupied the steppes east of the Yaik (Ural) River; that is, the eastern part of the present West-Kazakhstan and Gur'yev oblasts as well as the Aktyubinsk oblasts. Its immediate neighbours were the Yaik Cossacks on the right bank of the river, who first settled there in the middle of the 16th century. Subsequently their numbers were swollen by escaped serfs, so that by 1762 there were 3,300 people in their central settlement, the Yaik cantonment.

The process of strengthening the Russian frontier in these regions coincided with a period when a crisis in the primitive cattle-breeding economy was just beginning to be felt. The development of the Ural and Siberian Fortified Lines limited the area where the nomads could roam with their flocks and herds. The Russian Government forbade them to wander beyond the Yaik, which was the more serious since grazing lands in the Aral steppes were poor and the nomadic habits of the Lesser Horde included wintering on the right bank of the Yaik. Leave to cross it was seldom granted and sometimes the Kazakhs wintered on the opposite bank without permission - thus in 1759 Prince Putyatin reported that "the Kirgiz-Kazakhs without warrant and defiantly. . . [have moved] not only with their cattle but even with their kibitkas from the steppe to the inner side of the River Yaik, and their animals have caused damage to the Cossack hay." (IST. KAZ., SSR, 1957, p.267.)

The Tsarist authorities regarded crossing the river without permission as an act of lawlessness and it was often followed by fights between the nomads and the Cossacks. In the 1770s such incidents became frequent and the complaints of the Kazakhs against the Cossacks were ignored by the authorities. The Kazakhs watched with misgiving the growth of Cossack and Russian settlements along the frontier since these threatened to deprive them ultimately of the use even of their own steppe land.

Since 1748 the Lesser Horde had been ruled by Nuraly, the first khan whose title was officially confirmed by the Russian Government. Sultan Batyr, however, did not acknowledge his overlordship and was elected khan by the Shekty clan. Thus the Lesser Horde was weakened by an internal split: its south-eastern territories on the lower Syr-Dar'ya constituted Batyr's khanate while Nuraly ruled over the north-western part, which was most directly threatened by the territorial expansion of Russia.

II. Chuloshnikov's Account

The following is Chuloshnikov's account of the part played by the Kazakhs in Pugachev's rebellion:

Pugachev's rebellion started in the Yaik region. On 16 September 1773 at the Tolkachevo farmstead, 100 km. south of Yaik fort, he formed a small armed band of Cossacks and peasants, to whom he declared himself as Tsar Peter III, who had in fact been murdered. Until March 1774 the movement continued to spread in the Yaik area adjoining the lands of the Lesser Horde.

As soon as the report of the alleged re-emergence of the legitimate sovereign, Peter Fedorovich, reached the Kazakhs, Nuraly hastened to establish contact with him. The Khan's clerk, Zabir, was sent to Pugachev's headquarters on the river Usikha; his task was to present the "Tsar" in his master's name with a sabre, a chakan (a small axe set in silver), a Bukhara silk khalat and a bay horse, and to find out how reliable the rumour of his royal rank was. But on 15 September, just before Zabir's arrival, Pugachev had left the place and not until the 18th did Zabir meet him on the way to the Chagan outpost and deliver the gifts. Although Zabir's mission was only to obtain the desired information, Pugachev saw in it an opportunity to rally the Kazakhs to his cause and despatched an ukase which declared: "I, Peter Fedorovich, am your most gracious sovereign as well as of all my other subjects. This is my message to the Kirgiz-Kazakh Khan Nuraly, in order to dispel doubts as to my status. Send to me immediately, as a pledge of loyalty, one of your sons, the sultan, with a hundred men and with the men who have delivered this letter (s poslannymi s sim) from my Majesty to Your Honour (stepenstvo)". (P.203.) Subsequently he demanded 200 armed men.

Nuraly, however, having received Zabir's report, preferred to adopt a "wait and see" policy. Although he did not send the armed men asked for, he did not wish to alienate Pugachev. At the same time he did not want to displease the Russian Government and on 24 September he wrote a letter to Reynsdorp, the Governor of Orenburg, which reflected his attitude to the usurper: "We steppe-folk did not know whether this man now riding abroad was a scoundrel or the Tsar himself; but since he styled himself tsar, I thought up a pretext to send a messenger to him. On his return he told me that he did not know what sort of man that one was and all that could be noticed was that his beard was yellow." (P.203.)

Nuraly's behaviour during these months was somewhat puzzling. On the one hand, he continued to maintain relations with Pugachev and

style him Tsar Peter Fedorovich, while on the other he pretended that he wished to cooperate with the Government. At his meeting in September with the commander of the Yaik fort, Colonel Simonov, and the commander of the loyal Cossacks, Borodin, he declared: "Seize the brigands if you and your men are able to do so, but if you are not strong enough, let me and my people make a raid and capture them. But I may not cross the Yaik without the Orenburg Governor's permission." (P.204.) This statement satisfied the Yaik authorities, who had feared that Nuraly's alliance with Pugachev would be followed by the devastation of the Astrakhan' guberniya by the Kazakhs; but as the rebellion had not yet become dangerous, the authorities had no intention of accepting the Khan's services.

Nuraly, however, must have had a scheme of his own which required that he should cross the river legally, for he followed up his failure with Simonov by sending a letter to Reynsdorp which was received at Orenburg on 24 September. In it he put forward the offer made to Simonov and the messenger added that the Khan was ready with 5,000 men to pursue the usurper - clearly, Nuraly did not wish to commit himself in writing. But Reynsdorp turned down the offer merely requiring that, should Pugachev appear in the territories of the Lesser Horde, the Khan should try to capture him and his men and surrender them to the authorities.

Nuraly showed his resentment of this second refusal by moving with his people to the far part of the steppe, while those Kazakhs who stayed on the Yaik began to harass the Russian frontier. During this period Pugachev reached the limit of his success and laid siege to Orenburg, the capital of the province. On 20 November he issued an ukase to the Kazakhs promising them all sorts of favours after the final victory including that "they would be clad from head to foot", granted land, water, pastures, arms, foodstuffs and copper. (P.208.)

Pugachev's success emboldened Nuraly. He now crossed the frozen Yaik and on 26 November appeared outside Kulagino fort, announcing that he was going to winter there. This, however, did not mean that the mass of the Kazakhs cooperated with the rebels, though they were eager to profit from the existing disorder. Chuloshnikov says (pp.208-9) that the participation of the nomads in the movement "expressed itself only in the general increase of their usual raids on the Russian frontier line, in taking captives and stealing cattle, but was nowhere manifested by open action side-by-side with Pugachev's troops. Even the most tempting promises liberally made by Pugachev's supporters, that the nomads would be given Cossack wives and children and that their Khan would become the chief authority and commander of all the fortresses between Orenburg and Astrakhan', could not induce them to take organized action against the Government forces. Thus even Sultan

Dusali, whose son with a small number of the Kazakh-Kirgiz subject to him was at Pugachev's camp, and who himself maintained continuous close relations with Pugachev, did not openly side with the rebels. . ."

At the end of November Dusali received Pugachev's ukase mentioned above and, although he informed his superior, Nuraly, of it, he tried to evade the "Tsar's" demand that 200 armed dzhigits (horsemen) should be immediately despatched to his camp. This attitude agreed with the Khan's desire to remain neutral in spite of the recent cooling of his relations with Orenburg. Thus he congratulated Pugachev upon his recent successes and expressed his readiness to help the rebels but at the same time he asked that Seid-Ali, Dusali's son, should return from Pugachev's camp to the Horde, for his absence made it impossible for the Kazakhs to reach a final decision. (P.209.) On his part, Dusali protested his joy that his son served his Tsar and begged Pugachev to let him postpone the ultimate decision until various doubts concerning the rebels' cause should be clarified. This policy allowed him to be counted amongst Pugachev's supporters and at the same time to avoid helping him should this become inadvisable.

The same policy was adopted by all the Kazakh sympathizers of Pugachev, whose followers harried the Russian border settlements throughout the winter, spring and summer of 1773-4. It is noteworthy that "this was done irrespective of the social status of the harassed Russian population. The gentry, merchants, clergy, Cossacks of all ranks as well as common soldiers, serfs and peasants working at the industrial establishments were indiscriminately dragged into captivity or slaughtered." (P.210.) Such raids, naturally, weakened the rebels also. The damage done by the Kazakhs, who in the winter of 1773-4 felt themselves the undisputed masters of the lands between the Yaik and the Volga, must have been considerable if Krechetnikov, the Governor of Astrakhan, could report that in three months 200 inhabitants of the Russian farmsteads in his area alone were captured, while in peacetime along the very long borderline between Gur'yev and the Zverinogolovskoye post the average number of captives varied between 34-175 a year. (P.211.) The Governor of Orenburg reported that between May and August 1774, 348 Russian men and 86 women, peaceful inhabitants as well as soldiers, were killed or captured along the Orenburg Line by the nomads. (Ibid.) The same, though on a smaller scale, was being done by the Middle Horde along the Siberian Line. Thus the practical value of the Kazakhs' sympathy for Pugachev was questionable since it provided them with a pretext to plunder and oppress the settlers.

The authorities, who in September 1773 had alienated Nuraly by refusing him permission to cross the Yaik, now saw the results of their policy and hastened to win him over to the side of the legitimate Empress. In October 1773 when their situation was steadily

deteriorating, Reynsdorp sent to the Khan and his brother Aychuvak a gift of 100 rubles each. In the following June, when the raids were at their worst and had penetrated as far as the Buzuluk fortress, the Governor at last decided to fulfil Nuraly's request of the previous September - that his subjects, captured by the Russians while stealing the settlers' cattle and taking captives, should be released and return to the Horde. The nomads, however, did not appreciate this friendly gesture and from the beginning of August their raids grew so daring that they even attacked Russian forts and captured the smaller detachments of armed soldiers and their officers. This action was probably inspired by Pugachev's Kazakh sympathizers and Nuraly, who stuck to his policy of neutrality, was rapidly losing control over the Horde and complained that "the Kirgiz [Kazakhs] do not obey me now and the reason is that rogue who calls himself Peter III". (P.213.)

On 24 August 1774 the rebel army was annihilated in a battle near the Sal'nikov factory, 100 km. south of Tsaritsyn (Stalingrad) and Pugachev flying in the direction of Yaik was captured. On 5 January 1775 he was executed at Moscow.

III. The Current Line

It is evident from Chuloshnikov's account above that, having carefully examined the sources, he came to the conclusion that in the light of the known facts the extent to which the Kazakhs can be said to have supported Pugachev is open to considerable doubt. The 1957 HISTORY OF THE KAZAKH SSR, however, constructs an entirely different picture of the events, and it is noteworthy that although it cites a number of facts and figures to support its version there are no references to the original sources, which makes the whole account look unconvincing, the more so because its very obvious object is to show that the phenomenon of Russo-Kazakh friendship has a long history behind it. Such a theory, in order to be acceptable, must be adequately documented if the reader is not to regard it with suspicion. Thus allegedly when in the early months of the rebellion Pugachev called upon Nuraly to join forces with him against the Government, the latter answered that he could not change his loyalty to Catherine, whereupon Pugachev directly addressed the Kazakh people in the ukase of November 1773 mentioned above. This brought the desired result: "The toilers of the Lesser and Middle Hordes gave help to the insurgent army. In the regions where they came into contact with Pugachev's troops exchange of goods was going on, for example salt was bartered for cattle. In a number of cases the Kazakhs without pay supplied the insurgent army with cattle." (P.274.) The nomads helped the rebels by attacking "almost exclusively" Tsarist troops and forts. In the summer of 1774 Nuraly

begged help from the Government "to suppress by force of arms the action of the Kazakh workers" (p.276); this phraseology creates the classic atmosphere of class struggle between the "toilers" and the reactionary feudal lords and their ally, the Tsarist Government. The only point on which it is possible to agree with the official interpretation of these events is that the Kazakh raids helped Pugachev in the sense that they diverted part of the Government troops from the rebel army, although the purpose of the raids was not quite the same as stated by the 1957 History. The attacks of the Kazakhs on the peaceful settlers amply prove that the nomads did not regard themselves as friends and allies of the Russian workers against the oppressive Tsarist Government. The official interpretation of the significance of the rebellion for the Kazakhs, however, ignores this inconvenient evidence which Chuloshnikov gathered from his sources and declares: "The participation of the Kazakhs in Pugachev's peasant war was the first common action of the Kazakh and Russian peoples against the despotic and serf-owning regime. Amidst this common struggle which was frequently spontaneous, the Russian and Kazakh peoples started their historic campaign against their common enemy - Russian Tsarism. In the course of this long and difficult struggle national hostility gradually vanished and a sense of the common historical destiny of the two nations germinated." (IST. KAZ., 1943, p.177.)

There is no dispute about the facts of the suppression of the rising. Nuraly asked the Russian Government to send punitive expeditions to the winter camps of the Lesser Horde and the offenders were severely punished. To remove all traces of the rebellion the name of the river Yaik was changed to Ural and that of the fort, Yaitskiy Gorodok, to Ural'sk. Nevertheless the Kazakhs did not believe that Pugachev was dead and the legend of Tsar Peter III's survival continued to linger on for many years.

Death of Turkmen Communist Party official

Dzhuma Durdy Karayev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Turkmen Communist Party since 1958, died on 4 May 1960. Born in 1910 of a poor peasant family, Karayev became a member of the Komsomol in 1926 and in 1939 of the Communist Party. He was also an agricultural specialist and in 1947 was appointed Minister of Agriculture.

T H E P E O P L E S O F
S O U T H E R N T U R K M E N I S T A N A N D K H O R A S A N
I N T H E 1 7 T H A N D 1 8 T H C E N T U R I E S

The following is a shortened version of an article entitled "The Ethnic Map of Southern Turkmenistan in the 17th and 18th Centuries" by Yu.E. Bregel in KRATKIYE SOOBShCHENIYA No. XXXI (1959) of the Institute of Ethnography in the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

The article, which is of great interest, is accompanied by two maps showing the ethnographic distribution in Southern Turkmenistan and Khorasan in the 17th and 18th centuries. These maps are schematic and their re-drawing in transliterated form presents certain technical difficulties. That relating to the 17th century has, however, been reproduced by photography with a transliterated key. In addition, an outline map showing the place-names mentioned in the abridged translation has also been included.

The main sources used by Bregel are given at the end of this article.

. . .

Introduction - Iranian population - Turkic population - The Arabs.

Introduction

The 16th-18th centuries were a period of far-reaching changes in the ethnic composition of the population of northern Khorasan (i.e. southern Turkmenistan). The result of these changes was that, whereas in the 17th century its settled population did not noticeably differ racially from the southerners, by the end of the 18th century the picture was completely reversed: the nomadic and semi-nomadic Turkmens now occupied not only the steppes but also the oases of northern Khorasan while the settled Iranian population rapidly

vanished from these areas. At the same time in southern Khorasan the Iranian race, represented by the Kurds and Jamshids, became dominant.

In the 17th century the population of the north already differed markedly from that of the south owing to the predominance of nomads in it. This difference speedily grew more pronounced since in the course of the 16th-18th centuries the decrease in the settled population in northern Khorasan which had begun earlier, was speeded up by the wars waged on these territories by Persia and the Khanates of Khiva and Bukhara. The result was that by the middle of the 18th century northern Khorasan had changed into modern southern Turkmenistan - the land of the Turkmens.

Iranian population

In the 17th century, as before, the settled population of Khorasan considerably differed from the nomads in race, its bulk being constituted by the Shii Persians. At the turn of the 16th-17th centuries the Iranian group in Khorasan was strengthened when Shah Abbas, in order to weaken the position of the large nomadic tribes and defend the country against Uzbek incursions, transplanted part of the Kurdish population of Mazanderan and western Persia to Khorasan. He created for them a number of Kurdish dependencies (vladeniya) along the southern slopes of the Kopet-Dag on the border between north and south Khorasan. Their centres were Kuchan (Khabushan), Bojnurd, Darreh Gaz with its chief town of Mohammadabad, and Kelat (Kabud Gonbad). Thus the Kurds populated all the Atek border (Atek was the name given to the area round the Kopet-Dag) from Astrabad to Kelat. Apart from these, in the 17th century many Khorasan towns had Kurdish garrisons. In the 18th century another large area of Kurdish habitation is recorded - Semelgan (now Shahabad), Maneh and the Aladagh Mountains. The majority of the Kurds lived a settled life in the towns and villages of Khorasan.

Among the nomad population Iranians constituted only a small minority, represented in the 16th-17th centuries mainly by the Jamshids of eastern Khorasan. They had been introduced into Badgis by Timur where they lived beside the Aymak tribes. They were also found in the Meruchak oasis on the Murgab and in the Serakhs region on the Tedzhen.

In the 18th century the present racial character of northern Khorasan was finally emerging and the Iranian population there was shrinking rapidly. In the late 1730s Nadir Shah restored Merv and, although he settled 3,000 families of Persian peasants there, he also brought there the Turkic Qajars, to be followed in 1746 by numerous, mainly Turkic, groups from Azerbaydzhan. Iranians thus became a minority at Merv. In Atek their position was similar and about that time

the Persians came to regard it not as part of Khorasan but a separate province. So long, however, as northern Khorasan belonged to Persia, the Iranian population survived to some extent in Atek and on the Murgab, only to disappear in the second half of the 18th century when the Turkmens finally colonized this territory.

In the 18th century the Kurds continued as a large part of the population of the region of Kuchan, Bojnurd, Kelat and Darreh Gaz; they were also numerous at Nishapur and Abiverd while Kurdish nomads played an important part in the Aladagh-Semelgan area.


In Nadir Shah's reign a large number of Iranian nomadic tribes appeared in Khorasan. Thus in 1729-30 Nadir settled in various parts of the country 12,000 Afshar families and 44,000 families from Fars, Persia and Azerbaydzhan; in 1737 he transferred 10,000 Khaftlang and Chekharlang tribesmen to Khorasan, to be followed in 1744 by 3,000 families of Qashqai from Fars who were settled at Merv. Some Afghans were brought to Khorasan in the same way: in the 1730s some 9,000 Abdali families from the region of Herat were transferred to Merverrud, Nishapur, Sabzavar and Damghan but, they soon returned home, their place in Khorasan being filled by the Gilzai from Kandahar captured by Nadir in 1738. All this transplantation of tribes into Khorasan had no permanent results since after Nadir's death they returned to their native regions. Thus in the middle of the 18th century, apart from the Kurds, only the so-called Aymaks - mainly of Jamshid origin - represented Persian nomads in Khorasan. The Aymaks of Serakhs, who had refused to acknowledge Nadir's supremacy, were in the late 1720s transferred to Kelat and Abiverd.

Turkic population

Although Iranians constituted the bulk of the town-dwellers, new ethnic elements were penetrating into the towns, particularly in northern Khorasan. After the death in 1524 of Shah Ismail of Persia, the towns of Atek passed under Khorezmian overlordship and towards the close of the century belonged for some time to Abdullah, khan of Bukhara, and his son Abdalmumin. This brought new settlers to these towns: Uzbek "feudal" lords, their officials and troops. The influx of the Uzbeks had some racial effect on the local population and marked a stage in its turkicization, the more so since some Uzbeks remained there after the conquest of northern Khorasan by the Safavids. In 1729 they lived, together with the Turkmen Goklans, to the south of the upper Gorgan. Their subsequent history is unknown.

Another Turkic group among the settled population of Khorasan was the Kyzylbash. The Safavids, engaged in wars against the Uzbek

ETHNIC MAP OF KHORASAN AND SOUTHERN TURKMENISTAN IN THE MIDDLE OF THE 17th CENTURY



TOWNS WITH MIXED POPULATION

- 1 (Astrabad) - Persians, Kurds, Jelair, Qajars
- 2 (Isfaraïn) - Persians, Kurds, Bayats
- 3 (Sabzavar) - Persians, Qajars
- 4 (Nishapur) - Persians, Bayats, Kurds
- 5 (Turshiz) - Persians, Qajars
- 6 (Durun) - Persians, Kurds, Afshars, Jelair, Uzbeks
- 7 (Nisa) - Persians, Afshars, Jelair, Uzbeks
- 8 (Bagabad) - Persians, Jelair, Uzbeks
- 9 (Abiverd) - Persians, Afshars, Kurds
- 10 (Merv) - Persians, Qajars, Uzbeks

5	10	15
1	6	11
2	7	12
3	8	13
4	9	14
16	20	24
17	21	25
18	22	26
19	23	27
28	29	30
31		

1. Karadashli
2. Nokhurli
3. Murchali
4. Ali-ili
5. Goklans
6. Imreli
7. Yomuts
8. Teke
9. Saryks
10. Ersari
11. Salors
12. Bayats
13. Afshars
14. Qajars
15. Gireyli
16. Jelair
17. Uzbeks
18. Tatars
19. Persians
20. Kurds
21. Aymaks (including Jamshide)
22. Arabs
23. Georgians
24. Sparsely settled and nomad land
25. Districts with mixed populations

26. Tribes and peoples of adjoining territories
27. Kalmuk invasion of Khorasan
28. Abul-Ghazi's expeditions against the Turkmens
29. Turkmen nomad routes
30. Names of regions
31. Main roads and caravan routes

khanates of Central Asia, put Turkic garrisons first in the towns of southern and later, in the 17th century, of northern Khorasan. In addition, the administration was largely in the hands of Kyzylbash officials. Garrisons derived from various Kyzylbash tribes were found in many towns and a particularly large one, made up by the Qajars, held Merv. At the beginning of the 18th century, apart from Merv and environs, the Qajars were found at Chaacha, Mekhne, Turshiz, Sabzavar and the Astrabad province. As they were hostile to Persia, Nadir Shah had them removed from Merv (where they soon returned, in 1736) and after their uprising at Astrabad in 1744 they were deported to Nishapur whence they did not return until Nadir's death in 1747.

In the towns of southern, and to a smaller extent northern, Khorasan resided large military and civilian groups derived from other Kyzylbash tribes, the Bayats and Afshars. At the turn of the 16th-17th centuries the Bayats are recorded as the permanent inhabitants of Nishapur and district while the Afshars garrisoned Abiverd. The Bayat position at Nishapur was strengthened when Nadir transferred there, in 1732-3, 2,000 Bayat families from Kerkuk in Persia. They also lived round Mashhad. The Afshars in Nadir's reign lived in towns and strongholds; thus Bagvade, probably at the site of modern Ashkhabad, was inhabited by a clan or a branch of the Afshar Kunduzlu. The Afshars enjoyed much prestige in Nadir's reign since the Shah himself was descended from them and relied on their support. At the beginning of the 18th century the main area of their settlement was in Abiverd with the adjoining part of Dərreh Gaz. Apart from this, they lived in large numbers in the Andkhui-Akhcha region of Afghanistan and also at Kelat, Nisa, Durun, Kurgan, and in the stronghold of Bagvade. Nadir took steps to settle all the Afshars in Khorasan, but after his death they lost no time in returning to their original homes, except those of Andkhui who seem to have remained in Khorasan.

Another Turkic-speaking group was the Mongol tribe of Jelair scattered all over Khorasan. At the turn of the 16th-17th centuries they lived near Merv and in Atek round Nisa, Durun and Bagabad. The Astrabad region was one of the main areas of their settlement where they were already found in the 15th century. At the beginning of the 18th century they lived in large numbers also in the districts of Shibirghan and Akhcha in Afghan Turkestan, and round Astrabad where they constituted a compact mass of the population. In Afghanistan they maintained close relations with the Afshars and probably from there both groups were moved to Kelat where they survived almost until the beginning of the 20th century.

A Tatar tribe lived in the district of Merv. It was probably descended from the Mongol tribe of Kara-Tatar which at the end of the 14th century had been transferred by Timur to Transoxania from south-

west (Perednaya) Asia. Subsequently they moved to the Merv oasis where they stayed until its ravage by Nadir. They did not reappear after Merv had been restored in 1736.

In west Khorasan, near Kalpush, Khadz hilar and possibly Isfarain lived the Turkic tribe of Gireyli (Kerali). In the 18th century they remained in those regions.

Apart from the Uzbeks and the Kyzylbash tribes, some Turkmens were found among the settled population of Khorasan: the tribes of Karadashli, Nokhurli and in part the Goklans. But the bulk of the Turkmens were nomads or semi-nomads. They constituted the majority of Khorasan's nomadic population and in the 16th century they began to move eastwards along the Kopet-Dag.

Although in southern Khorasan the nomads constituted a smaller proportion of the population than in the northern, their ethnic composition was much more varied and Turkmen tribes, except in the Gorgan area, were in the minority, while they constituted the majority in the north.


In the 17th century the Turkmens were distributed over Khorasan as follows:

In the region of Dzhurdzhan, on the lower reaches of the Gorgan and Atek, lived a group of tribes called Yaka (i.e. coastal or border), or Sainkhani Turkmens. It included the tribes of Okhlu, Goklan, Imreli (Eymyur) and partly the Khorasani Salors. In the second quarter of the 17th century these tribes, having been repeatedly defeated by the Persians, moved eastwards from Astrabad, while the Imreli went to Atek and settled in the district of Koch. In the middle of the century the Goklans, pressed by the Safavid army, followed them to the east. The Salors after 1628 moved into Khorezm while the Okhlu disappeared from the records for some time. The old lands of the Imreli and Goklans were in the middle of the century occupied by the Yomuts arriving from the north.

The Ali-Ili, the first Turkmen tribe to move eastwards along the Kopet-Dag, by the middle of the 17th century had penetrated farther than the others. At the beginning of the century they lived in the Sumbar valley and the Khodzha-Kala district from where they were subsequently dislodged by a Kalmyk invasion.

The Ersari, who in the 16th century lived in the Balkhan Mountains and Mangyshlak, in the 1630s were finally driven out by the Kalmyks and moved to Atek, particularly the district of Mekhin.

**KHORASAN
AND SOUTHERN TURKMENISTAN
IN THE 17th-18th CENTURIES**



The Saryks in the middle of the 17th century lived in the Balkhans. Here the Teke also stayed for a time, but in the course of the century part of them penetrated into Atek and by the beginning of the 18th century they were already found round Nisa and Durun.

These Turkmen migrations were caused by the wars waged against them by Abul Ghazi, Khan of Khiva, and his son Anusha in the 1640s-50s. In that period the Turkmens fleeing from Khiva began a large-scale colonization of the banks of the Amu-Dar'ya and subsequently the lands on the Murgab including the oasis of Merv. In 1645 the Turkmens living in Khorezm round Khazarasp were defeated and a large part of them migrated towards the Tedzhen and hence, after another defeat, to the region of Bami-Beurma. As the Salors and part of the Ali-Ili and Ersari lived in Khorezm before Abul Ghazi's accession, it seems that it was against them that he waged his wars and pursued them to the Tedzhen. Thus in the middle of the 17th century the Salors and Ersari started their migration up the Amu-Dar'ya and by the middle of the 18th century they were found in the region of Chardzhuy (modern Chardzhou).

The movements of the Ali-Ili are less known and it seems that in the course of the 17th century they left Merv and moved up along the Murgab to settle round Meruchak.

The Turkmens who before Abul Ghazi's attack on Beurma had migrated to there from Balkh were probably the Afshars(1) who at the beginning of the 18th century lived in large numbers in the region of Andkhui. Another large part of the Afshars, belonging to the Karaklu clan, occupied the lands between Kubegan and Darreh Gaz where they had settled at the beginning of the 16th century.

In the first half of the 18th century the Turkmens of northern Khorasan were constantly in motion as a result of their struggle against Nadir. These wars resulted in a changed balance of power among the Turkmen tribes: while the Imreli and Ali-Ili were considerably weakened, the Teke and Yomuts grew stronger. In the 1720s the last two lived round Nisa and Durun and lands to the west of them. From there they slowly moved to the south-east and in 1731 appeared near Abiverd, only to be repulsed by Nadir. After the capture of Khiva by him, the Teke living there were transferred to Khorasan.

The Yomuts were the strongest tribe in the middle of the 18th century. The beginning of the century found them in the lands between

(1) There seem to have been two Afshar tribes: one Turkmen and the other Kyzylbash.

the lower course of the Gorgan and the Great Balkhans; together with the Teke they were penetrating into Durun. In Nadir's reign the Yomuts of Khorezm used to appear in Khorasan only to be driven back.

The Goklans continued to live on the upper Gorgan, between the Gorgan and the Atrek. Those of them who lived together with the Gireyli in the district of Karabag, were in 1729 driven by Nadir towards the Sumbar River and established themselves round Kara-Kala and Yuvan-Kala from where they dislodged the Ali-Ili and Karadashly.

In Atek only the settled Turkmen tribes survived - the Karadashly west of Durun and the Nokhurli.

The Imreli at the beginning of the 18th century were found all over Atek, between Durun and Abiverd; in the middle of the century they were mainly centred round Bami, Durun and Mekhin. To the east of them lived the Ali-Ili, between Durun and Bagabad. Another large Ali-Ili group was found far to the south-east, round Meruchak.

The Ersari at the beginning of the 18th century lived on the left bank of the Amu-Dar'ya, round Chardzhuy, from where they raided the oasis of Merv. When Nadir invaded Bukhara in 1740, they escaped to the north but soon returned and in the middle of the century stayed round Kerki from where they penetrated to Maimana in northern Afghanistan.

The Saryk used to live with the Ersari round Chardzhuy. In the 1720s together with the Teke and Yomuts they harassed Durun and Mekhin.

The Arabs

The third ethnic group of old Khorasan was that of the Arabs. They appear to have lived near Merv "since ancient times", but their presence there was not recorded until the first half of the 18th century. Possibly they were descended from the Arabs who in Timur's reign had come from Mesopotamia. In the 1720s Nadir transferred them to Abiverd and their subsequent fate is unknown.

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Week of Uzbek literature in Azerbaydzhan

A "week of Uzbek literature" opened in Baku on 5 May. Among the guests were several eminent Uzbek writers including Gamud Gulyam, Gafur Gulyam, Kyamil' Yashen and M. Sheykhzade. BR. 5.5.60

Centenary of Kirgiz bard

The one-hundredth anniversary of the birth of Togolok Moldo, famous Kirgiz akyn (bard) and writer, was celebrated throughout the republic in June 1960. OGONEK, 23.6.60

Lenin prize for Tadzhik writer

Mirza Turzun-zade, celebrated Tadzhik writer, has been awarded the Lenin prize for literature. KT. 28.4.60

L A B O U R A N D L I V I N G C O N D I T I O N S
I N K A Z A K H S T A N

During the last four months of 1959 it became evident that the Kazakh SSR was confronted with serious difficulties. Although mainly economic by nature, they throw considerable light on some political and social problems which are still awaiting solution. In the last resort the authorities, from the Kazakh Central Committee and the Council of Ministers down to the oblast Party and executive committees, were blamed for all that had gone wrong.

Shortcomings in agriculture were widely discussed in the press after Khrushchev's denunciations at the December Plenum, but industrial difficulties - as expressed by the Temir-Tau disturbances - have passed almost unnoticed by the official papers, and the fact that something has happened there can only be deduced from indirect newspaper references to Temir-Tau and their frequency in the critical month of October 1959.

Temir-Tau

At the end of October 1959 and again in March-April 1960 the Western press reported that large-scale riots, caused by extremely bad living conditions, had taken place at Temir-Tau on 3-5 October 1959. The news was said to have been brought by Western Europeans lately repatriated from Kazakhstan.

Temir-Tau, near the oblast town of Karaganda, originated as a settlement called Samarkandskiy. In 1942 construction of a metallurgical plant started there. In 1945 Samarkandskiy became the town of Temir-Tau and its steady growth dates from then. In 1952 another metallurgical plant, the building of the so-called Kazakhstan Magnitka was begun and is still going on. In 1956 the town had, apart from a number of industrial establishments, fifteen secondary schools, a technical college, three tekhnikums, three factory schools (FZO), the Pioneers' home, three clubs and a palace of culture. In 1959 the population had reached 55,000.

Briefly, the story of the disturbances which has reached the West

is this: three thousand young workers employed at building the Magnitka and housed in a tented camp in Vostok, a suburb of Temir-Tau, were dissatisfied with their difficult living and working conditions and low pay. On Saturday night, 3 October, about fifty of them set their communal dining hall on fire and proceeded to plunder a shopping area situated about a mile from the camp. They were joined by other youths from the camp, some fifteen hundred altogether, and the local militia was overpowered. One report says that its chief was hanged and his deputy with his men driven out of town. Throughout the night looting went on, some of the local population joining in; also the plant offices were wrecked. Meanwhile it was announced that troops were on their way to Temir-Tau, whereupon the rioters set an ambush and disarmed three truckloads of soldiers.

On Sunday morning the youths occupied the main department store and turned it into their headquarters. During the night troop reinforcements arrived and the part of the town where the rioters were gathered was cordoned off.

On Monday morning some of the youths tried to get away in three lorries, which were driven into a group of soldiers barring their way and some of the soldiers were killed or injured. Ninety-one people are said to have been killed and hundreds injured by Monday afternoon. At that time the troops were replaced with "People's Guards" (civilians helping the militia to maintain public order); they failed, however, to induce the rioters to give themselves up. In the evening the troops took their place; the youths were quickly dispersed and some of them set the camp on fire. The troops stayed in town until 8 October. (GUARDIAN, 4.4.60.)

There has at no time been any admission in the Soviet press of the occurrence of any such incidents as those just described, but that the situation in this area was and still is unsatisfactory seems confirmed by the following:

From 10 October 1959 until early November KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA whether deliberately or by coincidence, paid much attention to Temir-Tau, Karaganda and Kazakhstan's Magnitka. These references do not mention any disturbances but either discuss the unsatisfactory state of affairs at the Magnitka - delays in its construction - or the fact that living conditions in the oblast should be improved, while one issue, that of 23 October, devotes a whole page to the more cheerful aspects of building the Magnitka.

KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA of 10 October brings a "letter from Karaganda" called "Living Conditions (byt) - It Is Not a Trifle". It emphasizes the fact that the Government has allotted over 4 milliard

rubles for house building in the oblast during the current Seven-Year Plan and over a milliard for the construction of buildings for cultural and utilitarian purposes. It is, however, admitted that the housing situation in the oblast towns including Temir-Tau is very bad. Also the availability of groceries, cooked meals and consumer goods leaves much to be desired.

On 23 October the same paper published a number of short articles, distinguished by their "human appeal", on the life, work and high sense of duty of the worthy young people who build the Magnitka. The best example of these is what is described as a genuine letter written to her mother by a Ukrainian komsomol girl who, together with her brother and sister, tremendously enjoys building the Magnitka. She says, "there are now here multi-storied houses, palaces of culture, schools, clubs and hospitals - not worse than in Kiev. . . From all parts of the country people have come to build the Magnitka. They are friendly and hard-working and do not fear difficulties. And difficulties there are many - it is not easy to build such a plant in a bare steppe. . . I, Valyusha and Anatoliy [sister and brother] have found our place in life. . . We do not float in the clouds: all our dreams are real and have come true - after all, we live in a country where all doors are open to the young. And Kazakhstan's Magnitka has become our own home." Editorial comment adds that "thousands of young patriots whose flaming hearts have brought them here to build the plant" live like the author of the letter.

At the same time the authorities were clearly concerned about the situation at the Magnitka. On 21 October at the 9th Plenum of the Karaganda obkom no less a person than N.I. Belyayev*, the first secretary of the Kazakh Central Committee, spoke about the progress of the plant (his actual words are not reported), and administrative changes were made: M.S. Solomentsev became the first secretary and member of the bureau of the obkom and A.A. Askarov was appointed secretary and member of the obkom bureau. B.F. Bratchenko, chairman of the Karaganda Economic Rayon Sovnarkhoz, became member of the obkom bureau.

* Belyayev was relieved of his duties as first secretary of the Kazakh CP in January (P.21.1.60), and elected first secretary of the Stavropol' Kraykom (P.29.1.60). Since then he has been progressively demoted:

Relieved of his duties as member of the Central Committee of the Party Praesidium. (P.5.5.60.)

Relieved of his duties as first secretary of the Stavropol' Kraykom. (P.26.6.60.)

On 23-24 October the 16th Plenum of the Kazakh Central Committee was held and Belyayev again spoke on "the situation at the Karaganda metallurgical plant" (i.e. the Magnitka - KP.23.10.59). The Plenum admitted that construction was too slow and that the Karaganda obkom and sovnarkhoz had failed to create satisfactory living conditions for the builders. (KP.28.10.59.)

At the same time the Temir-Tau gorkom of the Party seems to have remained indifferent to the bad situation in the town, and ignored criticism offered by the press. When the gorkom's secretary, Gordov, was criticized at the meeting of the Magnitka building partkom for his ignorance of the local press comments, he declared: "If one were to take notice of all the critical statements made in the papers, a second Party gorkom would have to be created at Temir-Tau - and even without this we have enough to do." This view was shared by the first secretary of the gorkom, Katkov. (KP.4.11.59.) Nevertheless, whether as a result of press criticism or not the food trade position in the town was improved by the opening there, early in November, of the largest grocery shop in the oblast. (KP.11.11.59.)

The fact that there had been trouble at Temir-Tau was officially, though vaguely, admitted only at the republican Party congress in March 1960. On 10 March Kunayev, the first secretary of the Kazakh Central Committee, said: "We must draw the inevitable conclusions from the interruptions (sryvy) which took place in the building of the Karaganda metallurgical plant last year. They were caused by the indifference of the building management to the living conditions of the workers and by the neglect of this important construction by the Karaganda sovnarkhoz, the oblast committee of the Party, the obispolkom, the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan." (KP.11.3.60.)

Agricultural difficulties

Kazakh agriculture has developed rapidly since Khrushchev put forward in 1954 his celebrated plan of reclaiming virgin lands. The scheme was said to have been so successful that the republic won the second place in the Union, after the RSFSR, in grain production and even this is far below Kazakhstan's potential yield.

The harvest of 1959 proved to be a set-back to Kazakhstan's agriculture. The republic underfulfilled by 94,000,000 puds* the grain quota to be supplied to the State. The worst offenders were the three

* 1 pud = 35.27 pounds

northernmost oblasts: on 1 November 644,000 ha. of grain crops were still not harvested in the Kustanay, 274,000 in the Kokchetav and 130,000 in the North-Kazakhstan oblasts. (KP.22.1.60.) These crops were lost under the snow. The same happened to 600,000 ha. in the western and southern oblasts. (KP.25.12.59.)

This was the situation when the Plenum of the Central Committee opened in Moscow on 22 December. In a speech on the agricultural situation in Kazakhstan Belyayev was unwilling to dwell upon the failure of the harvest, although he admitted that the grain quotas had not been fulfilled, and he laid the blame mainly upon the weather. He tried, however, to divert the audience's attention with general figures illustrating the beneficial effect of the reclamation of virgin lands, the cultivation of maize and the very good progress of Kazakh cattle-breeding. (P.23.12.59.) D.A. Kunayev, chairman of the Kazakh Council of Ministers, was more outspoken on the subject of the unfulfilled quotas but, like his predecessor, ascribed it principally to "unfavourable weather conditions" and, to a smaller extent, to the inefficient organization on the part of the local authorities. (P.25.12.59.) But Khrushchev, both as the first secretary and as the father of the virgin lands, was not satisfied and in his speech on 25 December he attacked the two dignitaries:

"Comrade N.I. Belyayev has given a lecture here and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh Republic, D.A. Kunayev, has taken part in the debates. But these comrades did not have enough courage to speak about the shortcomings as Party men should do. This is why, comrade leaders of Kazakhstan, I want now to discuss what you preferred to keep quiet about. . . By 1 November 1,618,000 ha. of grain crops had not been harvested. I know that the Kazakhs try to explain in their own peculiar manner and say, 'some of the grain had gone under the first snow and afterwards we went on harvesting.' But what sort of work it was? You know how geese, particularly goslings, nip grass: a gosling gets hold of a blade of grass, pulls and falls on its backside. A cow would not eat grass a goose has passed over. (Laughter in the hall.) Everybody knows this. And this is just how in Kazakhstan they gathered the crops covered with snow. . . If we here, at the Plenum, do not tell you the truth, Comrades Belyayev and Kunayev, in Kazakhstan they certainly will not tell you about this - indeed, they will applaud you. And you will emphasize that at the Plenum everything has gone all right, while in fact the situation is bad - very bad.

"The heads of the Kazakh SSR say that some crops were not gathered for they did not ripen. Dear Comrade Belyayev, why did they not? I will tell you why they did not ripen: 18,000 of your tractors stood idle during the spring sowing for they had not been repaired. What

does this mean, comrades? This means that the kolkhozes and sovkhoses delayed sowing and when the time came to prepare for harvest, sowing was just being finished in Kazakhstan. So why blame the Lord God and say that the crops did not ripen? . . . The same inefficiency had place in the preparation and conduct of harvesting. . ." (P.29.12.59.)

Khrushchev's attack caused the Kazakh authorities to search their conscience for the real reason for the unsatisfactory state of agriculture and it was revealed that it was more complicated than a mere neglect of machinery for it was ultimately due to the indifference of the authorities to the living and working conditions of the skilled agricultural workers. The machinery had not been repaired because, on the one hand, the training of tractor and combine drivers and other technical workers (mekhanizatorskiye kadry) had been disregarded by those responsible for it and, on the other, these specialists kept abandoning agriculture en masse owing to very hard living conditions in the kolkhozes and sovkhoses. Thus in 1958, 94,300 such workers left agriculture and 46,600 in 1959. (KP.22.1.60.) This has been going on for some years; the big virgin land sovkhos, Zheleznodorozhnyy, in the Kustanay oblast, may be quoted as an example: in 1956 it lost 52.7 per cent of those who had come there to work permanently, in 1957 - 73.2 per cent, in 1958 - 65 per cent. Between 1955-8, 76.3 per cent of the mekhanizatory who during those years had come to work in the kolkhozes and sovkhoses of the oblast, left their jobs. (VOPROSY EKONOMIKI, No.4, 1960, p.138.) It should be noted that the harvest was most disappointing in the Kustanay oblast.

Thus there were not enough agricultural machines because there was an acute shortage of people to drive and repair them. This affected not only the sowing but also harvesting: 32,000 combines, 21,000 pickers and 11,000 harvesters stood idle awaiting repair while the onset of the winter destroyed the crops. (P.29.12.59.) A minor reason for the failure of the harvest was ascribed to the shortage of good quality seeds for sowing, particularly in the three northern oblasts where the harvest was most disappointing.

It seems clear that although the weather and bad organization may have been contributory causes of the failure of the 1959 harvest, the main underlying cause of the highly unsatisfactory state of the agriculture as well as of the industry of Kazakhstan has been inattention to the living conditions of the workers. Judging from the areas involved, it may be assumed that the trouble has been among the non-Kazakh settler population. This may perhaps account for the appointment of a Kazakh, Kunayev, to replace Belyayev and the appointment of a Kazakh, A.A. Arstanbekov, for the first time to the important post of Chairman of the Committee of State Security.

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Reorganization of economic administration in Uzbekistan

The economic administrative rayons of Tashkent, Fergana, Samarkand, Bukhara and Kara-Kalpakia have been merged into one economic administrative rayon. The separate Councils of National Economy have been abolished and a single council formed for the whole of Uzbekistan. (See CAR, 1957, No.3, p.335, and No.4, pp.391-2.)

PV. 2.7.60

Electrification of rural Turkmenistan

The electrification of Turkmenistan's rural areas is to be completed this year. Every collective and state farm is to be provided with its own cinema and 244 projectors are to be installed during the next three years.

SU. No.123, 1960

T H R E E L E N I N G R A D O R I E N T A L I S T S

The fortieth anniversary of the Revolution in 1957 was celebrated by the Leningrad Department of the Soviet Academy Institute of Oriental Studies and the Oriental Faculty of Leningrad University with a joint "jubilee" conference. The anniversary provided the orientalists with an occasion to recapitulate the achievements of Soviet oriental studies, with special reference to Leningrad, in the last forty years. The lectures given at the conference have now been published in *UCHENYYE ZAPISKI INSTITUTA VOSTOKOVEDENIYA*, Vol. XXV, 1960.

The greatest Leningrad scholars concerned with Central Asia were Bartol'd, Yakubovskiy and P.P. Ivanov. All three had established their reputations as scholars before Marxist-Leninist methodology was applied to oriental studies so rigidly as it is today. They were therefore able to pursue their own particular interests which lay in the pre-Soviet period.

Bartol'd

It is doubtful whether Bartol'd (1869-1930) can properly be described as a Soviet scholar. He was educated and wrote the majority of his internationally known works before the Revolution; what is more important, "being a representative of bourgeois science in his outlook, even in the Soviet period Bartol'd was unable to understand the role and importance of social classes and class struggle. This is why he could not achieve a full understanding of the economic, political, philosophical and religious problems in the history of the eastern peoples. He proceeded from a false premise, that eminent personalities are the moving force of history since it is they, and not the people, who make history."(1) It is admitted that "his works written after the Great October Socialist Revolution show no trace of essential change of ideas when compared with those he wrote before the Revolution."(2)

The above two opinions were expressed in 1950 and 1954 respectively. At the "jubilee" conference, however, an attempt was made to rehabilitate Bartol'd, at least partially. It was revealed that Bartol'd had always been conscious of the principle of class struggle in history. Romodin declared that, although Bartol'd was not a Marxist and never had a clear conception of the role of productive forces and

relationships in history, it was wrong to believe that history was to him a mere chaotic patchwork of events. [This view is expressed in the GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA, 2nd edn., Vol.IV, p.274.] In his researches he paid attention to class (soslovnaya) struggle and even at the early stage of his career he believed that "in the East, as in the West, large-scale movements were caused by the interests of a large number of people; both in Asia and in Europe the same laws of historical evolution are at work." (The quotation comes from Bartol'd's article published in ZAPISKI VOSTOCHNOGO OTDELA RUSSKOGO ARKHEOLOGICHESKOGO OBSHCHESTVA, Vol.XI, 1899.) Thus Romodin seems to ascribe the misunderstanding of Bartol'd by his Marxist critics largely to a difference in nomenclature (soslovnaya versus klassovaya bor'ba). (3)

Romodina was seconded by another speaker at the conference, I.P. Petrushevskiy, who said that Bartol'd's last works showed clearly a Marxist trend. For example, in an article on the relationship between social and economic factors in the life of the Turks and Mongols, published in IZVESTIYA OBSHCHESTVA ARKHEOLOGII, ISTORII I ETNOGRAFII PRI KAZANSKOM GOS. UNIVERSITETE, Vol.XXXIV, Series 3-4, 1929, he wrote: "Even in the conditions of nomadic life there is no way to create a strong government without an aggravation of class struggle." About the same time, so it was said, under the influence of the Marxist conception of feudalism as a social formation, Bartol'd came to recognize the social structure of medieval Persia as feudal. (4)

Bartol'd was descended from a well-to-do German family and his original name was Wilhelm; subsequently he substituted for this Vasilii Vladimirovich. He regarded Russian as his native language and his knowledge of German, at least at the early stage of his career, was not beyond reproach.

During his student days at St. Petersburg University, at the Faculty of Oriental Languages, Central Asia became his main interest and this was to dominate his whole career. In his "Autobiography" he wrote: "It seemed perfectly natural to me that a Russian oriental historian should be attracted to a region which geographically and historically is nearer to Russia than the other eastern countries, and where he has at his disposal sources which are much more inaccessible to western European research workers." (5)

He graduated in 1891, in 1896 began to lecture at his university and in 1901 became professor. In 1912 he was elected member of the Russian Academy, a post which he retained for the rest of his life.

Bartol'd was a scholar in Turkish, Persian and Arabic. Almost every year he travelled to Turkestan to study local records and

antiquities. He also spent much time in the libraries of Istanbul and Cairo, as well as in many European ones. Even the Russian Revolution did not seriously interfere with his work; his fame stood so high that the Turkmen and Kirgiz nationalists asked him to write for them the histories of their peoples.

Bartol'd was a prolific writer whose legacy consists of over 400 books and articles in learned publications. Among the earliest were **THE PROBLEMS OF ARCHAEOLOGICAL RESEARCH IN TURKESTAN** (1894), **HISTORY OF SEMIRECH'YE** (1898) and **TURKESTAN IN THE PERIOD OF THE MONGOL INVASIONS** (1898-1900). The last won Bartol'd international celebrity and was translated into English in 1928. It brings the history of Central Asia down to the death of Chingiz Khan. The period of the Timurids is dealt with in **ULUG-BEK**, written in 1915 but not published until 1918 (translated into English by V. and T. Minorsky, Vol.II of **FOUR STUDIES ON THE HISTORY OF CENTRAL ASIA**, Leiden 1958).

Before the Revolution Bartol'd also made a notable contribution to historical geography by putting forward the theory that in the 13th-16th centuries part of the Amu-Dar'ya waters flowed through the Uzboy to the Caspian Sea (**INFORMATION ON THE ARAL SEA AND THE LOWER REACHES OF THE AMU-DAR'YA FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE 17TH CENTURY**, 1902, and **CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORY OF IRRIGATION IN TURKESTAN**, 1914). Persia was dealt with in the **HISTORICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL SURVEY OF IRAN** (1903).

After the Revolution Bartol'd played an important part in organizing historical research in the Central Asian republics. He visited them on scientific missions, gave talks and lectures and played a notable part in setting up the department of oriental history at the Turkestan State University (1920) and in organizing the preservation and plans for studying ancient monuments (1925). The early scientific libraries, archives and museums in the national republics were often associated with his name. He held important posts: chairman of the Board of Orientalists of the Academy of Sciences, director of the Turcological Institute, chairman of the Academy of Material Culture, editor of the periodical **IRAN** and other publications of the Academy of Sciences.

At the same time Bartol'd continued writing and publishing. Some of the best-known of his later works are **ISLAM and MUSLIM CULTURE** (1918), **THE MUSLIM WORLD** (1922), **HISTORY OF TURKESTAN** (1923), **THE TAD-ZHIKS - A HISTORICAL OUTLINE** and **HISTORY OF THE STUDY OF THE EAST IN RUSSIA AND EUROPE** (1925), **HISTORY OF CULTURAL LIFE IN TURKESTAN** and **THE KIRGIZ** (1927), **IRAN** and **HISTORY OF THE TURKIC AND MONGOL PEOPLES** (1928), and **OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF THE TURKMEN PEOPLE** (1929).

Some of Bartol'd's works still await publication. A new edition of *TURKESTAN IN THE PERIOD OF THE MONGOL INVASIONS* will contain the notes added by its author to the English edition of 1928 as well as the last, unfinished, chapter which brings the story up to the 1270s. I.I. Umyakov's annotated bibliography of Bartol'd's works and notes on those still unpublished and deposited in the archives of the Soviet Academy of Sciences will be issued; the majority of them deal with Central Asia. There are also articles and notes on manuscripts, synopses of sources and texts prepared for printing. Thus Bartol'd's impressive legacy is by no means exhausted and it is to be hoped that his hitherto unknown works will eventually be published. The long-overdue task of rehabilitating his reputation was begun by N.A. Smirnov in *AN OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF ISLAMIC STUDIES IN THE USSR* (Moscow, 1954)* and the recent conference has done much to clear his name still further.

Yakubovskiy

Aleksandr Yur'yevich Yakubovskiy (1886-1953) belongs to the first generation of Soviet orientalists, owing to which fact he escaped the ideological difficulties confronting Bartol'd. In 1913 Yukubovskiy graduated from the Faculty of History and Philology of St. Petersburg University and spent some years teaching in the middle school. Only in the Soviet period did he become an orientalist: in 1924 he graduated from the Oriental Faculty of Leningrad University, where Bartol'd was one of his teachers, and in the following year started work at the State Academy of the History of Material Culture (Institute of History of Material Culture since 1937) and at the Hermitage. In 1935 he became professor at Leningrad University and a corresponding member of the Soviet Academy in 1943.

Yakubovskiy specialized in medieval history of the Near East, Caucasus and - first and foremost - Central Asia. He combined the study of written sources with that of antiquities and became a well-known archaeologist. He organized a number of important archaeological expeditions into Central Asia and after 1947 he directed the excavations of Pendzhikent in the Leninabad oblast where remarkable mural paintings of the Sogdian period were discovered. His works are stated to prove that he "keenly responded to the demands of Soviet science". To this category belong his researches on national uprisings in medieval Central Asia, origins of its peoples and periodization of its

* See *CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW*, 1954 No.1, 1955 Nos.1 & 2, and *ISLAM AND RUSSIA*, CARC, London, 1956.

history in the "feudal" period.(6) He also made an important contribution to the ideological side of Central Asian historiography in his critical estimate of Bartol'd's ideas from the point of view of the Marxist theory concerning social evolution ("Problems of Social History in the Works of V.V. Bartol'd", VESTNIK LENINGRADSKOGO GOSUDARSTVENNOGO UNIVERSITETA, No.12, 1947).

The vast majority of Yakubovskiy's works consists of articles in learned publications. His major works were FEUDALISM IN THE EAST (1932), SAMARKAND UNDER TIMUR AND THE TIMURIDS IN THE 14TH-15TH CENTURIES (1933), ORIENTAL CULTURE AND ART IN THE HERMITAGE (1937), THE PROBLEM OF THE ETHNIC ORIGIN OF THE UZBEK PEOPLE (1941) and THE GOLDEN HORDE AND ITS COLLAPSE (1937), the last written in collaboration with B.D. Grekov.

Romodin thus sums up the role of Yakubovskiy and Ivanov in Soviet oriental studies: "These oriental historians have made a large contribution towards accomplishing the very important task of Soviet scholars - they critically examined the estimates and comments on historical facts made in the works of bourgeois authors and in their own researches they applied creatively the principles of historical materialism."(7)

Ivanov

Pavel Petrovich Ivanov (1893-1942) devoted only the last eight years of his life to Central Asian history but in this short time he wrote a large number of articles and major works. He was an authority on the "late feudal" period (16th-19th centuries) and was the first to study thoroughly the social and economic history of the Central Asian peoples.

Ivanov was the son of a worker. Before the Revolution he finished a teachers' training college course and worked in a Russo-native school [presumably in Central Asia]. In 1916 he was called up for military service and after demobilization proceeded to study in the Turkestan Oriental Institute in Tashkent. In 1924 he graduated from its Persian Department, but did not at first work as an orientalist and could devote only his spare time to research. His earliest studies were concerned with Central Asian archaeology. In 1929 he moved to Leningrad where he taught oriental languages and it was not until 1934-35 that he could finally concentrate on historical research.

His choice of subject helped him to achieve success since his predecessors were not interested in Central Asia in the 16th-19th centuries. Ivanov was well equipped for the task since he knew Persian,

Tadzhik and the Turkic languages and could study the sources in the original. He soon made himself known when he published AN OUTLINE OF KARA-KALPAK HISTORY (in MATERIALS ON HISTORY OF THE KARA-KALPAKS, 1935) which was followed by a translated edition in Turkey.

The study of Bukharan and Kokand sources enabled Ivanov to publish a major work on the REBELLION OF THE KITAY-KIPCHAKS IN THE KHANATE OF BUKHARA IN 1821-1825 (TRUDY INSTITUTA VOSTOKOVEDENIYA AKADEMII NAUK, Vol.VII, 1939). The discovery and examination of the archive of the Khivan khans was Ivanov's crowing achievement. In 1940 he published THE ARCHIVES OF THE KHIVAN KHANS IN THE 19TH CENTURY and henceforward he was included among the leading Soviet orientalists. In the winter of 1941-42 during the siege of Leningrad he defended his doctoral thesis on the Khivan archives and soon afterwards he was dead. In 1958 another of his major works, ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF CENTRAL ASIA FROM THE 16TH UNTIL THE MIDDLE OF THE 19TH CENTURY, was published. It had been completed in 1941 but the outbreak of the war prevented publication. This thoroughly documented work is the comprehensive summary of Ivanov's researches and its importance is increased by the fact that Soviet historical literature suffers from an acute shortage of general works on Central Asian history in the "late feudal" period, although there are works on the history of the individual peoples.

Ivanov was the first Soviet scholar to produce an authoritative outline of the various historical processes in the history of the khanates of Kokand, Khiva and Bukhara from the earliest times until the Russian conquest. He studied it in close connexion with that of the nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples - the Kazakhs, Kirgiz and Turkmens. "A detailed study from the sources of social and economic conditions and creative application of Marxist-Leninist methodology enabled P.P. Ivanov to draw a number of important conclusions and describe some essential aspects of Central Asian feudalism."(8)

Among Ivanov's works which have not yet been published are a history of Afghanistan in the 18th century, a diary of his mission to Eastern Bukhara to inquire into its economic situation (1920-1), and some historical and ethnographical notes compiled in Tashkent and Kirgizia (on the topography of old Tashkent, genealogy of Kirgiz clans and materials relating to the Sart-Kalmyks inhabiting the shores of Lake Issyk-Kul').

Notes

- (1) GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA, 2nd edition, Vol.4, p.274
- (2) OCHERKI ISTORII IZUCHENIYA ISLAMA V SSSR. N.A. Smirnov. Moscow, 1954, p.120

- (3) UCHENYYE ZAPISKI INSTITUTA VOSTOKOVEDENIYA, Vol.XXV. Moscow, 1960, p.32
- (4) Ibid., pp.204-5
- (5) OGONEK, No.40, 1927, p.14
- (6) UCH. ZAPISKI, p.37
- (7) Ibid.
- (8) Ibid., p.41

Town planning in Uzbekistan

Plans for the replanning of Tashkent are now being worked out by the director of the Town Planning Institute of Uzbekistan, A.N. Zotov. The new mining town of Angren was also planned by Zotov.

OGONEK, 6.5.60

Alma-Ata observatory studies satellites

Scholars at the Alma-Ata observatory are studying the courses of man-made satellites. The director of the observatory, V.G. Feskov, propounded a theory of interplanetary dust which is of great importance in the study of the cosmos, and which has been confirmed by data obtained from the Soviet satellites.

PART. ZHIZN' KAZAKHSTANA, No.6, 1960

Failure of scheme to bring young Kazakhs into Karaganda factory

Under a scheme of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan last year it was decided to select 2,000 young Kazakhs to work in the metallurgical plant in Karaganda. But the selection was not done properly and the leaders of the factory have not helped the Komsomol in its work; they do not want to take young people. So far only 697 people have been chosen and 243 of them have already left the factory because of bad conditions.

PART. ZHIZN' KAZAKHSTANA, No.6, 1960

N E W S D I G E S T

The following items are taken from newspapers and periodicals received during the period 1 April - 30 June 1960. A list of abbreviations used will be found at the beginning of the Review.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND TERRITORIAL CHANGES

Administrative changes

Administrative changes are recorded in the following appointments only: First and Second Party Secretaries, Chairmen of the Councils of Ministers (Prime Ministers), Chairmen of the State Planning and State Security Committees, and Ministers of Communications.

Turkmenistan

On being elected First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, B. Ovezov was relieved of the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers. TI. 14.6.60

Dzhuma Durdy Karayev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, died on 4 May 1960. P. 5.5.60

Territorial changesAzerbaydzhan

By decree of 18 April 1960, the town type settlement Imishli has been included in the category of towns of rayon subordination. VVS. 28.4.60

By decree of 18 April 1960:

The settlement round the sovkhos "Azerbaydzhan" has been separated from the Kasym-Ismail village soviet and given the status of town type settlement with the name Karayeri.

The settlement Bagramtepe, Imishli rayon has been given the status of town type settlement and renamed Birmay. VVS. 28.4.60

Kirgizia

By decree of 26 May 1960, the settlement of Kara-Su, Kara-Su rayon, Osh oblast has been given the status of town with rayon subordination.
SK. 1.6.60

ARCHAEOLOGY

While excavating the ruins of Ming-Uryuk recently, Uzbek archaeologists located the ancient town of Chash (Shash). Excavations show that the town was situated on the heights above the north bank of the Salar river at the beginning of our era; this is the site of the present Tashkent and confirms the theory of the archaeologist M. Masson which he had based on ancient Chinese and Arab sources. Ming-Uryuk seems to have been the centre of the district of Chash.

Among the ruins excavated were found the ruler's residence of the 5th-6th centuries A.D. Life in Ming-Uryuk ceased at the time of the Mongol conquest. VOPROSY ISTORII, No.5, 1960

An article in KRATKIYE SOOBSHCHENIYA INSTITUTA ISTORII (vyp. 76, 1959), by G.A. Brykina, discusses an engraving of the 8th century found on a Turkish pebble. The pebble was discovered by a Kirgiz archaeological expedition in 1953-4 in the excavated ruins of a Buddhist temple at Ak-Beshim. The temple was built in the 7th century and destroyed by Turkish nomadic tribes in the 8th century. Fireplaces and storage holes found on the site show that the Turks used the ruins as living quarters for a time. The pebble was found in one of these fireplaces; it is 34cm. by 18.5cm. and has cut on it a picture of a hunting dog chasing a mountain goat. The figures are represented by a few outlines incised with a small metal instrument. The style as well as the strata in which the pebble was found (together with iron and bronze objects of Turkish origin of the 8th-9th centuries) indicate that it dates back to the 8th century. The find is unique as nothing similar has been previously discovered in Central Asia.

The technique of outline drawing was used by eastern Turks during the 6th-8th centuries and similar works of this period have been found in the Altay, Mongolia and the Trans-Baykal area. Furthermore, the features of the engraving resemble the style used by the ancient Altay Turks. This confirms the view that the temple was destroyed by the Qarluqs - originating in the Altay - at the time when they invaded northern Kirgizia, and explains how a work characteristic of the Altay Turks could be discovered at Ak-Beshim.

CONFERENCE OF KIRGIZ INTELLIGENTSIA

The first "conference of intelligentsia" in Kirgizia, was held in May 1960. The First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Kirgiz Communist Party, I.R. Rezzakov, gave a detailed report on "the tasks of the intelligentsia of the republic for realizing the decisions made at the XXIst Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" which is summarized below.

The XXIst Congress pointed out that in the present period of transition into Communist society the role of the intelligentsia has become more important.

The Kirgiz intelligentsia owes its existence to the Soviet State. There was no intelligentsia before the October Revolution and less than one per cent of the population was literate. Now, however, there are 65,000 specialists with higher or specialized secondary education.

The intelligentsia in Kirgizia includes 50 different nationalities, so in this respect too, it reflects the composition of the Soviet State. They represent and must propagate Marxism-Leninism and Communist internationalism free from narrow-minded local and nationalist interests.

The language of communication between the various nationalities of the Soviet Union is Russian. Since the October Revolution Russian has become the second language of all Soviet peoples. Knowledge of Russian links together the different nationalities as well as giving access to outstanding Russian works of science, technology and culture. More attention must be paid, therefore, to the teaching of Russian in every school of the republic, so that when children leave school they are able to speak Russian fluently and have a good command of the literary language.

The intelligentsia has two main tasks: to take an active part in the construction of the national economy, and to achieve the Communist education of the people.

In every branch of industry the standard of technology must be raised. To achieve this many more specialists are to be trained. Special attention should be paid to training local people as technicians and specialists. In the departments of physics, economics, mathematics and geography at the university there are no students at all from the Alay region, at the agricultural institute there are no students from the Alay, Dzhangi-Dzhol' and Batken rayons.

Another task of the intelligentsia is to explain to the people the importance of new technical methods for achieving the Seven-Year Plan. They must use every means of mass communication in propagating the principles of modern technology as indispensable requisites of progress.

In the period of transition into Communism the first essential of ideological work is to educate the people towards a Communist attitude to work, explain to them the cultural and economic advance of Communism, and the teachings of Marxism-Leninism.

Almost 50,000 people are engaged in propaganda work in Kirgizia. More than 80,000 men and women receive Party propaganda education. Yet there are shortcomings. Not enough attention is paid to the fact that many workers tend to prefer private to public ownership, and exaggerate the advantages of private farms to the detriment of kolkhozes and sovkhozes. There are survivals of capitalism in the morals of some people: drinking, malevolent attitude towards others, envy, etc. Survivals of a "feudal-bay ideology" concerning women are still present in some form or other; there are still instances of girls under age being given in marriage, or sold for bride money, polygamy etc. Women in Kirgizia today take an active part in the construction of Communist society and their role in the national economy becomes more and more important.

These problems as well as the struggle against survivals of religious ideology have been insufficiently dealt with so far.

The Party has been successful in propagating the ideas of socialist internationalism. However, some traces of bourgeois ideology remain - local patriotism, nationalistic views in explaining important events of the past, harping on so-called national characteristics. There are some followers of the reactionary poet Molla Kylych and the bourgeois nationalist ideologist Tynystanov.

In the ideological education of the masses, the press, radio, television and cultural establishments are the most effective means.

Remarkable results have been achieved in book publishing. In 1926, 26 books were published with a total of 65,000 copies. At present 800 books are published yearly with a total of 4m. copies. Soviet literature is of great importance for the Communist education of the people. Pre-Soviet literature was almost entirely confined to poetry. Now, all literary forms are flourishing. Works of Kirgiz authors are translated into other languages spoken in the Soviet Union. For instance, Tugel'bay Sydybekov's *MEN OF OUR TIMES* is very popular all over the

country. Kirgiz drama has also achieved its first successes. Russian and world literary classics as well as plays by Kirgiz playwrights are in the repertoire of Kirgiz theatres.

Concluding his speech I.R. Razzakov emphasized that in the course of further cultural development the multi-national composition of the population must always be borne in mind. Party organizations must cooperate with the intelligentsia and lead it to an active contribution to economic and cultural development. SK. 21.5.60

COMMUNICATIONS

Construction of the Kushka - Herat - Kandahar highway has begun. The road will be 760 km. long. Workers from the Soviet Union engaged on it, include leading members of the Komsomol. TI. 1.5.60

DELEGATIONS

A delegation of Indian women on their way to the International Women's Congress in Copenhagen, stopped at Tashkent. They visited industrial, cultural and medical centres and several institutions for children. PV. 17.4.60

Delegations of educational workers from Cambodia stayed some days in Uzbekistan. They studied the organizations for the political education of children. PV. 4.6.60

A delegation of women of the countries of Asia and Africa visited Tashkent in May. PV. 3.5.60

A delegation of the Japan-USSR Society arrived at Baku for a three-day visit. BR. 31.5.60

At the invitation of the Uzbek Chamber of Commerce, O. Bonsu, president of the Ghana Chamber of Commerce, and Ch. Tettey, general secretary, visited Tashkent. PV. 22.5.60

LITERATURE

The publishing house of the Institute of Linguistics and Literature, AN/Uz.SSR, has brought out a four-volume chrestomathy of Uzbek literature. This chrestomathy covers a thousand years of literary

history. For the preparation of the work research was conducted in the libraries of Istanbul, London, Cambridge and Paris, and several hitherto unknown writers were discovered including Yakini, a contemporary of Navoi.

OGONEK, No.13, 1960

The library of the Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography in Stalinabad is one of the richest libraries inside the Soviet Union and abroad. It has acquired nearly all the books of the Russian Orientalist V.V. Barthol'd and has the unique copy of the first edition of VOYAGES AND ADVENTURES OF PHILIP YEFREMOV IN BUKHARA, KHIVA, PERSIA AND INDIA (1786). The library possesses also many manuscripts in Oriental languages.

VOPROSY ISTORII, No.5, 1960

An article in KOMMUNIST, by G. Gusairov discusses shortcomings in planning book publication. In Kazakhstan recently there was not enough paper to print important textbooks such as the HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MARXISM-LENINISM, and PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, but at the same time the Kazakh State Publishing House printed 225,000 copies of A. Dumas' LE VICOMTE DE BRAGELONNE, using more than 400 tons of paper.

KOMMUNIST, No.5, 1960

A new monthly periodical entitled PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN' is to be published by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan. It will appear in Russian and the first issue comes out in July 1960.

Articles in this journal will deal with questions such as Party organization, Party political work, propaganda, activities of the soviets, Komsomol organization etc.

PV. 28.5.60

THE BORDERLANDS OF SOVIET
CENTRAL ASIA

P E R S I A

I. THE 1905-11 REVOLUTION

The Social Democrats in the 1905-11 Revolution

The question of the Marxist content of the Persian revolution of 1905-11 has much exercised the minds of Soviet historians, who have closely examined the question of the participation of Russian (Transcaucasian) revolutionaries in the Persian revolution (see CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, 1956, No.3, pp.288-98, and 1960, No.1, p.76).

Further material on this subject has now been presented by M.S. Ivanov in his article "New Material on the Social-Democratic Group in Tabriz in 1908", in PROBLEMY VOSTOKOVEDENIYA No.5 of 1959. Ivanov begins his article by noting that both Persian and Russian sources mention the activity in Persia during the 1905-11 revolution of Social Democrat groups, usually lumped together under the general title of the "Social Democratic Party". Such groups existed in Tabriz, Tehran and Rasht. He asserts, however, that there is no evidence available of the existence of a Party programme, Party regulations, or of any central control or organization. It is known, he says, that Social Democrats played an active role in the democratic-revolutionary Moja-hed Society, but there is insufficient evidence to determine whether this society was in fact the Social Democratic Party (Ejtema'iun-e-amiyun) or whether the Social Democrats merely comprised its hard core.

Ivanov then proceeds to an examination of certain documents from the G.V. Plekhanov Archives which throw light on the Social Democrat movement in Tabriz in 1908. The most important of these documents are (a) a report of a meeting of 30 Tabriz Social Democrats held on 16 October 1908 at which was discussed the question of the organization of a Social Democrat group in Tabriz; (b) a letter dated 3 December 1908 to leaders of the European Social Democrat movement in Geneva signed on behalf of a section of the Tabriz group by Tigran Dervini;

(c) a letter dated 10 December 1908 sent from Tabriz to Plekhanov by A. Chilinkrian.

The arguments for the creation of a Social Democrat group given in the first document were as follows: Persia had entered on the stage of machine industry. A proletariat had been formed. There was a danger that the bourgeoisie would make use of the proletariat to reinforce its position. The people (defined as the elements of society without property) were the most revolutionary section of society. The sooner they achieved class-consciousness the sooner the revolution would succeed. The tasks of the Social Democrats were to organize the proletariat and give it class consciousness. Therefore a purely Social Democrat group should be formed.

These arguments were opposed by a minority who took the line that the time was not yet ripe for the organization and unification of the proletariat, which in fact had not yet been completely formed. To organize the proletariat might drive the radical bourgeoisie into the arms of the reactionaries, while the Persian bourgeois revolution demanded the united activity of all dissatisfied elements. This group, therefore, proposed that the Tabriz Social Democrats should join the Democrats, "purify" them of their reactionary tendencies and act as their most radical element.

The first proposal was carried by a vote of 28 to two.

T. Dervini in the second document wrote that there were few Persian socialists; they were chiefly concentrated in Tabriz, and were in the main members of the intelligentsia who had received an education in Russia. Up to 1908 they had restricted themselves to self-education and propaganda among the intelligentsia, especially the Armenians.

In the third document Chilinkrian similarly wrote to Plekhanov that the Social Democrats in Tabriz were a small group whose aim was to propagate Marxist ideas.

These documents, concludes Ivanov, show that in 1908 the Social Democrat movement in Tabriz was in an initial stage of development. The group was not numerous. The documents give no indication of the existence of any central organization in Persia or of any Party programme or regulations. It is known that in 1909-10 when G.K. Ordzhonikidze was active in Rasht there was only a local Social Democrat group there. There is no documentary evidence of any connexions between this group and any other Social Democrat groups in Persia at this time. The documents show the low ideological level of the Tabriz Social Democrats, but they also allow us to conclude, writes Ivanov, that they were the most active leaders of the Tabriz uprising of 1908.

Early Russian Revolutionaries in Persia

Z.Z. Abdullayev and A.M. Agakhi in "New Facts on the Activity of Russian Revolutionaries in Persia at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century", (PROB. VOS., 1959, No.6) write about the influence on the Persian revolution of 1905-11 of Russian revolutionaries who had left Russia during the Russian revolution of 1905-7 and even earlier. Among their number were representatives of ISKRA, mechanics and expelled students.

The authors note that the majority of Soviet students of the 1905-7 revolution remark on the close connexions of the Persian revolutionaries with the Russian revolutionaries of Transcaucasia. They consider, however, that more attention should be paid to their connexions with Turkestan. They quote a letter from the Governor-General of the Trans-Caspian kray to the Ministry of War (23 December 1911) mentioning the presence in the area of passportless fugitives from the Caucasus on their way to Persia, and a letter from the Russian Consul-General in Mashhad, Klemm (2 September 1907), reporting the presence there of "suspicious subjects" from the Trans-Caspian region. The authors cite finally the anjoman (committee) formed by Persian subjects in Ashkhabad to give aid to the Persian revolution (see CAR, 1960, No.1, p.76).

The authors also give on the authority of the contemporary Persian press the names of some Russians who played an active part in the Persian revolution. These were the well-known "Alesha" (killed in Rasht, 1910), a sailor from the battleship "Potemkin", whom the authors have identified as T.A. Goncharov, a peasant's son from Lugansk; the Social Democrat Laso, known in Persia as "Surayya", who was active in Tabriz; Fonarev, a former soldier of the Russian Baku Brigade, who deserted in 1906, joined the Persian revolutionaries and became head of the partisans of the Ardebil "Sattar" Committee; and finally the Caucasian Akhund-zade Mamed Baghir.

II. INDIAN TROOPS IN PERSIA, 1914-20

L.I. Miroshnikov's "Anglo-Indian Troops in Persia, Transcaucasia and Turkestan, 1914-20" (KRATKIYE SOOBSHCHENIYA INSTITUTA VOSTOKOVEDENIYA, No. XXXV, 1959) is an attempt to show that "the British imperialists used Indian troops for the occupation of Persia, the suppression of the national liberation movement of the Persian people and also for armed intervention in Transcaucasia and Turkestan." The article's secondary aim is to show that such a use of Indian troops "to carry out predatory wars in countries far from India" was not only contrary to the interests of the peoples of these countries but also contrary to the interests of the Indian people, in the person of the Indian soldier.

The article begins with a historical survey of the occasions on which the British made use of Indians in order to oppress other peoples, from the Burmese War of 1824-6 to the First World War. Miroshnikov mentions also occasions on which, as he claims, Indian troops were not "a willing tool of the British colonizers": the Patna mutiny of 1764, the refusal of Bengali troops to fight in Burma in 1852 and the Mutiny of 1857-9. These actions had their counterpart, he alleges, in Persia also when at Enzeli in 1920 "the Indian gunners failed to carry out their officers' orders and refused to open fire on the ships of the Soviet flotilla. . . The unreliability of the Indian troops served as one of the reasons for the capitulation and retreat of the British. Evidence of revolutionary trends among Indian troops is provided by the fact of the desertion of Indian soldiers to the camp of Kuchik Khan" (the Jangali leader). [There appears to be no truth in this allegation, which is supported only by reference to contemporary Baku Communist newspapers. Ehsanulla Khan, one of Kuchik Khan's lieutenants, in his memoirs published in NOVYY VOSTOK, Nos. 23-24 (1928), 26-27 (1929) and 29 (1930) makes no mention of any Indian deserters to the Jangalis. Ed. CAR.]

Miroshnikov does not entirely lose sight of the influence on British policy in Persia of the need to counter Turkish and German military and espionage activity in the area. This does not, however, cause him to modify his basic line, because he considers that one of the main aims of Tsarist Russia, Germany and Britain in the area was "the plunder of Persia". Similarly "British intervention in Southern Persia was connected with military operations. . . against the Turks in lower Mesopotamia", but the aim of these operations was the "acquisition" of Mesopotamia which had been planned before the entry of Turkey into the war. On the presence in 1915 of 12,500 British troops in Khuzestan, which took place "allegedly because of the necessity of defending the oil pipeline" against the Turks, Miroshnikov says that during 1915 the

British forces never met the Turks but on the contrary were used entirely for punitive expeditions against the Arab population. After Townsend's occupation of Amara, when the Turks could no longer threaten the pipeline, part of these troops remained on the Karun river "which can only be regarded as the occupation of the territory of a neutral state".

Of the military operations in Bushire, where the "Anglo-Indian" forces reached 20,000, Miroshnikov writes that up to 1919 they "had to wage a real war against the local population".

Of General Sykes' mission in 1916 Miroshnikov writes that his task was to "create in Southern Persia police forces to bring about there a state of affairs satisfactory to Britain".

With the establishment of the East Persian Cordon and Major Keyes' march from Gwadar to Chahbar, writes Miroshnikov, "Britain. . . with the aid of Indian troops had established control over all the southern provinces of Persia from Khuzestan to Seistan." The Russian Revolution and the evacuation of the Russian troops who had composed the northern part of the East Persian Cordon gave Britain the opportunity of "annexing" the northern provinces and turning them into "an operational base for the invasion of Transcaucasia and Turkestan". A "group of interventionist forces" was formed in Mashhad under General Malleon. "Simultaneously with the intervention in Soviet Turkestan the imperialists were preparing to annex Baku and all Transcaucasia." Although "Dunsterforce" was originally entirely composed of British troops, writes Miroshnikov, here also the authorities later used Indian units.

Meanwhile, while Indian troops were suffering heavy losses in Soviet Turkestan, Indian units were being used to crush the anti-British movement of the Kurds in Khorasan.

The October Revolution, Miroshnikov writes, the national liberation movement in the northern provinces of Persia and the war of the Afghan people against the British had a revolutionary effect on the Indian troops in Persia, and the victories of the Red Army in Turkestan and Transcaucasia caused unrest among them. As a result they disobeyed their officers in Enzeli, and either deserted to Kuchik Khan or were so disaffected that they had to be withdrawn from Enzeli to Rasht and Qazvin "under the guard (pod konvoyem) of British armoured cars". [No authority is given for these statements which have in fact no foundation. Ed. CAR.]

The narrative of which the above is an abbreviation draws heavily on such British sources as Sir P. Sykes HISTORY OF PERSIA, W.E.R.

Dickson's EAST PERSIA, etc., and is liberally sprinkled with detailed references to individual British and Indian units. The general effect is of a massive build-up of troops appropriate to an attempted annexation of Persia, Transcaucasia and Turkestan. It is claimed that British aspirations were foiled by the Red Army not only in the last two cases but in the case of Persia also. Noting that the withdrawal of British forces from Persia began soon after the signing of the Soviet-Persian Agreement of 1921, Miroshnikov gives the peculiar reason that the British Government decided to withdraw because "it considered that the entry of the army of Soviet Russia into Northern Persia would be inevitable if Anglo-Indian troops remained there", although he does not say that the entry of Soviet troops was in fact inevitable in those circumstances.

Miroshnikov concludes that "the participation of Indian soldiers in the First World War called forth their dissatisfaction with the British imperialists, and encouraged the awakening of revolutionary feelings in the ranks of the army and their inevitable transfer to India."

THE BALUCHIS OF PAKISTAN AND PERSIA

What is apparently the first comprehensive Soviet study of the Baluchis of both Persia and Pakistan has now been issued jointly by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the Academy of Sciences of the Uzbek SSR. This is M.G. Pikulin's *BELUDZHI (IVL AN/SSR, Moscow, 1959, 212pp.)*. Previous writings by Pikulin and others on the subject of the Baluchis are listed at the end of this article.

Pikulin's work deals with the Baluchis of "the south-west of the Iranian plateau between Kerman on the west and the Indus on the east, along the coast of the Arabian Sea"; he does not discuss the Baluchis of Turkmenistan. He divides the Baluchi area into Western and Eastern Baluchistan; the former term corresponds to Persian Baluchistan, while the latter includes the Baluchistan Agency and the states of Kalat, Makran, Kharan and Las Bela in Pakistan.

The book has three chapters. The first deals with the origins, distribution and mode of life of the Baluchis; the second with the Khanate of Kalat, and Britain's conquest of Eastern Baluchistan; and the third with "The National Liberation Struggle of the Baluchis and their Position in Modern Times". The present article is a summary of the third chapter.

The sources quoted by Pikulin for his information on the Baluchis today are, for the Baluchis of Persia, the Persian daily press and the following Persian works: A. Razmara's *JOGRAFIAYE NEZAMIEYE IRAN* and Amanullah Jahanbani's *AMALIAT-E-QOSHUN DAR BALUCHISTAN*. A.K. Lambton's *LANDLORD AND PEASANT IN PERSIA* is also quoted. For the Baluchis of Pakistan the 1951 census is widely quoted, and also official publications and year-books and the Pakistani daily press. Pikulin's list of sources for the earlier period constitutes a considerable bibliography of works in Persian, Russian, English and French.

Pikulin's book received a favourable review in *PROBLEMY VOSTOKO-VEDENIYA*, 1959, No.6, at the hands of Yu. Gankovskiy. Noting that it was in essence the first monograph on the Baluchis to be published in the Soviet Union, Gankovskiy criticized the book for

omitting the Baluchis' fight for national cultural development, for giving insufficient space to the post-war Baluchi national movement and for omitting the question of the formation of the Baluchi nation. In all these cases Gankovskiy presumably has in mind only the Baluchis of Pakistan.

A comment by Sir Clarmont Skrine, OBE, who knew Pikulin, will be found at the end of the article.

. . .

I. From the End of the 19th Century to 1914 - II. 1914-1957 - III. Comment by Sir Clarmont Skrine.

I. From the End of the 19th Century to 1914


Eastern Baluchistan

The oppressive rule of the British drove the Baluchis to revolt in 1897-8, at the same time as the Pathan risings against the Durand Line demarcation. This rising took place in north-eastern Baluchistan, where colonial exploitation was especially severe and where in 1891-1901 the land tax had been increased from 2 to 2.5 rupees per acre of tilled land. [Noting the migration of Baluchis from Western to Eastern Baluchistan in search of work, Pikulin stresses that it should not be concluded from this that British rule had in fact led to improved living standards. On the contrary, it had brought about an increase in the feudal exploitation and expropriation of the peasants and, by strengthening the positions of the feudal landlords and moneylenders, had hindered the development of capitalist relations in agriculture.]

In 1907 dissatisfaction with the pro-British policy of the Khan of Kalat together with the influence of the Russian revolution of 1905-7 led to disturbances in northern Baluchistan. A punitive expedition composed of British forces acting "on the request" of the Khan of Kalat" succeeded in putting down the disorders by 1908.

Western Baluchistan

The whole of this area was ruled by Baluchi sardars (tribal chieftains) whose acceptance of the rule of the Persian government was only nominal. The sardars collected the taxes by a system of tax-farming. Rents and taxes were high, peasants who owned their land paying a tax of up to one-half of their harvest and landless peasants a rent of up



BALUCHISTAN (1927)
Scale 1:600,000

Km 100 50 0 100 200 Km.

↑	Date palms	B	Camels
☐	Fruit	Ш	Wool
∨	Coal	Ж	Iron
⊙	Main towns	⊙	Towns
○	Other inhabited points	—	Railways
—	Railways	—	State boundary
.....	State boundary	Boundary of British Baluchistan

Reproduced from *Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya*, Vol. V (Moscow, 1927)

to two-thirds of their harvest. Under this oppressive system peasants left their land and became brigands, robbing villages and caravans. Others went to India in search of work (see above).

In 1897 the Baluchis rose against their Persian rulers in Serhad, Saravan and Bampur under the leadership of the chief of the Narui tribe Hosain Khan. They demanded a reduction of taxes from one-third of the peasant's income to one-tenth. This demand being refused the revolt spread and was only ended in 1910 when Hosain Khan was bought off by being made ruler of a boluk (district) with the right of collecting taxes.

The Russian revolution of 1905-7 had considerable influence on the Persian revolution of 1905-11, which affected western Baluchistan. The Baluchi peasants rose against the Qajars, led by "their [tribal] leaders who were interested in preserving the independence of their khanates from the Persian authorities". In 1907 they rose again under Mir Bahram Khan Baranzai who was the virtual ruler of Persian Baluchistan for several years. He was betrayed, however, by Sa'id Khan who was rewarded with the post of Governor of Baluchistan. Henceforward the position of the Baluchi people deteriorated.

II. 1914-1957

Eastern Baluchistan

The First World War accelerated the approach of the general crisis of capitalism, and in particular of the crisis of the colonial system of imperialism, and thus helped the growth of national consciousness and the development of the national liberation movement of the peoples of India, including the Baluchis. Baluchistan, like the rest of India, became a source of material and reinforcements for the British armies: Baluchis were "recruited into the Anglo-Indian Army and forced to fight for the interests of the British imperialists". In 1917 the finances of Kalat were brought under the control of the British authorities.

The October Revolution induced a revolt among the peoples of India. The events in the Panjab and the North-West Frontier Province, in their turn, had an effect on the Baluchis who were suffering under the double oppression of their own feudal rulers and British colonialism. In 1918 news of British reverses in Mesopotamia had led to disturbances among the Marri tribe and in 1919 the Marri and Bugti tribes supported the Pathan tribes of the Frontier in the Third Afghan War. These movements "showed that the population of Baluchistan was

beginning to be drawn into the common current of the battle of the peoples of India against British imperialism". However the protests of the Baluchi workers against feudalism and colonialism failed because the working-class was few in numbers and lacked organization. Nor were there any peasant organizations, or Baluchi political parties to lead a protest movement. The All-India political parties were not interested in the area.

The development of capitalism which began during this period was deformed by the influence of colonialism. Colonialism preferred feudalism and tribalism which, in their turn, hindered the growth of productive forces. Baluchistan was agricultural and had almost no industry at all. Agricultural methods were primitive. The irrigated area, far from increasing, was not even fully used in spite of peasant land-hunger. The development of capitalism was "assuming those forms which were most agonizing for the broad masses, bringing increased exploitation of the immediate producers by the ruling class of khans and the British authorities".

During the century the land rent rose and the income from rent doubled between 1903 and 1930. The tax paid by nomads for the use of pastures was also high and was farmed out to the sardars. These tendencies were observable in Kalat also. In both British Baluchistan and Kalat the peasants were enslaved by moneylenders connected with British banks and firms.

From a consideration of two sets of data on the composition of the agricultural population of eastern Baluchistan it appears that between 1921 and 1931 the impoverishment of the peasantry assumed mass proportions: the number of landless agricultural labourers increased, the number of landowners decreased and women began to work in the fields as hired labourers. "The ruin of the rank-and-file nomad herdsman continued; witness in particular the fact of their intensified transition to simultaneous employment in semi-nomad livestock breeding and tilling the soil." The craftsmen who had previously served the village commune (*obshchina*) were also driven out of business by the growth of town handicrafts.

During the period 1911-1941 a great migration of population took place from southern to north-eastern Baluchistan, i.e. from the less to the more advanced areas. Such a process, as Lenin has pointed out, is a sign of the development of capitalist relations. In the 1930s the industries of transport and extraction began to develop. Industrial wage-scales, however, were lower than in the rest of India. Baluchi peasants migrated to other parts of India and returning brought democratic ideas with them. In Baluchistan a proletariat and national bourgeoisie began to appear. There were, however, no political

organizations or trade unions: "the workers, living in conditions of colonial and feudal oppression, were deprived of any political rights."

In Kalat British rule provoked unrest. In 1939 serious disturbances broke out, accompanied with demands for a provincial government, the removal of the Political Agents, the lowering of rents and taxes, etc.

The acquisition of independence in 1947 was "a great achievement of the peoples of India and Pakistan", but, owing to the policy of the Government of Pakistan "no noticeable improvement has taken place in the position of the labouring masses, including the population of Baluchistan". Agriculture remains primitive with a very low yield per acre. The irrigated area increases only slowly, while the total tilled area remains almost stable. The land registration carried out by the Pakistani Government in 1950-1 brought about no changes in land tenure in Kalat where the sardars and rulers of principalities continue to be the ultimate landlords. In former British Baluchistan the rent received by landlords from tenants has in general increased, although it varies according to area. In the tribal areas the sardar retains his old position.

[As Pakistani censuses do not give figures on a national basis Pikulin is forced to write not about the Baluchis but about Baluchistan where the Baluchis are in a minority.] Between 1931 and 1951 the number of people engaged in agriculture in Baluchistan increased while the tilled area remained stable; it follows, therefore, that the individual plots of land became smaller. Comparative rural overpopulation can be observed, especially in the north. Few peasants own or rent two acres, the minimum necessary to support a family. Consequently the number of peasants who find seasonal work in industry has grown, reaching 10,000 in 1951. As work in the towns is difficult to find and is ill-paid the worker leaves his family in the village and so preserves his title to his land. Nomads also are forced to eke out their living from other sources, which proves their growing impoverishment.

Its comparative rural overpopulation Baluchistan inherited from the British who had used Baluchistan as an operational base and had discouraged any industrial development which might have absorbed the surplus rural population. Such industries as had appeared (those of extraction, processing and transport) are very weak. Baluchistan's mineral deposits are hardly being exploited. Although oil was discovered in 1873 extraction began only recently. The only modern industrial installations are motor and railway workshops.

Skilled workers in Baluchistan total 18,904 and unskilled

(including seasonal workers who are also peasants) 22,900. There are also numbers of white-collar workers. The Baluchi working-class, national bourgeoisie and intelligentsia, therefore, are growing. However, "in spite of the appearance in Baluchistan of the first detachments of the working-class and bourgeois intelligentsia who are striving for the development of democratic institutions and the provision of democratic rights and freedoms to the population, the Baluchis still retain survivals of tribal organization."

The Baluchi areas of Pakistan formerly consisted of five districts administered by Pakistani District Officers together with the "Baluchi States' Union" (Kalat, Kharan, Makran and Las Bela) under their own feudal rulers and with a Union legislative assembly. In Baluchistan proper a movement had arisen for the unification into a single province of all regions inhabited by Baluchis (including parts of Sind, the Panjab and the North-West Frontier Province), while the Pathans of Loralai and Zhob "demand an autonomous Pashtunistan with the incorporation of these areas in it".

It was in an attempt to crush these and other national and democratic movements that the Pakistani Government in 1955 created the single province of West Pakistan, a move which "ignored the aspirations of the peoples of West Pakistan" and was resisted by the Baluchis. The mass movement against the unified province was led by the Ustaman Gall Party and led to armed clashes with Government troops. This party, as a member of the "National People's Party of Pakistan", has criticized the Government for not carrying out a policy of land reform, industrialization, the creation of linguistic states and withdrawal from military blocs.

In general since 1947 the position of the Baluchi workers has not changed. Agriculture is in a state of decay. The ruin of the peasantry continues while the possibility of migration into the towns is limited by weak industrial development. The standard of living is the lowest in Pakistan: both taxes and prices are rising while wages remain stable; the average wage for a worker in Pakistan is 6-7 rupees per week, while in Baluchistan it is 5 rupees per week. The root cause, as in the rest of Pakistan, is the dominating position in agriculture of feudal landownership.

Nevertheless the popular masses of Baluchistan are occupying an ever greater place in the battle of the workers of Pakistan for improved living conditions.

Western Baluchistan

During the First World War the area was occupied by the British.

Resistance was led by the tribal leaders who were not won over by British bribes. In 1915 the leaders of the resistance were arrested by the British and sent to India, only to escape on the way and return to their people. In 1916 mass anti-British demonstrations took place among the Damani and Baranzai tribes. In spite of defeats the resistance lasted until 1924, when it was put down by joint British and Persian forces.

When in 1925 Reza Khan became Reza Shah Pahlavi of Persia he immediately had to contend with the separatist aspirations of the tribal leaders in the outlying areas of Persia. The Baluchi sardars were informed that they would no longer be treated as independent rulers and that henceforward only Tehran's writ would run in Baluchistan. The natural result was a rising led by Dost Muhammad Khan Baranzai.

The central Government, which was confronted also with risings of the Turkmens and Kurds, entrusted an American in Persian service, Major Hall, with the task of negotiating a settlement with the Baluchis. Major Hall's attempts were successful, and Dost Muhammad Khan was made Governor of Persian Baluchistan.

By 1928 the Kurds and Turkmens had been dealt with and the Government again moved against the Baluchis. Dost Muhammad Khan, faced with artillery and aeroplanes, was defeated and the disarming of the Baluchis began. However, even though disarmed the Baluchis continued to resist. A protest of the Kukhak tribe in 1938 against customs tariffs on livestock was suppressed by armed force with the execution of 74 ringleaders.

The subjection of Baluchistan by the central Government furthered its attraction into the all-Persian market, while the development of money relations put an end to the former economic isolation of Baluchistan and furthered trade both with the other provinces of Persia and with Muscat and India.

At the same time the exploitation of the producers increased. The nomads lost their livestock and took up a settled or semi-settled way of life. A large proportion of the land was owned by the sardars who rented it to peasants on the share-cropping system and at ruinous rates. According to SEVERNAYA PERSIYA: SBORNIK KONSUL'SKIKH DOKLADOV (Moscow, 1933), a nomad oba (a temporary commune or obshchina) made 1,980 tomans per year and expended on livestock taxes, pasture taxes, hire of herdsmen, etc. 420.5 tomans. In all, excluding local and feudal taxes, each of the oba's five members received 275 tomans per year.

According to the same data a settled family of three persons with a plot of average size, a vineyard, a working ox and a cow earned in cash from the sale of produce 52 tomans, i.e. 17 tomans each. [Pikulin points out that the settled family earns one-fifth the sum earned by the individual nomad. He does not emphasize the fact that the peasant would presumably sell only what was surplus to his own requirements and that, therefore, his total income is likely to be more than his cash income. Ed. CAR.]

Between 1933 and the Second World War, with "the intensification of the burden of taxes and of feudal exploitation. . . the living conditions of the nomad herdsmen and of the settled farmers in Persia deteriorated considerably". After the war "the position of the broad labouring masses of Persia became even harder".

During and after the Second World War rents and taxes in Persia were high. Peasants who rent khalise (State) lands pay a rent of up to two-thirds of their harvest. Only in oases far from the roads does the peasant retain half his harvest. Those peasants who own small inherited plots of land in the territories of the sardars have to pay the following taxes: the penduk to the State - one-tenth of the harvest; the mulkat-e-zamin to the feudal ruler - one-fifth of the harvest; taxes to maintain the local authorities.

Peasant craftsmen are in a state of serfdom to their feudal lords and pay them a proportion of their earnings.

Although slavery was officially abolished in 1929 it existed until the most recent times: in 1939 the Baluchi sardars of the nomads of the Bent oasis had 2,000 slaves.

Persian Baluchistan, therefore, is still backward. There is no trace of industrial development. The majority of the people till the soil with implements appropriate to the Stone Age. The tribal system is still strong and within the tribes patriarchal relations still exist. The lot of the Baluchi peasants is "cruel exploitation and ignorance".

Pikulin, as is obvious from the title of the chapter, sees the recent history of both Eastern and Western Baluchistan as that of the struggle of a people against the double oppression of their own feudal rulers and foreign domination - from Tehran or Whitehall. In cases where tribal leaders head a movement against the British or the Persian

Government Pikulin normally points out that in doing so they were pursuing their own interests which differed from those of the people. Pikulin follows the well-worn Soviet line also when he denies any civilizing role to British rule. The development of capitalism, which is admitted to have been necessary, was made more "agonizing" than it would otherwise have been by the deforming influence of colonialism. As has been seen, according to Pikulin, the achievement of independence brought no change since the Government of Pakistan simply stepped into the place of the British and carried out the same policy of oppression of the national minorities. Pikulin attributes the political leadership of the Pakistani Baluchis since independence to the Ustaman Gall party within the National Party and the National People's Party of Pakistan. This marks a change from the earlier line according to which "the Baluchis are now taking part in a national democratic movement merging into the national liberation movement of the other peoples of India led by the Communist Party of India," (LARGE SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA, 2nd ed., Vol.IV (1950), article "Baluchis"). It should be noted that while his attitude towards the "national aspirations" of minorities is one of approval, neither Pikulin nor apparently any other Soviet writer has explicitly supported the Baluchi demands for a "Great Baluchistan" composed of all the areas inhabited by Baluchis.

Pikulin's picture of the state of affairs in Western Baluchistan is even gloomier. Here too he is at pains to show that as the rule of the centre became firmer the position of the Baluchi peasant and nomad deteriorated. The combination of feudal and Persian oppression has produced a country with no industry, working-class, national bourgeoisie or intelligentsia, where the people (in the words of the newspaper DEJ, 18 July 1952) "are all illiterate and live in appalling poverty. Their greatest dainty. . . is a maize cake with dates. They drink rainwater. . ." "Persian Baluchistan", Pikulin concludes, "is the most backward area of backward Persia."

III. Comment by Sir Clarmont Skrine

The following comments have been contributed by Sir Clarmont Skrine, OBE, who had intimate experience of the Baluchis both in what is now Pakistan and in Persia. He was Assistant Political Agent Marris and Bugtis 1915-16, Vice-Consul and later Consul in Kerman 1916-19, and Political Agent in Chagai 1921-2. He was Consul in Seistan 1927-29 during the Dost Muhammad Khan's revolt against the Persian Government. He carried out a long tour in the Sarhad in 1931 and was later Political Agent in Kalat 1932-5. It was while he was Consul-General in Mashhad (1942-5) that he became acquainted with Captain Pikulin.

Pikulin came as a captain in the Soviet Army to Mashhad in the summer of 1944 when the Russians began to apply pressure to Persia over the northern oil concession. He played an active part in the pro-Tudeh campaign as director of the Red Army's "cultural" (i.e. publicity and propaganda) organization. This coincided with the appointment of Abramov as Consul-General, Mashhad, and that of Maksimov, a former Consul-General, Mashhad, as Ambassador. Pikulin spoke no English but good Persian and several times tried to pump me about the southern or "British" zone which included the Baluch tribal area of the Sarhad and Persian Baluchistan. He toured about the Russian zone during 1944 and 1945 starting branches of the Tudeh party in outlying townships and tribal areas, and he also paid at least one visit to Zahedan and Khwash, but refrained from political activity there so far as I know. After my departure in July 1945 when the Russians' position in Khorasan became easier he doubtless went south again and may have made contact with anti-British refugees from Kalat, Kharan and Las Bela. These would give him a garbled account of past events and current trends in support of their (probably justified) complaints against their own khans and sardars.

I agree entirely with the editorial comment at the end of the article and would like to add the following observations:

Page 300, Eastern Baluchistan. Under the "Sandeman System" initiated in the 'nineties we did not interfere in the internal affairs of the Khan of Kalat or his sardars except to help them to restore order when necessary. The Jirga system, which Sandeman re-organized and placed under British supervision, gave the people self-government on their own traditional lines.

Pikulin's remarks on the "land-tax" in north-eastern Baluchistan presumably refer to the Quetta-Pishin district, the only area where we collected revenue and which we leased from the Khan of Kalat. That was and still is Pathan country, not Baluch.

Pages 300-1, Western Baluchistan. The account is correct on the whole. At Kerman in 1916-17 I heard a good deal about the province, the sardars of which had been rebellious for at least 30 years under the weak and corrupt rule of the last Qajar Shahs. The nominal revenue payable to the Central Government, 100,000 tomans, appeared every year in the Budget but was never realized.

Page 301, para.4. Both here and on p.305, para.1, Pikulin neglects to mention the fact that in both East and West Baluchistan unrest was fomented by German agents. In Kalat it was suppressed in 1916 by a military expedition which resulted in a tighter control over the State (the Khan of which, Mahmud, was mad) in 1917. In West Baluchistan there were no "mass demonstrations". There were no masses to demonstrate.

Page 301, para.5. Neither the 1905-7 Russian revolution (see p.300, para.5) nor the October Revolution of 1917 had the slightest effect on the Baluch. The sardars kept the tribesmen in ignorance of outside affairs, except perhaps those of the Panjab and Sind. Otherwise the statements in this paragraph are not far from the truth. During World War I there was no question of overthrowing or in any way undermining the authority of the thoroughly "feudal" sardars, except in extreme cases of oppression or misrule. But in peace-time, too, it is true that we preserved the political status quo and discouraged attempts to indoctrinate the people with liberal ideas.

Page 302, paras.2, 3. It is nonsense to say that the British authorities as well as the khans exploited the people. Neither the British nor the Indian government extracted any profit at all from Baluchistan, while the Government of India poured capital into it for public works and paid for the public services enjoyed by the Baluch.

Page 303, para.2. There was some political unrest in Quetta, Pishin and Loralai in the early days of the war, but it was confined to Panjabis, Sindhis and a few educated Pathans.

Page 305, para.2 - page 306. This account is substantially correct, though I am sure that Dost Muhammad Baranzai was never made Governor of Baluchistan. He certainly never paid any revenue. It is true that the standard of living in the province was and probably still is miserably low, but the Persians ought to be given some credit for having brought Baluchistan back into the fold. Baluchistan is of no strategic value to Persia and she cannot be expected to subsidize it as we did British Baluchistan.

Soviet Writing on the Baluchis

The following is a list of recent Soviet writing dealing with the Baluchis:

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| A.M. D'yakov | NATIONAL NYV VOPROS I ANGLIYSKIY IMPERIALIZM V INDII, Moscow, 1948. See CAR, 1957, No.2, p.181. |
| M.G. Pikulin | "The Baluchis of Pakistani Baluchistan", SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA, 1958, No.6. |
| Yu. Gankovskiy | "The National Composition of West Pakistan", in PAKISTAN: ISTORIYA I EKONOMIKA, Moscow, 1959. See CAR, 1960, No.2, p.205. |
| E.G. Gafferberg | "A Journey to the Baluchis of Turkmenia in 1958", SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA, 1960, No.1. |

THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TO PASHTUNISTAN

In CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, No.3 of 1959, there appeared in summarized form a Soviet account of the Afghan attitude on the Pashtunistan problem. As remarked by Sir Olaf Caroe in his comments to this article (pp.297-300), the Afghan material contains two themes: that a state of Pashtunistan should be carved out of Pakistan embracing only "the Pashtuns beyond the border" and stretching "from the Khyber to Dera Ghazi, from Gilgit and Chitral to the Arabian Sea"; and that when this state had been set up it would through ethnical, linguistic and other affinities naturally join Afghanistan. The argument was: "since there is no difference between us, there is no sense in our being disunited". The first of these demands, since it takes into consideration southern Baluchistan, Chitral and Gilgit, which are non-Pathan in population, can be justified only on historical grounds in that all these areas (except Gilgit) owed a loose allegiance to the Durrani Empire of Ahmad Shah (1747-73). The second claim rests on the premise that the "Pathans" of the former North-West Frontier Province are Afghans who have been torn away from their motherland by the British colonizers.

The purpose of the present article is to determine to what extent Soviet authorities support these Afghan claims (the Soviet article referred to above did not commit itself) and why.

Soviet views on the ethnographical aspect of the problem are clear and unambiguous, even if they are in some respects erroneous: the symposium NARODY PEREDNEY AZII (Moscow, 1957), section "Narody Afganistana", includes under the term "Afghans" not only the western tribes such as the Durranis, but also the Gilzais and such "Pathan" tribes as the Afridis, Wazirs and Mahsuds. The number of Afghans in Afghanistan is given as "over 6m." and it is stated that the Afghans call themselves "Pakhtane". It follows from this that their criterion is linguistic and that for the Soviet authors anyone is an Afghan who speaks Pashtu and calls himself a Pashtun. The same work states that there are 5.5m. Afghans in Pakistan "in Pashtunistan, the area inhabited by the Afghan 'independent tribes'." [In fact the population of the independent tribal areas can be roughly estimated at 2.5m. and the figure of 5.5m. can be applied only to the whole of the former North-West Frontier Province. This error reflects a common Soviet misconception.] A footnote in the same work refers to the Pathans of West

Pakistan as the "5m. Afghan population of Pashtunistan". The Soviet view, therefore, is that there is no distinction between the "Pathans" of the old North-West Frontier Province and elsewhere, what is now West Pakistan, and the "Pathans" of Afghanistan and, furthermore, that within Afghanistan itself there is no distinction between "Pathans" and Afghans. All the Pashtu-speaking peoples of the area from the Indus to Sabzawar and from Kabul to Kandahar are thus regarded as Afghans.

After Marshal Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev had returned from Afghanistan in 1955, Marshal Bulganin in a speech before the Supreme Soviet defined Pashtunistan as "a region inhabited by independent Afghan tribes". This led one to suppose (CAR, 1956, No.2, p.192) that in the Soviet view Pashtunistan was now limited to the independent non-administered tribal areas, as opposed to the administered areas. It has since appeared, however, that no such significance was to be read into Marshal Bulganin's use of the word "independent". N.A. Khalifin's "The Pashtunistan Problem" (KRATKIYE SOOBShCHENIYA INSTI-TUTA VOSTOKOVEDENIYA, No.XXV, 1959) makes it clear that Soviet authorities do not regard the Pashtunistan problem as referring only to the tribal areas.

Changes in the Soviet attitude

Soviet writers have differed about the extent of the allegiance to Afghanistan of the "Afghan tribes" of the North-West Frontier Province. L. Gordon, for example, in an article entitled "The Battle of Afghanistan against British Aggression at the End of the Nineteenth Century", which, although published in 1951 in OCHERKI PO NOVOY ISTORII STRAN SREDNEGO VOSTOKA, was written in 1947, stresses that the mountain tribes were as unwilling to accept the authority of the Amir Abdurrahman as that of Delhi, and notes that "the trade of the Pathan tribes was closely connected with India, and the British did all in their power to foster the trade of the powindah [seasonal nomads]. So, in spite of close national, cultural, religious and political ties between Afghanistan and the Pathans of the North-West Frontier Province, the latter, even by the end of the nineteenth century, were in an economic respect noticeably gravitating towards India."

In the GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA, 2nd edition, Vol.3 (1950), article "Afghanistan", I.M. Reysner refers to Abdurrahman's preparations prior to the Durand agreement of 1893 to "reunite to Afghanistan the independent Afghan tribes inhabiting the frontier belt between India and Afghanistan" and later writes of "the 5,415,000 Afghans who [in 1849 and 1893] had been torn by the British from Afghanistan".

Later articles, however, avoid giving the impression that the regions divided in 1893 by the Durand Line were not under the effective authority of the Afghan Government. N.A. Khalifin, for example, in a recent article "The Pashtunistan Problem" (KRATKIYE SOOBSHCHENIYA INSTITUTA VOSTOKOVEDENIYA, Vol.XXXV, 1959) writes that the agreement "cut away from Afghanistan the regions of Waziristan, Swat, Bajaur, etc. inhabited by Afghan tribes", and quotes the Amir Abdurrahman in his AUTOBIOGRAPHY as saying that "England has never missed an opportunity of cutting something away from Afghanistan".

Similarly the Soviet attitude towards Afghan claims regarding the tribes across the frontier has undergone a change. In Reysner's article in the SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA referred to above, there was no sympathy expressed for the Afghan Government's motives in supporting the "foreign Afghans". "In these conditions the Afghan Government, which is landowner-bourgeois and nationalist in character, while denying the right to national self-determination of the non-Afghan peoples within Afghanistan itself, supports the movement for national self-determination of the Afghans in India with the separation of their lands from Pakistan into the independent area (oblast') of Pathanistan. Afghan ruling circles, while emphasizing the national unity of the Afghans on both sides of the frontier, are taking every step to deprive the national movement of the Afghans abroad of its revolutionary, anti-feudal and anti-imperialist character."


In 1955, however, Vol.XXXII, article "Pathanistan", stated simply that the demand for the creation of this state "has found support in Afghanistan".

Yu.V. Gankovskiy in an article entitled "The National Composition of West Pakistan" (PAKISTAN: ISTORIYA I EKONOMIKA, Moscow, 1959), sketches the development of the Afghan people (narodnost') up to 1893 when it was split by the Durand Line. Had this not happened, he writes, the Afghan "people" would have developed into the Afghan "nation", and he implies that this "nation" would have included the Pathans of what is now Pakistan. In this he seems to differ from L. Gordon's opinion quoted above that even before the Durand Agreement the border tribes were becoming more closely connected economically to what was then British India than to Afghanistan, for one of the conditions necessary for the development of a nation according to the Marxist definition is a "common economic life".

The question of self-determination

From the above it seems obvious that Soviet writers support the ethnographic argument that the Pathans are in fact Afghans who find

THE PATHANS OF WEST PAKISTAN



(Adapted from map in *Agrarnyye otnosheniya v severo-zapadnoy pogranichnoy provintsii Indii*, Moscow, 1953)

themselves outside the Afghan state by an accident of history. It is regarded as self-evident that Pakistan should give them the right of national self-determination. The corresponding argument put forward by Reysner in the *ENCYCLOPAEDIA* in 1950 (see above) that the non-Afghan races of Afghanistan deserve the same right has since been dropped. Afghanistan is now regarded as the "champion of the just national rights of a part of the Afghan people torn away by the imperialists" (*NASH SOSED AFGANISTAN*, I.M. Reysner and R.T. Akhramovich, Moscow, 1956), and is absolved of any intention of putting forward a claim to the Pathan lands (N.A. Khalfin, op. cit.).

Soviet speakers have stressed that the Pashtunistan problem "cannot be correctly solved without consideration of the interests of the peoples who inhabit Pashtunistan" (speech of Marshal Bulganin in Kabul, 16 December 1955), and that the problem calls for the "application of the principle of self-determination on the basis of the UN Charter" (Joint Soviet-Afghan Communiqué, Kabul, 4 March 1960). The question, therefore, is one of the national self-determination of the "Pashtun people" and it follows from this that only those areas whose population is predominantly Pathan are envisaged as forming part of Pashtunistan. The Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan, Dr. M.S. Kapitsa, recently made it clear that Soviet experts did not consider that Pashtunistan should contain any Afghan territory when he said, in answer to the proposal of the Pakistani Foreign Minister Mr. Manzoor Qadir that a referendum should be held among the Pathans of Afghanistan: "Mr. Qadir's statement is a joke. The Pathans being the basic population of Afghanistan the question of a plebiscite on the other side does not arise." (T.14.3.60.) According to *THE TIMES* this statement caused surprise but, as has been shown, it is completely in line with the official and long held Soviet view on the ethnography of the "Afghan people". It does not appear that any Soviet spokesman has supported the wider Afghan claims to Chitral, Gilgit and Southern Baluchistan - non-Pathan areas which owed allegiance in the past to the Durrani Empire of Ahmad Shah.

Western interest

Some indication of one reason why the USSR has changed its attitude towards the Afghan position to one of qualified support can be found in a quotation from Khalfin's article already referred to, "The Pashtunistan Problem": "The problem of Pashtunistan became a weapon with which the imperialists could exert pressure on Afghanistan with the aim of forcing her to take part in the military blocs being knocked together in the Middle East. Before 1954 the USA tried persistently to use Afghan-Pakistani quarrels. . . and under the disguise of mediation strengthen American positions in these countries."

Khalfin gives an account of alleged American attempts to draw Afghanistan into a military alliance, beginning with the visit to Kabul in 1953 of Vice-President Nixon and Senator Knowland. As a result of an Afghan refusal to join the military pact between Pakistan and Turkey in 1954 the USA not only decided to support Pakistan on the Pashtunistan issue, Khalfin writes, but began to exert pressure on Afghanistan through Pakistan. An example of this pressure was Pakistan's decision to found the West Pakistan Administrative Unit and to abolish the North-West Frontier Province.

In 1954-5 British and American military specialists are alleged to have examined in detail the Khyber Pass, "the shortest route to the capital of Afghanistan" and also to have worked out plans for "an army of 100,000 men to combat the liberation movement of the peoples of Asia. In its recruitment an important role was allotted to the Pashtuns." The disorders of the 1 April 1955 in Peshawar are alleged to have been provoked by the British and Americans who "spread fantastic rumours about 'Moscow's intrigues' among the Pashtuns". The United Press correspondent in Karachi is alleged to have received on 13 April an order to fake a communication from Kabul that the USSR had promised military aid to Afghanistan in case of Pakistani or Western aggression aimed at stopping the Afghan demand for a plebiscite among the Pathans.

Khalfin gives a very one-sided account of the Afghan-Pakistani disagreements of 1955, passing on to the Soviet-Afghan Transit Agreement of June ("help was given the Afghan people by its true friend and good neighbour the Soviet Union") and the state visit of Marshal Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev during which Afghanistan first received Soviet support on the Pashtunistan issue.

The Soviet attitude to the whole question of Pashtunistan can be summarized as follows: The Soviet Government agrees in principle with the creation of a Pashtunistan which would consist of the Pashtu speaking people now living in both the settled districts and the tribal territory of Pakistan. They do not distinguish ethnically or linguistically between the Pathans living on either side of the Afghan frontier, all of whom they regard as Afghans, but they do not visualize the inclusion in Pashtunistan of any Pathans now living inside the frontiers of Afghanistan. The Russians have never declared themselves either on the subject of the wider Afghan claim to the non-Pathan areas of Chitral, South Baluchistan and Gilgit, or on that of the nature of the association of a future Pashtunistan with Afghanistan. In the past, however, they have on the one hand criticized the Afghan Government's attitude to the non-Afghan peoples inside Afghanistan (i.e. Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmens), and on the other have admitted the growing economic orientation towards Pakistan of the Pathans living outside the Afghan frontier. The sum total of overt Soviet support for the Afghan

contention about Pashtunistan thus seems to be very limited. In spite of ceasing to criticize Afghanistan on her handling of her national problems, it seems unlikely that Marxists could hold that linguistic, cultural and historical ties with Afghanistan should outweigh the Pathans' economic connections with Pakistan.

T H E E C O N O M Y O F A F G H A N I S T A N

I. Water Resources - II. Foreign Trade 1900-45 - III. Afghanistan's "Guided Economy".

A collection of 10 Soviet studies on Afghanistan has recently been issued by the Institute of Oriental Studies (AFGANSKIY SBORNIK - KRATKIYE SOOBShCHENIYA INSTITUTA VOSTOKOVEDENIYA, Vol. XXXIII, 1959). Half of these deal with various aspects of the economy of Afghanistan, and are reviewed below; the others include a study by A.A. Polyak on Buristan, and studies on archaeology, literature and linguistics (M.R. Arunova on "Some General Results of Archaeological Excavations in Lashkargah", Z.M. Kalinina on "The Imperative Mood in Modern Literary Pashtu", A.S. Gerasimova on "Conditional Clauses in Modern Literary Pashtu", and L.N. Dorofeyeva on "The Farsi Language of Afghanistan").

I. Water Resources

In an article entitled "The Study of Afghanistan's Water Resources for the Needs of Agriculture" A.D. Davydov makes use not only of Western material on this subject but also of some recent Soviet and Afghan research. Davydov has also contributed an article on "The Development of Geological and Geographical Knowledge in Independent Afghanistan"; this is mainly about Afghan technical education in these fields, but it contains a section on recent developments in the study of Afghanistan's natural resources which is relevant to the question of water resources. A list of Davydov's sources is given in an appendix to this article.

Davydov says that although according to Afghan statistics there are some 2,000 Afghans capable of taking topographical photographs, there are as yet no topographical maps and the task of photographing the whole of Afghanistan would take 50 years. Since without maps no study of the country's resources is possible, the Ministry of Mines and Industry has signed a three-year contract with the American Fairchild Company to compile by means of aerial photography maps of southern and south-western areas to scales of 1:250,000 and 1:50,000. Similar work

is to be carried out in the north with Soviet help.

The meteorological service is also developing, writes Davydov. According to the Five-Year Plan 20 meteorological stations are to be set up: two first-class stations in Kabul (to act also as a coordinating centre) and Kandahar. These centres will send up meteorological balloons with weather forecasting equipment twice daily; second-class stations are to be set up in Jalalabad, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif, Gardez and Ghazni, and third-class stations in Faizabad, Baglan, Charikar, Kunduz, Obek, Bala-Murghab, Daulatyar, Chahan Sur, Girishk, Mukur, Paghman, etc.

A summary of Davydov's article follows.

Previous research, 1923-58

Previously the role of glaciers and eternal snows in supplying Afghan rivers had been overestimated. In fact the central Hindu Kush has no snowline, and every variation in precipitation in the mountains is reflected in the foothill valleys: lack of precipitation causes dry rivers and drought; excessive precipitation causes flooded rivers and broken dams and again threatens drought. It is obvious, therefore, that organized and regular meteorological observation and forecasting is necessary for the development of Afghan agriculture. There was, however, no official meteorological service until 1939, while the fullest amateur service was that carried on by G. Iven between 1929 and 1932.

In May 1939 the Afghan Ministry of Public Works invited E. Stenz, a Polish meteorologist, to organize an Afghan meteorological service. Between 1939 and 1948 Stenz set up nine meteorological stations and carried out the first hydrometric studies of Afghan rivers. He became technical director of the Afghan meteorological service, and as a professor of Kabul University trained Afghan meteorologists and hydrologists. His meteorological stations were located at Kabul, Paghman, Jalalabad, Gardez, Ghazni, Kandahar, Girishk, Farah and Herat. A station was begun at Mazar-i-Sharif, but was never completed, so that Stenz's work contains no information on the most important of Afghanistan's arable oases. During 1948-57 difficulties in obtaining personnel and equipment caused many of the provincial stations to close down.

From 1957, with the cooperation and under the guidance of A.S. Likhmachev (USSR), a United Nations specialist, the re-establishment of stations, including that at Mazar-i-Sharif, was begun. At the time of writing meteorological stations are in operation at Jalalabad, Ghazni, Mazar-i-Sharif, Baglan, Kunduz and Herat.

Climatic conditions

Data collected by Stenz and Likhmachev on the quantity of precipitation in the main irrigated oases of Afghanistan, except those in the north, give the following picture: in the foothill deserts and semi-deserts of the south-west (Kandahar, Girishk, Farah) average annual precipitation totals 100-200mm.; in the foothill and inter-mountain valleys open to the west and south-west (Herat) the figure is a little above 200mm.; in the valleys of the centre, east and south-east - 200-300mm. on the average; the average for all the inhabited oases, therefore, is 200-300mm.

The full use of 1mm. of precipitation will yield 4-8 kilos of grain per hectare. Two hundred millimetres, therefore, will yield 800-1,600 kilos per hectare, and areas with less than 200mm. precipitation must be considered as in need of artificial irrigation. In the temperate belt this figure of 200mm. must be increased by 25-30 per cent to account for drainage loss since the crops in fact do not make full use of the available moisture.

In sub-tropical areas the rate of evaporation is very high, considerably exceeding the rate of precipitation (in Girishk - 23 times, Herat - 17 times, Jalalabad - 16 times, Kandahar - 15 times and Gardez and Kabul - 7 times).

Most precipitation occurs in the winter months of December-May under the influence of cyclones from the Atlantic, while June-November are almost entirely without precipitation, the winds being mainly continental. On the rare occasions when the Indian monsoon reaches Afghanistan it causes violent summer storms and catastrophic floods in the south-east and centre of the country. The higher the altitude and the further west the location, the earlier the winter rains occur.

Rivers

The existing meteorological stations give information on either the lower foothill sections of river basins (Jalalabad, Kandahar, Girishk, Herat, Farah) or, at best, their middle sections (Kabul, Paghman, Gardez, Ghazni). Nevertheless the upper areas of the river basins are most important in the study of the conditions of the formation of discharge.

[The article gives a full description of precipitation and its effect on the discharge of Afghan rivers, but as this seems to have been largely compiled from Western sources, it has not been included here. Ed. CAR.]

The needs of agriculture

The calculations of American agronomists of the amount of water needed to irrigate various crops in the Helmand and Argendab valleys show that the rivers are at present unable to meet the need. The demand for water occurs to a considerable extent in the autumn and winter when the water-level of the rivers is low. This demand for water after the high-water season has passed, together with losses caused by evaporation, means that in the second half of the year many Afghan rivers run dry, causing great hardship.

The needs of agriculture call for the following measures:

- (a) The organization in the Hindu Kush of stations to measure the depth of snow and so to forecast the water-level in the rivers and give warning of drought and flood.
- (b) The creation of a network of posts to study water discharge from all sources and to compile a water census so that new lands may be developed.
- (c) The regulation of the discharge of rivers by means of reservoirs to collect excess floodwater for use during the low-water period.
- (d) Improved use of subterranean water by the entrapment of springs and streams in subterranean water galleries (karez), and the wide use of pumps and artesian wells.

The necessity of posts to study water discharge has been obvious for a long time. Few observations have yet been made, but are becoming more possible with the emergence of young Afghan specialists.

E. Stenz set up six instruments for measuring the water-level in the Helmand and Argendab rivers and others. Regular measurements on these rivers have been carried out since 1946 by engineers of the Morison Knudsen Company. During 1956-7 Soviet specialists carried out hydrometric observations on the river Kunduz at Pul-i-Khumri, on the river Panjsher-Kabul at Naglu and Darmta, on the river Jilga at Sarda and on the river Paltu at Paltu.

The value of reservoirs has been shown by results. In the 1920s a reservoir and dam were built in Budkhak and several similar installations were started in central Afghanistan in the 1930s.

After the war the Morison Knudsen Company began building two dams

on the Helmand and Argendab rivers. Although colossal sums have been spent, the dams are not yet finished. The land to be irrigated has been found to be saline, which is due partly to failure to provide a system of drainage to combat the rise of soil-water through excessive irrigation and partly to bad preliminary work. American companies, in any case, "care much more about profit than about the future use by the Afghans of the irrigation installations".

At present six dams and reservoirs are working at Gazi, Siraj, Surkhab, Karga, Argendab and Kajakai with a total capacity of 2,833m. cubic metres and a total irrigated area of 344,600 hectares. The Five-Year Plan provides for dams, reservoirs and hydroelectric stations on the rivers Panjsher-Kabul, Kunduz, Kokch, etc. Some are being built with Soviet financial and technical aid.

II. Foreign Trade 1900-45

The collection of studies on Afghanistan referred to above included an article by N.M. Gurevich on "Afghanistan's Trade during the Second World War". Gurevich had already reviewed Afghan foreign trade during the period 1900-39 in VNESHNAYA TORGOVLYA AFGANISTANA DO VTOROY MIROVOY VOYNY, IVL AN/SSR, Moscow, 1959. The following summary of Gurevich's account of the whole period is based on these two works.

Anglo-Russian trade rivalry in Afghanistan, 1900-17

The Amir Abdurrahman had limited trade with India, which was expensive and had made it difficult for exports from India to compete with those from Russia in the Afghan market. Consequently British imports began to reach Afghanistan through Persia via Quetta-Nushki-Seistan. However, even after the construction of the Quetta-Nushki railway, this route remained prohibitively expensive.

On Abdurrahman's death in 1901 and the accession of Habibullah, Anglo-Afghan relations improved. With the relaxation of trade restrictions the turnover of Indian-Afghan trade increased from 10,620,000 Indian rupees in 1901 to 20,952,000 rupees in 1907.

These relaxations applied also to Russia but to a lesser extent, and Habibullah soon raised import duties on Russian goods and forbade the export of certain goods to Russia. As a result between 1901 and 1907 Russian-Afghan trade turnover increased only from 4,149,000 rubles to 5,139,000 rubles. In 1907, 73 per cent of all Afghan trade passed over the Indian border, only 23 per cent over the Russian.

By the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 Russia officially recognized Afghanistan as outside her sphere of influence and Britain agreed to Anglo-Russian equality in the Afghan market. Habibullah, however, refused to accept this and import duties on the Indian border remained lower than on the Russian.

In 1913 on the completion of the Bukhara-Termez railway Russia again demanded equality with Britain in Afghan trade. Faced with the German threat Britain was willing to make concessions, but negotiations were first held up by disagreement on the status of Herat and were then stopped by the outbreak of war.

At this time Britain monopolized the Afghan market to the south of the Hindu Kush and Russia to the north. Neither country allowed the transit of foreign goods across its territory into Afghanistan. Trade in both directions across the Russian border increased from 4,245,000 Indian rupees during 1896-1900 to 18,200,000 Indian rupees during 1911-15, and the percentage of the total Afghan trade passing over this border increased over the same period from an average of 28 to one of 38. Trade over the Indian frontier increased over the same period from 10,682,000 Indian rupees to 29,181,000, and the average percentage decreased from 72 to 62.

In 1915 the Tsarist Government again demanded special rights in Afghanistan. The British Government, alarmed by the talks which were taking place between Habibullah and the Germans, seemed about to make concessions. The October Revolution, however, broke off "the deal between the two rapacious imperial powers".

The development of Soviet-Afghan trade, 1917-39

"The October Revolution of 1917. . . put an end to the policy of plunder both within Russia and in relation to other countries. In the first days of its existence the Soviet Republic proclaimed and began to put into effect the principle of the equality of rights of all countries and peoples, large and small. Proceeding from this the USSR has always given and continues to give all possible assistance to colonial and dependent countries in their battle for political independence and economic self-sufficiency, and both now and in the past has come out against the exploitation of these countries by the imperialists. Therefore the policy of the Soviet Union. . . has been . . . directed at 'cooperation in developing the economy of these neighbouring countries, the raising of their culture and the development of their own industry' (A.S. Mikoyan, "The Monopoly of the Foreign Trade and Import of the USSR", ENTSIKLOPEDIYA SOVETSKOGO IMPORTA, Vol.I, Moscow, 1929). This was and has remained the policy of the Soviet

Union in relation to Afghanistan also, to whom our country has constantly given much political and economic aid."

During 1917-19 trade between Afghanistan and Russia ceased: northern Afghanistan suffered acute shortages of manufactured consumer goods and amassed reserves of such exports as cotton, wool, karakul and carpets which could not be exported to India because of the expense. This expense and the fact that northern Afghanistan was near the Central Asian railway system and that the Soviet Union was a more reliable and stable market than the capitalist countries made it possible to renew and develop Soviet-Afghan trade in the 1920s in spite of the break during the Civil War.

During the period 1920-5 Soviet-Afghan trade remained inconsiderable: whereas the pre-war turnover had been 12,245,000 rubles, in 1925 it was 2,122,000 rubles, mostly Afghan exports.

Between 1925 and 1929, however, the Soviet Government abolished import licences and abolished or reduced import duties on Afghan goods, and Soviet-Afghan trade revived. By 1927-8 the pre-war level had been reached and the USSR for the first time had a credit trade balance with Afghanistan. The development of trade, however, was hampered by the lack of good roads in northern Afghanistan and the high customs duties which the Amir Amanullah continued to set upon Soviet goods. Negotiations on a Soviet-Afghan trade agreement were at last making progress when Amanullah was killed.

During 1929-33 the Bachha-Saqao episode and the slump curtailed trade with the West and brought about a further expansion of Soviet-Afghan trade. During the late 1930s Afghan national trading capital was concentrated and centralized in sherkats (lit. companies), a move which was met with hostility by Britain but with encouragement by the USSR. Soviet trading organizations, in their dealings with the sherkats, followed the principle of supporting them and making their future activity possible.

During 1936-9, with the re-establishment of the net-balance system which had been dropped during the slump, world trading prices changed again in Afghanistan's favour. The Afghan sherkats, strengthened by the presence at their back of a guaranteed Soviet market and supply of Soviet goods, began to make agreements direct with the trading agents of European countries, by-passing Indian middlemen. The Soviet share of Afghan foreign trade grew from 7 per cent in 1924-5 to 17 per cent in 1933-4 and 24 per cent in 1938-9.

Soviet-Afghan trade, 1939-45

During the Second World War the USSR ceased to import Afghan wool and cotton and to export her cotton cloth and sugar to Afghanistan. During this period also the following rise took place in export and import prices:

	<u>39-40</u>	<u>40-1</u>	<u>41-2</u>	<u>42-3</u>	<u>43-4</u>	<u>44-5</u>
General export index:	100	118	120	275	265	201
General import index:	100	99	176	374	432	368

Thus while between the wars export prices grew faster than import prices, owing to the favourable influence of trade with the USSR, during the war this trend was reversed.

During the second half of the war the price of Afghanistan's imports was more than twice that of India's. India was able to use her position as a monopoly exporter to Afghanistan to put obstacles in the way of her foreign trade. This would not have been possible had not Afghanistan's trade relations with other countries, especially with the USSR, been broken.

The structure of Afghan foreign trade, 1900-1945

(a) Imports: Cotton cloth: Up to 1939 this was Afghanistan's most important import. At the beginning of the 20th century cotton cloth began to be imported from Russia, which thus broke the monopoly hitherto held by cotton coming across the Indian border. Imports from Russia increased from 134 tons in 1899-1900 to 1,750 tons in 1913-14, half the import from India in that year. As a result of the First World War imports from Russia decreased slightly, while those from India increased.

With the Revolution imports over the Russian border came to a temporary stop. At the same time the cost of cotton imports from India increased and their amount fell from 3,607 tons in 1914 to 1,473 in 1921-2. With the price collapse which followed the crisis of 1921, however, cotton imports from India rose (3,302 tons in 1924-5). Imports from the USSR, reached their pre-war level only in 1931-2 and by 1936 were up to 2,892 tons.

Although the slump decreased the amount of imports from India her place was taken by Japan and the USSR lost ground to the capitalist powers in Afghan cotton cloth imports: in 1937-8 the USSR's share of the market was 41 per cent, and in 1938-9 was 36 per cent.

During the period 1914-39, although cotton prices fell, imports into Afghanistan increased only slightly because (a) the domestic weaving and spinning industries continued to develop, (b) the Afghan Government controlled the import of cotton cloth, and (c) imports of woollen, silk and synthetic textiles increased.

The German invasion of the USSR and the war against Japan left India as Afghanistan's sole supplier of cotton cloth. Exports from India, however, were controlled and, although Afghan imports from Persia grew, total imports fell from 69.5m. metres in 1939 to 40.6m. metres in 1945.

Oil products: Before the 1920s Afghanistan imported only kerosene for lighting purposes. Only when roads and motor vehicles appeared did the import of petrol begin. In 1937-8, 1,569,000 gallons of petrol were imported, 1,120,000 of them from capitalist countries (Burma and Persia).

With the war imports from Burma stopped, while those from Persia increased until after 1942 all Afghanistan's petrol imports were coming from Persia through India. In that year export controls in India caused Afghanistan's imports to fall. There was a sharp shortage of petrol in Afghanistan; prices rose by 24 per cent and were prevented from rising further only by the development of Persian production and the contraction of its market.

Sugar: Before the 20th century all Afghanistan's sugar was imported from India and was very expensive. From the end of the 19th century, however, imports from Russia caused the price of sugar in Afghanistan to fall, which in its turn caused an increase in imports from India and from Russia. Imports from Russia, which totalled 1,610 tons in 1913-14 and fell to 14 tons in 1924-5, reached equality with imports over the Indian border in 1937-8 (9,900 tons) and remained at approximately the same level during the next year, although imports over the Indian border fell to 3,884 tons. By the end of the 1930s the bulk of the sugar imported over the Indian border came from Java.

In 1941 supplies ceased both from the Soviet Union and from Java, and India became Afghanistan's only source of sugar. The introduction of the quota system and, more important, the rise in sugar prices and the development of an Afghan sugar industry with a mill at Baglan, caused imports to drop to 892 tons in 1942-3 (12,270 in 1941-2).

Equipment and motor vehicles: Equipment and machinery were rarely imported before the 1930s. Purchases subsequently increased and became comparatively regular. Most machinery was imported from the

capitalist countries, mainly from Germany (69 per cent). The USSR equipped one cotton-cleaning mill at Kunduz.

Motor vehicles first appeared in Afghanistan in the early years of the century, but were not imported in any appreciable numbers until 1925. Between 1932 and 1939 the number of cars in Afghanistan increased from 400 to 3,100. The majority of Afghanistan's motor vehicles were supplied by Britain (48 per cent) and America (39 per cent). During the war imports of both equipment and motor vehicles dropped sharply and became irregular.

Tea: Before the 19th century most of Afghanistan's tea had come from China and was very expensive. During the late 19th and 20th centuries, however, the cheaper Indian tea began to make inroads on the Chinese monopoly. Imports grew with falling prices and increased demand. Of the 1,497 tons imported in 1939, 50 per cent was Chinese, 30 per cent Japanese and 20 per cent Indian.

In 1941 India became Afghanistan's sole supplier of tea. Afghan imports rose as did Indian prices; the latter reached 117 per cent of the 1939 figure in 1944 but fell to 80 per cent of this figure in 1945. In Afghanistan, however, over the period 1939-45 prices rose by 142 per cent.

(b) Exports: Karakul: During the first half of the 19th century Afghan karakul (Persian lamb) had been exported to Europe mainly via Persia. Later, however, Bukhara became the main market through which it reached Europe. The Amir Abdurrahman, in an attempt to free himself from Russian middlemen, declared the export of karakul his own monopoly and tried to deal direct with London. This attempt failed, however, because of the low quality of Afghan karakul. By the end of the 19th century approximately 80,000 fleeces annually were exported to Russia. This figure increased at the beginning of the 20th century, with Russian trade expansion in Afghanistan and an increase in world karakul prices, to 150,000 fleeces, with smuggling accounting for another 150,000.

The First World War caused a drop in Russian exports of karakul and consequently a drop in Afghan exports to Russia. Afghan karakul, however, continued to reach Europe via Mashhad, although in reduced quantities.

The Russian Revolution and Civil War caused exports to Bukhara to stop altogether. However, the Afghan karakul industry gained by the acquisition of 300-400,000 head of pure-bred karakul sheep which were driven into Afghanistan by defeated Central Asian tribal leaders. These sheep improved the quality of Afghan karakul and the skill of their

owners improved Afghan breeding and preparation techniques. Afghanistan resumed export of karakul in the second half of the 1920s.

Although Afghanistan was the largest single supplier of karakul the influence of British and American middlemen caused her to receive less than the market price for her produce. Only in 1928 did Afghanistan open a trade agency in London. Large-scale exports to the USSR began under the influence of the revolts of 1928-30, the closing of the Kabul-Peshawar railway and the slump. By 1928-9 exports to the USSR had reached the pre-war level and continued to grow. Exports to India, Europe and America began to increase again in 1931.

In 1934 the monopoly of the export of Afghan karakul was given to the Afghan National Bank and its sherkats: the right to export was restricted to Afghan citizens.

As a result of the expulsion of foreign capital from the export of karakul, the presence of an assured market in the USSR and the rise of karakul prices in the capitalist world brought about an increase in karakul production. Exports rose from 906,500 fleeces in 1932-3 to 2,280,300 in 1939-40. Exports were limited by bad natural conditions in Afghanistan, which caused high mortality rates among karakul sheep, and by inexpert skinning and preparation of the fleeces.

With the outbreak of sea warfare in 1940 London lost its place as the world's chief fur-market. Afghan karakul already in London was sent on to New York, which from 1940 became its only market. In spite of the decrease in the demand for Afghan karakul wholesale prices rose from \$6 per fleece in 1939 to \$11.70 in 1945, a sharper rise than that shown by the general index of wholesale prices in America.

Fruit and nuts: Export of Afghan fruit and nuts began (to India) in the second half of the 19th century. These exports grew with the advance of the railway to Peshawar and Quetta. Exports to Russia began at the beginning of the 20th century, and before the First World War accounted for 2,000 of the average annual export of 9,000 tons.

After the war exports to Russia stopped, while those to India remained stable. Fruit and nuts were two of the few Afghan exports whose value increased to keep pace with the rising cost of imports, and their export consequently increased. The introduction on Indian railways of refrigerated wagons made the export of fresh fruit on a large scale possible for the first time.

In 1934 a semi-monopoly on the export of fruit and nuts from Kandahar province was given to the "Pashtun" sherkat, which sold its

fruit and nuts through a trade representative in Chaman. This system resulted in higher prices and was extended to other Indian cities. By 1939 exports reached 46,512 tons.

In 1938, however, Indian traders in retaliation for the exclusion of Indian middlemen from the export of Afghan fruit and nuts declared a boycott on these goods, and by 1940 prices were only 50 per cent of their 1937 level. The "Meva" sherkat was ruined and the "Pashtun" sherkat stopped paying dividends. This damaged the interests not only of the Afghan bourgeoisie but also of the Afghan peasant.

The war stopped exports to all countries except India (exports to Germany had been growing). Attempts to export dried fruit to America were unsuccessful. Prices in India increased, but transport difficulties caused a slight drop in exports, which most affected the northern provinces: Herat sherkats tried to export to Persia.

During the Second World War Afghanistan established a kind of monopoly on the export of fruit and nuts by coordinating the activity of exporters and making them all sell their goods through the Afghan trade delegation in Peshawar.

Wool: The growth of the British wool industry led to a great increase in Afghan wool exports through India. Exports to Russia also began at the end of the 19th century. Rising prices and demand on the eve of the First World War caused exports of wool to these countries to reach dimensions never surpassed: in 1915-16 exports to Russia totalled 4,400 tons, to India 9,200 tons.

After the war the inability of wool prices to keep pace with the rising cost of imports and the curtailment of trade with Russia led to a drop in wool exports. Prices rose, however, in 1925-9 and exports to Russia reached their 1915 level, where they remained stable until 1939, although exports to India fell again. Consequently before the Second World War the USSR was the main importer of Afghan wool, paying higher prices than India and giving in exchange high quality manufactured goods. Other countries imported only a small quantity of Kandahar wool, which was sufficiently valuable to make its export to India and abroad profitable.

During the war exports to the USSR ceased and average exports to the capitalist world rose to 5,000 tons annually. However, prices in India, already lower than in the USSR, failed even to keep pace with world prices.

Cotton: Afghanistan began to export cotton to Russia at the end of the 19th century, importing cotton manufactured goods in

exchange. In 1915 exports to Russia reached 4,539 tons. When the Civil War stopped export to Russia hardly any cotton was exported as export to India was too expensive to be profitable. As a result the domestic spinning and weaving trades developed to meet Afghanistan's need for cotton textiles. Exports of cotton to, and of cotton textiles from, the USSR reached pre-war levels only in 1931-2.

Meanwhile the Afghan Government, with the help of the USSR, was taking steps to improve the quality of Afghan cotton and in particular to develop the cultivation of long-staple cotton, and it achieved such success that in 1939 cotton was exported to Germany, as well as to India and Japan.

In 1939 export to Europe by sea stopped. Afghan cotton, however, continued to reach the USSR and, through the USSR, Germany. After 1941 and the failure of trade talks with Japan, India remained Afghanistan's sole market.

Afghan exports to India rose from approximately 6,000 tons in 1939 to 7,000 tons in 1941. Transport difficulties and shortage of petrol, however, caused exports to fall to 2,500 tons in 1942 and 3,000 tons in 1945. The area under cotton in Afghanistan contracted until it was just able to meet the growing Afghan demand. Consequently Afghanistan did not accumulate large reserves of unsold cotton.

III. Afghanistan's "Guided Economy"

Two other articles in the AFGANSKIY SBORNIK refer to economic questions. N.I. Chernyakhovskaya in "The Economic Policy of the Afghan Government, 1953-7" notes with disapproval that the Afghan Government has begun to attract foreign capital investment in mining, public works, agriculture and transport, and considers that such foreign capital investment, even when as strictly controlled as it is in Afghanistan, is "pregnant with dangers of imperialist enslavement". She also emphasizes the alleged superiority of Socialist aid as being "more serious" and as forcing the capitalist countries to offer more favourable terms than they otherwise would.

As foreign capital is acting, she writes, more and more as State-monopoly capital the Afghan Government is forced to interfere in the country's economy to protect Afghan national capital which is still weak. This new course of State capitalism was revealed most clearly with Muhammad Daud's appointment to the post of Prime Minister in 1953 and his support in 1954 of a "guided economy".

The aim of Afghanistan's guided economy, writes Chernyakhovskaya, is "to secure the national capital's profits, development and entrenchment with the help of the State". She notes that the State has entered the field of banking with the Dy Afghanistan Bank, which has taken over the dominating position previously occupied by the Afghan National Bank. A number of specialized semi-State banks have appeared, 51 per cent or more of whose capital belongs to the Dy Afghanistan Bank. Foreign trade also is monopolized by State institutions and Government-controlled large companies.

Yu.M. Golovin, also, in "Some Features of the Development of Industry in Afghanistan" notes the growth of State capitalism in Afghanistan, especially after Muhammad Daud's election in 1953, and accounts for it in the same way. In his conclusion, however, he writes that the Afghan State has been protecting national capital for 40 years, and points out that Afghanistan up to 1956 had allowed no foreign capital investment in Afghan industry, and that modern factory-type industry in Afghanistan had been built mainly with Government funds because of the weakness of the Afghan national bourgeoisie. Even when the government began to sell State undertakings to private capital it retained its hold on the extraction industries and established control over the sherkats.

APPENDIX

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S I N K I A N G

The Collectivization of Agriculture

A recent study by G. Bakhamov, "The Collectivization of Agriculture in the Sinkiang-Uyghur Autonomous Rayon of the Chinese People's Republic" (TRUDY AN/KAZ. SSR, SEKTOR VOSTOKOVEDENIYA, Vol.I, Alma-Ata, 1959), affords an example of the Soviet attitude towards developments in Sinkiang under the Communist regime. The attitude is one of uniform approval, but mistakes made by the Communist authorities, and their rectification, are duly noted.

Bakhamov begins with a survey of land tenure in Sinkiang before the province's "liberation" by the Communist forces. In a country, he writes, where 88 per cent of the population is engaged in agriculture on the average 50 per cent of the land was in the hands of 5-6 per cent of the population. In the farming, as opposed to the livestock-breeding areas, eight per cent of the population owned 80 per cent of the land.

Consequently, he writes, the first problem was to redistribute the land. Landowners and kulaks were deprived of all land except that which they worked themselves and of all working animals, implements, living accommodation and grain surplus to their own needs. This land reform, which did not affect the livestock-breeding areas, was completed by 1952.

Meanwhile the process of collectivization had begun in 1950 with the formation of "Labour Mutual Aid Brigades", the members of which owned the means of production privately but agreed to share them. During the formation of these brigades, Bakhamov writes, "left-wing mistakes" were made. Some organizers recruited the brigades by force, others tried to create brigades in which land, tools, etc. were owned in common and wages were paid according to labour, and yet others, against the Party's instructions, formed brigades according to class or national criteria. These tendencies were checked in 1953.

In 1953 the peasants of Sinkiang began to demand that their brigades should be made into collectives. The Government published regulations governing the conversion, and the change began. In 1955,

however, Mao Tse-tung criticized right-wing views which were slowing down collectivization and called for the completion of collectivization within the next few years. This appeal was followed by the voluntary transformation into collectives of the majority of brigades, both within Sinkiang and elsewhere, and by the spread of the collectivization movement to peasants who were not members of brigades. During this stage the official attitude towards the kulaks changed from one of "preservation" to one of "limitation and gradual liquidation".

During 1957 the transformation was completed from collectives of lower type (where a limited degree of private property in the means of production was allowed) to those of higher type (where all the means of production were communal property and wages were distributed according to labour). By October of that year 95.49 per cent of all peasant households were members of collectives of the higher type.

Meanwhile in the livestock breeding areas the creation of "Labour Mutual Aid Brigades" had begun in 1955. During 1956 a mass campaign for collectivization was carried out and, according to Bakhamov, made use only of propaganda methods. The formation of collectives of the lower type was completed by autumn of 1958.

The campaign for collectivization was helped by the example of its advantages given by the State collectives, including some manned by units of the Chinese Army, and by the State loans which are given first of all to peasants who are members of collectives. The "fraternal help" of the Soviet Union to the peoples of Sinkiang was "invaluable" and between 1950 and 1956 totalled 1,066 tractors, 140 combines, and 4,000 tractor-ploughs, seed-drills, cultivators, etc. Soviet specialists helped in the construction of irrigation installations and gave instructions in the use of new machines and in new agricultural techniques. "Finally the successes of the collectivization movement are explained by the fact of. . . the unprecedented revolutionary activity of the peasant masses themselves."

Collectivization, Bakhamov claims, has increased productivity several times. Between 1955 and 1956 the number of livestock in Sinkiang grew by 7.26 per cent.

T H E B O R D E R L A N D S I N T H E S O V I E T P R E S S

Below are reviewed reports on the Borderlands countries appearing in Soviet newspapers and periodicals received during the period 1 April - 30 June 1960. The Editors regret that owing to the large amount of material it has been found impracticable to continue the coverage of Soviet reports on India.

T H E U - 2 I N C I D E N T

In its Note of 10 May to the US Government the Soviet Government stated that the route of the US reconnaissance aircraft shot down by Soviet rocket forces near Sverdlovsk had been Peshawar - Aral Sea - Sverdlovsk. Subsequent Soviet comment on the incident assumed that the aircraft had violated Afghan territory. Y. Korovin ("Aerial Espionage and International Law", INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, No.6 of 1960) said that "in sending an American plane on an intelligence mission to the USSR via Afghanistan, without the knowledge and consent of the Soviet and Afghan Governments, the United States deliberately violated the sovereignty of two UN member states."

Afghan reactions to the incident were promptly ascertained. In answer to questions by a Tass correspondent (PRAVDA 12.5.60) the Afghan Foreign Minister Muhammad Naim said that the USA's "aggressive activities" could lead to war, that a state which offered its territory for such aggressive acts was an accomplice in aggression, and that the Afghan Government intended to protest to both the US and the Pakistan Governments. PRAVDA reported on 19 May that the protests in question had been made. Afghan press comment denouncing the American "aggression against Afghanistan" was reported in the Soviet press.

PRAVDA published the texts of the Soviet Notes to Pakistan of 14 May and 22 June, which accused the Pakistan Government of "complicity" in the flight of the US reconnaissance aircraft over Soviet territory. The first of these Notes declared that the Soviet Union had the means to "render harmless military bases used for the commission of aggressive acts against the Soviet Union"; the second Note said that in the event of further "provocative flights" the Soviet Government, to protect the security of the Soviet people, would "be compelled to take appropriate measures not excluding strikes at the bases used to carry out such flights."

An article in the Pakistani JANG condemning the U-2 incident was quoted in KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA of 4 June. JANG said that Marshal Malinovskiy's strictures on this violation of Soviet air space were fully justified, and that the dispatch of further "espionage aircraft" over Soviet territory by the USA or its allies would be "the gravest crime".

AFGHANISTAN

The Afghan Premier Muhammad Daud, accompanied by his wife, arrived in the Soviet Union from Vienna on 15 April for a holiday and to continue medical treatment. In addition to formal meetings with Soviet leaders in Moscow, he was entertained by Khrushchev at his dacha at Gagra on the Black Sea coast. He left for Kabul on 21 May.

Afghanistan's National Day, 27 May, was marked by festive meetings in Moscow and Tashkent devoted to Soviet-Afghan friendship. In special articles on the 42nd anniversary of Afghan independence PRAVDA, PRAVDA VOSTOKA and BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY reviewed Afghanistan's friendly relations with the USSR during this period, emphasized the part being played by the USSR in building up the Afghan economy, and, in particular, praised Afghanistan's foreign policy. Yermolayev, in PRAVDA, said that the Afghans themselves called their policy one of neutrality, but in fact it was very different from "the passive contemplation of international events"; it was a policy of "active participation in the fight for peace and for the liquidation of colonialism and the imperialist plundering of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America".

Under the heading "Pashtunistan Wants to be Free" TRUD of 3 June published a report of a tribal jirga held "in one of the regions of Pashtunistan", at which tribal representatives declared their resolve to continue the struggle for the freedom of Pashtunistan, and expressed their gratitude to the Afghan Government and people for its aid. IZVESTIYA of 7 June published an account of a speech by the Afghan Premier condemning references to the Pashtunistan issue made in a speech by Mr. Macmillan in the House of Commons. Mr. Macmillan, said Muhammad Daud, had spoken in defence of the Durand line; but the Afghan Government considered that this line, "imposed by force", was not the line of demarcation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and it would never concede that Pashtunistan was part of the territory of Pakistan, as Mr. Macmillan had declared it was.

NEPAL

The results of the Sino-Nepalese discussions in Peking, which led to an agreement on frontier questions and an agreement on Chinese economic aid to Nepal, were acclaimed in the Soviet press (CAR, 1960, No.2, p.229). NEW TIMES (No.14 of 1960) observed: "Judging by Western press comment, successful completion of the Sino-Nepalese negotiations has come as a disappointment to those who want to incite enmity between countries with differing systems. But everyone who favours international peace, friendship and détente will welcome these agreements as one more step towards these goals." The subsequent visit of Chou En-lai to Nepal, during which a Sino-Nepalese "treaty of peace and friendship" was signed, was fully reported in the Soviet press.

According to a Tass dispatch of 10 May (KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA 12.5.60) a group of Soviet specialists had completed a preliminary reconnaissance in various regions of Nepal and had decided on the sites for the erection of a hydroelectric station, a sugar factory and a tobacco factory, under the Soviet-Nepalese economic aid agreement. Work on the projects would begin towards the end of this year. Meanwhile, according to the HINDUSTAN TIMES, Soviet-Nepalese trade was increasing; a first consignment of Soviet goods was expected in Nepal in June, including motor-cars, bicycles, clocks and watches and electrical equipment.

PERSIA


PRAVDA of 15 May published the Soviet Note warning Persia of the consequences of possible violation of Soviet air-space, in connexion with the CENTO military and air force manoeuvres of 14-18 May. The Note said that the US Government had "proclaimed as its state policy the infringement of the sovereignty and inviolability of the frontiers of other states, as well as espionage and diversion", and therefore to allow such a state to make use of the air-space of countries bordering the USSR could only be considered as a hostile act against the USSR and a contravention of Soviet-Persian treaties, and in particular the Soviet-Persian treaty of 26 February 1921.

The death sentences passed on five "Azarbaijani democrats" on 4 May, and the sentences of life imprisonment passed on 17 others, were the occasion for long articles in Soviet newspapers denouncing the Shah's regime (IZVESTIYA 12.5.60; PRAVDA 1.6.60; TRUD 3.6.60). Those sentenced, it was noted, had been accused of preparing a "Communist plot", and of having links with foreign states; but in fact their only crime was to defend the national independence of their country. There

was not a single year of the present Shah's reign that had not been marked by savage reprisals against the population, beginning with the brutal reprisals against Azarbaijani and Kurdish democrats in the first years of his reign.

Soviet comments on the military coup in Turkey suggested that the next convulsion might well take place in Persia. A. Leonidov, in *NEW TIMES*, No.22 of 1960, made a virulent attack on the Shah and the Persian ruling class ("an utterly corrupt court clique"). Greed for oil profits and "fear of the awakening people", said Leonidov, had "made these high-placed adventurers agree to turn Persia into a doomed outpost of the CENTO war bloc"; but the people of Persia were silent no longer, and "only the blind and the deaf can fail to perceive the portents of a storm".

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In addition, the *REVIEW* analyses past and current Soviet publications on the countries bordering on or adjacent to these republics, namely, Persia, Afghanistan, the Indian sub-continent, Tibet and Sinkiang.

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Abbreviations

Abbreviations used in the Review when referring to the Soviet Academies of Sciences, and to newspapers and periodicals etc. employed as sources, are as follows :-

AN/SSSR	Akademiya Nauk (Academy of Sciences) of USSR
AN/Az. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Azerbaydzhan SSR
AN/Kaz. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Kazakh SSR
AN/Kirg. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Kirgiz SSR
AN/Tad. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Tadzhik SSR
AN/Turk. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Turkmen SSR
AN/Uzb. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Uzbek SSR
SAGU	Sredneaziatskiy Gosudarstvennyy Universitet (Central Asian State University)
BR	Bakinskiy Rabochiy
IZ	Izvestiya
KP	Kazakhstanskaya Pravda
K	Kommunist
KT	Kommunist Tadzhikistana
KZ	Krasnaya Zvezda
NT	New Times
P	Pravda
PV	Pravda Vostoka
SK	Sovetskaya Kirgiziya
SU	Soviet Union
TI	Turkmenskaya Iskra
VVS	Vedemosti Verkhovnogo Soveta

CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

VOL. VIII, NO.1

EDITORIAL

The holding of the XXVth International Congress of Orientalists in Moscow marks an important stage in the history of Soviet oriental studies and of Soviet oriental policies in general. If its impact on the various participants and on the world at large was considerably less than the Soviet Government had anticipated, this was certainly not due to any lack of effort on the part of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. The Congress was given very considerable advance publicity in the Soviet press and frequent meetings of ministerial officials and orientologists -- one report said every month since 1958 -- were held to consider the various organizational aspects of the Congress. Apart from the absence of any kind of common room where delegates could meet each other socially, the administrative arrangements made inside the University for the plenary and special sessions were adequate. That the arrangements made by Intourist fell far short of requirements and evoked loud and frequent complaints, particularly from Western scholars, must be attributed partly to the absence of facilities in Moscow for the accommodation of such a large party of people with widely varying tastes and standards.

Before the Congress there had been some speculation on how the Russians would handle it. Those familiar with Soviet publications on the official attitude to oriental studies and on the part which they ought to play in exposing imperialism and colonialism as practised outside, but not inside, the Soviet Union thought it probable that the XXVth Congress would be less academic than its predecessors and would be given a political angle. Expressions of this opinion brought angry protests from the Soviet sympathizers in Britain and particularly from those whose ignorance of the Russian language prevented them from reading Soviet publications.

In the event, the Congress was given a very definite political setting. In the report in PRAVDA of the opening plenary session it

was remarked that "until recently oriental studies have seemed to be a purely academic science far removed from present-day problems. Today this science finds itself in the thick of current events and this constitutes one of the distinguishing features of the present Congress." This theme was amplified in Mikoyan's opening speech which was almost wholly political and dealt largely with the national liberation movements of the East. In an interview given to PRAVDA on 9 August, B.G. Gafurov, Director of the newly-named Institute of the Peoples of Asia and Africa, was asked to say what the contribution of Soviet orientalists would be. He replied inter alia: "The works of Soviet scientists unmask the false theories of the apologists of colonialism. To groundless hypotheses about 'the white man's mission' and 'the organic backwardness of the East' we oppose the historic truth about the East." Any further confirmation which participants in the opening plenary session might have required about the extent to which Soviet scholarship is harnessed to policy could be found in the inscription which confronted them in the vast auditorium of Moscow University during the plenary sessions. It read as follows: "A Leninist cannot simply be a specialist in his favourite branch of science. He must at the same time be a political and social scientist with a lively interest in the destiny of his country. He must be familiar with the laws of social development and be able to use those laws; he must be an active participant in the political leadership of his country."

By far the most startling event of the Congress was the absence of any representation from the Chinese People's Republic. Soviet advance publicity had spoken of the presence of many hundreds of Chinese scholars as one of the respects in which the Congress would differ from previous ones when only a few Chinese from Formosa had been present. Throughout the opening and closing plenary sessions there was no Soviet mention of the Chinese People's Republic and no reason was given for the absence of its representatives. It is of course possible that the Soviet organizers, not to speak of some of the Asian delegations, may have been relieved at not having to cope with the many problems which a large Chinese delegation would have presented.

It is difficult to speak of the general effect of the Congress on the various participants with any degree of precision. The main Soviet effort was naturally directed towards the Asians and Africans whose number apart from the 115 representatives from the Soviet Eastern Republics, made up only about 15 per cent of the total of members mentioned in the official list. They may well have been impressed by the fine University buildings, by the special attention paid to them, and by the well-organized concerts of oriental songs, dances, and recitations. It is also probable that they were impressed with the wide range of the subjects on which Soviet scholars read papers and by the fact that, unlike those of the Western delegations, a large part

of them dealt with current Asian and African topics. Soviet proficiency in the modern forms of Asian and African languages, too, must have had its effect. But the Soviet organizers were also clearly anxious to please and impress Western orientalists and here they were much less successful. There were many criticisms of Soviet papers as elementary, unoriginal, and as containing too much propaganda. A notable example of the last was the paper read by A.Kh. Babakhodzhayev on "The 1919 Afghan War for Independence". This paper was delivered in Russian and translated sentence by sentence into Pashtu for the benefit of the half-dozen Afghans present, not all of whom seemed to be Pashtu speakers. The whole procedure had been very carefully rehearsed and the paper was simply a piece of violent anti-British and pro-Afghan propaganda designed to fit in with what appears to be the current Soviet policy of currying favour with the Afghans and of trying to damage their relations with the British. Such a performance seemed to be quite out of place in a congress of scholars. It was calculated to give Western orientalists a bad impression of Soviet scholarship as a whole and caused them to underestimate its importance. Another circumstance which contributed to this impression was the Soviet practice of preparing comments on papers submitted by foreigners on the basis of scripts which had been previously submitted to the Soviet Academy of Sciences. In some instances these comments were rendered ridiculous by the fact that many of the scripts had been substantially changed in the meanwhile and Soviet scholars found themselves making sharp attacks on statements which were not in fact made at all.

Whatever the Soviet aim was in respect of Western orientalists, there can be no doubt that these left the Congress with a lower opinion of Soviet oriental scholarship than when they entered it. It is not of course the fault of Soviet scholars that Western orientalists do not know Russian and are thus only able to judge of Soviet scholarship on the basis of the English and other translations of Soviet papers rather than on the great mass of Soviet literature which has not been translated. But the Russians could have done much more to avoid alienating Western goodwill, always provided, of course, that they wish to do so.

Ibn Sina manuscript

A valuable old manuscript of the Uzbek translation of Ibn Sina (Avicenna)'s CANON OF MEDICINE has been presented by a local inhabitant to the Uzbek Historical Museum in Samarkand. The manuscript dates from 1670. PV. 16.9.60

T H E P A R T I T I O N O F C E N T R A L A S I A

The entire political and economic reorganization of Transcaspia, the Steppe Region and Turkestan, and of the former semi-independent states of Bukhara and Khiva, stems from the demarcation (razmezhvaniye) of 1924. A recent book by A.A. Gordiyenko* gives an interesting and significant account of this demarcation and is analysed in the present article.

In 1924, after seven years of Soviet rule, Russian Central Asia was divided into five national areas: the more advanced and more numerous peoples - the Uzbeks and Turkmens - were formed into Soviet Socialist Republics, the smaller and less advanced into Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (the Tadzhiks) or Autonomous Oblasts (the Kirgiz and the Kara-Kalpaks). Subsequently the Tadzhiks were promoted to an SSR (in 1929), the Kara-Kalpaks to an ASSR (1932) and the Kirgiz to an ASSR (1926) then to an SSR (1936), since when there have been no further changes.

At the time of the Revolution in 1917, Russian Central Asia consisted of three political divisions which cut across divisions of nationality - Russian Turkestan, the Khanate of Khiva, and the Emirate of Bukhara, the first being directly administered by the Russian Government and the last two being internally independent but acknowledging Russian suzerainty. In November 1917 Russian Turkestan fell under Soviet rule, but remained isolated from central Russia by the anti-Communist forces who controlled Siberia, until late in 1919. During this period, with the exception of one incident, Khiva and Bukhara were left unmolested by their revolutionary neighbour and remained still traditional, backward Muslim states. During the period 1917-20 Turkestan was ruled from Tashkent by a government of Bolsheviks and Left

* SOZDANIYE SOVETSKOY NATSIONAL'NOY GOSUDARSTVENNOSTI V SREDNEY AZII. State Publishing House of Legal Literature, Moscow, 1959. 247pp. 2,000 copies.

SRs who were, to a man, Russian or Jewish or otherwise non-native, and who carried out a policy of extreme oppression of the native population on the theoretical grounds that the natives had no proletariat and therefore could not take part in the dictatorship of the proletariat.

At the end of 1919 permanent communications were re-established between Turkestan and Moscow. A powerful Turkestan Commission (Turkkommissiya) was despatched to Turkestan, which dismissed the heretical and disastrous Tashkent Government and made serious efforts to win over the native population to Communism while at the same time suppressing all separatist tendencies. One of the first actions of the new administration, and of the Red Army which had triumphantly brought it to Turkestan, was to attack Khiva and Bukhara and to establish, in the stead of their autocratic rulers, revolutionary governments. In the years 1920-3, the People's Republics of Khorezm and Bukhara, as they were called, came increasingly into the political and economic sphere of the RSFSR and of their neighbour Turkestan, in spite of the fact that they were guaranteed independence by treaty and that they had been specifically excluded from the Soviet Union when it was established at the end of 1922. For its part, Turkestan was still merely an Autonomous Republic within the RSFSR and not directly a member of the Soviet Union, whose constituent parts were the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Transcaucasian Federation.

The same period, 1920-3, had seen the re-conquest by the Soviet regime of Transcaucasia, the establishment in March 1922 of the Transcaucasian Federation (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaydzhan), and the increasingly centralist rule of the Federation by the Union Government. Opposition to Moscow's centralist rule came to a head in October 1922 with the resignation of the whole Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party in protest at the high-handedness of the Party's Caucasian Bureau (Kavbyuro) and was voiced for the last time at the XIIth Party Congress held in April 1923. This Congress, however, overwhelmingly approved the centralist tendencies of the Soviet Union and retained the Federation. (1) (It was not until December 1936 that the Transcaucasian Federation was dissolved and the three republics which composed it became individual members of the Soviet Union.)

By the end of 1923 it had evidently become obvious to the Party that the existing political divisions of Central Asia were no longer adequate. The notion of abolishing the Turkestan ASSR and the People's Republics, and of substituting national republics for them, does not seem to have been discussed at the XIIth Party Congress and the idea of national demarcation was first considered by the Party in January 1924 (see below). There can be no doubt that the architect, if not the originator, of the plan was Stalin, the very man who was

responsible for the Transcaucasian Federation. Federation was considered unsuitable for Central Asia, for reasons which have never been given but which almost certainly included the difficulties experienced with the Transcaucasian Federation and, more important, the fact that Central Asia, unlike Transcaucasia, was inhabited by peoples who while differing in language and nationality were yet united by their Muslim faith and Islamic way of life and whose intellectuals had long advocated the idea of a Turkic state. Evidently Stalin saw the best means of welding the national borderlands to the Russian State to be the use of their internal divisions: in the case of Transcaucasia this meant forcing the traditionally hostile Christian and Muslim peoples into one political unit; in the case of Central Asia - breaking down such cultural unity as there existed by creating national states among peoples to whom the concept of nationality was historically unimportant if not unknown. The principle of divide and rule was in fact applied to Central Asia, although this is a phrase which Communist writers and commentators never apply to the Soviet Union and which they invariably condemn as the baneful weapon of Western imperialism, pointing to the Indian sub-continent and to the arbitrary divisions of Africa. For a Communist, however, division by nationality is not only permissible but desirable, whereas division by religious criteria or by imperialist conquest is wholly to be condemned.

. . .

The partition of Central Asia was carried out with comparative ease in the course of about a year and was completed by the end of 1924. It is a subject frequently mentioned in Soviet works but rarely described in detail, and the appearance of A.A. Gordiyenko's book *THE CREATION OF SOVIET NATIONAL STATEHOOD IN CENTRAL ASIA*, which attempts to give the constitutional history of Central Asia in the period 1917-25, is thus of particular interest. The book is typical of post-Stalinist Soviet historiography: an attempt to use archive material and other primary sources, but to use them extremely selectively, in order to present the material in such a way as to conform to the current official line on the period of history under consideration. Gordiyenko's book contains some extremely interesting material, but much is left unsaid and it is frequently illogical, evasive and diffuse, a result, no doubt, of attempting to fulfil the conflicting demands of modern Soviet historiography.

Gordiyenko starts his book with a standard introduction (pp.3-36): an affirmation of the positive general principles of Soviet nationality policy which guarantees national sovereignty in the Soviet Union, a brief review of previous literature on the national demarcation,

and a brief account of Central Asia before the Revolution showing how the area was exploited by the Tsarist regime and by its native ruling classes, and how on the other hand an alliance grew up between the oppressed Russian immigrant workers and the down-trodden native peoples.

From the October Revolution to 1923

The first chapter, which comprises nearly half the book (pp.37-129) deals with the period from the October Revolution until the end of 1923. It is divided into three sections: Turkestan in 1917-20, Khorezm and Bukhara in 1920, and developments in all three areas between 1920 and 1923. Gordiyenko's attitude to the Tashkent Soviet Government is ambivalent: on the one hand he condemns it for its oppressive policy towards the native population and its "deviations" from the principles of Lenin's nationality policy, but on the other hand he sees the Government as the expression of Soviet rule and thus as historically justified. On 30 April 1918 under pressure from Moscow, the Tashkent Government proclaimed Turkestan to be a Soviet Socialist Republic within the RSFSR, but its relationship to the RSFSR was never defined because communications with Moscow were interrupted by the Civil War. During the latter half of 1918 and for almost the whole of 1919, Turkestan was isolated from central Russia, beset by internal and external enemies, and desperately short of food and other supplies. Gordiyenko describes the anarchy of the period in lurid terms. The settlers were guilty of "great power chauvinism" while among the natives "bourgeois nationalist" ideas were rife. Native Communists such as Ryskulov, the chairman of the Turkestan Central Executive Committee at the end of 1919, believed that the class war had no meaning for the natives whose first aim should have been to liberate themselves from the yoke of the Europeans (this idea in fact originated with Sultan-Galiyev, whom Gordiyenko does not mention). The arrival of the Turkestan Commission in Tashkent in November 1919 radically altered the situation: Ryskulov's plan for a Turkic republic with a Turkic Communist Party was rejected; stern measures, including confiscation and expulsion, were taken against the settlers; the Party and Soviet organizations were purged of unreliable and hostile elements; and Turkestan was proclaimed an Autonomous Republic closely tied to the RSFSR. By the constitution of March 1920, Turkestan was declared to be self-governing in all matters except defence, foreign relations, and the management of the railways and posts and telegraphs. Moreover, the RSFSR Government retained the right to confirm the republic's budget; indeed the economy of Turkestan had to conform to the general plans and laws laid down by the RSFSR.

The second part of Chapter I deals briefly with the establishment of Soviet People's Republics in Bukhara and Khorezm and their develop-

ment until 1924 (pp.99-112). The "full independence" of Khorezm and Bukhara was recognized by the RSFSR in treaties signed with the People's Republics in September 1920 and March 1921 respectively, but so Gordiyenko affirms, both republics in fact relied heavily on the RSFSR for political and economic aid. Military aid too against the Basmachis was perhaps even more important in establishing the dependence of Bukhara and Khorezm on Russia, but Gordiyenko does not mention this.

In the third part, Gordiyenko describes developments in Turkestan and the People's Republics from 1920 to 1923, a period characterized according to him by "acute class struggle" and at the same time by deliberate efforts to draw the native population into the administration and Party. In September 1920 there was held the IXth Congress of Soviets of Turkestan at which "for the first time the majority of delegates were natives". Both the newly formed Central Executive Committee and the new Central Committee of the Communist Party of Turkestan in 1920 had more natives than settlers. At the end of 1920 the Central Committee of the Turkestan Communist Party established three national departments - Uzbek, Kirgiz, and Turkmen - for work among the native population. Similarly the Central Executive Committee formed Kazakh, Uzbek, Turkmen and Kirgiz national departments. In August 1921 the Government of the RSFSR decreed that in principle Turkestan should be administratively divided by nationality: as a result on 7 August 1921 the Transcaspian Oblast was renamed the Turkmen Oblast. Gordiyenko proudly claims that at the XIIth Congress of Turkestan Soviets in January 1924, of the 356 delegates, 226 were native (and 130 settlers) and that at about the same time, of the 12,500 full members and about 9,000 candidate members of the Turkestan Communist Party, 5,843 were Uzbeks, 5,436 were Kazakhs and Kirgiz, 835 Tadzhiks, and 111 Turkmens - a total of 12,225 natives to 9,275 non-natives. But even these figures show a disparate proportion of settlers who probably amounted to one sixth of the population of Turkestan. Gordiyenko admits, however, that in the years 1922 and 1923 only 45 per cent of Soviet and Party workers were native.

During the same period, 1920-3 significant steps were taken to draw the People's Republics into the political and economic orbit of Turkestan and the RSFSR. In February 1922, the Bukharan and Khorezmian Communist Parties were merged into the Russian Communist Party. In May of the same year the Turkestan Bureau (Turkbyuro) - as the Turkestan Commission was then named - was transformed into the Sredazbyuro (Central Asian Bureau) which was given authority over all Communist organizations in Turkestan, Bukhara, and Khorezm. In March 1923 the economies of Turkestan, Bukhara, and Khorezm were unified and a Central Asian Economic Council was established which had authority over all three areas. Its members included representatives of Turkestan, Bukhara,

Khorezm and the RSFSR. The Council unified the monetary and taxation systems, and with the help of extensive credits and equipment from the RSFSR, began to re-develop river and railway transport and to establish industries. (It should be borne in mind that Bukhara and Khorezm were still officially independent and were not yet part of the Soviet Union.) Gordiyenko comments: "The economic unification of the Central Asian republics and the disinterested help given to them by the Russian people were clear demonstrations of the national policy of the Soviet regime in the East and constituted both a guarantee of the successful economic development of Turkestan, Bukhara and Khorezm and a firm basis for the establishment of national peace in Central Asia." (P.127) By the end of 1923, economic and political control over Khorezm and Bukhara was such that in October 1923 Khorezm was declared a "socialist" republic, and in September 1924, Bukhara followed suit. Both republics were apparently then accepted into the Soviet Union, although Gordiyenko does not make this clear.

The national demarcation and the formation of states

In Chapter II Gordiyenko deals with the national demarcation of Central Asia and the formation of the national states. The chapter is divided into four sections: the ethnographic and social-economic reasons for the demarcation (pp.130-55); the process by which the demarcation was carried out (pp.155-200); the legal position of the republics as parts of the Soviet Union (pp.200-12); and the significance of the national demarcation (pp.212-19).

Gordiyenko first answers the question: why, since the political divisions of Central Asia cut across divisions by nationality, was a national demarcation not carried out before? He gives six reasons in answer: firstly, Turkestan developed more quickly towards socialism than Bukhara or Khorezm; secondly the economic backwardness of Khorezm and Bukhara compared with Turkestan; thirdly, the varying stages of development among the different Central Asian peoples; fourthly, national hostility among the various peoples inhabiting Central Asia, the presence of "nationalist deviations", and the shortage of reliable trained Communists; fifthly, "the necessity for a certain period of time in which to carry out certain important social and economic transformations. . . to develop national consciousness. . . and the idea of national demarcation among the native working-class. The national demarcation could take place only in the whole of Central Asia. . . It was impossible to put through this measure in Turkestan only since a large part of the population belonging to the nationalities living there were to be found in the Bukharan and Khorezmian republics. . ." (p.133); sixthly, the extreme shortage or complete absence among the more backward peoples of politically mature trained personnel. It is

noticeable that he does not here mention the fact that Bukhara and Khorezm were still guaranteed independent existence by their treaties with the RSFSR.

Gordiyenko emphasizes that the national demarcation was not an end in itself but rather the means whereby "the working masses would be brought closer to the organs of power, . . . and the peoples better organized for the struggle for communism" (p.135).

Before the demarcation could be carried out it was essential to put an end to the economic and cultural inequality that existed among the different peoples. What were the obstacles in the way of this equality? According to Gordiyenko there were three: first, native distrust for the Russians; second the devastation of the country as a result of the Great War, the Revolution and the subsequent Civil War, and the widely differing cultural status of the Central Asia peoples. ("It was impossible because of these differences to establish the necessary single body of laws for all questions of social life, or easily to apply economic planning. . . or to apply a single education system" (p.140)); and third, the existence of national feuds among the Central Asian peoples: Gordiyenko mentions Turkmen-Uzbek hostility in Khorezm and Bukhara, Turkmen-Kazakh hostility in Transcaspia, and Uzbek-Kazakh and Uzbek-Kirgiz hostility in Turkestan and Bukhara. He describes also the national rivalries which existed within the organs of administration and the existence of "Uzbek chauvinism", the Uzbeks being at that time the most advanced of the Central Asian peoples.

Gordiyenko asserts that the Communist Party and Soviet Government had realized the necessity of demarcating Central Asia into national states "even in the first years after the October Revolution", but he says that they had considered that several factors were necessary before this would be possible. These factors were: careful preparation, the firm establishment of Soviet rule and the transformation of Bukhara and Khorezm into socialist republics. Gordiyenko here finds himself in difficulties, for it seems obvious from his quotations from the proceedings of the Turkestan Commission in 1920 (pp.148-50) that it was in fact Ryskulov who had put forward the idea of partition on national lines, although his plan was evidently for national states within a Turkic federation, and that it was the Turkkommissiya which had rejected the plan, a rejection which was confirmed by Lenin. (2) Gordiyenko emphasizes the fact that Lenin, while rejecting Ryskulov's plan, had ordered the Turkkommissiya "to draw up an ethnographical map showing the areas inhabited by the Uzbeks, Kirgiz [i.e. Kazakhs and Kirgiz] and Turkmen" and had further ordered them "to examine in detail the conditions for unifying or partitioning the three areas" (Reviewer's underlining). It is hard to accept, from this evidence, Gordiyenko's assertion that the Party and Government had finally

decided on demarcation from about 1920. Furthermore, Gordiyenko describes how in January 1921 the Kazakh Regional Congress at Auliye-Ata (Dzhambul) had raised the question of the Kazakhs of Turkestan being united with the Kazakh ASSR; yet in "1922-3" they were apparently still petitioning the Party authorities for this. Similarly the Turkmens of Bukhara, Khorezm and Turkestan frequently during the period 1922-3 had asked to be united, but it was not until April 1924, i.e. when the decision had been made to partition Central Asia on national lines that they were at last formed into a Turkmen Oblast.

There can be no doubt that, in spite of Gordiyenko's arguments, the Party did not decide to demarcate Central Asia until the latter half of 1923. Gordiyenko's evidence of the demands by the natives for national unions only confirms this opinion.

The second section of Chapter II describes the measures by which the national demarcation was carried out. On 31 January 1924 the Orgbyuro of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, "taking into consideration the demands of the working masses for the national demarcation and the formation of national states in Central Asia", appointed Rudzutak, one of the original members of the Turkestan Commission, to examine the problem. During February and March the approval granted, or the decision made, by the Russian Communist Party was echoed in regional Party meetings in Central Asia, when detailed work started on the problem. In April the decision to demarcate was formally approved by the Politbyuro of the Russian Communist Party. On 28 April the Sredazbyuro appointed a special commission to report by 10 May on measures for carrying out the demarcation; this special commission appointed three sub-commissions an Uzbek commission (with Uzbek and Tadzhik representatives), a Turkmen commission, and a Kazakh commission (with Kirgiz and Kazakh representatives). These sub-commissions studied boundaries and made plans for national centres. On 10 May the sub-commissions reported to the Sredazbyuro in favour of national-territorial republics and rejected the plan put forward by the Kazakhs for a Central Asian federation to include the Kazakh ASSR. On 11 May the Sredazbyuro announced the decision to create Uzbek and Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republics which would become full-fledged members of the Soviet Union, and Tadzhik and Kirgiz Autonomous Oblasts; and to unite the Kazakhs of Turkestan with the Kazakh ASSR. The Sredazbyuro then appointed a territorial and an economic commission.

Unexpected opposition, however, came from Khorezm. On 8 May the Khorezmian Party and Government presented the Sredazbyuro with a report in which they declared themselves to be opposed to the national demarcation of Khorezm, and proposed instead that Khorezm as a whole should be included in the USSR. The chief argument for this was that

Khorezm and the Amu-Dar'ya oblast were one economic region "sharply differentiated from the rest of Central Asia both economically and geographically" (p.162). Gordiyenko ascribes the Khorezmian attitude to the secret and wicked schemes of bourgeois nationalists who had wormed their way into the Party. The Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, however, evidently thought otherwise - at least for a time, and on 12 June the Politbyuro agreed to the demarcation of Turkestan and Bukhara, but "strictly observing the sovereign rights of states and the principles of expression of the will of the people. . . decided to leave the Khorezmian republic outside the plan for demarcation" (p.165). This was not the end of the story, however, Pressure was evidently brought to bear on the Khorezmian Party, although Gordiyenko does not say how, and on 26 July it petitioned the Russian Communist Party to be allowed to be included in the demarcation and asked that, apart from the Kara-Kalpak areas, the republic should be included in Uzbekistan.

With the Politbyuro's decision of 12 June to demarcate Turkestan and Bukhara, the process of demarcation passed from the period of study to the period of application. The Communist Parties of Turkestan and Bukhara were re-formed by nationality, but the Sredazbyuro was retained as the coordinating and directing body. At the end of June the Sredazbyuro appointed a territorial commission with representatives of 16 nationalities which was charged with the organization of political, Party, economic, statistical and national commissions. The tasks of the national commissions were, in the political field, to prepare plans for the republican constitutions, for the new administrations, to prepare election campaigns, and to summon Soviet constituent congresses; in the territorial field, to define state boundaries and administrative divisions; in the economic field, to work out national development plans for all branches of the economy. By September 1924 the new national boundaries had been determined.

Opposition to the national demarcation came, according to Gordiyenko from several directions, apart from the apostasy of the Khorezmians: some Party members accused the Party of "forgetting the basic tasks of socialist construction because of the national borderlands". Some local nationalists, however, went to the other extreme and saw the creation of national states as an end in itself. The Uzbeks and the Kazakhs demanded respectively the formation of a Great Uzbek state and a Great Kazakh state, the Uzbeks wanting to include the Kazakhs of the Syr-Dar'ya and Semirech'ye oblasts, and the Kazakhs wanting the Uzbeks of Syr-Dar'ya and Tashkent to be included in their territory. Moreover, "the Kazakh and the Uzbek representatives demanded the annexation to Uzbekistan of the Kara-Kalpaks of the Amu-Dar'ya oblast, while the Kara-Kalpaks in their turn raised the question of their unification with the Kara-Kalpaks of the Khorezm republic and of

the formation of a Kara-Kalpak autonomous oblast. The Kirgiz nationalists, besides their territorial claims, started talking about the necessity of creating in Central Asia separate 'state formations' of the Kirgiz tribes" (p.168). Another line of opposition came from "bourgeois nationalists in a bloc with the Trotskyites" who demanded that the national demarcation should take place only if a Central Asian Federation were formed. The pan-Islamists and pan-Turkists denied the necessity for uniting the Central Asian peoples into national states, asserting that Central Asia was inhabited by a Turkic nation and should become a Turkic republic. This idea, according to Gordiyenko was favoured particularly by the Uzbek and Tatar intellectuals.

None of these opposition groups were successful, however, and on 15 July the Sredazbyuro published its "theses" on the demarcation of Central Asia together with practical measures by which they were to be applied. Throughout the rest of July and August extensive propaganda was carried out among the local population for the demarcation plan. Evidently this resulted in local unrest since on 31 August the Sredazbyuro criticized the local Party and administrative organs for discussing the local application of the plan rather than its general theoretical principle and ordered them "not to allow public discussions which harmed national relations and which resulted in the decision of an important national problem being reduced to vulgar petty bourgeois nationalism" (pp.177-8). On 6 September the territorial commission of the Sredazbyuro defined the boundaries of the Turkmen and Uzbek republics, and of the Tadzhik and Kirgiz autonomous oblasts. On 15 September the Turkestan Central Executive Committee unanimously passed the law for the demarcation of Turkestan, on 20 September the Bukharan Government, and on 29 September the Khorezmian Government, followed suit.

On 25 September the Politbyuro of the Russian Communist Party having studied all the reports of the Sredazbyuro created a special commission under V.V. Kuybyshev to report on the situation in Central Asia. On 6 October, under the chairmanship of Rudzutak, a conference of Central Asian representatives took place in Moscow which further discussed the demarcation. On 11 October the Politbyuro finally took the decision for the national demarcation of Central Asia. It was then confirmed that Tashkent should belong to Uzbekistan, that the Kara-Kalpak Autonomous Oblast should be part of the Kazakh ASSR, that the Tadzhiks should be formed into an ASSR, not an AO as was first suggested and should be part of the Uzbek SSR. On 14 October the decision of the Politbyuro was confirmed by the All-Union Central Executive Committee which further specified that the Kirgiz AO should be part of the RSFSR (for reasons which Gordiyenko does not give).

During November Revolutionary Committees were set up in each new national state to administer it until the formation of the new national governments. These committees made the final decisions on details of the new boundaries and made preparations for the election of soviets. By February 1925 the work of the revolutionary committees was completed and government by soviets took over in the new republics. Thus, in just one year a radical and highly revolutionary measure was put through which totally altered the map of Central Asia without apparently causing any undue disturbances.

In the concluding sections of Chapter II, Gordiyenko considers the legal position of the Central Asian republics in terms of their constitutions and the constitutions of the USSR, and the significance in general terms of the demarcation. In his Conclusion (pp.220-47) he briefly describes the economic and cultural development of the republics since the demarcation.

Notes

- (1) See Richard Pipes, *THE FORMATION OF THE SOVIET UNION*. Harvard, 1954, pp.263-82.
- (2) See *LENINSKIY SBORNIK*, Vol.XXXIV, 1942, pp.323-6 for Lenin's comments on the Turkestan Commission's plan of 13 June 1920. This is partly quoted by Gordiyenko pp.148-50.

Russian translation of Muhammad Sadiq's work

Muhammad Sadiq's geographical work on the Khanate of Bukhara has been translated into Russian and edited by A.E. Madzhi. Muhammad Sadiq (known also as Gulshani) completed the book in 1909. Its importance lies in the fact that it is the first of its kind to be written by a local author. The book is divided into eight sections (a vilayet to each) instead of the usual division of the Khanate into 25 bekstvo; it contains a separate section on the economy of Bukhara and another devoted to the description of archaeological monuments. The book is to be published by the Tadzhik Academy of Sciences. KT. 6.9.60

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AKHAL OASIS
BY RUSSIA

Sources - The Akhal oasis - British interests in Akhal in the 1870s - Russo-Teke relations in 1873-8 - Subjugation of the Tekes - Conclusion.

Sources

The Akhal oasis, unlike the rest of the Turkmen lands, was "united" with Russia as a result of armed conquest which served as a prelude to the annexation of Merv (now Mary). These conquests consolidated the position of Russia in Central Asia.

Three main sources have been used in compiling this article: "The Annexation of the Akhal Oasis to Russia" by D. Davletov (IZVESTIYA AKADEMII NAUK TURKMENSKOY SSR, SERIYA OBSHCHESTVENNYKH NAUK, No.2, 1960), whose main concern is to analyse the relations between Russia and the Teke Turkmen on the eve of the conquest. It is based on a variety of sources including MSS. in the Central State Military and Historical Archives (Military Academy) and the Central State Historical Archives of the Georgian SSR. The second part of Volume 1 of the ISTORIYA TURKMENSKOY SSR (ed. A. Karryyev and others, Ashkhabad, 1957) contains a description of the two campaigns culminating in the fall of Geok-Tepe in 1881. While Davletov follows the traditional Soviet interpretation of the attitude of the Central Asians to the annexation (strongly emphasized at the Historical Conference in Tashkent in May 1959, see CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, 1959, Nos. 3-4) and says that the mass of the population was well-disposed towards the great Russian people, even if it was temporarily led astray by feudal and clerical elements, the ISTORIYA takes a much more moderate view, which will be quoted below. Both works denounce anti-Russian intrigues of British "agent provocateurs". It is typical that, while nothing improper is seen in the Russians conquering other people's land, all manifestations of British interest in it are represented as the basest possible intrigues on the part of the "imperialists" and "colonizers". Edmund O'Donovan, special correspondent of the London DAILY NEWS, is seen as the main villain in the crucial years 1879-81. In these circumstances his two-volume THE

MERV OASIS: TRAVELS AND ADVENTURES EAST OF THE CASPIAN DURING THE YEARS 1879-80-81 (London 1882) provides a useful check on the more fantastic episodes described by Davletov and the ISTORIYA.

The Akhal oasis

In the 19th century the Tekes were divided into two territorial groups settled in the Akhal and Murgab oases. In both of them the two main tribal branches of the Tekes were represented: the Otamysh and Tokhtamysh. About the middle of the century the Tekes had finally dislodged the remnants of the earlier Turkic and Iranian inhabitants of the oasis and became almost its sole masters.

The oasis lies along the northern slopes of the Kopet-Dag and occupies the southern border of the Karakum Sands. It stretches from Kızyl-Arvat in the west to Gyaurs in the east, a distance of 250 kilometres. Its width varies between 9-20 kilometres. The land is irrigated by a large number of streams and small rivers flowing from the Kopet-Dag, and the population engaged in agriculture and cattle-breeding. In 1887 there were 7,904 households with a population of 32,990 Turkmens and 1,700 others (G.N. Curzon, **RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA IN 1889**, London, 1889, p.73). The position of the oasis across the route of Persian, Khivan and Turkmen raids was emphasized by its 43 fortresses and many fortified villages.

British interests in Akhal in the 1870s

"Akhal, a strategically important region from the point of view of the Russo-British rivalry in Central Asia, played a very important part in British colonizing schemes. For this reason all Russian plans and undertakings concerning Akhal were regarded with hostility by the governing circles of Britain." (Davletov, p.43.)

Davletov says that after the Russian conquest of Khiva in 1873 British agents were busy on the Persian-Turkmen frontier and incited the Turkmens against Russia. They encouraged "religious fanaticism", bribed the khans and ishans (sheiks or spiritual guides) and promised British military and financial help against Russia. Prominent among them was Captain Napier who in the summer of 1876 appeared at Bojnurd in Persian territory near Akhal. To make the situation more complicated, the British tried to get Persia interested in her Turkmen neighbours and suggested that a confederation of Turkmen tribes should be formed to resist the attempts of Russia to extend her Central Asian frontier. At British inspiration in the summer of 1876 the Shah, through Abdul Huseyn Khan, the ruler of Kuchan, established relations with the Teke khans and informed them that, if they acknowledged

allegiance to the Shah, he would not let the Russians disturb them. Subsequently Abdul Huseyn Khan and forty Turkmen notables went to Tehran to discuss the matter with the Shah. Although no agreement was reached, Russia felt alarmed and General Lomakin was ordered to capture Kizyl-Arvat in the spring of 1877.

On 12 May 1877 the first skirmish between the Russians and the Teke took place near Kizyl-Arvat. "The provocative anti-Russian activities of British agents and their myrmidons, the feudal Persian rulers and individual representatives of the Teke reactionary leaders managed to induce the backward part of the Akhal population to offer armed resistance to the Russian troops." (Davletov, p.45.)

The skirmish was followed by a British note, dated 9 July 1877, to the Russian Government which warned Russia against "evil consequences which might result from the present operations of the Russian army in the Turkmen steppes". (Central State Military and Historical Archive, Military Academy, MS. No.6899, fol.57.)

"In the Persian territories bordering upon Akhal the notorious British agents, Captain Napier, Captain Butler, Colonel Stewart, Captain Gill (Gill), O'Donovan and others, started their rabid anti-Russian activities. Their strenuous intrigues could not but produce results in the end. As early as the beginning of 1878 General Lomakin reported that, induced by British agents, 'the Teke have completely stopped all their dealings with us, keep strict guards everywhere and do not let anybody pass from their side into ours and from ours into theirs'."

"Through some Teke khans and ishans who were their paid agents, the British imperialists even managed to organize a number of assaults on Russian posts. In some cases British agents who had penetrated into Akhal personally led such attacks, for example the Teke attack on the Chekishlyar post on 24 December 1878." (Davletov, p.45.)

Russo-Teke relations in 1873-8

The conquest of Khiva in 1873 opened for Russia the way into Turkmenia. "In these years the Teke were not united in their attitude towards Russia. The main reason for this was the prevalence of feudal particularism and internecine dissension. The feudal and tribal aristocracy - khans, chieftains and leaders of the reactionary Muslim clergy - were swayed by class interests and deliberately fostered this discord and strife. . . . It is understandable that in such circumstances the attitude of the Akhal inhabitants to Russia was not uniform, although the mass of the toiling population wished to establish

friendly relations with the Russians which would be advantageous to both sides. This explains why, while supporters of rapprochement with Russia sent their representatives to the Russians with peaceful proposals, their antagonists tried to oppose them by all means and raided Russian posts and the settlements of the coastal Turkmens who rendered various services to the Russians." (Davletov, pp.38-39.)

In October 1874 a delegation from the inhabitants of strongholds close to Russian territory (Kizyl-Arvat, Kodzh, Zau, Kizyl-Cheshme and Bami) came to Krasnovodsk. Its leader, Sofi Khan, told Lomakin: "Our people have had more than enough of these continuous quarrels and disorder. Without your help we shall not have peace. Moreover, trade caravan traffic between the Tekes and Krasnovodsk is indispensable to all of us. We are short of the basic necessities of life: apart from wheat and sheep we have nothing and Khiva and Merv are far away." (Davletov, p.39.)

At this juncture the "anti-Russian party" led, significantly, by "inveterate brigands" Aman Ali Kaga, Bektash Shikh, Kepek Serdar and others, took steps to frustrate the negotiations. They raided Dashly-Kabil, a village 35-40 kilometres from Krasnovodsk inhabited by Yomuts loyal to Russia: "But, in spite of all the efforts of the anti-Russian party, it could not destroy the desire of the majority of the population of the oasis wishing to end arbitrary rule and internal discord and quarrels, and establish friendly relations with the Russians." (Davletov, p.39.)

The ISTORIYA, on the other hand, is not so sure about the desires of the Akhal-Teke. It says that, apart from the reactionary elements, "a large part of the toiling population of Akhal for good reasons feared the coming of Russian troops, seeing in them another conqueror. The haughty conduct of Tsarist generals and officials, outrages suffered only too often by Turkmen representatives in the Russian camp, and all sorts of requisitions and extortions practised by Tsarist authorities, particularly mass requisition of camels, kikitkas and foodstuffs for the troops, which sometimes degenerated into plain robbery, all this alienated from Tsarist Russia her former Teke adherents. . . . The Tsarist Government, when sending troops to Turkmenia, did not do so to promote the interests of the Russian and Turkmen peoples, but to gratify its own predatory and colonizing aspirations." (P.123.)

In 1875 the Tsarist authorities had no intention of fighting the Tekes and tried to befriend them. Thus at the beginning of the summer of 1875 Lomakin obtained from Khiva three Teke children who had been captives there and returned them with gifts to Akhal, while his letter invited the oasis dwellers to maintain peaceful relations with Russian

territory. This favourably impressed the Tekes, and the "reactionaries", feeling the ground slipping from under their feet, held a council (maslahat) at the beginning of June. They decided to release the Yomut captives taken at Dashly-Kabil and to send messengers to the Russians and the khan of Khiva to express their "complete submission". This opened a short period of peaceful coexistence between the Russians and the Tekes. From all over Akhal chieftains and khans of fortresses came to Lomakin to offer their services and the Tekes brought their goods for sale in the Russian camp where a temporary bazaar was set up.

On 22 June a Teke delegation delivered to the Russians a letter from the four Khans, rulers of Akhal. It declared that, since Khiva, Bukhara, Afghanistan, Kurdistan and Persia wished to annex Akhal but found it difficult, they had raided and plundered the oasis. This being so, "we have decided that the only way to stop this difficult situation and save ourselves from all such attempts is to become subject to the great Russian "Ak-padishah" (White King) who is the most powerful of all rulers, and to request him to take our people under his exalted and gracious protection." They also asked that trade relations should be established between the Tekes and Russia and expressed their readiness to serve in the Russian army. (Davletov, pp. 40-41.) Lomakin, however, did not know how to deal with this emergency and answered the Tekes that he would report their request to the Tsar.

Thus in the summer of 1875 Russia could have easily annexed Akhal but the Tsarist Government had no clear conception of what its future administrative relationship to Russia should be. The situation was further complicated by the fact that Russia feared annexation would worsen her relations with Britain. As for the Tekes, they were willing even to become subject to the Khan of Khiva as a "servant of the White Tsar" and upon receiving Lomakin's indecisive answer, they sent a letter to the Khan requesting him to take Akhal under his protection. The Khan submitted the letter to the commander of the Amu-Dar'ya Military Department, Colonel Ivanov, and on his advice sent to Akhal at the end of the year a certain Musa Mutavali to govern the oasis as his deputy.

The chiefs of the Caucasus Military Department, including Lomakin, were against Khivan government of Akhal for the Khan was too weak to maintain his supremacy over the Tekes. Lomakin wished to replace it in Akhal with a "people's government"; i.e. one conducted by a specially appointed khan who would act as a middleman between the Russians and the Tekes and carry out instructions from Russian authorities. As a candidate for that post he selected Nurberdy Khan, whom he took to be the head of the pro-Russian Tekes; and directed the

Akhal population to send all their announcements and petitions to Krasnovodsk only through him. (Davletov, p.42.) Lomakin's reliance on Nurberdy was later to prove unfounded.

The four Akhal Khans resented the favours bestowed on Nurberdy Khan by Lomakin, especially as the Khan's position was strengthened when at Lomakin's urgent request Musa Mutavali returned to Khiva. Once more unrest started in Akhal and spread throughout the Transcaspien district so that caravan traffic between Khiva and Krasnovodsk had to stop. To relieve the situation, Lomakin proposed to march at the head of an armed force to Ashkhabad, the centre of Akhal, and there call a meeting of Teke notables and induce them to elect a khan to be their sole ruler. But the Russian Government rejected this plan fearing that it would lead to an armed conflict with the Tekes and necessitate large expenditure on increasing the Russian army in Transcaspia; moreover, the Balkan situation was strained and Russia had no wish to endanger further her relations with Britain. Thus in the spring of 1876 Lomakin was forbidden from carrying out his scheme. This reluctance on the part of Russia made a bad impression on the Tekes and "the result was that anti-Russian sentiments spread in Akhal and subsequently they were exploited by British colonizers to further their imperialist aspirations directed against Russia." (Davletov, p.43.)

One of those "agents" was Captain Butler who in 1878 was sent by the Viceroy of India, Lord Lytton, to superintend the work on fortifying the chief Akhal fortress of Geok-Tepe. "To the same period belong the activities of a British agent provocateur O'Donovan among the Turkmens of the Gyurgen valley, who travelled about in the capacity of a correspondent of the DAILY NEWS." (ISTORIYA, p.124.) [As can be gathered from O'Donovan's book, he did nothing sinister on his travels.] All this had some influence on the Tekes' anti-Russian sentiments and O'Donovan wrote that ". . . I could not help thinking, and I had grounds for doing so, that they [Turkmens] were allowed by the Government of Lord Beaconsfield to base their hopes of aid on something more substantial than their own illusions. Certainly while there still existed any possibility of coming in hostile contact with Russia over the Cabul question, no better policy could have been adopted than that of allowing the Turcomans to hope that British soldiers might march from Herat to their assistance. And I feel convinced that they were not only allowed to believe it, but that it was directly told them. Finding themselves on the horns of a dilemma in which they might either fight alone or submit, they decided to try the former alternative, and then, if worsted, to turn round and join heartily with Russia in any movements she might consequently make eastward." (Vol.1, pp.468-9.)

The ISTORIYA adds, "in order to prevent the advance of the Tsarist troops in Turkmenistan, British agents tried by every means to hamper

the gathering of food supplies for the army, provoked disorders in the border districts of Persia, etc. The British attempted to induce the Persian Government to take action against Russia and they openly threatened the Shah that, should he suffer Russian troops to occupy Akhal, Britain would seize one of the islands in the Persian Gulf." (P.124.)

Subjugation of the Tekes

In these circumstances the anti-Russian party gained the upper hand in Akhal. The maslahat decided to prohibit the Russians from entering the oasis and the ancient stronghold of Geok-Tepe was fortified. The war started with a series of minor skirmishes fought in 1877-8 in western Turkmenia and the Kizyl-Arvat region. In 1879 Lomakin led the first Turkmen expedition and on 28 August the Russians unsuccessfully stormed Geok-Tepe, losing some 450 men killed and wounded.

From the point of view of the Russian Government the failure was very serious since "just in this period of transition from capitalism to the imperialist stage British expansion towards Afghanistan and Central Asia reached its peak." (ISTORIYA, p.125.) In 1878 the Second Afghan War broke out and in the early 1880s Britain assumed the control of the Emir's internal policy. This enabled the "British colonizers to try to forestall Tsarist Russia in conquering Turkmenistan". (Ibid.) They intrigued among the Turkmen tribes and in the Emirate of Bukhara, and "by bribing influential members of the feudal-bay leadership and clergy and by various anti-Russian provocations they tried to prevent further development of Russo-Turkmen relations and hinder the growing Russian orientation of the Turkmen, in order to prepare the way for subjugating Turkmen lands by imperialist Britain or the feudal oriental rulers, Turkmen neighbours, who were dependent on her." (Ibid.)

The ISTORIYA maintains that the Minister of War, Milyutin, understood the importance of Akhal in the British "colonizing" schemes and emphasized that it must be occupied by Russia if British influence should not spread in the future to the lands bordering upon the Caspian. Another Turkmen expedition was decided upon and General Skobelev who had lately distinguished himself during the Turkish war was appointed its head.

On 28 May the Russians captured Khodzha-Kala; in June Karry-Kala and Bami were taken. A railway line from Krasnovodsk was put under construction in order to supply the troops. In spite of the initial Russian success, the majority of the population supported its anti-

Russian leaders: the Khan of Akhal and Merv Nurberdy Khan (who in 1870 had been thought by Lomakin to be pro-Russian), his son Makhtumkuli Khan, Tykma Serdar, Kurbanmurad Ishan and others.

On 23 December the siege of Geok-Tepe started. In spite of great losses inflicted by Russian cannon fire the Tekes, helped by their compatriots from Merv, bravely defended the fortress. Finally, on 12 January 1881 part of the wall was destroyed by a mine and the fortress was taken. From a place in the mountains surrounding the Geok-Tepe plain the disaster was watched by O'Donovan who had originally intended to accompany the Russian forces on their march from Krasnovodsk and was refused Skobelev's permission. (ISTORIYA, pp.126-7.)

The fall of Geok-Tepe was followed by the capture of the village of Ashkhabad by the Russians on 18 January. The campaign was over and Akhal in Russian hands. Now Merv became the centre of the anti-Russian Tekes who still hoped that British help would save them from the Russians, but by 1884 they saw the futility of their expectations and Merv submitted to the Russians.

Conclusion

The fall of Geok-Tepe and the capture of Akhal by Russia sealed the fate of all the Turkmen lands, since the Teke disaster discouraged the chiefs of the still free districts from thinking of armed resistance. The result was that the rest of Turkmenistan was "united" in a "peaceful" way.

In spite of the bloodshed involved, Davletov believes that the conquest of Akhal was of "progressive value": "The toiling people of the Akhal and Tedzhen-Merv oases, who had for a long time inclined towards rapprochement with Russia, now saw a chance to realize their hopes of being saved from the oppression and arbitrary rule of their khans and the neighbouring feudal rulers. This is the chief reason why the annexation of Atek [district to the east of Akhal] and the Tedzhen-Merv lands to Russia was carried out peacefully." (P.46.) This reasoning, however, is difficult to reconcile with what Davletov says higher up on the same page - that in the conquered districts of Turkmenia the Tsarist authorities oppressed the population with all sorts of extortions and requisitions and, if the Turkmen resisted, force was used and hundreds of daykhan (peasant) holdings were ravaged. Thus he gives no satisfactory explanation why the Turkmen preferred this sort of oppression to that inflicted by their own native khans.

The end of his article is typical of all historical articles of its type: "Finally, it should be observed that, though the annexation

of Akhal to Russia was achieved by means of armed conquest, owing to its objective results and consequences it had great progressive importance and initiated a new historical epoch in the development of the Turkmen people." (P.47.)

An interesting commentary on the aftermath of the annexation of the Akhal oasis is provided by Lord Curzon in his *RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA*. During his visit to Transcaucasia and Central Asia in 1888 Curzon recounts how in Baku he saw "drawn up on the landing-stage to greet the Governor-General a number of gorgeously-clad Turkmen,* robed in magnificent velvet or embroidered khalats, and their breasts ablaze with decorations. They, too, had come over to be presented to the Tsar. At the head of the line stood a dignified-looking Turkmen, with an immense pair of silver epaulettes on his shoulders. This, the general told me, was Makhtumkuli Khan, son of the famous Teke chieftain Nurberdy Khan by an Akhal wife, the hereditary leader of the Vekhil or Eastern division of the Merv Tekes, and the chief of the Akhal Tekes in Geok-Tepe at the time of the siege. Reconciled to Russia at an early date, he was taken to Moscow to attend the coronation of the Tsar in 1883, and is now a full colonel and Governor of the Tedzhen oasis - where but lately, in the exercise of his administrative powers, he, a Turkmen and an old Russian enemy, arrested a Russian captain serving under his command. And yet this was the man who, in 1881, told Edmund O'Donovan that 'it was the intention of himself and his staunch followers to fight to the last should Merv be invaded by the Russians, and if beaten to retire into Afghanistan. If not well received there, they proposed asking an asylum within the frontiers of British India.' Adjoining him stood his younger brother, Yusuf Khan, son of Nurberdy by his famous Merv wife, Gur Jemal, a boy of fifteen or sixteen at the time of O'Donovan's visit, but now a Russian captain; Maili Khan and Sari Batir Khan, chiefs of the Sichmaz and Bakshi, two others of the four tribes of Merv; old Murad Beg, leader of the Beg subdivision of the Toktamish clan, who conducted O'Donovan to the final meeting of the Great Council; and, mirabile dictu, Baba Khan himself, son of the old conqueror Kushid Khan, and hereditary leader of the Toktamish, the one-eyed Baba, who led the English party at Merv in 1881, and, in order to demonstrate his allegiance to the Queen, branded his horses with V.R. reversed and imprinted upside down. The three last-named are now majors in the Russian service. Baba's

* The spelling of proper names has been altered to accord with that used in the article.

colleague of the Triumvirate of 1881, Niyaz Khan, is also a Russian officer, but did not appear to be present. The old Ikhtyar at the date of O'Donovan's arrival, Qajar Khan, who led the forlorn anti-Russian movement in 1884, is detained in St. Petersburg. Gur Jemal, the elderly matron and former chieftainess, of whom I have spoken, and whose potent influence was so diplomatically enlisted by Russia prior to the annexation of Merv, was also in Baku, waiting to receive the compliments, to which she was unquestionably entitled, from the lips of the Emperor. There were also present the Khans of the Sarik and Salor Turkmens of Iolatan', Sarakhs, and Penjdeh, and some imposing Kazakh notabilities with gorgeous accoutrements and prodigiously high steeple-crowned hats. The delegation brought with them rich carpets and a collection of wild animals as presents to the Emperor, who in return loaded them with European gifts and arms, and said in the course of his speech that he hoped to repay their visit to Merv in 1889 or 1890.

"I do not think that any sight could have impressed me more profoundly with the completeness of Russia's conquest, or with her remarkable talents of fraternization with the conquered, than the spectacle of these men (and among their thirty odd companions who were assembled with them, there were doubtless other cases as remarkable), only eight years ago the bitter and determined enemies of Russia on the battlefield, but now wearing her uniform, standing high in her service, and crossing to Europe in order to salute as their sovereign the Great White Tsar. Skobelev's policy of 'Hands all round' when the fight is over, seems to have been not one whit less successful than was the ferocious severity of the preliminary blow." (Pp.131-3.)

Tolstoy in Kirgiz

On the 50th anniversary of L.N. Tolstoy's death several of his books are to be translated into Kirgiz. The SEVASTOPOL STORIES has just been published and translations of CHILDHOOD, BOYHOOD and YOUTH are under preparation. P. 11.8.60

Death of Kirgiz composer

Karamoldo Orozov, "outstanding composer and popular artist of Kirgizia", died on 8 July 1960 aged 77. He was talented and well-known improviser and komuz player (a string pizzicato instrument), and composed many popular tunes for the komuz. In recognition of his services to the cultural life of Kirgizia he was elected a deputy to the Kirgiz Supreme Soviet and was awarded the Red Banner of Labour and the Badge of Honour. SK. 9.7.60

TURKIC NATIONALITY AND TURKIC SPEECH
IN THE USSR IN 1959

AN ANALYSIS OF THE CENSUS RESULTS

By

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I. General Observations - II. Turkic Nationalities - III. Turkic Languages.

I. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

A report on the broad features of the numbers and distribution of the nationalities and languages of the USSR, based on the all-Union Census of 15 January 1959, was given in the Soviet official press of 4 February 1960.

From this report it is possible to gain a fairly full and a fairly accurate picture of the numbers and distribution of the people who are members of the different Turkic nationalities and who speak the different Turkic languages. It is still impossible, for reasons which will be apparent later, to obtain an absolutely complete picture.

It seems desirable in the first instance, therefore, merely to record the official Soviet statistics and to arrange, without comment, the statistical information so as to make the fullest possible deductions from them. Conjecture about details, comparison with earlier censuses, references to other sources of information and comment have been left, with one exception, for a supplementary article.

Information about the nationalities and languages of the USSR is given in two tables, each of two columns, in Section II of the official report. We shall refer to these as Table I and Table II.

Table I

Column 1 108 named nationalities of the USSR and the single classification 'Other Nationalities'.

The nationalities are listed in decreasing numerical order. The 'Nationalities of Dagestan' and 'Nationalities of the North' are treated as two units in this list, but are subdivided into 10 and 20 separate nationalities respectively under the two general headings. The 108 nationalities mentioned above include these separate nationalities of Dagestan and the North.

The total population of the named nationalities is 208,806,000; that of the 'Other Nationalities' is 17,000. These form 99.99 and 0.01 per cent respectively of the total population of the USSR. The figures for the nationalities are given in thousands, except for 10 of the 'Nationalities of the North' - nine of which are for numbers below 2,000 - and 11 others which range in numbers from 14,700 (Slovaks) to 600 (Tofalar) where figures are given to the hundred.

Column 2 The percentage of each nationality regarding the language of that nationality as its mother tongue. The percentage figures are given to the first place of decimals.

Table II

Column 1 A list of the 15 Soviet Socialist Republics with the total population and, in general, the major national composition of each.

Column 2 The percentage of the total population of the republic which each named nationality comprises.

Three general observations may be made at this stage. Firstly, in Table I the total population of the USSR is given as 208,827,000. The total obtained by adding the figures for the 108 named nationalities is 208,806,000. If the number for 'Other Nationalities', 17,000, is added to this, the total of 208,823,000 is reached. The discrepancy of 4,000 between the two figures for the total population of the USSR is doubtless due to the rounding off of individual nationality figures and is so small in proportion to the total population - it is in fact about 0.002 per cent of the total population - that it can be ignored. It is clear that all the population of the USSR is included in the list of nationalities.

Secondly, in Table II only certain nationalities are recorded for each republic. The exact distribution of nationality by republic for

any nationality except Russian - which is quoted for all republics - cannot, therefore, be ascertained. The difference between the total USSR figure for a given nationality in Table I and the sum of the figures for the same nationality given under the individual republics in Table II represents the numbers of that nationality in unnamed areas. This is clearly a fact of some importance.

Thirdly, since only selected nationalities are given in Table II, the point at which nationalities cease to be recorded for each republic and the percentage of the total population of each republic which is unrecorded is not without significance for a full understanding of the problem of distribution. But this, being a matter of conjecture, is not dealt with here.

It should be noted that the nationality of children is given as that of their parents, but if the parents are of different nationalities and cannot decide the nationality of their children, preference is given to the nationality of the mother.*

II. TURKIC NATIONALITIES

Of the 108 named nationalities of the USSR, 23 are Turkic. The total number of people of Turkic nationality is found, by addition of the individual figures, to be 23,099,500; or, in round figures, 23,100,000. This is 11.1 per cent of the total population of the USSR.

In the following Table 'A', columns (b) and (c) are taken from Table I: columns (a) and (d) have been calculated.

* VSESOYUZNAYA PEREPIS' NASELENIYA 1959 GODA (Moscow, 1958), p.41.

Table A

Turkic Nationalities in the USSR

(a) Numerical order	(b) Nationality	(c) Number (thousands)	(d) Percentage of total population of USSR
4	Uzbek	6,004	2.9
5	Tatar	4,969	2.4
6	Kazakh	3,581	1.7
7	Azerbaydzhani	2,929	1.4
14	Chuvash	1,470	Under 1
19	Turkmen	1,004	
20	Bashkir	983	
21	Kirgiz	974	
33	Yakut	236	
36	Kara-Kalpak	173	Under 0.1
40	Kumyk	135	
42	Gagauz	124	
46	Tuvin	100	
47	Uygur	95	
49	Karachay	81	
54	Khakass	57	
55	Altay	45	
56	Balkar	42	
57	Nogay	41	
58	Turk	35	
71	Shor	15	Under 0.01
84	Karaim	5.9	
106	Tofalar	0.6	
Total		23,099.5	11.1

Nationalities 1 - 3 are: Russian 114,588, 54.9 per cent; Ukrainian 36,981, 17.7 per cent; Belorussian 7,829, 3.7 per cent. These three comprise 76.3 per cent of the entire population of the USSR.

Nationalities 8 -13 are: Armenian 2,787; Georgian 2,650; Lithuanian 2,326; Jewish 2,268; Moldavian 2,214 and German 1,619.

Nationalities 15-18 are: Latvian 1,400; Tadzhik 1,397; Polish 1,380 and Mordvinian 1,285.

The Turkic nationalities may be classified by republics by abstracting the necessary data from Table II, columns 1 and 2. Details are given in Table 'B' below, together with statistics for the total population and the Russian population for purposes of comparison.

Table B

Turkic Nationalities by Republics

(a) Republic	(b) Nationality	(c) Number (thousands)	(d) Percentage of total population of the republic
RSFSR*	Total population	117,534	100
	Russian	97,845	83.2
	Tatar	4,077	3.5
	Chuvash	1,436	1.2
	Bashkir	948	0.8
	Kazakh	383	0.3
	Yakut	235	0.2
	Tuvin	100	0.08
	Azerbaydzhani	71	0.06
	Khakass	56	0.05
	Altay	45	0.04
	Recorded Turkic	7,351	6.2

* 'Nationalities of Dagestan' are included in the list of nationalities of the RSFSR. Since these include the two Turkic nationalities of Kumyk and Nogay, the total figures and the percentage of the recorded Turkic nationalities are certainly too small. Estimates of the numbers of the Kumyk and Nogay depend on the following figures (in thousands):

<u>Table I:</u>	'Nationalities of Dagestan' (Total USSR)	945
	of which, Kumyk	135
	Nogay	41

<u>Table II:</u>	'Nationalities of Dagestan' (RSFSR only)	795
	Lezgin (Azerbaydzhani only)	98

It is possible that all the Kumyk and Nogay are located within the RSFSR; in this case the total recorded Turkic population would be 7,527 or 6.4 per cent of the total population of the republic. A rather more accurate estimate may result from the following line of reasoning:

Total Dagestan nationalities in USSR	945
Lezgin in Azerbaydzhan	98
Therefore Dagestan nationalities less Lezgin in Azerbaydzhan	847

795 of these 847 (i.e. 94 per cent) live in RSFSR. If it is assumed that the separate peoples of the Dagestan nationalities live in the RSFSR in the same proportion as they do in the rest of the area of 'USSR minus Azerbaydzhan', it can be estimated that 127 Kumyk and 39 Nogay (i.e. 94 per cent of 135 and 41 respectively) live in the RSFSR. On this basis the totals for recorded Turkic nationalities should be 7,517; the percentage of the total population is still, however, 6.4.

UKRAINE SSR	Total population	41,869	100	
	Russian	7,400	17.7	
<hr/>				
Turkic not Recorded				
BELORUSSIA SSR	Total population	8,055	100	
	Russian	729	9.1	
<hr/>				
Turkic not Recorded				
UZBEK SSR	Total population	8,106	100	
	Russian	1,101	13.6	
	<hr/>			
	Uzbek	5,026	62.0	
	Tatar	445	5.5	
	Kazakh	335	4.1	
	Kara-Kalpak	168	2.1	
	Kirgiz	92	1.1	
Turkmen	57	0.7		
<hr/>				
Recorded Turkic		6,123	75.5	

KAZAKH SSR	Total population	9,310	100
	Russian	4,014	43.1
	Kazakh	2,755	29.6
	Tatar	192	2.1
	Uzbek	137	1.5
	Uygur	60	0.6
	Recorded Turkic	3,144	33.8
GEORGIA SSR	Total population	4,044	100
	Russian	438	10.8
	Azerbaydzhani	157	3.9
	Recorded Turkic	157	3.9
AZERBAYDZHAN SSR	Total population	3,698	100
	Russian	515	13.9
	Azerbaydzhani	2,481	67.1
	Recorded Turkic	2,481	67.1
LITHUANIA SSR	Total population	2,711	100
	Russian	231	8.5
	Turkic not Recorded		
MOLDAVIA SSR	Total population	2,885	100
	Russian	293	10.2
	Gagauz	96	3.3
	Recorded Turkic	96	3.3
LATVIA SSR	Total population	2,093	100
	Russian	556	26.6
	Turkic not Recorded		

KIRGIZ SSR	Total population	2,066	100
	Russian	624	30.2
	Kirgiz	837	40.5
	Uzbek	219	10.6
	Tatar	56	2.7
	Kazakh	20	1.0
	Uygur	14	0.7
Recorded Turkic	1,146	55.5	
TADZHIK SSR	Total population	1,980	100
	Russian	263	13.3
	Uzbek	454	23.0
	Tatar	57	2.9
	Kirgiz	26	1.3
	Kazakh	13	0.6
	Recorded Turkic	550	27.8
ARMENIA SSR	Total population	1,763	100
	Russian	56	3.2
	Azerbaydzhani	108	6.1
	Recorded Turkic	108	6.1
TURKMEN SSR	Total population	1,516	100
	Russian	263	17.3
	Turkmen	924	60.9
	Uzbek	125	8.3
	Kazakh	70	4.6
	Tatar	30	2.0
	Recorded Turkic	1,149	75.8
ESTONIA SSR	Total population	1,197	100
	Russian	260	21.7
Turkic not Recorded			

Total Turkic recorded by republics: 22,305,000. This figure excludes Kumyk and Nogay. If the full total of 176,000 for these is included, the total Turkic population recorded by republics would be 22,481,000; if the lower estimate is used the figure would be 22,471,000.

Further useful information about the distribution of the Turkic nationalities may be obtained from the official tables by classifying by nationalities and indicating whether they are to be found in 'named locations' (i.e. named republics) or 'unnamed locations'. Figures for the latter are obtained by noting the difference between the total USSR figures and the sum of the figures for republics. The percentage of the total nationality in each of the named locations and in the whole of the unnamed location can then be calculated. Columns (a), (b), (c) and (d) are taken from Tables I and II, and the other columns show calculated results.

Table C

Turkic Nationalities by National Groups

(a) Nationality	(b) Total No. of Nationality (thousands)	Named Location			Unnamed Location	
		(c) Republic	(d) Number (thousands)	(e) % of Nat.	(f) Number (thousands)	(g) % of Nat.
UZBEK	6,004	Uzb.	5,026	83.7	43	0.7
		Tad.	454	7.6		
		Kirg.	219	3.6		
		Turk.	125	2.1		
		Kaz.	137	2.3		
		<u>Total</u>	5,961	99.3		
TATAR	4,969	RSFSR	4,077	82.0	112	2.3
		Uzb.	445	9.0		
		Tad.	57	1.1		
		Kirg.	56	1.1		
		Turk.	30	0.6		
		Kaz.	192	3.9		
		<u>Total</u>	4,857	97.7		

KAZAKH	3,581	RSFSR	383	10.7
		Uzb.	335	9.4
		Turk.	70	2.0
		Kirg.	20	0.6
		Tad.	13	0.4
		Kaz.	2,755	76.9
		<u>Total</u>	3,576	99.9
AZERBAJDZHANI	2,929	RSFSR	71	2.4
		Az.	2,481	84.7
		Geo.	157	5.4
		Arm.	108	3.7
		<u>Total</u>	2,817	96.2
CHUVASH	1,470	RSFSR	1,436	97.7
TURKMEN	1,004	Turk.	924	92.0
		Uzb.	57	5.7
		<u>Total</u>	981	97.7
BASHKIR	983	RSFSR	948	96.4
KIRGIZ	974	Kirg.	837	85.9
		Uzb.	92	9.4
		Tad.	26	2.7
		<u>Total</u>	955	98.0
YAKUT	236	RSFSR	235	99.6
KARA-KALPAK	173	Uzb.	168	97.1
KUMYK	135			
GAGAUZ	124	Moldavia	96	77.4
TUVIN	100	RSFSR	100	100

UYGUR	95	Kaz.	60	63.2	21	22.1
		Kirg.	14	14.7		
		<u>Total</u>	74	77.9		
KARACHAY	81				81	100
KHAKASS	57	RSFSR	56	98.2	1	1.8
ALTAY	45	RSFSR	45	100		
BALKAR	42				42	100
NOGAY	41				41	100
TURK	35				35	100
SHOR	15				15	100
KARAIM	5.9				5.9	100
TOFALAR	0.6				0.6	100
<u>TOTAL TURKIC</u> NATIONALITIES 23,100			22,305	96.6	795	3.4

It may be useful to indicate as far as possible the distribution of those Turkic nationalities which are not enumerated in specified republics by eliminating the republics in which they are recorded. For convenience the USSR may be divided into four groups of republics:

1. RSFSR.
2. Central Asia (Turkmen, Uzbek, Tadzhik and Kirgiz SSRs) and Kazakh SSR.
3. Transcaucasia (Azerbaijdzhan, Georgia and Armenia SSRs).
4. Western Borderlands (Moldavia, Ukraine, Belorussia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia SSRs).

Table D

Nationalities in Unnamed Locations

(a) Nationality	(b) Number in unnamed location (thousands)	(c) By elimination these must be in:
UZBEK	43	RSFSR; W. Border; Transcaucasia
TATAR	112	W. Border; Transcaucasia
KAZAKH	5	W. Border; Transcaucasia
AZERBAYDZHANI	112	W. Border; CA/Kaz.
CHUVASH	34	W. Border; CA/Kaz.; Transcaucasia
TURKMEN	23	RSFSR; W. Border; Transcaucasia; Tad.; Kirg.; Kaz.
BASHKIR	35	NOT RSFSR
KIRGIZ	19	RSFSR; W. Border; Transcaucasia; Turk.; Kaz.
YAKUT	1	NOT RSFSR
KARA-KALPAK	5	NOT Uzbekistan
KUMYK	135	Any republic. (See note in Table 'B'.)
GAGAUZ	28	NOT Moldavia
UYGUR	21	RSFSR; W. Border; Transcaucasia; Uzb.; Tad.; Turk.
KARACHAY	81	Any republic
KHAKASS	1	NOT RSFSR
BALKAR	42	Any republic
NOGAY	41	Any republic. (See note in Table 'B'.)
TURK	35	Any republic
SHOR	15	Any republic
KARAIM	5.9	Any republic
TOFALAR	0.6	Any republic

III. TURKIC LANGUAGES

Information about the numbers of peoples speaking the Turkic languages is given in Column 2 of Table I of the official report. In this the percentage of people of the nationality regarding the language of that nationality as their mother tongue is recorded. The mother tongue of children who have not yet learnt to speak is regarded as the language generally used in the family.*

The percentage varies considerably over the whole range of nationalities listed. The highest percentages are for Russian (99.8) and for the 7,000 people who comprise the Rutul of Dagestan (99.9); the lowest are for the Jewish (numbering 2,268,000, percentage 20.8), and the Turkic Karaim (16.5 per cent).

Of the Turkic nationalities only the Bashkir, Karachay and Karaim have less than 80 per cent of their numbers speaking their own national language.

The official tables do not give any information about the languages of those people who do not speak the language of their national group; nor is it possible to ascertain the state of the languages by republic.

In Table 'E' which follows, Column (d) has been calculated.

Table E

Turkic Languages

(a) Nationality	(b) Total No. of nationality (thousands)	(c) % regarding language of nationality as mother tongue	(d) No. regarding language of nationality as mother tongue (thousands)
UZBEK	6,004	98.4	5,908
TATAR	4,969	92.1	4,576
KAZAKH	3,581	98.4	3,524

* Op.cit., p.42.

AZERBAYDZHANI	2,929	97.6	2,859
CHUVASH	1,470	90.8	1,335
TURKMEN	1,004	98.9	993
BASHKIR	983	61.7	607
KIRGIZ	974	98.7	961
YAKUT	236	97.5	230
KARA-KALPAK	173	95.0	164
KUMYK	135	98.0	132
GAGAUZ	124	94.0	117
TUVIN	100	99.1	99
UYGUR	95	85.0	81
KARACHAY	81	73.9	60
KHAKASS	57	86.0	49
ALTAY	45	88.6	40
BALKAR	42	97.0	41
NOGAY	41	84.3	35
TURK	35	82.2	29
SHOR	15	83.7	13
KARAIM	5.9	16.5	1
TOFALAR	0.6	89.1	0.5
<u>TOTAL</u>	23,100	94.6	21,855

The figure of 21,855,000 as the number of speakers of a Turkic language as a mother tongue is a minimum, for it is possible that members of Turkic nationalities not speaking the language of their own nationality may use another Turkic tongue. It would be permissible to round off these language figures and, without much loss of accuracy, to consider the total number of people in the USSR who speak a Turkic language as 22m.

A G I T P R O P

SOME DETAILS OF AGITATION AND PROPAGANDA WORK
IN THE MUSLIM REPUBLICS

The following article attempts to throw some light on the Party work of agitation and propaganda as conducted in Central Asia and Azerbaydzhan.

The words agitatsiya and agitator as used in Russian today have an entirely different meaning from the English 'agitation' and 'agitator' which almost invariably have a pejorative significance. According to the Soviet official DICTIONARY OF FOREIGN WORDS, agitatsiya is: "A powerful instrument of political education of the people in the spirit of communism and Soviet patriotism. It organizes the Soviet people in their fight for the victory of communism." Thus in the Soviet Union an agitator is on the side of the authorities whereas elsewhere he is always engaged in trying to subvert authority of one kind or another. Similarly the words propaganda and propagandist as used in Russian today do not have the somewhat disreputable meaning now usually attached to them in English. Agitatsiya and propaganda are often used to mean the same thing although the former refers more particularly to the activities necessary to disseminate propaganda. Thus while a 'propagandist' is usually a lecturer, a teacher or a writer, an 'agitator' is essentially a public relations man.

There is probably no essential difference between the Muslim and other republics of the Union as far as the methods and principles of agitation and propaganda are concerned. Rightly or wrongly all Soviet citizens are expected to react in the same way to official indoctrination.

I. Organizations - II. Methods - III. Agitation in Practice.

I. Organizations

Agitators - Propagandists and lecturers - The Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge - Other organizations.

Agitators

Communist education of the "toiling masses" is carried on by various people and organizations who duplicate one another's work. The most numerous group in this vast propaganda network are the "agitators", usually organized into "agitation collectives" attached to the local agitpunkt or "red corner" (a sort of political and recreative club organized by local Party officials in every district).

The agitator's vocation is regarded as very honourable. He is "the transmitter of the Party policy to the masses. He sees and understands what inspires and interests the people who work with him, what shortcomings there are and how to overcome them. His task is to keep his comrades always informed about the internal and international situation of our country, to propagate the best methods of work and cause them to be adopted in production processes. He must initiate and supervise socialist competition, watch how [socialist] obligations are carried out and publicize the competition widely." (PART. ZHIZN' KAZAKHSTANA, No.8, 1958, p.16) In order to do all this, he must "be able to speak simply, appealingly and without phrase-mongering" (BR. 16.7.59) - an apparently unheeded stipulation in view of the highly elaborate jargon used by Soviet propaganda.

The agitators are not necessarily Party members - they may be what is described as "non-Party activists". They are recruited from among the local intelligentsia, outstanding workers and people enjoying general respect, and they operate in the establishments which employ them as well as in private homes and public places (po mestu zhitel'stva naseleniya). A minority are full-time professionals. They are appointed by the local Party cells and, as their morals must be beyond reproach, the Party carefully watch all aspects of their conduct at work and outside. Nevertheless there do occur agitators who "have no moral right to agitate others", like one Chernykh of the Kumdagneft' (Kum Dag oil trust) agitpunkt: he got drunk and started a brawl at a public place. (TI. 21.11.59) There are also cases when Party authorities seem to be contaminated with a "feudal-bay attitude to women" and neglect to appoint agitators from among native women -

thus in the Kazandzhik rayon of Turkmenistan there are about 400 agitators, only 18 of whom are Turkmen women. (TI. 20.6.59)

If the agitator's knowledge needs brushing up, he is sent to a special school or "seminar". Such schools exist in many towns and rayons as well as in some big kolkhozes and industrial establishments. An exemplary school is run by the Party cell of Stalinabad airport. It has 42 students and the course lasts one year; lectures deal with politics as well as agitation methods and practice. (KT. 14.8.59) The same subjects are taught in Kirgizia where in October 1959 there were 284 agitation schools with over 9,000 students. These are impressive figures but it appears that many rayons and towns still have no such schools. (SK. 11.10.59)

Propagandists and lecturers

The propagandists and lecturers (lektory), attached to the primary Party cells do work very similar to that of the agitators. "Party propaganda is called upon to elucidate the scientific bases of the policy conducted by the Communist Party, to explain unceasingly to the workers the correctness of the Party policy and the necessity of active struggle to translate it into reality." (GT.SOV. ENCYCLOPAEDIA, 2nd edn. Vol.35, 1955, p.70) These people seem to be more closely attached to the local Party organizations than the agitators.

The Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge

The lecturers are also associated with the Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge which has branches in every republic. Its members are not only people of the same quality as the agitators, but also scientific workers and members of the lecturing staff of the VUZ and tekhnikums. Although their lectures cover the same range of subjects as those of the former two groups, it seems that atheist propaganda figures particularly prominently among the Society's activities. It is more refined than its crude counterpart practised by the agitator, for the Society's lecturers emphasize the "scientific" character of atheism and prove the falsehood of religion by illustrating their lectures with chemical experiments which "unmask religious miracles", lecture about the structure of the universe and seem to believe that demonstrating that thunder and lightning are natural phenomena is one of the most effective weapons at their disposal - this part of their atheistic repertoire is repeatedly referred to in the press.

The Society, founded in 1947, is a large organization. In October 1958 it had 7,470 members in Azerbaydzhan and in 1957 they gave 37,660

public lectures; the great majority of these in kolkhozes and industrial establishments. (BR. 19.10.58) In Kirgizia in November 1959 the Society had over 6,000 members who during the first nine months of that year gave 34,000 lectures. There is, however, much room for improvement: half the members do not lecture at all and many of those who are employed by educational establishments neglect their work to such an extent that they gave but 300 lectures in the first nine months of 1959 or less than 1 per cent (sic) of the total. (SK.4.11.59) In March 1958 the Uzbek branch had 11,500 members. (PV. 29.3.58)

Other organizations

Finally, propaganda and agitation are carried on by libraries, "universities of culture", local dramatic and musical societies and "agitation brigades" (not to be confused with "agitation collectives").

Each republic has a formidable army of people who educate the workers in the Communist orthodoxy. In 1958 in Kazakhstan there were 40,000 agitators in the countryside alone. (PART. ZHIZN' KAZ., No.8, 1958, p.16) In February 1960 Tadzhikistan had over 44,000 propagandists and agitators (KT. 20.2.60), and in October 1959 there were over 42,000 agitators in Kirgizia (SK. 11.10.59). Four months earlier Samarkand was being "agitated" by 92 agitkollectivs and 85 agitpunkts with 2,460 agitators (PV. 19.6.59), while at Baku "tens of thousands" of agitators were busy explaining to the population the new Seven-Year Plan (BR. 16.7.59). These figures will, of course, greatly increase if the membership of the Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge is added. Thus the workers are being intensively educated by these various organizations.

II. Methods

Reaching the workers - Meetings and broadcasts - Visual aids
- Shortcomings.

Reaching the workers

The workers cannot escape the agitation whose numerous variations reach them everywhere irrespective of place and time. It is carried on in the lunch-hour in the fields and factories, after work in various clubs, and even individually in private homes where the agitator does not hesitate to penetrate. Night-shifts in factories also get their share of agitation: for example, at the ferro-alloy plant in Aktyubinsk the agitator Kurakbayev gives talks to the workers on the tasks facing the ferrous metal industry, and there are also short meetings at which

results of socialist competition are estimated and problems of rationalization and strengthening factory discipline are discussed. As at night workers' mental concentration is somewhat lowered they must be particularly careful for the agitators' sharp eyes watch them unceasingly - thus when a machine operator fell asleep at work, the agitator immediately issued a "flash" (molniya - an impromptu one-sheet publication) bearing a caricature of the man asleep and a condemnatory doggerel. (PART. ZHIZN' KAZ., No.7, 1959, pp.25-26)

The agitator has numerous propaganda methods at his disposal. Even chess and draughts, available at the agitpunkts, as well as other types of "cultured" recreation are listed among the facilities the agitkollektivs provide for the "toilers". Propaganda methods can be roughly divided into two groups: one when the agitators and propagandists speak to the people directly or broadcast their talks and, secondly, the nagladnyye posobiya or visual aids.

Meetings and broadcasts

The first group covers meetings of all sorts and broadcasts. The most common type are the meetings held in kolkhozes and industrial establishments in the lunch-hour and after work. There the agitator may simply read aloud from a newspaper or "elucidate" the current Plan, always specifying what part in it the people he is talking to must play. This enables him to arrange a "socialist competition" on behalf of his audience and coax individual "socialist obligations" from the workers. Once these are taken, he carefully watches how they are being carried out, makes useful suggestions and finally publishes the results. He must know intimately the establishment employing him so that he can watch the staff and keep in touch with innovations in their particular branch of industry. These constitute another important subject of his talks - he lectures on "progressive methods" and sees that they are adopted; he also encourages the workers to become novatory who invent better, quicker and cheaper working methods.

All this is included in "political mass education", for increasing productivity and fulfilling or, still better, overfulfilling the Plan has a distinct political flavour - it hastens both the transition to Communism and the time when the USA will be "overtaken and surpassed" economically. Apart from this, there is the most important of all political propaganda: keeping the workers informed about the efforts undertaken by the Party to make their life still happier, and by the Soviet Government struggling to preserve peace endangered by the "colonizers and imperialist warmongers".

Finally, there are meetings where the agitator chats informally

with his flock - discussions, "question-and-answer evenings" and individual heart-to-heart talks, the last enabling him to play the role of a father-confessor. He must know the answer to all sorts of problems: political, social, economic and personal and be able to explain that the Party is always right.

Visual aids

"Visual agitation" is also very varied. The most common medium is the wall newspaper (stengazeta) produced by the agitator with the help of an "editorial college" recruited from among the workers of his industrial establishment or one of its departments, or a kolkhoz brigade, as the case may be. These papers are "the result of creative initiative and spontaneous activity of the workers' collective". (GT. SOV. ENCYCLOPAEDIA, 2nd edn., Vol.40, 1957, p.597) A good example of such a publication is the daily wall newspaper TEPLOVOZNIK (the Motor-man) published at the locomotive repair establishment in Ashkhabad. Its virtue lies in its "ability to comprehend the wide and many-sided life of the establishment and its people, to propagate the new, and sharply castigate the obsolete. . . it writes about [socialist] competition and rationalizers, deals with the culture of production and fearlessly interferes in people's life and conduct." It publishes both good ("the leading workers today are comrades. . .") and bad news (turner Mirzoyev "wastes 25 minutes of working time needlessly every day"). This policy is warmly recommended: "Two - three words and everything is clear, and the target is, of course, reached quicker." (TI. 10.6.59) It is reached quicker also in agriculture: a brigade leaflet in the Lenin kolkhoz, Kolkhozabad rayon of Tadzhikistan, bore the caricature of a field worker, Saidov, who had neglected his work. His colleagues jeered and Saidov blushed, but by the following night he fulfilled the norm by 180 per cent. (KT. 24.7.58)

Minor versions of the wall newspaper are the already mentioned "flashes" and "battle cries", the latter stating how much the workers have already done, how much remains to be done and containing slogans designed to influence the readers' minds in that direction. The same purpose is served by "honour-boards" (doski pocheta) praising good workers, graphic representations of the progress of socialist competitions and the contribution of the factory or kolkhoz towards the Plan. Finally, there are various placards, maps illustrating some propaganda point, schemes of the flight of the sputniks, patriotic pictures and caricatures whose purpose is to make the workers hate the "enemies of peace", mobile exhibitions on scientific and atheist subjects and popular films on science, politics, social problems, historical events and a host of other topics. The list of visual aids is completed by shields (shchity) and slogans (lozungi) (usually big

pieces of red cloth with some inscription) bearing patriotic slogans and appeals to produce more for the State. These are displayed in factories, clubs, libraries and wherever people are to be found and, as they hang also across streets and on the outside of public buildings, their omnipresence successfully rivals even that of the wall newspapers.

Shortcomings

The four cardinal sins of propaganda and agitation are: formalism (when, for example, the significance of the Plan is explained to the workers but the part they themselves and their factory must play in it is not "elucidated"); shturmovshchina (last moment spurts to catch up on a badly spaced work-schedule); kampaneyschina (synonymous with shturmovshchina) and kazenshchina (synonymous with formalism). These are repeatedly denounced by the press. Thus, for example, the Ordzhonikidze rayon of Uzbekistan used to suffer from kampaneyschina - shown by the brisk agitation which followed the XXIst Party Congress in the kolkhozes and which subsequently considerably decreased in intensity. (PV. 5.6.59)

III. Agitation in Practice

In the towns - In rural areas

In the towns

In towns agitation is carried on in factories, educational establishments, and in "private homes and public places" - that is private homes, yards, "red corners", clubs, chaykhanas (tea houses) and agitpunkts. The city of Namangan provides an example close to the agitator's ideal conception of propaganda among town population. Until lately the city agitation suffered from kampaneyschina until some Communist suggested that mass political education should be undertaken by the local Communists organized in groups, each working in the quarter of the city where they lived. Thus in the Oktyabr' Quarter there is a group of 20 Communists helped by the local intelligentsia, some 100 persons altogether. The "red" chaykhana ("red" presumably meaning "cultured" in the Soviet sense) has become their agitpunkt where the workers can read books and newspapers, and almost every night lectures and discussions take place. Every agitator has been allotted a number of houses which he visits regularly and chats with the inhabitants. Some private houses have been turned into minor agitpunkts - for example, that of the Boldadayevs in Tashkent Street is a place where the neighbours gather to listen to the agitator Rakhmanov;

his colleague, Karimova, has similarly adopted the Kadyrovs' house in Samarkand Street where she lectures on "perfidious aggressive exploits of the USA imperialist circles against the USSR and on the new schemes put forward by the Soviet Government seeking a complete general disarmament".

In the ten quarters of the city over 100 lectures have been given lately. Moreover, each quarter has "people's brigades" to deal with every case of "breach of the rules of Socialist community". For example, a certain Nishanov of the Oktyabr' Quarter used to drink and brawl, so he was brought before the "comrades' court" constituted by the local people. They condemned his "undignified" behaviour and "their truthful, good words have borne fruit: Nishanov started to behave as is seemly for a Soviet citizen." Or: "Sadullayev of the Karl Marx Quarter dishonourably treated his family and was rude to the neighbours. The agitators and members of the brigade often talked to him. Finally he saw his errors, promised to improve and has done so. Now he remembers with gratitude the Communists who have put him on the right path."

The agitkollectivs also lead a campaign among housewives to make them go to work. These and other efforts have been so successful that two types of misdeed are at last being eliminated: "The number of those observing religious ceremonies and guilty of immoral acts has been considerably reduced." (PV. 24.6.60)

The art of visual agitation is flourishing in Ashkhabad. The streets are decorated with shields, more than 100 in number, which impress upon the workers their obligations towards the Seven-Year Plan. These "mobilizing calls" declare: "Men and women workers, engineers, technicians and skilled personnel! We will win in the socialist competition between the factories of Ashkhabad and Stalinabad! By 20 December we will carry out the plan for the year 1959 and give our fatherland 25,000,000 rubles worth of above-quota produce!" This type of agitation flourishes also at the city factories, for example, the Dzerzhinskiy cloth mill has its own satirical paper KRYUCHOK (Hook) praising members of the Communist labour brigades and conducting a stern campaign against drunkenness, hooliganism and breaches of the "discipline of labour"; there are also the usual slogans as well as a special study group delving into the materials of the XXIst Party Congress. This study plays a beneficial role in raising production: one of the factory brigades, consisting of elderly women, has increased its output since they have joined the group. This is described as an example of "labour heroism". (TI. 10.6.59)

Some quarters of Baku, however, lag behind Ashkhabad. In the Azizbekovskiy rayon visual agitation consists of "standard appeals and

placards yellowed with age". The local oil industry establishments are just as bad: some of their slogans are ten years old and partly illegible. The Cabinet of Political Enlightenment is largely to blame for this: it has prepared a number of good slogans, like "let us produce this year 2,500 tons of oil above the Plan", but has not sent them to the factory agitators to be used. (BR. 25.8.59)

In rural areas

While in the towns agitation activities seem to be evenly distributed throughout the year, in the countryside they follow the agricultural curriculum though this dangerously smells of kampaneyschchina. The times of sowing and reaping, on which ultimate success of the plan depends, throw the agitators into a frenzy of activity: an exodus of the kolkhoz agitkollectiv (aided by the propagandists) to the fields takes place. There they lecture in the lunch-hour and again after work, use the local broadcasting system with loudspeakers to prompt the workers on, "visual agitation" flourishes and the agitator becomes an inquisitor always on the alert to find shortcomings and culprits to be acidly denounced in public. Field camps (polevyye stany) where the kolkhoz brigades rest and eat their lunch or even spend nights if working far from home, become the agitation centres. Thus the Oktyabr' kolkhoz in the Naryn rayon of Uzbekistan has 40 camps with an agitkollectiv of 87 persons. One of these camps sets an example for the others: it is "pleasantly decorated" with slogans and placards summoning the kolkhozniks to "struggle to realize the resolutions of the XXIst Party Congress". There are recent newspapers, a wireless set, a small library, a photographic [wall] newspaper (fotogazeta), and the agitators helped by the brigade activists publish "battle cries". The same purpose is served by the kolkhoz broadcasting centre which informs the population about the progress of socialist competition among the field and tractor brigades and the work of local cattlebreeders, denounces the brigades and individuals who "lag behind" and gives talks on subjects ranging from the ways to work better to atheism. The people are watched closely and their errors promptly corrected - an agitator reports that when cotton sowing in April was over, "some kolkhozniks decided to give themselves a rest and began to stay at home. I visited them and explained the harmfulness of such an attitude and they have understood." (PV. 15.5.59)

Some local Party cells have mobile agitpunkts. Those belonging to the Pavlodar rayon committee tour the fields while harvest is in progress. Aminov, the manager of one such agitation van (agit-mashina), describes how he toiled during the harvest of 1958. His "collective" consisted of six people including a lecturer, cobbler and

barber (apparently the agitators should also provide the workers with facilities to look "cultured"). Their equipment includes a gramophone with loudspeaker and records, film projector, newspapers, magazines, slogans and placards. They displayed fotovitriny (a variety of wall newspaper with topical photographs) which specialized in denouncing bad workers: "in the morning we took photographs of a loafer whom the brigade leader had to wake up repeatedly or a driver who had abandoned his lorry or combine. . . . In three hours the photographs were ready . . . and on a big sheet of paper we arranged a satirical display called 'The Photograph Accuses'". There were also fotovitriny bearing pictures of leading socialist competitors. "Battle cries" and "flashes" were published to keep the kolkhozniks informed about the feats performed by the best workers and progress of socialist competitions. In the harvest season Aminov's collective gave 45 lectures, organized 25 radio chats on the best ways to work, produced 30 film newspapers, conducted 10 evenings of rest with music, showed 45 films and published 30 "battle cries", "flashes", and fotovitriny. (PART. ZHIZN' KAZ., No.11, 1958, pp.46-48)

Agitation plays a big role also in cattlebreeding. For example, the work of the 13 agitators of the Lenin kolkhoz in the Leninpol' rayon of Kirgizia used to "lag behind the requirements of life" and the kolkhoz had the lowest milk yield in the rayon. (SK. 21.9.59) The cattlebreeders of the Mamlyutskiy sovkhov in the North-Kazakhstan oblast, however, are being unceasingly inspired by the agitators to undertake obligations and take part in socialist competitions. The agitkollectiv has 55 members, the majority of whom work in the sovkhov as milkmaids, tractor drivers and brigade leaders. The agitator Amrin, "a good political informant and skilled organizer of socialist competition" looks after a group of milkmaids. "Every day he informs them of the totals of the daily yields and names the better among them. Those who in five days obtained the highest milk yield receive from him a red pennant." The agitator Isakova is likewise responsible for some milkmaids. She gives them talks on politics and on the ways to get more milk from their animals. The agitator Vennikov is in charge of yet another group whose work used to be very unsatisfactory, so he explained to them that they had every possibility to improve and even to surpass their colleagues. Results promptly followed: when they were discussing the resolutions of the December Plenum of the Central Committee, two milkmaids were inspired to declare that in 1960 they would struggle for the first place in the sovkhov and challenged another milkmaid brigade to socialist competition. The challenge was accepted (it is not clear if one could refuse without being considered unpatriotic) and now a brisk competition is going on. Thanks to the agitators' efforts, "the sovkhov collective, inspired by the resolutions of the December Plenum of the Central Committee, is

struggling to carry out their obligations for the year 1960." (PART. ZHIZN' KAZ., No.3, pp.42-44)

A recent visitor to Central Asia reports that in the cities people seem to pay no attention whatever to the "visual aids" which are seldom in any way colourful, eye-catching or original. They are, however, such an essential part of Soviet life that their discontinuance would be unthinkable. The habit-forming qualities of Soviet propaganda must, however, make it increasingly difficult to inculcate new ideas.

Too few Tadzhik and Turkmen girls finish school

Of girls entering the first grade in Tadzhik schools, only 14 per cent complete the 10th grade. Most of those who give up school are from the native population. In the Pyandzh rayon, for instance, only one per cent of the pupils in the 8th-10th grades are natives. Consequently only 10 per cent of all women students at the university are from the local population.

Similarly in Turkmenistan 6-8,000 pupils leave school for no apparent reason every year. In the Mary oblast 1,500 girls left during the school year 1959-60. Of every 100 Turkmen girls entering the first grade only 15-20 finish middle school, and of every 100 admitted to the 8th grade, 30-35 finish school. Thus there is a shortage of women among the Turkmen intelligentsia; for example, of the 14,000 teachers in the republic only 1,300 are women.

KT. 7.8.60; TI. 18.8.60

Uzbek actors visit Turkmenistan

Actors from Bukhara have been giving performances of 15 Uzbek plays on contemporary and historical themes in the summer theatre at Chardzhou, Turkmenistan. Gulyam's FERGANSKIY RASSKAZ and the classical Uzbek plays LEYLI AND MEDZHUNUN and ASHIK GARIB were amongst those performed and warmly received by the audience.

TI. 21.8.60

T H R E E R E C E N T C E N T R A L A S I A N N O V E L S

The three novels here summarized are fairly typical of current fiction centred round Central Asia and Kazakhstan. All are by non-Asians - Russians or other Slavs - and all seem designed to appeal to an unsophisticated and non-Asian reading public. The main characters are Russians whose attitude towards the native peoples is of a patronizing and big-brother description. All three books are strongly reminiscent of the outpost-of-empire, white-man's-burden type of literature highly popular as boys' books in England at the turn of the century, but which has now virtually disappeared.

The authors are all aware of the need for strongly rubbed in morals and they are clearly conscious of the difficulty of complying with this need while maintaining their readers' interest. According to the long review of the EAGLE STEPPE in PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN' (No.8, 1960), Bubennov has failed to provide "a detailed description of the measures which the Party adopted or of the historic decisions which led to a radical change in the conditions of work in the collective farms and to the rapid improvement in agriculture." The conclusion is inescapable that however desirable such a description might have been from a political point of view, it could hardly have enhanced the entertainment value of the book.

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I

WHERE THERE WAS SILENCE (TAM GDE BYLA TISHINA). By Yevgeniy Krivenko.
Izd. TsK LKSMU Molod', Kiev, 1960.

The story, which opens in 1932, centres round three young people, Viktor Makarov, Nikolay Kostenko and Nataliya Petrova, civil engineers, who have come from Poltava in the Ukraine to the frontier zone of Turkmenistan to build a road. Their first taste of what lies ahead starts at Ashkhabad where they have to wait for their passes to the

frontier zone. Here they meet the older engineers of the region, who think of nothing but drink and an easy life; Makarov also meets Tkachev, who is in charge of road construction in the region. Tkachev paints a grim picture of the situation - only failures or politically unsound people come to Central Asia, old Trotskiists and Basmachis operate in the region, enemies are everywhere and Afghanistan is only just across the river. Tkachev puts Makarov in charge of a road which is being built from Mukry station to Gornyy in the Kugitang mountains where recently discovered sulphur deposits are now being prospected and mined; the road is to be the vital link between Gornyy and the railway which will carry the badly-needed sulphur to Soviet industries.

Toushan, a beautiful Turkmen girl who lives with Tkachev, gives Makarov a letter to her sister Dursun, who lives near Mukry station.

The Stalinabad train deposits the three young people at Mukry. Makarov discovers that the road is being built with spades and wheelbarrows by a handful of workmen who have no food, clothes or money. In the Turkmen village the Road Construction Office is a mud hut and a larger mud barracks houses all the workmen under appalling conditions. The office accountant has just died of drink, the foremen are drinking, the superintendent intends to steal the money and disappear. The workmen riot and demand their pay; half of them decide to leave.

A rich old Turkmen, Durdyev, has bought Toushan's 14 year-old sister Dursun to become one of his many wives. Durdyev is working against the Soviet regime which, he realizes, will deprive him of his lands, cattle and wives. He and Niyazov, another rich Turkmen also anti-Soviet, pretend to be pro-Soviet to allay suspicion, and the former works as watchman to the Road Construction Office while the latter gets himself elected as chairman of the aul soviet. Two other subversive characters are Buzhenikov, the new accountant, and a new road-building recruit, Dubinka. Behind these four works the mastermind, Anatoliy Kurlatov, an agent of the imperialists operating from Afghanistan, and rumoured to have been seen lately in Ashkhabad. A mysterious white-turbaned figure has also reappeared in the Kugitang foothills to the terror of the local population as previously his visits have been marked by murders and sabotage. A Soviet frontier guard outpost is stationed at Mukry; its C.O. is well alive to the situation and warns Makarov of all the dangers. But Makarov's mind is entirely engrossed in his road.

Makarov discovers that the road as officially projected will be flooded in spring; it will take years to build by hand and it will cost millions. He and his friends work out another project which will

make the road safe from flooding and be cheaper and quicker to build. The new project has to be approved by the authorities in Ashkhabad for money is only forthcoming on completed sections of the official project. On his own authority Makarov transfers some of his workmen to a camp in the mountains to work on his new projected route and appoints Nataliya as camp superintendent in spite of repeated warnings not to leave her alone and unprotected.

Unknown saboteurs burn Makarov's only lorry in the mountains; panic sets in, but Nataliya restores order. Down in the plain things are no better; Soldatenkov, Makarov's best foreman and leader of the Komsomol team, beats up Durdyev after seeing him beat his young wife Dursun. This incident is seized upon by local enemies and Makarov and his team are accused of aggression against the native population.

Meanwhile Niyazov has a meeting with the imperialist agent, Kurlatov, who gives him money and his orders: on no account are the Kugitang sulphur mines to fall into Soviet hands, nor is the road to be completed. Soon Kurlatov will come to Mukry, collect his accomplices and when his work is done cross into Afghanistan. Kurlatov's girl-friend, Nina, who has refused to follow him on realizing the nature of his activities, finds herself in Mukry and soon joins Makarov's team in spite of the atrocious living and working conditions.

Things go from bad to worse: Nikolay, sent to Ashkhabad, returns without the necessary approval for the new road project. Makarov at his own risk, continues work on his project. But money and food are almost non-existent, and such little as the men get is immediately spent on drinking and gambling. Someone attempts to kill Makarov, but he escapes. The Turkmen workmen are incited to strike in support of Durdyev whom Makarov has dismissed from his watchman's duties. Called to a meeting at the geologists' settlement, Makarov realizes that some high government officials, for reasons of prestige and gain, are also working against the mining and road projects. Dubinka (in Kurlatov's pay) works to frighten and demoralize the people, and drive them to drink. Only Soldatenkov and his Komsomol brigade remain loyal and firm. The others continue to riot from hunger and exhaustion. Earthquakes pile up rocks on a section of the newly-cleared road tract; blazing heat and an outbreak of malaria add to the hardships; Makarov himself is stricken with malaria.

Into this situation walks the big chief Tkachev with his girl Toushan, travelling on a tour of inspection. Immediately aware of the situation, he provides food, and most important of all - support and money for Makarov's project. Toushan decides to remain at Mukry, as head of the future kolkhoz, and to investigate the disappearance of her sister, Dursun.

Nikolay loves Nataliya; Nataliya loves Makarov. Makarov thinks that he loves Yulia Tumanova, his Poltava girl friend, now a well-known concert singer. He discovers that she is about to give a concert in Ashkhabad and goes to meet her, disobeying Tkachev's orders not to leave Mukry.

Meanwhile, the road builders reach an obstructing rock which has to be dynamited. The enemies put out anonymous notes to the effect that whoever touches the rock will die. Soldatenkov is now in charge, but he courageously disregards all warnings. As Makarov returns the rock is blown away, but a few hours later Soldatenkov is found murdered. A letter to Makarov discloses the murderer to be Durdyev, who meanwhile disappears. A search of his house reveals Dursun, beaten almost to death and locked in an outbuilding.

Kurlatov and his accomplices assemble in a mountain cave and kidnap Nina. They plan to blow up the sulphur smelting shop which has just been erected at Gornyy. To celebrate the erection of this smelting shop and the completion of Makarov's road, the geologists and road builders are holding a dance. They are saved from destruction by Nina, who, escaping from the cave, has alerted the frontier guard. Kurlatov attacks, but in the fight that follows, in which Makarov is wounded, his party is defeated. Next day the wounded Makarov regains consciousness to find a loving Nataliya by his side and a bright future ahead. His task is completed, and a fleet of lorries carrying sulphur is just starting down the new road.

II

SECOND SPRING (VTORAYA VESNA). By M. Zuyev-Ordinets. Izd. Sovetskiy Pisatel', Moscow, 1959.

This is the story of a two-day journey undertaken by a group of young people, together with their machinery and equipment, on their way to found a new sovkhos in the virgin lands. Their route lies across 250 miles of Kazakh steppe.

The opening chapters describe the life of Galim Nurzhanov, an elderly Kazakh schoolteacher in a small aul. His only son Temir, killed in the Second World War, had been a dreamer of great deeds and changes that would transform his poverty-stricken steppe into a fertile agricultural region. Many years later, Nurzhanov learns that the

virgin lands of Kazakhstan and Siberia are to be opened up, and realizes that his son's dreams are about to come true.

One night the small aul is awakened by the noise of motors and the light of headlamps. Nurzhanov watches an immense mechanized column travel across the steppe. A little later lights on the horizon and distress rockets indicate that the column has come to grief. Nurzhanov realizes that they must have come across the swamps of Shybyn-Utmes; he orders his coachman Kozhagul to saddle two horses to go to their help.

At Turksib station a large contingent of people, with their tractors, machinery, servicing equipment, building materials etc. are assembled to organize the last 250 miles of their journey to Zhangabyl where the headquarters of their new sovkhos is to be. Under their director, Korchakov, they are divided into two columns, the first consisting of the heavy machinery and the second the lighter lorries and cars. Korchakov leads the second column of 113 vehicles and some 300 people.

From these 300 the author develops a number of personalities: Korchakov himself, a good organizer and leader; Kurman Gazizovich Sadykov (a Kazakh), an ex-major and the transport manager - a severe and demanding officer but respected by his subordinates; Vasya Mefodin, a driver and easy-going, life-loving boy, but with a shady past and easily influenced by the villain of the story, Shpolyanskiy, a rough Ukrainian. The three central characters are Shura Kvashnina, the young doctor who is to be in charge of the mobile medical unit of the future settlement; Boris Chuprov, correspondent of the local Komsomol newspaper, accompanying the expedition - an idealist and enthusiast, and in love with Shura; Nikolay Neuspokoyev, an engineer and the construction superintendent, also an idealist who left an easy life in Leningrad for the hardships of the virgin lands. He is good-looking and clever and Shura falls in love with him. He works with enthusiasm and fears nothing, but throughout the book he behaves badly; is critical, arrogant and rude to his equals and superiors and completely inhuman to his inferiors.

A rumour that swamps in the Shybyn-Utmes region, which the column has to cross, have been encountered by a geological expedition is discounted by Sadykov and the order given to start. In spite of difficulties the column completes the first day's journey according to plan. They camp for the night in the steppe; the villain Shpolyanskiy produces vodka and tempts Mefodin and another driver to drink, although Korchakov has forbidden the drivers to drink during the journey. The matter is reported to Korchakov who restrains Neuspokoyev from beating

up the drivers. To punish Mefodin, Sadykov takes away his lorry and appoints another driver. Mefodin loves his lorry and wishes to reform; Boris tries to intercede for him but Korchakov supports Sadykov's decision.

Next day the column travels on under heavy rain and at night comes unawares upon the swamps of Shybyn-Utmes. Two lorries are bogged down; working waist-deep in the mud the boys succeed in freeing one but the other has to be abandoned. Korchakov tries and fails to find a suitable crossing. The leaders meet to work out a plan of action: Sadykov and Neuspokoyev press for sending people back into the mud to find a crossing but Korchakov and the doctor, Shura, refuse to allow any further inhuman treatment.

It is at this moment that the two Kazakhs, Galim Nurzhanov and Kozhagul, arrive; they join the meeting, suggest a new route via the Sultan-Tau mountains and the column move into Nurzhanov's school in the aul for the rest of the night.

Here Mefodin makes a full confession of his past life to Boris, and of Shpolyanskiy's influence which led him to stealing and drinking. Boris spends the rest of the night reading the diaries of Temir, Nurzhanov's son who was killed. The diaries describe the superstitious resistance of the Kazakhs to any innovations and especially to the ploughing up of their pastures.

In the morning the convoy is visited by four Kazakhs from the nearby kolkhoz. They are received with friendliness and show great interest in bricks, which they have evidently never seen before. Later, Neuspokoyev, seeing the Kazakhs about to leave each carrying a few bricks (given them by the boys) accuses them of stealing and attempts to beat them up. Boris intervenes, and in his turn is prevented by Shura from beating up Neuspokoyev. This incident is seen by many people; Shpolyanskiy warns Neuspokoyev that it could be labelled as colonialism and racism, and be written up by Boris in the press.

Sadykov and Kozhagul return from a reconnaissance of the Sultan-Tau road and describe the difficulties which lie ahead to the drivers who, however, decide to attempt the crossing rather than turn back. Guided by Kozhagul and Nurzhanov the column moves off but their way is soon barred by a section of forest. They proceed to fell the trees under the guidance of Ipat Krokhaliev, a Russian carpenter, an outstanding character vividly described throughout the book. A falling tree injures a Leningrad boy, who cannot face the hard life ahead and asks to be sent home; he is the only defector. Meanwhile Mefodin gets hold of his lorry, starts it with a duplicate key made by Shpolyanskiy, and makes off; the latter has incited him to steal it, sell its load and share the profits.

The convoy starts off again, but later in the night encounters another obstacle: melting snows have cut a deep ravine in a narrow gorge. The escaping Mefodin has also been stopped by this, and his trial is organized immediately. But Mefodin is recognized as being willing and able to return to the right path and is absolved. Shpolyanskiy's crimes are exposed and he is put under arrest.

Under Neuspokoyev's direction a timber bridge is rapidly built. The first two lorries cross safely, but the bridge collapses under the third. Neuspokoyev's pride is wounded by failure and he refuses to find another solution or to cooperate further. A proposal is made to build a dam of earth and stones across the ravine; this work is carried out throughout the night and its success arouses Neuspokoyev's jealousy and anger. The ravine is safely crossed and one last obstacle lies ahead - a steep ascent which the lorries cannot take. On their own initiative the people push and pull the lorries upwards. Galim Nurzhanov, whose weak heart has been overstrained by the night's heavy work, collapses with a heart attack and dies at dawn.

Boris, more than ever in love with Shura hears from her that she is fully aware of Neuspokoyev's selfishness, dishonesty, cowardice and emptiness, but she loves him and intends to stand by him in her future life.

By dawn, with all difficulties overcome, the column faces a wide steppe road leading them to Zhangabyl.

III

EAGLE STEPPE (ORLINAYA STEP'). By Mikhail Bubennov. OKTYABR', 1959, Nos.7-10.

Leonid Bagryanov is 13 years old at the time of the German occupation in the Second World War, his father is killed and he sees his native village wiped out by the Germans. He also meets a wounded Soviet officer, Zima, who tells him stories of his native Altay. Later he moves with his mother to Moscow, becomes an engineer, and falls in love with a Moscow girl, Svetlana. On hearing the call for volunteers to work in the virgin lands, he remembers Zima's stories and with Svetlana decides to go to the Altay region.

With a party of young people they reach Barnaul, meet Zima, who is the agronomist of the MTS at Zalesikha, a village near the Kazakh border, and follow him there. In Zalesikha Bagryanov meets Deryaba, leader of a group of young farm workers who engage in hooliganism; Deryaba becomes his sworn enemy. Krasnyuk, director of the MTS, patronizes Deryaba and works against Bagryanov. After many difficulties Bagryanov's brigade moves to another village, Lebyazh'ye, and from there to their camp in the steppe.

In the steppe Bagryanov hears from a native chaban (shepherd), Beysen, how his sheep are dying for lack of food; he is distressed to see his land ploughed up, the pastures shrinking, and complains bitterly. Sever'yanov, president of the kolkhoz, describes to Bagryanov the desperate situation in the virgin lands and the reasons for failure: shortage of men and machines.

Under great difficulties Bagryanov's brigade begins the ploughing. He encounters Imambay, the horse herdsman of the kolkhoz, whose pastures Bagryanov is ploughing up, thus forcing him to move far away, to Lake Baklan'ye, a region of salt lands, leaving his house and possessions.

Three love stories develop in the novel: Bagryanov and Svetlana (but Bagryanov finds himself attracted also to Khmel'ko, the woman agronomist at the kolkhoz); Vanya Sobol', a tractor driver, and Tonya; An'ka, a girl in Bagryanov's brigade, whose lover is Deryaba the hooligan.

Bagryanov, short of men, sends An'ka to Deryaba entrusting her to win over some of his gang to come and work for him. An'ka lets out this secret to Deryaba who conceives a plot to ruin Bagryanov by terrorizing the brigade and sends two of his gang to work for him.

The difficulties in Bagryanov's brigade multiply: he cannot get sufficient food and his people begin to hunt and eat suslik (marmot). The big boss, Krasnyuk arrives for an inspection, gets fed on susliki and trouble follows. Deryaba's hooligans make this worse by bad ploughing; Deryaba sets a wolf on the camp as part of his campaign of terror, but Bagryanov kills it. Sever'yanov, after an argument with Bagryanov, dies of a heart attack and the village holds Bagryanov responsible for his death. The hooligans desert and one of them, with Deryaba, goes into hiding.

Following Sever'yanov's funeral, drunkenness, violence and ill-feeling towards Bagryanov break out in the village. That night one of the brigade is murdered and suspicion falls on Vanya Sobol' and on some others from the village; they are arrested. In fact the murder was committed by Deryaba.

Unable to stand the strain, after a quarrel with Bagryanov Svetlana deserts with one of the brigade. The two of them wander through the steppe; Svetlana is bitten by a viper.

At last the brigade begins the sowing, but Krasnyuk dismisses Bagryanov as brigade leader.

Imambay, the banished horse-herdsman, gives refuge to Deryaba and his friend thinking they are deserters. Soon Imambay and his son realize that he is the murderer and when Deryaba tries to run away they hunt him. Deryaba perishes.

Svetlana, nursed and restored to health by some local inhabitants, returns to the brigade. The authorities of the Central Committee accept Bagryanov's plan for the creation of a large sovkhos in the Eagle steppe and Zima is appointed as its director. A new settlement begins to rise on the site of Bagryanov's old camp.



None of the novels is a literary masterpiece and the themes of all three are similar: the triumph of young, mainly Russian idealists pioneering in new lands against appalling difficulties presented by nature, reactionary and criminal elements, and sheer bureaucratic inefficiency.

WHERE THERE WAS SILENCE is, from a literary point of view, very poor. The characters are little more than dummies, alternately pompous or sentimental. The author seems solely concerned with the plot, though periodically he remembers his duty and rattles off a few pages of propaganda. The outstanding impact of the book is the picture of the appalling hardships suffered by the people building the new Soviet society and economy. Men and girls live, sleep and eat in the only existing one-room barrack; there is no technical or mechanical aid for the road builders; everything is done by hand or with the most primitive tools. But one has to remember that the story is set in the 1930s.

The local Turkmen are presented as either rich oppressors of the poor and enemies of the Soviets (such as Durdyev, Niyazov etc.), or as the oppressed poor who welcome and help the new regime, such as the girls Toushan and Dursun. The minor Turkmen characters in the book are just as unconvincingly drawn as the others.

Both here and in SECOND SPRING the authors develop an identical situation, in which the leaders of these pioneer enterprises show no

concern whatsoever for the welfare and safety of the people entrusted to them. The leaders never spare themselves, but are blind and thoughtless to the needs of others; their sole interest is the success of the enterprise. Thus Makarov in *WHERE THERE IS SILENCE* is shown as completely irresponsible, ignoring all warnings which could have prevented misfortune, including Soldatenkov's murder, and in *SECOND SPRING* Neuspokoyev and Sadykov try to drive their men beyond endurance. The only worth-while thing in life appears to them to be the heroic deed or podvig, whether undertaken personally or collectively.

In *SECOND SPRING*, however, the secondary characters are on the whole infinitely more vivid, alive and interesting than the heroes. Ipat Krokhaliev, the Russian carpenter, is one; but this is not an all-Russian collective, there is a Kazakh boy who acts as interpreter, Sadykov speaks in Kazakh with Kozhagul. Everyone, and Sadykov especially, treats the Kazakh teacher, Nurzhanov, with the utmost respect, though towards Kozhagul the Russians show amusement and curiosity; to them the simple Kazakhs are both exotic and extremely backward.

From a literary point of view *EAGLE STEPPE* is probably the best of the three. The descriptions of steppe scenery have distinct merit.

NEWS DIGEST

The following items are taken from newspapers and periodicals received during the period 1 July-30 September 1960. A list of abbreviations used will be found at the beginning of the Review.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND TERRITORIAL CHANGES

Administrative changes

There were no administrative changes in the appointments recorded by CARC during the period under review.

Territorial changesAzerbaydzhan

A new residential suburb, Sallakhan is to be constructed in "greater Baku". The new district (mikrorayon) will be 40,000 square metres in extent and consist of blocks of flats. The first stage should be completed in 1961. BR. 10.9.60

Kirgizia

The town of Osh is being enlarged by 212 hectares, taken from the Osh rayon. SK. 16.9.60

CONFERENCES

The Writers' Union of Kazakhstan held a plenary session at Alma-Ata in April 1960. A. Tadzhibayev's report to the session was followed by a discussion on the problems of cinema, drama and television in the republic.

In the course of the discussion, the speakers brought out the deficiencies of contemporary Kazakh drama: there are no good plays with

a contemporary subject; of 150 Kazakh plays 15 are on historical subjects and only these are popular - they are still presented while the 135 plays on modern themes have long been forgotten.

It was suggested that playwrights fail to give a profound analysis of their characters, without which no play can be good. Discussing the problem of the hero, Z. Shashkin explained that the hero is, in fact, our epoch, and "our ideal is the idea of production". He added that "those playwrights who impose casual episodes, details and speeches on the hero, are wrong; he himself should create his own situation and destiny."

L. Galimzhanova thought the general weakness of Kazakh plays is that the characters are very rarely interesting people: "They think little, feel little and dream little."

Some young playwrights were criticized for being influenced by neo-realism, thus narrowing the scope of the characters to small details. "Our aesthetics," said A. Salynskiy, "require characters whose perspective of the development of the world is active, strong and intelligent." He added that the only sympathetic character he could find was in Tadzhibayev's play ONE TREE - NOT A FOREST.

One of the most important points in the discussion was the problem of technical skill (mastery). It was agreed that both the construction and the style of contemporary Kazakh plays are deficient in this.

In discussing film making in Kazakhstan, the director of the film studio, K. Sironov, criticized writers for not taking cinematographic art seriously, and producers for working exclusively on scripts of Moscow authors. "Among writers invited there were undoubtedly talented people, but many of them had done only great harm." In conclusion Sironov said, "it is not that we want to refuse the help of professional playwrights from Moscow or from any other town, but we must think of training our own local script-writers."

PROSTOR, 1960, No.7

EDUCATION

A new department of the University of Moscow has been founded for students from Asia (including Soviet Asia), Africa and South America. This new "Friendship University" is not a government institution but is directed by an elected council and as such is "autonomous and democratic".

The first year began on 1 October 1960 with 500 students; the authorities had received 35,000 applications for the 500 places. Short-listed candidates were invited to Moscow for an entrance examination - fares and expenses paid. Friendship University will take 2,000 students, so that each year 500 new students will be admitted. In the course of their first year the students will learn Russian (students from the Asian part of the Soviet Union, two foreign languages) and then go on to the various faculties.

There are no fees at the University which also pays the living expenses of the students. VOKRUG SVETA, 1960, No.9

IRRIGATION

The Irtysh-Karaganda canal


Central Kazakhstan is unusually rich in natural resources and its industry is rapidly expanding. The shortage of water hinders industrial development and the problem is particularly acute in Karaganda and Temir-Tau.

The Irtysh carries through central Kazakhstan over 900 cubic metres of water per minute and is the obvious source from which the industrial districts can be supplied. Eight projects for using it for irrigation have been drawn up, of which the so-called Shiderty bed version has been chosen as the best. The canal will therefore flow from Yermak on the Irtysh to Karaganda. (For detailed course see CAR, 1960, No.2, p.148.)

The length of the canal will be 514 km. and pumping stations will raise water to the total height of 475 metres. Its surface will be between 20-40 metres wide; the width of its bed will vary between 5-10 metres and the depth will be between 4-6 metres. Seventy-five cubic metres of water per second will pass through its starting point, which corresponds with the flow of the Dnieper at Mogilev.

The canal will supply the industrial districts of Ekibastuz, Maykain, Bozshakul, Karaganda and Temir-Tau. Moreover, it is intended to construct a branch canal which will remedy the shortage of water in the upper reaches of the River Ishim and irrigate a number of rayons in the Akmolinsk oblast. Later the canal may be extended by a further 500 km. to the Dzhezkazgan industrial region from where a branch will flow to the Atasu rayon where new mines are being opened up. Apart from industry, the canal will make it possible to develop agriculture in the parts of the Pavlodar and Karaganda oblasts adjoining the industrial districts.

IRTYSH — KARAGANDA CANAL.



The canal will very considerably lower the cost of water. Irtysch water supplied to Ekibastuz via covered conduits would cost 60 kopecks per cubic metre while the canal water will be obtained at 2 kopecks; now the water Karaganda receives from local resources costs 70-80 kopecks per cubic metre and the canal will lower the price to 18 kopecks.

The first sector of the canal from the Irtysch to Ekibastuz, 140 km. long, will be completed in 1963 and the rest in 1965.

The Chim-Kurgan reservoir

This reservoir, under construction on the river Kashka-Dar'ya, will be the largest in Uzbekistan. It will cover 50 square kilometres and have a cubic capacity of 500m. cubic metres. Part of the work finished by 1 May 1960 made possible this year the cultivation of 10,000 hectares of land in the Surkhan-Dar'ya oblast. PV. 7.9.60

The Khan-Khauz reservoir

The project for the Khan-Khauz reservoir (between the Murgab and Tedzhen rivers), has been confirmed by the Ministry of Water Supply of the Turkmen SSR. This will be the largest reservoir in Turkmenistan with a capacity of 435m. cubic metres of water, and will irrigate 45,000 hectares of desert. (See also CAR, 1960, No.2, p.140.)

TI. 22.9.60

LINGUISTICS

In a short article entitled "The Tadjik Dialects and their Location" (VESTNIK TNIK LENINGRADSKOGO UNIVERSITETA, 1960, No.14, Seriya istorii, yazyka i literatury, vyp.3), N.A. Melekh gives a classification of the Tadjik dialects illustrated by a map showing their location. The map (reproduced facing) is based on data from 1940, and later publications were used only in the case of some dialects. The author explains that the region south of Stalinabad is at present populated by people who come from other parts of the Republic and also from other republics. The establishment of communication and cultural relations between various parts of the Republic has also been a cause of linguistic changes; the literary language propagated in schools, radio, press and theatre is another important factor. A large percentage of the population of central Tadjikistan is Russian or Turkic speaking.

A result of the mass migration of the mountain Tadjiks to the newly irrigated regions (Vakhsh valley), is that the dialectal composition has undergone changes; some data shown on the map may, therefore, be out of date.


The author classifies Tadjik into three groups and several sub-groups as shown on the map. This is the first attempt at visual representation of the Tadjik dialects.

Tadzhik dialects and their location

----- Dialects.
 Sub-dialects.

20 0 20 40 60

J.P.



PRESS

A new periodical **PARTIYNANA ZHIZN'** started publication in Uzbekistan in July 1960. Another new journal, entitled **KOMMUNIST UZBEKISTANA**, sponsored by the Central Committee of the Uzbek CP has recently made its appearance; this is a Russian language periodical which deals with theoretical and practical questions of Communist construction.

P. 11.8.60

T H E B O R D E R L A N D S O F S O V I E T
C E N T R A L A S I A

HERAT, 1856--7

In 1959 the Soviet Academy of Sciences published a book on the little known episode of the Anglo-Persian War of 1856-7, P.P. Bushev's GERAT I ANGLŌ-IRANSKAYA VOYNA 1856-1857 GG. This is a solid work of 250 pages with an appendix of 24 relevant documents, indexes of proper and place-names and a bibliography of 255 titles in Russian, English, French and Persian. The value of the book as historiography is reduced by the fact that like all Soviet writing on Persian and Afghan history it is a book with a purpose, the purpose being to adduce evidence that British relations with these countries were essentially sinister and connected with British designs on Central Asia.

The following article is a summary of the book's argument and narrative.

. . .

- I. British Policy in Persia - II. Anglo-Persian Relations 1851-5 -
 III. The Seizure of Herat by Persia and Anglo-Persian Negotiations -
 IV. Military Operations - V. The Paris Treaty - VI. Sources and
 Literature - VII. Editorial Comment.

I. British Policy in Persia

"One of the most important aims of Great Britain's foreign policy in the 18th and 19th centuries was the seizure of colonies and of the opportunity for their all-round exploitation, and also the creation of bases on the route from the British Isles to the East." (Bushev, p.3)

As a result of the wealth plundered by Britain from her colonies her industrial capacity grew immensely and by the middle of the 1850s a need was being felt for new markets. The British bourgeoisie "seized colonies and opened new markets by force of arms" and "subordinated to

their needs the whole home and foreign policy of the State" (p.4). Their prey was Persia, Afghanistan and Central Asia. By 1852 the Indian market was so swamped with British goods that the British economy was thrown between 1855 and 1857 into one of its recurring crises of over-production. To the British bourgeoisie expansion in Central Asia and China seemed to be the answer.

Herat was to be the British base for aggression in Central Asia. Besides being naturally rich it was strategically placed. In the war against Persia in 1856, besides the conquest of the markets of Persia, Afghanistan, Central Asia and Transcaucasia, Britain's aims were:

- (1) the establishment of bases on the islands of Qishm and Kharak and at Bandar Abbas, Bushire and Muhammarah in the Persian Gulf;
- (2) the establishment of consulates in southern Azarbaijan, Gilan, Mazandaran, Khorasan and Asterabad to increase British economic and political influence in Central Asia and Transcaucasia;
- (3) the economic and political subjection of Afghanistan and her transformation into a base for aggression against Central Asia and Transcaucasia;
- (4) the formation in Herat of a government dependent on Britain and the stationing there of a British resident and garrison, or the seizure of the Khanate.

II. Anglo-Persian Relations, 1851-5

Persia

Persia was a backward, agrarian and feudal country. The import of foreign, mainly British, goods had harmed domestic handicrafts. Class differences had broken out into rebellion in the Babi movement of 1848-52. The British were trying to force the Persians to accept British consulates in the north of the country and were using the campaign against the slave-trade as a pretext to gain bases on Persian territory in the Persian Gulf. Mirza Taghi Khan had, indeed, carried out certain reforms which had had the effect of slightly strengthening the Qajar dynasty, but they should not be overemphasized: they were all, except the reform of the Army, repealed by Aga Nuri Khan, the sadr-i-azam (prime minister).

The Persian Army remained badly trained, officered and equipped. The majority of the Shah's forces was composed of the retinues of vassal khans and maliks, so that there was a lack of discipline and central control. During the first half of the 19th century British officers were employed as instructors in the Persian Army: however,

only the regular army was affected by their instruction, which, indeed, left much to be desired. If the Army's weapons were out of date and the soldiers did not know which end to load their rifles "it is obvious that this was to a considerable extent the result of the British military instructors' 'training'." (P.36) This state of affairs was no accident, since "naturally this condition of the armed forces of Persia facilitated the aggressive activity of the British plunderers" (p.37). The Army consisted, on paper, of 100,000 men organized in 82 regiments. However, the illiteracy and corruption of the officers together with bad organization and the lack of a satisfactory supply system reduced the Army's effectiveness. Contemporary British sources tended to exaggerate the strength of the Persian Army with the obvious aim of making British victories more impressive.

Herat

On the death of Yar Muhammad Khan in 1851 his son Sayyid Muhammad Khan succeeded to the throne. Sayyid Muhammad Khan was a stupid and erratic ruler who to strengthen his position at home sought the support now of Persia, now of Britain. Herat itself was split between Afghan and Persian factions and the picture was complicated by the conflicting interests of Dost Muhammad Khan, ruler of Kabul (whose son had married Yar Muhammad Khan's daughter); Kuhandil Khan, ruler of Kandahar (who had received a petition from the inhabitants of Herat), and of Britain, who pretended to be interested in "saving" Herat from Persian occupation. The growing predominance of the Persian faction alarmed Britain because it "hindered her aggressive plans in relation to Persia, Afghanistan and Central Asia" (p.39). The British envoy in Tehran, Lieut.-Col. Shiel, demanded assurances from Persia which were refused. He was, however, assured that Persia would not attempt to occupy Herat unless Dost Muhammad or Kuhandil Khan first attempted to do so. It was in Persia's interest to keep Herat and Kandahar independent and weak as buffers between herself and Afghanistan.

In 1851 an attempt by Kuhandil Khan to occupy Herat was foiled by the Persians, who rejected his proposal that they should carry out a joint occupation.

In 1852 Shiel reported to Palmerston that the sadr-i-azam had renewed his demands that Britain should assume responsibility for the defence of Herat against Kabul and Kandahar, when Persia would cease to interfere in the affairs of the khanate. In the same year the Shah proposed that Britain and Persia should replace Sayyid Muhammad Khan with their own nominee and should join in persuading Kuhandil Khan to renounce the occupation of Herat. Shiel, in the absence of instructions, agreed to send agents to Kandahar if the Shah would, in return, renounce

all rights to Herat. The Shah agreed but demanded that the British should not allow the occupation by Kandahar of even a part of Herat. Shiel, who had still received no instructions, refused. As a result the Persians occupied Herat. The British made protests in Tehran, exerted diplomatic pressure on the Persian Chargé d'Affaires in London [who was, writes Bushev, "sent out of the capital of England to the provincial town of Coventry" (sic) (p.43)*], broke off diplomatic relations and finally ordered the fleet to seize the island of Kharak. However, the resignation of the Cabinet prevented this from being done. Finally, with Russian help the British in January 1853 got from Persia a written renunciation of interference in the affairs of Herat. Although this document was so composed that all that was granted in its first part was taken away in the second, the British accepted it because events elsewhere distracted their attention. This agreement forced the Persians to work secretly. Nevertheless they "still calculated on seizing Herat in favourable circumstances" (p.50).

In 1854 the head of the Afghan party in Herat, Isa Khan, became head of the garrison and so in effect seized power. The Persian party petitioned the Shah to "save" Herat and Persian troops were sent. The British immediately made a military demonstration in the Persian Gulf. However, in the same year Sayyid Muhammad Khan was turned out and replaced by Muhammad Yusuf Khan. "It is quite obvious that Muhammad Yusuf Khan's seizure of power in Herat in September 1854 took place with the support of both the Afghan and the Persian group since his candidature suited them both. He was a prince of the Sadozai dynasty and at the same time an officer of the Persian Army, an émigré who had fled from Herat to Persia and owed it to the Persian Government that he had become ruler of Herat." (P.53) He declared himself a vassal of the Shah. Dost Muhammad saw him as a Persian puppet and renewed his advocacy of his son's claims to Herat. The British supported Isa Khan.

* Palmerston in answer to Disraeli, Debate on the speech from the Throne, 3 February 1857: "The Opposition also recognized the importance of Herat to the defence of India. . . when the right hon. Gentleman [Disraeli] was in office in Lord Derby's Administration, and when it had been alleged that the Persian Government entertained an intention of annexing the territory of Herat. . . what was the consequence? Why, the Government of Lord Derby sent the Persian Minister to Coventry, told him that they would have nothing more to do with him until that annexation was revoked." Hansard, 1857, p.166.

Even if Mr. Bushev's knowledge of English does not extend to the common idiom "to send to Coventry", his knowledge of international usage should tell him that no government can banish a foreign envoy to a provincial town. -Ed. CAR.

In 1855 British aggressive intentions against Persia made further progress with the treaty with Dost Muhammad. This treaty was unequal in that while Dost promised to be "friend of the friends and enemy of the enemies" of the East India Company, the Company made no such promises to him. So Dost became "drawn into the orbit of the expansionist policy of Britain which was directed in the first instance against Persia and the khanates of Central Asia". (P.48) The treaty was not, however, without benefits for him as he received money, arms and recognition as the ruler of an independent Afghan state.

The Mirza Hashim Khan Episode

With the Mirza Hashim Khan episode in the summer of 1855 Anglo-Persian relations began sharply to deteriorate. Mirza Hashim Khan was a Persian subject in the employ of the British Embassy in Tehran. In September 1854 the British Chargé d'Affaires in Tehran, Thomson, had attempted to appoint him secretary of the Tehran Embassy and (after the Persian Government had refused its consent to this) to make him British agent in Shiraz, to which also the Persian Government was opposed because it did not wish to give official recognition to the existence of a British consulate in Shiraz. Thomson had accepted the Persian Government's refusal and the Foreign Minister Clarendon had agreed with him. Nevertheless the new British representative in Tehran, Murray, renewed the demand that Mirza Hashim Khan should be appointed secretary of the British Embassy in Tehran or British agent in Shiraz. When the Persian Government, as before, refused, Murray threatened to break off diplomatic relations, obviously acting on instructions from London. Mirza Hashim Khan's wife was detained by the Persians and Murray demanded her release. Yet when the Persians agreed to release her Murray stipulated fresh conditions, including a public apology. The rupture of diplomatic relations which took place on 20 November 1855 was obviously brought about deliberately by Murray in connexion with the British bourgeoisie's "intensified expansion in Asia, in particular against Persia" (p.58), which began towards the end of the Crimean War. The rupture was viewed with disfavour by the Opposition in Britain and was much regretted by the Persian Government.

III. The Seizure of Herat by Persia and Anglo-Persian Negotiations

Even before Murray's departure from Tehran the Persian Government had begun negotiations with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, British Ambassador to Turkey, asking him to regulate the conflict. Stratford de Redcliffe, however, declared that he was not empowered to act. The British Consul in Tehran, Stevens, was instructed by London not to enter into political negotiations with the Persian Government.

Kuhandil Khan, ruler of Kandahar, died on 12 August 1855. Dost Muhammad immediately occupied Kandahar. The Persians believed that he did this with British sanction and would next occupy Herat and on these grounds the Shah sent an expedition against Herat. In fact Dost wanted and intended to occupy Herat but he was delayed by the complex situation in Kandahar. "All this, of course, does not justify the Persian Government's interference in the internal affairs of the khanate of Herat" (p.66). The ending of the Crimean War meant that Britain again had attention to spare for the East, and caused the Shah to regret his expedition. Considerations of prestige, however, made it impossible for him to retreat. He therefore simultaneously made all efforts to take Herat (so as to use it as a counter in negotiation) and began negotiations with Stratford de Redcliffe. Stratford de Redcliffe did all in his power to make the negotiations fruitless and on instructions from London stipulated that the conflict could only be regulated after the siege of Herat had been raised. The Shah refused but this was no more than a gesture. Subsequent correspondence shows the willingness of the Persian side to make concessions on Herat. Farrukh Khan, Persian envoy extraordinary to Paris, was empowered to conduct negotiations with Stratford de Redcliffe at Constantinople (on his way to Paris) and to agree to Murray's return to Tehran and the evacuation of Herat. The British, however, had sent an ultimatum to the Shah threatening war unless Herat were evacuated before Farrukh Khan had even reached Constantinople. The British ultimatum made no mention of the Hashim Khan pretext for war, which had been dropped in favour of the occupation of Herat which was a more substantial casus belli. Without waiting for an answer the British Government instructed the Governor-General of India (the war was carried on by India "in order to by-pass Parliament" (p.85)) to prepare an expedition against Bushire and the island of Kharak. The Persian reply stated that Farrukh Khan had instructions to discuss with Stratford de Redcliffe both Murray and Herat so that Clarendon received the House of Lords in February 1857 when he declared that the Persian reply was "a mere letter of pretences" with no mention of Herat. Moreover, this reply was received in time for military action to be stopped and, since it made it clear that Persia was ready to negotiate, it is obvious that this should have been done. The fact that the war was not stopped "testifies eloquently to Britain's aggressive designs in relation to Persia" (p.71). In the British answering note of 10 October 1856 "in essence the British ruling circles declined a peaceful regulation of the conflict with Persia" (p.71).

Herat finally fell on 26 October 1856 after a siege which had been carried on by the Persians with "lack of decision and energy" (p.77).

Farrukh Khan found his position in Constantinople difficult. The negotiations were protracted and were carried on by the British side in

an insulting and arrogant tone. The negotiations had "already been doomed to failure by the British side" (p.80). Furthermore, when they began Britain was in essence already at war with Persia, although Farrukh Khan only learnt this from the Indian press in December 1856.

During the first stage of the negotiations, from 30 October to 21 November 1856, Stratford de Redcliffe put the following demands:

- (1) the evacuation of Herat;
- (2) compensation to be paid by the Persians for any loss suffered by the inhabitants;
- (3) Persia to abandon its claims to Herat and to guarantee its independence;
- (4) Persia to agree to a new trade agreement with Britain and to the expansion of the network of British agents in Persia;
- (5) the sadr-i-azam to be dismissed and replaced by "a person who will further a correct understanding" (p.89) of Anglo-Persian relations.

These demands were not published in the Blue Book and were given to Farrukh Khan orally. When Farrukh Khan agreed to the evacuation of Herat Stratford de Redcliffe put forward new demands, and finally in an ultimatum demanded immediate evacuation of Herat and compensation of its inhabitants. Farrukh Khan signed an agreement providing for unconditional evacuation and declared himself ready to come to a satisfactory agreement on compensation.

On 24 November Stratford de Redcliffe presented five fresh demands and insisted on complete Persian agreement to all his demands, both new and old. Farrukh Khan refused to accept this memorandum and sent to Tehran for instructions. Meanwhile he received news (26 November) of the fall of Herat, but stressed that he continued to hold by his agreement on unconditional evacuation. The British, however, continued to demand unconditional acceptance of all their demands and the negotiations bogged down.

On 4 December, emboldened by a telegram from the French Foreign Minister inquiring why the Persian envoy was delaying so long in Constantinople (this telegram was intended to give him moral support), Farrukh Khan in a memorandum to Stratford de Redcliffe wrote that he had gone as far as he was empowered to do and that if the British Government was dissatisfied and went to war then his previous agreement on the evacuation of Herat and other points would become invalid and non-existent. Stratford de Redcliffe refused to accept this memorandum.

The next day (5 December) Farrukh Khan threatened to leave Constantinople unless he received assurances that no British expedition

would land on Persian soil and that Britain would make no further demands. However, he lacked the necessary consistency and firmness and on the 10th agreed to stay and await Tehran's answer on the five demands made on 24 November. Stratford de Redcliffe insisted on preliminary agreement to all the British demands. But Farrukh Khan agreed only to the earlier demands in return for a British assurance that Persia would not be attacked. Stratford de Redcliffe was instructed by London that these terms were impossible and that he must insist on the dismissal of the *sadr-i-azam*. These instructions and the news from India that war had been declared on 10 November caused Stratford de Redcliffe to break off negotiations.

British statesmen did all in their power to mislead Parliament and public about the negotiations. They passed over in silence the fact that Farrukh Khan had agreed to the evacuation of Herat and the compensation of its inhabitants, and explained the failure of the talks by alleging that Farrukh Khan was only in Constantinople on his way to Paris, although he stayed there two and a half months. Palmerston declared on 16 July 1857 that Farrukh Khan signed no conditions which could have bound his Government to anything; in fact, however, Farrukh Khan signed an agreement to evacuate Herat and only demanded guarantees that his country would not be attacked in December when he had heard of the dispatch of the British expedition to the Persian Gulf.

"In summing up the negotiations it must be noted that all Persia's attempts to regulate the conflict with Britain by peaceful means failed because of the position taken up by British ruling circles who wanted war." (P.94)

IV. Military Operations

Long before the official declaration of war on Persia the British Government had begun its preparations. "For the realization of her aggressive plans in Persia Britain had to secure the collaboration of the neighbouring countries of Muscat and Afghanistan" (p.82). Britain counted on gaining possession of the islands of Qishm and Ormuz and the port of Bandar Abbas which the Imam of Muscat leased from Persia, and on using the Imam's Arab troops in military operations in the deserts of southern Persia. The East India Company sent General Brett to obtain the Imam's help. Whatever he may have told Brett, however, the Imam of Muscat had no intention of supporting the British, and in April-May 1856 he renewed his lease of Qishm, Ormuz and Bandar Abbas from Persia for 20 years on terms which forbade him to transfer the territories to anyone else or to allow foreigners there.

In order to subordinate Dost Muhammad Khan to the East India Company and to make him their ally in the war against Persia the British concluded a treaty with him (26 January 1857) by which, in return for a monthly subsidy of 100,000 rupees, Dost undertook to maintain 18,000 troops and to allow British officers to serve with the Afghan Army as observers. The British also gained control of Afghan foreign policy and the right to keep an agent in Kabul. In return Dost received a guarantee of the safety of Kandahar, Kabul and Balkh against Persian aggression.

This treaty had been preceded by a British attempt to attack Herat from the east by land through Afghanistan. In August 1856 Colonel Cavenagh of the Indian Army was sent to Kabul to plan joint Anglo-Afghan military operations against Persia. It was obviously as a result of an agreement between Cavenagh and Dost Muhammad that in October 1856, 5,000 men under Brigadier Neville Chamberlain set out for Kabul. By 21 November they had reached Safid Koh to the west of Jalalabad. "However, the freedom-loving Afghan tribes did not allow the British troops to pass and made them turn back."

[Little need be said about Bushev's treatment of military operations (pp.95-129). British victories he considers unimpressive as they were won against a weak and ill-equipped opponent who offered little resistance. In the one case where resistance was shown, the storm of the Reshire fort, he accuses the British of letting a sepoy regiment bear the brunt of the assault according to "the normal British tactic". General Outram and the British press are accused of shameless exaggeration in their accounts of the campaign. Nevertheless, he notes also that Persian historians either pass over in silence the movements of the Persian forces or present them in an apologetic spirit. The British, he concludes, gained a complete military victory; "however, the general economic and political situation forced the British ruling circles to renounce the realization of their military plans in Persia."]

V. The Paris Peace Treaty

The debates in Parliament on the Government's policy in Persia and China show that opposition to that policy was very strong. The strain of the Crimean and now the Persian and Chinese wars was having its effect on Britain's economic position: the ordinary people were hurt by the rising cost of living while the rich felt the effect of the recently increased income-tax. There was a campaign in the country to reduce taxation. "Lack of money to carry on two wars simultaneously forced the British Government to renounce one of them. Palmerston

preferred to stop the war with Persia." (P.139) This was the real reason why the Treaty was so "merciful", as British historians usually write. There is no truth at all in the theory held by some Soviet orientalists that Palmerston was forced to make peace with Persia by the Indian Mutiny. News of the Mutiny could not have reached England earlier than March-April 1857, when the Treaty was already signed. Even in April the Government attached so little importance to the news from India that they were arranging to send European units from Persia not to India but to China.

The Treaty itself gave the British less than they had refused to accept in Constantinople: Farrukh Khan had refused to agree to the dismissal of the *sadr-i-azam*, which had previously been considered essential, or to compensation for the inhabitants of Herat, arguing, falsely, that the occupying forces had caused them no loss but had been provided for from Persia. The British accepted the Persian plea that Mirza Hashim Khan had voluntarily renounced his employment in the British Embassy and no longer needed British protection. It is true that the Shah renounced sovereignty over Herat, but Article 7 of the Treaty allowed him to undertake military operations outside Persia (i.e. in Herat) in case of an infringement of the Persian border by any state (i.e. Afghanistan), provided that Persian troops returned home afterwards, and this gave him a convenient loophole for interference in Herat which he later used.

The Treaty gave Britain nothing worth even the paper wasted on it, to make no mention of the money and blood. It was in fact a victory for Persia. The British received no bases in the Persian Gulf and failed to acquire Herat as a base for aggression against Central Asia and Transcaucasia. Herat was under Persian influence until 1863 when "Britain, weakened by the rising of the peoples of India in 1857-9, had to agree to its incorporation in Afghanistan". Britain failed also to conclude a favourable trade agreement and even lost her "right of protection" together with some other privileges.

The war, however, displayed the weakness of the Qajar dynasty and facilitated the entry of foreign capital into Persia, a process which finally made Persia a semi-colony of the imperialist powers.

VI. Sources and Literature

Bushev devotes a whole chapter to an examination of his sources, which he divides into British, American, French, Persian and Russian. Only the first and the last two will be dealt with here.

He gives British historians short shrift: "Their interpretation of the facts does not permit an elucidation of the real essence of the policy of the British colonizers and has the aim of justifying it" (p.173), and: "to mask the genuine aims of the war - that is the main task of British historians" (p.182). On the claim that Herat was a bastion of defence against Russia he writes: "All the inventions of British bourgeois historiography about the Russian threat to India hardly require serious refutation" (p.176).

The Blue Book on Anglo-Persian relations provides Bushev with many quotations but he considers that so many documents are omitted and the others are so abridged that it must be considered a work of falsification.

Bushev considers the most reliable source to be Hansard, although he is quick to add that the revelations contained in it were made with "narrow, party aims" (p.181). Nevertheless his own use of this source is somewhat selective.

Persian sources, Bushev writes, are "scant and unoriginal" (p.187) and "follow bourgeois historiography, especially British. This, in effect, leads to a refusal to unmask British aggressive policies in Persia in the 19th century" (p.188). Instead Persian authors preach pan-Iranian doctrines and assert Persia's right to Herat and to a considerable part of Central Asia up to the Amu-Dar'ya and the Caucasus. An exception is Sa'id Nafisi's SOCIAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF PERSIA IN THE PRESENT AGE which contains a correct appraisal of British policy. Some Persian writers give false accounts of military operations, Bushev writes, and exaggerate the successes of the Shah's forces. Recent Persian publications of documents from archives are reduced in value by lack of a qualified commentary.

In pre-revolutionary Russia no monograph or article was devoted to the Anglo-Persian war of 1856-7. Bushev consequently deals with general histories of Central Asia, memoirs and books of travel descriptions. He is especially critical of the works of S.N. Yuzhakov (THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN QUARREL, St.Pb., 1885; AFGHANISTAN AND BORDERING COUNTRIES, St.Pb., 1885) for carelessness in reporting facts and for accepting the thesis of the Russian threat to India. He considers the most important Russian works of this period to be M. Grulev's THE RIVALRY OF RUSSIA AND BRITAIN IN CENTRAL ASIA (St.Pb., 1909), and M.A. Terent'yev's RUSSIA AND ENGLAND IN CENTRAL ASIA (St.Pb., 1880), and THE HISTORY OF THE CONQUEST OF CENTRAL ASIA (St.Pb., 1903-6). Terent'yev "unmasked" the false thesis that there was a Russian threat to India, but, writes Bushev, did not carry this correct argument to its conclusion by discovering the British threat to Central Asia.

In Soviet Russia also, until Bushev's book appeared, there had been no monograph or article devoted to the war. Moreover, Bushev writes, in works published up to the end of the Second World War the views characteristic of pre-revolutionary orientalism prevailed: insufficient stress was laid on British aggression in Persia and credence was given to the British claim that Herat was essential to the defence of India against Russia. One Soviet book (M.G. Reyser's *AFGHANISTAN*, Moscow, 1946) even asserts that "Russian troops were encamped under the very city walls [of Herat] threatening British well-being in India" (p.196). Bushev identifies these troops as Samson Khan Makinskiy's (Samson Yakovlevich Makintsev's) "Russian batallion", Russian deserters in the Persian service who had no connexion with the Russian Army. Even later works are convicted of inaccuracy: M.S. Ivanov's *OUTLINE HISTORY OF PERSIA* (Moscow, 1952), states erroneously that Murray broke off diplomatic relations because of the Persian invasion of Herat. Among recent works Bushev commends a number of degree theses (including his own) and the works of N.A. Khalfin - *THREE RUSSIAN MISSIONS* (Tashkent, 1956), and *BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST* (Tashkent, 1957). These works, he writes, are valuable, in spite of individual faults, because they are based on a wide selection of archive material.

VII. Editorial Comment

In connexion with the alleged British expedition through Afghanistan under Neville Chamberlain (see above, p.411) the following quotation is of interest: The Earl of Derby, House of Lords, 3 February 1857: "I heard with dismay and I heard with satisfaction, first of the advance of troops on Kabul, and then of their retrograde movement, though I am at a loss to understand the cause of the first advance of that small body of troops. (The Earl of Clarendon was understood to deny that such a movement had taken place.) Well, then, perhaps when the papers which have been promised to us are laid upon the table they will throw some light upon the subject. . ." Hansard, Vol.144, col.40. Bushev is familiar with this speech, from which he quotes in another connexion, but he does not use this quotation. He bases his assertion that such a movement took place on a report in the *TIMES*, 17 January 1857, and on the reports of the Russian "military agent in London"; Colonel N.P. Ignat'yev, at present in the Military Science Archive of the Central State Military-Historical Archives of the USSR.

The most important parts of Bushev's book are those dealing with Britain's allegedly aggressive policy in Persia and Central Asia. His account of the military operations is interesting but of secondary importance and his criticisms of the negotiations at Constantinople

and the Treaty of Paris go little further than contemporary criticisms in the House of Commons.

Bushev undertakes to prove the existence of aggressive British plans from "the evidence of authoritative politicians and soldiers of Britain and Russia", but his British witnesses are not numerous or weighty: both Rawlinson and General Outram "more than once wrote that the aim of the British invasion of the Persian Gulf was to obtain bases - the islands of Kharak and Qishm and the ports of Bushire, Bandar Abbas and Muhammarah" (p.24); and: "Rawlinson asserted that 'Britain. . . had the right to (territorial) compensation'" (p.25). Cowley in a note of 3 March 1857 to Farrukh Khan wrote that Britain had wanted "to possess valuable parts of Persian territory. . ." (p.25) but had subsequently refrained. John Jacob and John Lawrence, Bushev writes, urged upon Canning the occupation of Quetta, Kandahar and Herat. Finally the Quartermaster-General of the Indian Army, MacGregor, in a "secret note" on the defence of India urged that Herat be made into a border province of India (after the subjection of Afghanistan) as a first step towards solving the Russo-Indian question by driving Russia out of the Caucasus and Turkestan. Bushev also gives quotations from the Deputy Governor of the Caucasus, A.I. Baryatinsky, the Chief of Staff of the Caucasian Military District General D.A. Milyutin, and Baron Turnau to show that they regarded British operations in Persia and Afghanistan as a threat to Russian Turkestan and the Caucasus.

Like most Russian and Soviet historians Bushev greatly overestimates the effect which statements by military officers and other advocates of a "forward policy" such as Sir Henry Rawlinson had on British policy. In fact they were of no more significance than the recorded statements of Tsarist Russian officers advocating a Russian attack on India. That Russia never seriously contemplated such an attack has been admitted by British historians for at least fifty years. But Soviet historians have a particular reason for trying to perpetuate the myth of British designs on Central Asia. The plain truth is that whatever some British generals and minor politicians may have wanted, British imperial expansion stopped short at the northern frontiers of India. Subsequent to the Herat affair dealt with by Bushev, Russian colonialist expansion continued even into the Soviet period when Khiva and Bukhara, the last of the independent khanates, were eventually swallowed up in 1921. It is precisely this truth that Soviet historians seem anxious to obscure.

R U S S I A N - I N D I A N T R A D E I N T H E
E I G H T E E N T H C E N T U R Y

The following article is a slightly abridged translation of "Some Projects for the Organization of Russian-Indian Trade in the 18th Century" by Ye.Ya. Lyusternik and Ye.G. Shapot which appeared in UCHENYYE ZAPISKI LGU, SERIYA VOSTOKOVODCHESKIKH NAUK, 1960, Vyp.9: ISTORIYA I FILOLOGIYA INDII.

The article is a detailed and well-documented account of a number of schemes for establishing trade relations between Russia and India in the 18th century, not one of which, as the authors admit, was ever put into practice. It seems likely, therefore, in view of this fact, that the main aim of the article is not to fill a gap in our knowledge of the period but to stress the alleged difference between Russian and British intentions towards India at that time and to demonstrate that Russia's intentions have not changed from that day to this. As in the days of Peter the Great so now, the Russians want from India only "mutually profitable trade on a foundation of equal rights". From the time of Peter the Great until now the Russian people, in the person of the "best people" of Russia, have felt admiration, and later sympathy, for the peoples of India. This admiration and sympathy have developed under the influence of the October Revolution and the acquisition by India of independence into "friendly and many-sided collaboration between the two countries." This attempt to show that Russia's approach to India has always been in the spirit of the Panch Shila, even in the time of Peter the Great is not new; see CAR, Vol.VI, No.4, pp.448-61, and Vol.VIII, No.1, pp.87-89. It is worth while remembering that, however accurate a reflection of the present it may be, this theory leaves out some facts about the past. V.V. Barthold, for example, writing in 1925 about the foundation of Orenburg, says: "Under the influence of the enfeeblement of Turkey and the khanates of Central Asia vast plans of conquest were being elaborated in Petersburg. . . Kirilov insisted on the necessity of accepting the subjection of Abdul Khair [Khan of the Kazakh Lesser Horde]. . . He demonstrated that otherwise we could lose not only the numerous new peoples who have become our subjects, or wish to do so, with many such towns as Tashkent and Aral, but also the chance of acquiring the provinces of Bukhara and Samarkand and the rich locality of Bodokshan." These last words

reveal that in Central Asia at this time, as earlier in Manchuria and Mongolia, plans under elaboration provided for the annexion to Russia of regions which in the event remained outside the boundaries of the Russian Empire. The rich locality of Bodokshan, i.e. the province of Badakhshan, is now part of Afghanistan." (V.V. Barthold, LA DECOUVERTE DE L'ASIE, Paris, 1947.) It appears, therefore, that conquest was not entirely contrary to the nature of the men who wanted "mutually profitable" trade with India.

. . .

Peter the First's attempts to establish trade-routes - State encouragement and concessions to traders - The Orenburg trading company and commerce through Central Asia - Failure of trade expansion on British conquest of India.

In the study of the history of Russian-Indian relations the numerous projects for the organization of trade between the two countries which were put forward in Russia in the 18th century are of undoubted interest. It was not only among the ruling circles that such projects occurred. Their authors were frequently individual civil servants and prominent scholars.

M.V. Lomonosov, the great Russian scientist, V.N. Tatishchev, the prominent historian, I.K. Kirilov, one of the founders of scientific cartography in Russia, I.P. Rychkov, distinguished geographer and economist and others attached great importance to the development of Russian-Indian economic ties. They showed great initiative in seeking out trade-routes to India and were active in attempting to establish direct trade between Russia and India.

. . .

Peter the First's attempts to establish trade-routes

The beginning of the 18th century in the history of Russia was marked by a further development of productive forces. Industry was developing, economic ties within the country were becoming stronger, trade was widening its scope and there was an increase of specialization in the agricultural regions. Trading capital already represented a considerable economic force. The process of the political centralization, broadening and strengthening of the Russian State was continuing. Russia's international connexions - her trade with the countries of Western Europe and the East - grew.

Nevertheless, in spite of considerable successes, Russia's economy lagged behind that of the most fully developed countries of the time - England, France and Holland. Russia depended on other states for many types of industrial manufactured goods. Native industry could satisfy neither the growing demands of the population nor the military needs of the State. Frequent and lengthy wars exacerbated the position. The country felt the need of large sums of capital.

Moreover, Russia was cut off from the seas and this favoured a state of affairs where foreign trade was to a considerable extent in the hands of foreigners, especially Dutch and English, who pushed Russian merchants aside in every way possible.

Russia was faced with complex historical tasks: to liquidate her economic backwardness and (immediate tasks closely connected with this) to fight for the seas and to expand and reinforce her economic and cultural ties with other countries. Russia, wrote Marx, could not leave in the hands of the Swedes the mouth of the Neva, which was the only exit for the sale of the products of northern Russia any more than she could leave the mouths of the Don, Dniester and Bug and the Kerch Straits in the hands of nomad Tatar plunderers.(1)

Peter the First's historical merit lay in understanding these tasks and putting into effect a broad programme of economic and cultural transformations in the country. A considerable place in his programme had been set aside for the development of foreign trade, in particular with the countries of the East. Eastern markets became important to Russia not only as suppliers of valuable raw materials - silk and cotton - but also as consumers of Russian manufactures. Peter wanted to set up direct trade relations with Eastern countries and also to further the development of the transit trade with the aim of making Russia the middleman between West and East.

Plans for establishing direct trade with India formed part of Peter's foreign policy. "The Transformer of Russia was moved by the hope of enriching the Empire with the products of temperate climes and of bringing Russians into communication with India. His repeated attempts to overcome the natural inconvenience in intercourse with this, the furthest removed part of the world from the North, prove what great profit he foresaw from the Indian trade."(2)

Peter regarded the Central Asian khanates of Khiva and Bukhara as the gates of India. In search of convenient routes he equipped a number of expeditions to study the Caspian Sea and the rivers which flow into it. There is record of the following expeditions sent by Peter in 1714-19: the expedition of I.A. Bukhgol'ts and the geodesist Likharev to the upper reaches of the Irtysh; the expedition of Prince

A. Bekovich-Cherkasskiy to Khiva in 1716-17 "to bring the khans of Khiva and Bukhara to submission" and investigate the routes to India; the embassy of Florio Beneveni to Bukhara in 1718-25.(3)

The search for trade-routes to India was one of the factors which defined Peter's policy with regard to Persia.

As is well known no trade-routes between Russia and India had been established either through Khiva and Bukhara or through Persia. The difficulties of gaining control over (osvoyeniye) such complex and far-flung land communications were complicated by the constant danger of attack by the nomad Kirgiz-Kaysak Herdes. Therefore it was no accident that attempts were made to find direct sea routes to the East, including one through the Arctic Ocean.

Thus in 1713 Peter the First received F.S. Saltykov's plan to establish a direct northern sea route to the countries of the East, in particular China and India. "Then, wrote Saltykov, it will be possible to send ships from your State to the merchants of the East Indies, in which will be profit and great wealth for the State, while it will be nearer to trade thither from your State than from others."(4)

In 1716, independently of Saltykov's proposals, two trading houses of Petersburg submitted a request to the Senate for permission to carry on trade with Japan and the East Indies. They proposed to establish a trade-route from the Northern Dvina through the Arctic Ocean and the Gulf of Ob', then by river to Lake Baykal and then by the rivers Selenga, Indigirka, Shilka and Amur to the Eastern Ocean.(5) It is known that this request was given to Ya.V. Bryus(6) and that he sympathized with the plan to establish a trade-route to the East Indies and advised Peter the First to begin a scientific survey of the Siberian coast with the aim of finding a passage from the Arctic Ocean to the Pacific.

Peter equipped several expeditions to study the northern sea route. (7) They amassed a huge amount of factual material and had great scientific significance but in fact did not manage to find a northern sea route to India.

In 1723 Peter attempted to establish trade relations with India by the already familiar sea route around Africa. He sent Vice-Admiral Vil'ster to the island of Madagascar and the East Indies. In the first item of his instructions Peter directed him to leave Petersburg and "set out on a voyage to the East Indies namely to Bengalen [sic]."(8)

Vil'ster's task was to set up trade relations with India and to conclude a treaty with the Great Moghul. This is shown by the fourth

item of his instructions: "When with God's help you shall have arrived at the indicated place in the East Indies, then present yourself there to the Great Moghul and try by all measures to incline him to permit trade to be carried out with Russia, and make a treaty with him, and establish which of their goods are in demand in Russia and also which Russian goods are needed in his regions."(9)

While preparing his expeditions to India Peter acquainted himself with the past history of Russian-Indian relations. As early as March 1716 he demanded from the Senate material on Semen Malenkov's embassy to India(10), "what goods were sent with him, Malenkiy [sic], and what Malenkov and his companions on their arrival in Moscow declared about their stay and journey." Delay in delivering the requested information called forth corroboratory edicts from the Governing Senate to the Treasury dated 9 and 30 April of that year.(11)

In his eagerness to establish with India not only trade ties but also diplomatic relations Peter demanded that the documents under preparation for the despatch of ambassadors in 1716 should be composed and phrased in a spirit of respect for the Indian ruler. With this aim he ordered: ". . . contrary to previous custom there should be sent to the Khans and to the Moghul of India from his Imperial Majesty letters of credence (gramoty veryushchiye). . . And the title which has been given to the Moghul of India . . . should be checked in the original and written down and the letter should be written to the Moghul accordingly."(12)

Peter emphasized the peaceful aims of his policy and the mutually profitable character of the trade which he was eager to establish with India. "Be as diligent as possible, he directed his envoy to the Great Moghul in 1723, to bring about between both countries a useful and favourable commerce."(13)

As is known, Peter's efforts to establish diplomatic relations and direct trade connexions with India were not crowned with success. However this problem remained a crucial one for the Russian State for the rest of the 18th century. The demands of the economic development of society gave birth to new plans and proposals for trade with the countries of the East including India.

It is worth while mentioning in this connexion a manuscript headed "A means of carrying on commerce in the states of the Great Moghul, to the town of Balkh. . . to Bukhariya (sic) and the other towns and provinces belonging to it; also to Khiva and other places". (14) The manuscript is written in folio in the clear cursive of the 18th century. There is some foundation for dating it in 1727. For example, referring to Beneveni's embassy which was in Bukhara from 1718

to 1725, the author notes: ". . . it is now two years since the above mentioned envoy left Khiva."(15)

Relying on information acquired by the Tsar's envoy, Beneveni, the author of the document thought it possible to trace a route to India through the khanates of Khiva and Bukhara. Regular Russian-Indian trade through Bukhara, however, he considered possible only if that khanate should be ruled by "a Khan of good deeds, a bold man possessing all the power". If this condition were met, in his opinion it would be "possible freely to hope for favourable commerce for the benefit of the Russian people both with the Moghul in India and with all other countries".(16)

The author of the manuscript considered the organization of trade with India through Khiva to be more difficult because of the political complications connected with A. Bekovich-Cherkasskiy's expedition. Nevertheless, of the several routes to India from Central Asia the author preferred the route through Khiva. He proposed that the Khiva khanate be subjected to a Russian protectorate whose main aim he saw as confirming "on a permanent basis the laudable commerce of all the tropical Indies by land and sea routes. . ."(17)

The plan posed concrete tasks: to put in order the road from the river Yaik [Ural] to Khiva, to supply trading caravans with water and accommodation along the route, to establish routes between the Amu-Dar'ya and the Caspian Sea and to protect the trade routes from constant brigandage. After these steps had been taken, the author considered, "our intended trade with India and all the surrounding lands, when we have founded in Khiva as it were an arsenal of trade from both sides, would doubtless take place with the greatest force and success and this empire would derive great benefit."(18)

One of the essential preliminary conditions for the establishment of direct Russian-Indian trade ties, the author believed, was the consent of the Moghul ruling circles, "whether that court will accept our trade".(19) He proposed as mediators in the negotiations the khans of Bukhara and Balkh or the Black Kalmyks. It is obvious from this that the author envisaged Russia's trade with India as organized on the scale of the State and as based on equal rights, not imposed by force.

Considerable interest is presented also by another manuscript headed "On Kamchatka and Okhotsk".(20) The manuscript is written in folio in the cursive of the 18th century and can be dated to the '30s of the century.

The author considered Okhotsk to be a convenient port for carrying on trade with the East as far as India. He noted that before the

conclusion of the Treaty of Nerchinsk with China (1689) the river Amur had been a convenient trade route. But in so far as the Amur had been lost to Russia "although it is further and more difficult, yet all that the Russian interest demands may conveniently be done through Okhotsk." (21)

The author, who was an advocate of the development of the Eastern trade, laid out in detail all the advantages and benefits which could accrue to the State from the development of trade through the port of Okhotsk.

The fact deserves attention that both these manuscripts belonged to V.N. Tatishchev and were presented by him as a gift to the Academy of Sciences. This prominent Russian scholar was at the same time an important State functionary. In the line of his employment Tatishchev was in the thick of the problems connected with the organization of trade with Central Asia, Persia and India. (22) In economic matters he held the view that a country's wealth consisted in flourishing crafts, industry and trade. He made considerable efforts to develop production of cotton and silk in Astrakhan' and to organize trade with the East. (23) He collected information on trade with Khiva and Bukhara (24), ascertained the trade-routes through Central Asia to India, arranged the dispatch of trading caravans to Khiva and Bukhara, gave privileges to Armenians, Indians and Bukharans trading in Astrakhan', etc. (25) So Tatishchev's interest in the various projects for the organization of trade with the East was not accidental.

State encouragement and concession to traders

From the middle of the '30s of the 18th century attempts to establish a trade-route to India through Central Asia became more determined. It was no accident, therefore, that in the '40s-'60s it was in Orenburg that there appeared a pleiad of energetic advocates of a Russian-Indian economic rapprochement: V.N. Tatischev, I.K. Kirilov, I.I. Neplyuyev, (26) P.I. Rychkov and others. The very emergence of this town was connected with the search for routes to Central Asia, Persia and India and the desire of the ruling circles and influential merchants of Russia to arrange direct trade with India. Russia's policy towards the Central Asian khanates was to a considerable extent determined by her attempts to make safe the roads to India.

In 1734 Councillor of State I. Kirilov and Murza Tevkelev, who was attached to him as his interpreter, put forward a proposal for the organization of trade with the countries of Asia, including Khiva, Bukhara and India. (27) The authors of the project attempted to demonstrate the necessity of founding a new town on the river Or' which

should become the centre of Russian trade with Central Asia and adjacent countries. In demonstrating the advantages of their project Kirilov and Tevkelev wrote: "It is much easier for a caravan to reach Khiva from this fortress than from Astrakhan' because it is always possible to receive enough water and wood on the way and one can travel in summer, in the month of September, not in winter. But because of lack of water in the steppe caravans always leave Astrakhan' in winter."(28)

To improve the organization and safety of trade for caravans the authors considered it essential to found yet another town in the lands of the Kara-Kalpak people, "near the Aral lake on the river Syr' where there ought to be a resting place for Russian trading caravans which have to go from the new town to Bukhara, Vodokshan and India."(29) Thus Kirilov and Tevkelev's conception contained new, important and more concrete proposals by comparison with the plans for the organization of trade with India which had been advanced earlier.

The resolution of the Empress Anna Ioannovna on the project followed on 1 May 1734. It confirmed the foundation of a town at the mouth of the river Or' where it flowed into the Ural. This decision was motivated by the fact that the town "is extremely necessary not only for restraining the Kirgiztsy [i.e. Kazakhs], but also for opening a free trade route to Bukhara, Vodokshan [i.e. Badakhshan], Baikh and India, which the Emperor Peter the Great desired extremely and, sparing neither treasury nor men, he sent Prince Aleksandr Cherkasskiy from Astrakhan'."(30)

Subsequent official documents relating to the foundation of Orenburg bear witness no less vividly to the fact that questions of trade with India were considered of first-rate importance. The town's privileges, published 7 June 1735, are indicative in this respect.

The first point of the privileges proclaims the right "of all Russians and of every people (except fugitives from our service and peasants subject to poll-tax), merchants, craftsmen, raznochintsy, and also foreigners, merchants and artists of foreign European states, and the local Bashkir people and those who live with them, and our new subjects the Kirgiz and Kara-Kalpak peoples, and visitors from Asian countries - Greeks, Armenians, Indians, Persians, Bukharans, Khivans, Tashkentians, Kalmyks and others of whatever title and faith. . ." to come, settle, live, trade and practise any craft.(31)

The privileges also guaranteed the liberty of goods from customs duties for the first three years. The authorities were directed to set aside without payment space for courtyards, store-rooms and warehouses, and shops, supply timber and stone from the State's stores and

give ten-year, interest-free loans.

Both in his project and in practice Kirilov paid great attention to the establishment of Russian-Indian trade ties. He collected information on the routes by which Indian and Central Asian merchants carried on their trade, on goods and prices, and on India itself.

In February 1735 Kirilov asked to see an Indian merchant who was staying in Astrakhan' with the intention of receiving more reliable information from him. In his narrative the Indian gave a detailed description of the four trade-routes which led from India to the countries of Central Asia, Afghanistan, Persia and Russia (Astrakhan'). All these roads met at Delhi, the capital of the Moghul Empire.

The information on Russian-Indian trade is interesting. From the narrative it can be seen that not long before 200 Indian merchants had arrived in Russia every year, but that later this figure had fallen to 80 and even less. The merchant explained this by reference to events in Persia and Bukhara, and mainly to plunder of the caravans by nomad peoples. "But if there were free transit through Bukhariya, as that road is near and more convenient for all goods, then he would expect up to 600 Indian merchants to travel to Russia yearly, and they would bring a great amount of goods as the merchants wish to have free commerce with Russia. Also they would carry Russian goods back with them."(32)

It is difficult to check the accuracy of these figures. But other facts adduced in the narrative - a description of India, a list of goods exported from India to Russia and from Russia to India and other information also - correspond with data from other sources and are beyond doubt.

There is some foundation for connecting the results of the interview with the Indian merchant Barayev [sic - the name is clearly corrupt] and the instruction of the Empress Anna Ioannovna dated 11 February 1736. Its contents permit the supposition that after the interview with this merchant and the receipt from him of more detailed information, new proposals were made to the Court on the subject of trade with the East. The above mentioned instruction was, apparently, an answer to these proposals. This document dealt with measures for the development of trade with Central Asia and India.

In the fifth item of the instruction Kirilov was directed: ". . . in order to address the Indian company which was in Bukhara and has now returned to India, send the Indian marvari [banker] Barayev, giving him a copy of the privileges and up to 1,000 rubles to buy

goods, on condition that he pays this money back into the Treasury on his return. For the purposes of his dispatch we have ordered that his business in Astrakhan' be put in the care of the Senate while his chattels are sequestrated until his return, lest they get lost while he is away."(33)

So, from what has been quoted and from the other points of the instruction it appears that the ruling circles of Russia took energetic steps to develop trade with India through Central Asia.(34) To acquaint the Indian merchants with the favourable conditions of settlement and trade in Orenburg the envoy Barayev was provided with a copy of the privileges granted the newly built town.

The Orenburg trading company and commerce through Central Asia

The '40s of the 18th century are characterized by increased activity on the part of the authorities and merchants of Orenburg in broadening trade with Central Asia and India. I.I. Neplyuyev, the Governor of the Orenburg Region (kray), was an extremely determined advocate to trade development by all possible means between Russia and India and was tireless in demonstrating its benefits. V.N. Vitevskiy, the author of a lengthy monograph devoted to the life and work of Neplyuyev, wrote that he learned of the visits of Indian merchants to Bukhara, Khiva and Balkh where they eagerly bought up Russian goods imported from Orenburg and he had the idea of "establishing for Russian merchants a caravan trade route to India itself".(35) While doing all in his power to promote the development of trade through Central Asian merchants Neplyuyev at the same time gave energetic help to Russian merchants in their attempts to set up direct trade connexions with Indian merchants. He found tireless adherents in his closest assistants P.I. Rychkov and M.A. Tevkelev.

In 1750 Neplyuyev wrote a project "For the spread of Orenburg commerce to Khiva, Bukhariya and India".(36) Tevkelev took an active part in drafting the project. In this document, together with other measures which were intended to make trade with these countries safe, Neplyuyev proposed the foundation of a company with a fifteen year monopoly of trade.

The project provided for the company's composition from among the richer merchants trading in Orenburg. Among them were named the Moscow merchant Gavriila Zhuravlev; a Greek Ivan Mikhaylov, son of Mavrodiya; a Simbirsk merchant from the Orenburg department Ivan Tverdyshev, owner of a copper smithy; a local Tatar Abdul Khayalin and Aleksey Kekin from Rostov.(37) "If they do not want to combine, the project says, then, even though they will be trading separately, each

with his own goods and through his own people, nevertheless let them be called a company and combine in their councils and correspondence and let no others trade thither, unless one of them for any reason drops out when a worthy man from those who are willing should be put in his place, and which of these people shall be best, to them let the guidance be entrusted."(38) This gave an outline of the regulations of the proposed trading company.

The project also sketched out a programme of activity. The company was to found trading houses in the city of Bukhara, the most important towns of the Khanate of Bukhara and also in Khiva. It would have its representatives in these places. The company was to equip caravans from Orenburg to Bukhara and other trading centres of Central Asia and thence to India. "And if. . . passage through those peoples shall be confirmed to be safe, then such small caravans should be sent every year and we must try to reach India itself. For which purpose in the caravans should be employed Tatars, Armenians or Greeks, or Russians of the common sort but who know the language and customs perfectly."(39)

Besides introducing Russian goods into Asian countries the company was also given the duty of attracting Asian, including Indian, merchants to Orenburg.(40)

Neplyuyev's views on the role of foreign trade as the most important source for strengthening the economy and political might of a landowning state linked him with the most prominent economists of the time. His project was a link in the chain of innumerable plans for overcoming Russia's economic backwardness and taking her foreign trade out of the hands of European companies, firms and private traders.

To present his project to the Senate Neplyuyev sent Rychkov to Petersburg. At the beginning of 1751 this document was approved in its basic provisions. However, their realization, especially in connexion with the Indian trade, made no progress. Neplyuyev revealed in his memoirs that to his chagrin he did not "achieve success in beginning the trade with India which I had undertaken for Russia's benefit". (41)

Nevertheless the Orenburg functionaries continued their efforts in this direction and put forward new projects for arranging trade with India. Thus we know of P.I. Rychkov's work "An explanation of the methods for carrying on Russian commerce from Orenburg with the Bukharan, and thence with the Indian, areas".

In his practical activity and in his scientific works, including the most fundamental of them, the "Topography of Orenburg", P.I. Rychkov

in spite of all difficulties and failures continued to demonstrate the possibility and advisability of establishing direct trade routes with India. (42)

At the beginning of the '50s Rychkov defended Neplyuyev's project. He intended to go himself to Bukhara to organize trade with Bukharan and Indian merchants. Rychkov explained his subsequent failures to execute his plans for trade with India by the Central Asian line by reference to insecure communications and the constant threat to caravans represented by nomad hordes. "And therefore, he wrote, I was forced to elucidate the most useful means of carrying on trade over the Caspian."

Rychkov proposed that traders and their goods should be sent along the river Ural to Gur'yev and then, holding to the eastern half of the Caspian, to Krasnovodsk Bay. He considered it essential to found here, on territory not belonging to Persia, a trans-shipment point for goods and a fortress for their defence. From here the goods were to be shipped to Balkh, Badakhshan and, further, to India. It was supposed that the defence of the caravans would be entrusted to Russians or, if an agreement could be made with them, to Bukharans.

In contrast to his predecessors in Orenburg who considered that the main thing in trade with Asian merchants was that they should bring gold and silver into the country, Rychkov was in favour of their importing other goods also. (43) In his view Russia's main exports ought to be textiles and furs, as well as lead, copper, iron and other metal wares. At that period the local iron and copper ores in the Orenburg Governorate-General were permitting a comparatively rapid development of industrial production.

Rychkov wanted "our local Asian commerce to spread and multiply over all tropical Asia to India itself". (44) By "commerce" he understood not only trade but also business and manufactures.

The projects put forward by Rychkov did not lead to the flowering of Russian-Indian trade he had dreamt of. The safer routes proposed by him proved of no help. In spite of all the importance of the problem of communications, by this period it was not they which formed the main obstacle to the establishment of direct and firm trade relations between Russia and India. The real causes must be sought in the basic changes which had taken place in the interior and exterior position of India in the third quarter of the 18th century.

Failure of trade expansion on British conquest of India

In the '50s and the beginning of the '60s took place the final disintegration of the Moghul State - a feudal power which in its heyday had included within its boundaries almost the whole of India.(45) A new outbreak of feudal discord was crowned by the disintegration of the unified state system. The position was further exacerbated by the invasion of Afghan forces under Ahmad Shah who in 1747-69 carried out a series of campaigns of conquest in India.

Characterizing the interior political situation which took shape in the country in the middle of the 18th century Marx wrote: "The supreme power of the Moghul was overthrown by his lieutenants. The might of his lieutenants was broken by the Marathas. The might of the Marathas was broken by the Afghans, and while they were all fighting each other the British made an unexpected appearance and managed to subjugate them all."(46)

The conquest of the Indian provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa by the East India Company in the '50s and '60s of the 18th century served as a starting point for the process of the transformation of India into a British colony. Unrestrained plunder of the country by the British colonizers began. Streams of gold flowed from India to Britain and made fruitful the industrial revolution which had begun there. The conquest of India gave incredible acceleration to the process of the creation of the material and technical basis of British capitalism.

India, quite recently one of the greatest powers in the world, lost her political independence. The age-long international ties which connected India with many countries, especially those of Asia, were broken off. Trade relations gradually decayed. The British colonizers monopolized the foreign trade of India helped by the extension of the scope of the Navigation Acts to this newly acquired colony.(47)

It is in these circumstances that the main reason is to be found for the failure of attempts to establish direct trade relations and communications between India and Russia. But these opposing factors did not reveal their decisive significance immediately. Britain's conquest of India extended over almost a hundred years. At the end of the 18th century aggressive wars were taking place in the regions of India furthest removed from her Central Asian frontiers.

Orenburg functionaries of the end of the 18th century continued to make plans for direct trade between India and Russia. This is proved by the note of the Mufti of Orenburg Muhammad Jan Husain with the

title "A description written by Mufti of the Mahometan law Muhammad Jan Husain of the tracks leading from Orenburg to the capital of the realm of India, then the roundabout route from Gur'yev to the above-mentioned Indian capital. thence turning as far north as Petropavlovsk and thence along the Russian frontier to Gur'yev, with distances in versts; also about the inhabitants, capitals, etc."(50)

Muhammad Jan Husain had in view three possible trade-routes to India: the first from Gur'yev to Delhi (or Shah Jehanabad, or Shagi Ziga Nabat as it is called in the project), the second from the fortress of Orsk through Bukhariya to Delhi and the third from Petropavlovsk through Tashkent, Kashgar, Tibet and Kashmir to Delhi. The author gave a detailed description of each of these routes. He preferred the first which brought his project near the proposals of P.I. Rychkov.

Among the historical sources which deal with the question of Russian-Indian trade at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries one is of especial interest - the "Description composed from written and oral information collected from a native of Asia, the prisoner Gabaydulla Amirov [presumably Abdullah Amir], who has wandered for more than 30 years and has spent most of his life in various parts of India".(51)

None of the projects for establishing Russian-Indian trade in the 18th century was ever put into practice and consequently they had no practical role. However, an analysis of these documents is of considerable scientific and historical interest and permits the following conclusions to be reached:

- (1) The organization of direct, regular trade with India and the blazing of direct trade-routes to that country were at the centre of attention of Russia's ruling circles in the 18th century and were raised to the level of a matter of state.
- (2) Together with and independently of the plans for establishing diplomatic and trading relations with India which were being worked out by the Tsarist Government, projects for Russian-Indian trade ties were being put forward by individual State functionaries, scientists and traders.
- (3) Prominent Russians of the 18th century (P.F. Saltykov, V.N. Tatishchev, I.K. Kirilov, P.I. Rychkov, I.I. Neplyuyev) were active advocates of the establishment of Russian-Indian trade ties, worked out projects and tried to put them into practice. The great Russian scientist M.V. Lomonosov devoted a special work to this problem: "A short description of the various voyages in the northern seas and the demonstrations of a possible passage by the Siberian Ocean to East India".(52)

All these projects were distinguished by a desire to set up peaceful trade and good-neighbourly relations between Russia and India.

During subsequent centuries the traditions of respect and sympathy for the Indian people and its ancient culture, sympathy with its just battle, and a desire to establish with it good-neighbourly relations received further development among the best people of Russia who expressed the aspirations and hopes of her peoples.

Only the victory of the great October Socialist Revolution in Russia and the conquest of independence by the Indian people have created the conditions necessary for the establishment and growth of friendly and many-sided collaboration between the two peoples in the name of their benefit and world peace.

Author's Notes

Abbreviations:

TsGIAL - Central State Historical Archives, Leningrad.
 AVPR - Archives of Russia's Foreign Policy, Archive Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

- (1) Karl Marx. SECRET DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. London, 1899, p.87.
- (2) A. Malinovskiy. "Information on the Despatch to India of Russian Envoys, Couriers and Merchants with Goods and of the Arrival of Indians in Russia from 1469 to 1751". TRUDY OBSHCHESTVA ISTORII I DREVNOSTEY ROSSIYSKIKH, Pt.VII; Moscow, 1837, p.175.
- (3) TsGIAL. fund 1374, case 2399, pt.1. Correspondence on steps considered necessary to develop trade with India, Bukhara and Khiva; A. Popov. SNOSHENIYA ROSSII S KHIVOYU I BUKHAROYU PRI PETRE VELIKOM, St.Pb., 1853; F.I. Soymonov, OPISANIYE KASPIY-SKOGO MORYA. St.Pb., 1763; Ye.L. Shteynberg, PERVYYE ISSLEDOVATELI KASPIYA (XVIII-XIX cc.); Moscow, 1949.
- (4) Fedor Stepanovich Saltykov (d.1715), a supporter of political, economic and cultural changes in Russia. His proposals have been published from P.N. Tikhanov's MS. "The Propositions of Fedor Saltykov". Manuscript from P.N. Tikhanov's collection;

Appendix No.5 to the minutes of the meetings of OLDPA [Society of Lovers of Ancient Literature] (PAMYATNIKI DREVNEY PIS'MENNOSTI I ISKUSSTVA, Vyp.83, St.Pb., 1891); P. Pavlov-Sil'vanskiy. PROYEKTY REFORM V ZAPISKAKH SOVREMENNIKOV PETRA VELIKOGO. St.Pb., 1897, pp.32-35. Saltykov developed his proposals in a memorandum to the Tsar of 1714 headed "Expressions of Benefit to the State".

- (5) A.S. Sgibnev. "Russian Attempts to Establish Relations with Japan". MORSKOY SBORNIK, 1869, No.1. St.Pb., p.40.
- (6) Ya.V. Bryus (1670-1735), Russian functionary and scholar, one of Peter the First's closest associates.
- (7) The expedition of the geodesists Yevreinov and Luzhin in 1719 and the expedition to the mouth of the Ob' in 1721. The 1st and 2nd Kamchatka expeditions (1725-30 and 1733-43) were subsequently carried out according to Peter's plans. (See A.V. Yefimov. IZ ISTORII RUSSKIKH EKSPEDITSIIY NA TIKHOM OKEANE. Moscow, 1948.)
- (8) A. Malinovskiy, op.cit., p.176. (See also A. Zaozerskiy, "An Expedition to Madagascar During the Reign of Peter the Great", in the book ROSSIYA I ZAPAD, Coll. No.1. Petrograd, 1923, pp.91-102.)
- (9) A. Malinovskiy, op.cit., p.178.
- (10) The Mission headed by the Moscow merchant Semen Malenkov had been dispatched to India by order of the Great Treasury in 1695. This was the first Russian mission to reach the capital of the Moghul Empire. It was received with favour by the Emperor Aurangzebe (1658-1707) and received a number of trade privileges.
- (11) MATERIALY VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKOGO ARKHIVA GLAVNOGO SHTABA, Vol.1. St.Pb., 1871, pp.226-35, 252-3, 257-8.
- (12) Ibid., p.239.
- (13) A. Malinovskiy, op.cit., p.178.
- (14) Leningrad Section of the Institute of History of the AN/SSSR. Manuscript book collection, no.410, sheet 21.
- (15) Ibid. sheet 6 reverse. In another place the author mentions the accession of the Emperor Peter II which took place 7 May 1727
- (16) Ibid., sheet 20.
- (17) Leningrad Section of the Institute of History of the AN/SSSR. Manuscript book collection, no.410, sheet 8 reverse.

- (18) Ibid., sheet 10 reverse.
- (19) Ibid., sheet 20 reverse.
- (20) The manuscript is kept in the archives of the AN/SSSR among V.N. Tatishchev's Questionnaires on Siberia, fund 21, inventory 5, no.149, sheets 417-26.
- (21) Ibid., sheets 417-18.
- (22) In 1737-41 Tatishchev was I.K. Kirilov's successor in the construction of Orenburg; in 1741 he headed the Kalmyk Commission and in 1741-5 he was the Governor of Astrakhan'.
- (23) See the archives of the AN/SSR, fund 95, inventory 5, no.42, sheets 153 and 220; fund 95, inventory 5, no.41, sheets 215-20.
- (24) See "Eleven Geographical and Historical Problems of Bukhariya and Khiva" by V.N. Tatishchev. The MS. is kept in the MS. Section of the Library of the AN/SSSR and was published in N.A. Popov's book TATISHCHEV I YEGO VREMYA, Moscow, 1861, pp.560-3.
- (25) N.A. Popov, op.cit., pp.365-6.
- (26) I.K. Kirilov (1689-1737), prominent geographer and cartographer. The foundation of Orenburg is connected with his work.
I.I. Neplyuyev (1693-1773), Russian statesman and diplomatist. An active supporter of the changes brought about by Peter I. Head of the Orenburg Region 1742-58.
- (27) See "Extract from a Project by Councillor of State Kirilov and Tevkelev on the Foundation of the Orenburg Commerce with 18 Asian Provinces: Khiva, Bukhariya, India, etc." AVPR, fund "Russia's Relations with Khiva, 1734-40", inventory 134/1, case 1, 10 sheets. The extract was made by the chancellory of the Orenburg Governorate-General.
- (28) AVPR, fund "Russia's Relations with Khiva, 1734-40", inventory 134/1, case 1, sheet 4.
- (29) Ibid., sheet 3.
- (30) POLNOYE SOBRANIYE ZAKONOV ROSSIYSKOY IMPERII, Vol.IX, 1830, p.312.
- (31) Ibid., p.345.
- (32) AVPR, fund "Russia's Relations with Khiva, 1751-54", inventory 134/1, case 1, addition to sheet 10.
- (33) Ibid., inventory 134/17, case 1, addition to sheet 10; see also TsGIAL, funds 1329, 1736, inventory 1, case 44, sheets 73 reverse and 74.

- (34) See O.F. Solov'yev, *IZ ISTORII RUSSKO-INDIYSKIKH SVYAZEY*. Moscow, 1958.
- (35) V.N. Vitevskiy. *NEPLYUYEV I ORENBURGSKIY KRAY V PREZHNEM YEGO SGOSTAVE DO 1758 G.*, Vol.III. Kazan', 1897, p.826.
- (36) AVPR, fund "Russia's Relations with Khiva", inventory 134/1, case 1, sheets 2-5 reverse.
- (37) Ibid., sheet 4 reverse. A. Malinovskiy wrote about this proposal in his cited work but made no reference to his source. See also V.N. Vitevskiy, op.cit., p.827.
- (38) Ibid., sheets 4, reverse 5.
- (39) Ibid., sheet 4 reverse.
- (40) Ibid., sheet 5 reverse.
- (41) *ZAPISKI IVANA IVANOVICHA NEPLYUYEVA (1693-1773)*. New complete edition, St.Pb., 1893, pp.141-2.
- (42) "The gentleman who composed the 'Topography of Orenburg' by his diligent labours makes clear among other things. . . that he owns the most convenient method of bringing about a growth of interest. . . (i.e. the growth of State income. -Authors) to be the carrying on of Russian trade with Bukhara and thence with India, for which he justly deserves the thanks of every patriot and especially of every Russian merchant." (*YEZHEMESYACHNYYE SOCHINENIYA I IZVESTIYA O UCHENYKH DELAKH*, November 1763, St.Pb., pp.401-8.)
- (43) See *SOCHINENIYA I PEREVODY, K POL'ZE I UVESELENIYU SLUZHASHCHIYE*, July 1762, St.Pb., pp.610, 615.
- (44) Ibid., p.615.
- (45) The state of the Great Moghuls existed from 1526 to 1761.
- (46) K. Marx and F. Engels, *WORKS*, Vol.9, p.224.
- (47) The Navigation Acts were a series of acts of the English Parliament directed at the promotion of English trade and industry and their protection from foreign competition. The Acts forbade foreigners to trade in the English colonies without Government permission. They were repealed only in the middle of the 19th century.
- (48) *Mufti* - a Muslim theologian and jurist. Representative of the higher Muslim clergy, approximating to a Christian Bishop or Metropolitan.

- (49) Muhammad Jan Husain, first Mufti of the Orenburg Muslim Congregation which was organized in accordance with Catherine the Second's edict of 22 September 1788. Did much work among the Kazakhs, the mountaineers of the northern Caucasus and other peoples with the aim of bringing them within the Russian Empire. Frequently rewarded for his services by the Tsarist Government.
Husain was connected with the Free Economic Society. See MATERIALY PO ISTORII KAZAKHSKOY SSR (1785-1826), Vol.IV, Moscow-Leningrad 1940, App.21; M.P. Vyatkin. "The Journal of the Orenburg Mufti". ISTORICHESKIY ARKHIV, Vol.II, Moscow-Leningrad, 1939.
- (50) The State Saltykov-Shchedrin Public Library, manuscript section. P.N. Tikhanov's collection, No.149, sheets 62 reverse - 76.
- (51) See Pavel Nebol'sin's OCHERKI TORGOVLI ROSSII SO STRANAMI SREDNEY AZII, KHIVROY BUKHAROY I KOKANOM [sic] (SO STORONY ORENBURGSKOY LINII). St.Pb., 1856, App.III.
Passages from a description of the wanderings of Gabaydulla Amirov had been published even earlier in the magazine AZIATSKIY VESTNIK, 1825, Bk.1, pp.26-37, Bk.2, pp.102-20, Bk.3, pp.180-9, Bk.4, pp.241-56. (See also E.Ya. Lyusternik. RUSSKO-INDIYSKIYE EKONOMICHESKIYE SVYAZI V XIX V. Moscow, 1958, Ch.I and App.1.)
- (52) See M.V. Lomonosov, POLNOYE SOBRANIYE SOCHINENIY, Vol.6, Moscow-Leningrad, Izd. AN/SSSR, 1952, pp.417-98. V.A. Perevalov, LOMONOSOV I ARKTIKA, Moscow-Leningrad, 1949. V. Antsiferov, LOMONOSOV I SEVERNYIY MORSKOY PUT', Moscow-Leningrad, 1940.

T H E P O S I T I O N O F T H E
I N D I A N W O R K I N G - C L A S S , 1 8 7 0 - 1 9 3 9

The symposium INDIYA I AFGANISTAN (ed. A.M. Osipov, Moscow 1958) contains three articles on the Indian working-class during the British period: L.V. Shaposhnikova's "The Position of the Indian Proletariat and the Workers' Movement at the End of the 19th and Beginning of the 20th Century", L.A. Gordon's "The Position of the Working-Class of Bombay between the Two World Wars" and S.F. Levin's "The Position of the Indian Railway Proletariat on the Eve of and After the World Economic Crisis of 1929-33". All these articles rely to a great extent on official British information to which they give a Marxist interpretation. The following is a short summary of these articles in the order in which they are listed above.

. . .
I. 1870-1918

The position of the proletariat

"Large-scale capitalist production began to develop in India in the middle of the 19th century. Simultaneously there developed a proletariat whose ranks were filled by ruined peasants and craftsmen." The peasants had been ruined by colonial land reforms and an oppressive tax system, the craftsmen by the competition of factory industry. "The breakdown of the peasant economy proceeded much more quickly than the development of industry, which was unable to absorb the pauperized village population. There thus resulted a latent agrarian over-population."

"The heterogeneous composition of the Indian working-class (national, caste and religious differences) slowed down the unification of the workers." Both caste and religious differences were for obvious reasons fostered by the colonial administration and local capitalists but, nevertheless, the class-consciousness of the working-class grew.

The formation of a permanent Indian proletariat was also hindered by the rapid turnover of labour in the factories. Indian industry was still backward in that some factories were open only part of the year and provided only seasonal work, while some of the workers, although they had lost their land, "frequently continued to be personally dependent on the money-lender or landowner". Some of them, again, had land and regarded factory work as a secondary source of income.

"The double oppression to which the Indian worker was subject - from the British imperialists and the Indian capitalists - and the existence of a reserve army of workers in the form of hidden agrarian overpopulation determined the basic features of the material position of the working-class." The factory owners, for instance, were able to demand an inhumanly long working-day and to offer a wage so low that it did not even suffice to restore the worker's energy.

It is true that the mill-owners of Lancashire, who were alarmed by Indian competition, began a campaign in 1870 for factory legislation in India. The resulting Factory Acts, however, were ineffective: the first (1880) applied only to factories of more than 100 workers using mechanical power; the employment of children under seven was forbidden and the working-day for children from 7-12 was limited to nine hours; nothing was said of women's working conditions. The second Act of 1891 further limited the working-day. Both these Acts, however, were evaded and "factory legislation had no effective influence on the length of the working-day".

Because of the surplus of the supply of labour over the demand the value of labour dropped to a level below its worth. "The Indian worker's real wage could not ensure the restoration of the energy lost in the process of production. In addition this wage fell steadily." Over the period as a whole the index of wages rose by eight per cent while that of food prices rose by 30 per cent. Even though the purchase of food absorbed the greater part of a worker's wages an average family of three people with an income of 14 rupees could not buy for its members the necessary 3,000 calories per day.

"Inhuman conditions of work, a beggarly level of wages and hard living conditions led to the physical exhaustion of the bulk of the Indian proletariat."

The workers' movement

No sooner had it appeared than India's industrial proletariat began its battle against its exploiters. "At first these protests were fortuitous in character and directed mainly against individual

capitalists." The strike movement began in the 1870s and developed in the 1880s. These strikes bear witness to the class-consciousness of the progressive part of the Indian proletariat, and show some organization.

In the 1890s the strike became the dominant form of the working-class's fight for economic rights, and as time went on they became more stubborn and protracted. Joint action by workers of various branches of industry began to take place. Workers' unity, however, continued to be hindered by artificially inflamed Hindu-Muslim rivalry.

At the beginning of the 20th century the strike battle, although still without organization, began to take on a class character. Religious and caste differences were being erased in the course of the common struggle. The workers' protests already had a political overtone. The Indian working-class's determination to take part in the struggle for independence was shown by the wave of strikes during the revolutionary upsurge of 1905-8.

II. The Working-Class of Bombay, 1919-39

[L.A. Gordon's article takes the story into another stage but restricts it to one city. However, the author in his introduction writes that the Bombay proletariat was exceptionally large (500,000) and formed the "militant vanguard" of the Indian workers' movement, while social conflicts showed themselves with especial sharpness in the city. For this reason, he argues, Bombay can be taken as in some ways typical of a country suffering capitalist exploitation under foreign imperialism.]

The colonial regime in India left its imprint on the condition of the working-class: it was responsible for the preservation of feudal forms of exploitation, for the immense relative overpopulation and for arbitrary police rule - all of which produced a "sharp deterioration in the condition of the working-class".

The most important feature of capitalist exploitation in colonial India was the sale of labour at a price several times below its full worth. The existence of inexhaustible reserves of labour "allowed the bourgeoisie not to pay for the upkeep of the workers' families". "In countries with a developed capitalist economy the increase in the working-class takes place mainly by means of its own natural reproduction. For this reason the bourgeoisie is here forced to assure the proletariat a wage which permits the existence not only of the worker himself

but of his family also. In colonial India, where relative overpopulation many times surpassed the active labour force, the increase could quite easily take place from this reserve of surplus labour. As a result the lower wage limit reached the value of the minimum necessary for the existence of one worker only, but not his family." This meant that his family also had to work, and this in its turn helped to preserve the lower and worse forms of capitalist production - those "based on the cruel exploitation of female and child labour". The preservation of these forms of production is, of course, characteristic of all capitalist countries, but they were especially well developed in colonial India. The women worked in workshops which used no mechanical power and took work home for their children to do. Official British figures do not include these children. The Indian workers, therefore, "suffered not only from the development of capitalism but from its insufficient development". [It should be mentioned here that the USSR is still, or at any rate was until 1956, one of the few countries where women work in coal mines. -Ed.]

"Feudal survivals" - caste, religious and national distinctions - continued to hinder the unity of the working-class and to be supported by the authorities and the capitalists. Money-lending and bribery and corruption, both inevitable consequences of the surplus of the supply of labour over the demand, also tended to depress the condition of the working-class.

"The combination of all these features brings about a special colonial form of the capitalist exploitation of the working-class, characterized by the acquisition by the capitalist not only of the surplus value but also of a considerable part of the necessary product. Meanwhile the condition of the working-class steadily deteriorated. Colonial exploitation faced the working-class literally with physical destruction."

The slump brought widespread unemployment. The real wage of the Bombay textile workers during the slump cannot be calculated merely by comparing nominal wages with the cost of living, as is normal, but must also take into account the number of unemployed. If this is done it appears that real wages were lower in 1938 than in 1914. The disproportion is increased when one considers also the fact that the workers' social and cultural needs had much increased.

"The peculiarities of the position of the working-class in colonial India conditioned the distinctive nature of its class struggle. The first task of the Indian proletariat was to destroy colonial forms of exploitation. Therefore the direct political aim of the workers' movement to overthrow imperialist rule. The role of the working-class in the Indian people's victorious struggle for independence shows that it coped honourably with this task."

III. The Railway Workers, 1929-33

S.F. Levin begins his article with a survey of the reasons for which the railways of India were built, in which he states that they were primarily designed to facilitate the exploitation of the country and served also as a profitable field for the investment of British capital: by 1870 India's railway debt had passed £55m. They also had a military role, especially in Burma and on the North-West Frontier.

Although the British capitalists in building the railways did not have the interests of the Indian people in mind, Levin notes, the development of railways had one good result in that it accelerated the development of capitalism and of a working-class. The railway workers are the oldest and most progressive section of the Indian working-class and, because they are scattered over the country, have had the greatest "revolutionizing" influence on other sections of the working-class. Nevertheless the railway workers, like workers of other industries, suffered from the preservation (helped by the Government and railway administration) of caste, national and religious differences.

The railway administration made profits in two ways: by plundering the peoples of India through railway loans and debts, etc., and by exploiting the railway workers. The existence of an immense reserve of labour, caused by comparative agrarian overpopulation, meant that labour could be bought at a price lower than its true worth. In 1930 one half of the labour force was receiving less, sometimes much less, than 20 rupees per month. According to the calculations of the Indian economist R. Mukerjee the minimum sum necessary to keep a worker and his family was 30 rupees 13 annas. The result of this disproportion was malnutrition and a crippling load of debt.

Working conditions also were unenviable. Although the working-day was officially limited to 11 hours with a 60 hour week, the workers not infrequently worked 70-84 hours per week and in any case the limitation applied only to salaried staff, not to workers hired by the day. A piece-work and bonus system was in force but did not work to the benefit of the worker: if he overfulfilled his norm the company took half the profit, while if he underfulfilled his norm he paid the whole of the deficit. In fact this system merely made work more intense and reduced wages.

As in other industries, the workers were also affected by bribery and corruption among the administration, by the system of fines and deductions (which were often made whether there had been any fault or not) and by the high cost of accommodation.

The slump caused a drop in industrial production and trade and, consequently, in freight traffic, and the Indian railways began to lose money. The companies met this challenge by attempting to put the whole burden on the shoulders of the workers: the railways were rationalized, with reduced rates for piece-work, workers were dismissed and wages were reduced (although they had already been falling behind the cost of living). By 1932 wages had fallen by 40 per cent in comparison with 1929.

Responsibility for this state of affairs falls on the Anglo-Indian Government, which either owned or controlled all Indian railways. This fact of governmental ownership or control had a bearing also on the labour movement on the railways, since any protest of the Indian workers against working conditions was both a political act (since the railways were Government owned or controlled), and a protest against national oppression (since the managerial positions were occupied by Britons or Anglo-Indians).

Labour relations on the railways were, therefore, of first importance to the Government, which tried to gain control of the workers' movement by means of "yellow" workers' organizations. An example is provided by the local committees of railway workers and employees which vetted the workers' demands and put before the management only those which met with their approval. The Government also made use of Social Reformists "connected with the British Labour Party" to split the workers' organizations and prevent their unity.

Neither of these tactics worked however. Strikes took place at Lilloa (1928: 28,000 workers involved), on the Southern Indian Railway (1929: 17,000 workers) and on the Great Indian Peninsular Railway (80,000 workers involved). These strikes helped to reunite the railway workers and to unmask the treachery of the Social Reformists. The strikes of 1930-3 frequently had a clearly political character.

S I N K I A N G, 1 9 2 8 - 5 9*

History, 1928-49 - The principles of local national autonomy -
 Administrative history, 1949-59 - Administrative divisions -
 Trade and industry, 1949-57 - Material welfare and culture -
 Diagrams of administrative organization at various levels.

K.F. Kotov's book MESTNAYA NATSIONAL'NAYA AVTONOMIYA V KITAYSKOY NARODNOY RESPUBLIKE (NA PRIMERE SIN'TSZYAN-UYGURSKOY AVTONOMNOY OBLASTI) appeared in Moscow in 1959. It is a work apparently based on printed, mainly Russian, sources which contains less information specifically on Sinkiang than its title leads one to expect. The author's stated aim is to "trace, on the example of the Sinkiang-Uygur Autonomous Region the most multinational area of the Chinese People's Republic, the process of the construction of local national autonomy in the Chinese People's Republic, to show its essence and legal position and also the basic achievements of the people's democratic state in liquidating factual economic and cultural inequality between nations." Considerable space has been given in the following treatment to the pre-Communist history of Sinkiang, to which Kotov devotes an introduction.

Throughout the article English translations have been used for the Chinese administrative divisions as follows:

<u>Chinese</u>	<u>Russian</u>	<u>English</u>
chou	okrug	district
hsien	uyezd	county
ch'ü	rayon	area
hsiang	volost'	rural area

* For previous articles on Sinkiang see CAR, 1956, No.1, pp.72-75, No.4, pp.432-47; 1957, No.2, pp.144-62; 1958, No.1, pp.76-88, No.3, pp.264-71; 1959, No.1, pp. 84-89 and 93-96, No.4, 398-408; 1960, No.1, pp.80-85, No.3, pp.332-3.

History, 1928-49

The following section is a summary of Kotov's introduction. During the period 1929-33 Governor Chin Shu-jen, a nominee of the Central Government, carried out an oppressive policy. All administrative posts were held by Chinese and the regime was characterized by Great-Han chauvinism. The Kuomintang's policy of economic and national oppression called forth a revolt in 1931-4. "Since the Kuomintang armed forces proved incapable of suppressing this movement, the local satraps began to manoeuvre. Chiang Kai-shek's Government was forced to make some temporary concessions. . . In April 1933 a new Government was formed in Sinkiang headed by Sheng Shih-ts'ai." The new Government's declarations of support for national equality, the democratization of the administration, etc., were "demagogic" screens for its activity. Therefore the fight of the Uygur and Kazakh peoples for freedom from the oppression of the Chinese Government and their own feudal leaders had failed. The reason for this was that there was no proletariat or Communist Party to lead them. As a result the local feudal leaders managed to obscure the class nature of this national battle and to preach the unity of the interests of all classes of one or another nationality. Such feudal leaders were Sabit Jamulla, Muhammad Bugra, Shamansur, etc.

[Here Kotov gives an account of the growth of the Chinese Communist Party under the influence of the October Revolution and of its nationalities policy. "Shoulder to shoulder with the great Han nation the national minorities took part in the revolutionary battle."]

This process was especially evident in Sinkiang, where "under the influence of the revolutionary battle of the Chinese people in all areas of the province the national liberation struggle of the peoples inhabiting it was widely developed."

Under the new regime the Kuomintang continued to harry progressive elements. Sheng Shih-ts'ai, "champion of the reactionary regime of Chiang Kai-shek in Sinkiang", introduced fascist methods of government. In 1939 over 1,000 "progressives" were imprisoned and in 1940, 28 were buried alive. In 1941 Sheng created the provocative organization "Six Stars for the Study of Marxism-Leninism" which was, in fact, a secret-police force. In 1941 an American Consulate was established in Urumchi, and with their help Sheng organized the pro-fascist "Committee for Carrying our a New Census" which "occupied itself with the physical destruction of Communists and other revolutionaries". [In fact the American Consulate in Urumchi was not established until 1943. -Ed.]

In the last 12 years of Kuomintang rule in Sinkiang over 12,000 "of the best fighters for the people's cause" died in Kuomintang gaols, including three Chinese Communists - Chen T'an-chiu, Mao Tse-min and Lin Chi-lu. This was accompanied by intensified national and economic oppression of the non-Chinese nationalities of Sinkiang. In March 1944 the Government decreed that 10,000 horses should be supplied to the Kuomintang Army. In August as a result of this decree the peasants and nomads of the Nilkh county of the Ili district rose in revolt. The Nilkh area was completely liberated by November and the capture of Kuldja soon followed. The revolt was led by a Central staff formed on 12 November in Kuldja, of which Akhmedzhan Kasimi was a member. The formation of a regular army was declared on 8 April 1945. [Kotov calls this army the National Army of Sinkiang. -Ed.]

This revolt was a national liberation movement of the broad toiling masses of the various nationalities led by "such fighters for democracy" as Kasimi, Sayfuddin Azizov, etc. The revolutionary battle of the masses of the nationalities of Sinkiang merged into that of the Chinese people. "The progressive representatives of the national minorities became convinced that only the victory of the Chinese people . . . could bring freedom to the nationalities of the country." Consequently the battle of the national minorities took place under the influence of the Chinese people led by the CPC. The revolutionary battle of the national minorities of Sinkiang was inspired by the victories of the Communist army and encouraged by their reforms in newly liberated areas.

The National Army had completely liberated the Tarbagatay district by July 1945, the Altay district by September and the towns of Aqsu and Bay by October. This encouraged an armed uprising of the "working masses" of Tashkurgan who were soon joined by the Aqsu, Kashgar and Yarkand districts.

The Kuomintang, having failed with force, now tried to regulate the "Sinkiang question" by peaceful means. The Central Staff accepted their representations, and negotiations began in Urumchi in October 1945 and lasted for 8 months. A preliminary agreement was signed in January 1946 and the final agreement on 6 June 1946, to come into force on 1 July. The agreement provided for some democratization of social and political life: a coalition government was to contain 15 Uygurs and 10 representatives of other nationalities; the local languages were to be given equal status with Chinese at all levels of the administration; freedom of speech, assembly and organization were guaranteed, as was the continued existence of the National Army.

The Coalition Government contained as Vice Chairman Akhmedzhan Kasimi together with Sayfuddin Azizov, Rakhimzhan Sabirov and Abdukarim

Abbesov, all members of the revolutionary movement. Their political programme provided for all the democratic freedoms, friendship with the Soviet Union, aid to peasants and nomads, the development of industry, transport and public health, democratic elections, etc.

Kuomintang reactionaries, however, foiled this programme: the elections to local "organs of State power" were carried out by means of terror, blackmail and falsification and produced no essential changes. In effect all the points of the treaty remained unfulfilled. Far from decreasing, the Kuomintang armed forces in Sinkiang increased by 500 per cent by the end of 1946. The Kuomintang secret police retained its power. Representatives of the local nationalities were not appointed to local judicial posts.

In the spring of 1947 the Kuomintang forces, having regrouped, began an attack on the free areas and began to persecute the democratic elements throughout the province. The representatives of the national liberation movement left the Government.

At this the Kuomintang formed a new government under "the Uygur nationalist and agent of the Anglo-American imperialism, Masud". "Carrying out the will of his masters" Masud began to persecute the democratic elements in Sinkiang, helped by the "nationalist bands of Osman, Janim Khan, Yulbars and Kalibek [? Qali Beg] and the bands of the head of the 'black hundreds' Sung Hsi-lien". [Sung was in fact the commander of the Chinese forces in Urumchi. -Ed.] "Replying on the support of the Kuomintang and the American imperialists they tried to submit the national liberation movement to the interests of the 'Panturkists' fight for the unification of the mythical 'Turkic nation' (natsiya tyurkov), for the creation of a 'Turkic state'." The peoples of Sinkiang, however, understood the role of Masud and gave their support to the Central Staff.

In January 1948 the "Union for the Defence of Peace and Democracy", a form of Sinkiang national front, was created under the guidance of the CPC and did much to help the national liberation movement in the province.

Under the impact of the National Army's successes Masud's Government ceased to exist. At the beginning of 1949 a new interim government was formed under Burhan. This government formally broke with the Kuomintang and joined Communist China on 26 September 1949.

In October the Chinese National Liberation Army entered Urumchi.

[As might be expected, Kotov's account of this period is incomplete, its most glaring omission being any treatment of Soviet influence in Sinkiang during Sheng Shih-ts'ai's governorship. Governor Sheng is regarded as being a faithful subordinate of Chiang Kai-shek. Consequently Kotov does not mention Soviet armed intervention in 1933 (the "Altay Volunteers"), or Soviet economic penetration under the terms of the "Secret Pact" of 1931 and the "Tin Mines Agreement" of 1940. Sheng Shih-ts'ai's interest in Communism is alluded to only when Kotov mentions his creation of a "provocative" organization for the study of Marxism-Leninism in 1941.

It appears likely from some verbal similarities that Kotov's account is based on an earlier article by A.G. Yakovlev, "The National Liberation Movement of the Peoples of Sinkiang (1944-9)", UCHENYYE ZAPISKI INSTITUTA VOSTOKOVEDENIYA, No.XI (KITAYSKIY SBORNIK), 1955. The two articles have the same general viewpoint. Kotov, however, does not go as far as Yakovlev on the question of the 1931-4 uprisings: Yakovlev writes that they were "on the whole reactionary" and "pursued the aims of the creation of an independent Muslim state". Kotov has also given less emphasis than Yakovlev to the alleged machinations of British, American and Japanese imperialists in Sinkiang. Neither Soviet author mentions the man who is named by most Western writers as the leader of the 1944 Ili revolt (Kasimi is named merely as a member of the Central Staff), Ali Khan Türe, who is said to have had Soviet backing. -Ed.]

The principles of local national autonomy

Kotov gives five principles. The first four, which are of little but theoretical interest, are: democratic centralism; the democratic dictatorship of the people; equal rights for all nations and national groups; and the national territorial principle. The fifth is the principle of the "nativization" (korenizatsiya) of the apparatus of self-government, seen as implying the translation of the proceedings of the government into the languages of the local nationalities and the introduction of members of these nationalities into the local administration. The first thing involved is the "education and re-education" of national "cadres": by 1958 specially established schools and courses had produced 400,000 "cadres" from among the local nationalities.

Kotov also stresses the necessity of using the local languages in State administration. Apart from measures to develop these languages (reform or creation of scripts, etc.) by a special Party decree of March 1957, every Chinese "cadre" was bound to learn within 3-5 years

one of the minority languages of the region in which he worked.

The process of "nativization" obviously aroused nationalist aspirations in some places, since Kotov emphasizes that the term must not be confused with "Uygurization", "Tibetization", etc. and that it does not mean the removal of Chinese and other "cadres". Furthermore "in mixed regions where Chinese and other nationalities are in a minority, workers of the basic nationality promise to show essential tact and the maximum attention to their interests and needs".

Besides being opposed by "local nationalists", "nativization" was also unwelcome to "great power [i.e. Chinese] chauvinists". While the former wanted "autonomy only for the basic nationality", the latter ignored local peculiarities and opposed the inclusion of representatives of local, formerly oppressed, nationalities in the apparatus of self-government.

Both these tendencies were condemned by the VIIIth Congress of the CPC.

"Democratic centralism" is a system which claims to give the national minorities "unlimited opportunities to develop their economy and culture, national in form and socialist in content", while reserving to the "central organs" of government the general task of guiding the regional People's Committee (Narodnyy komitet) with the right of changing or annulling "inexpedient" measures of the regional People's Committee or Assembly of People's Representatives. The various departments of the life and economy of the region are under the guidance of both the regional People's Committee and the appropriate central ministry.

Apart from the normal functions of State organs the "organs of self-government" have various duties of which the following are the most important:

Economic construction: to work out the regional plan and control its fulfilment, and to work out and control region, district, county, city and rural area expenditure; to manage the region's State-owned industrial and trading establishments; to carry out "socialist transformations" in industry, trade and agriculture.

Cultural construction: to manage public health, social security, public assistance, primary and secondary education, educational and scientific organizations and foundations; to control and observe the organization of higher education, physical culture and sport.

In 1958 the autonomous regions were given greater control over their finances. Besides the above general responsibilities the Sinkiang-Uygur Autonomous Region has the right to create social defence brigades and to work out proposals for autonomy, which, however, have to be confirmed by the Permanent Committee of the All-Chinese Assembly of People's Representatives.

Kotov emphasizes that "in no field of economy or State control does the Sinkiang-Uygur Autonomous Region have full plenary powers. It carries on its activity according to State direction and under the control of the central State organs of the CPR."

Administrative history, 1949-59

Immediately after the liberation the Kuomintang system of rule was abolished and the Chinese Army set up "organs of military control", that is to say, military committees collaborating with the local People's Governments, in all districts except the three northern ones "where organs of people's power had already been set up" [presumably by the National Army of Sinkiang -Ed.]. The role of the military committees was, in the words of Lyu Shao-tsi, "to crush reactionaries by force and simultaneously protect and inspire the people and help them to set up Conferences of People's Representatives - organs of people's power of all degrees which. . . will gradually receive full power."

This system was especially necessary in Sinkiang because of the presence there of Kuomintang bands and secret societies. In many areas reactionaries infiltrated into the State apparatus and sabotaged the measures of people's power. Out of 95 employees of the State institutions of Kashgar 53 were "after painstaking investigation unmasked as spies of various intelligence services".

In order to crush exploitation and reaction representatives of the military committees were placed in each newly created administrative institution to agitate among the "cadres". "Lackeys of imperialism and reaction" were shown the door.

The first constitutional document of the CPR, accepted 1 September 1949, proclaimed a policy of local national autonomy and the creation of "united democratic governments" containing representatives of each nationality. In December of that year a "united democratic government" was founded in Sinkiang with 31 members - nine Uygurs, three Kazakhs, two Chinese, two Dungans and one representative of each other nationality. [As there are 13 nationalities in Sinkiang this system accounts only for 25 members. -Ed.]



(Reproduced with due acknowledgment from *China's Changing Map* by Theodore Shabad. Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1956.)

To replace the old Kuomintang baotsya system a new system of local administration was set up: local people's governments were established in districts, counties, areas, rural areas and villages (kishlak). Of the ten district chairmen four were Uygurs, three Kazakhs, two Chinese and one Mongol. Of the 78 county chairmen 45 were Uygurs, 13 Kazakhs, 11 Chinese, four Mongols, three Kirgiz and one Tatar.

In the second half of 1950 a reorganization began of the already existing organs of people's power in the three northern districts of Tarbagatay, Altay and Ili: the Governors were replaced by Administrative-Control Boards and local people's governments were established in counties, areas and villages.

The system of military control lasted for only a few months and power began to pass into the hands of the local Conferences of People's Representatives of All Strata of the Populace and to the local people's governments elected by them.

These Conferences were a transition stage of popular representation, existing while the economy of the country was being reconstructed. They existed at village, rural area, county, city and province level. Their most important functions were to debate and make proposals about the work of the people's governments and to publicize the decisions of the governments among the people. During the first period of their activity their resolutions were no more than recommendations. From the middle of 1951, however, they began to exercise the powers later possessed by the Assemblies of People's Representatives. After this date the Conferences selected the corresponding people's governments, controlled their activity and confirmed their budgets, and their resolutions had the force of commands. This stage was completed in Sinkiang by the end of 1952.

At the first session of the Provincial (Provintsiálny) Conference, April-May 1951, of the 530 delegates 470 had been selected by various social organizations, State institutions and the Chinese Army and the rest had been nominated by the Provincial Government. Workers, peasants, traders, intelligentsia, students, the Communist and other parties and Buddhist, Muslim and other religious groups were represented. The proportions of delegates according to nationalities were as follows: Uygurs - 40.3 per cent; Chinese - 25.1 per cent; Kazakhs - 14.1 per cent; Dungans - 4.7 per cent; Kirgiz - 3.1 per cent; Tatars - 2.7 per cent; Russians - 0.7 per cent; others - 9.3 per cent. [The high proportion of Chinese to Uygurs (population figures 300,000 and 3,640,000) shows that representation was not straightforwardly proportionate. It is possible, however, that in the Conferences, as later in the Assemblies (see below), the urban population was more heavily represented than the rural population, which might account for the high proportion of Chinese representatives. -Ed.]

Between sessions the Conferences were represented by consultative councils elected by them. The resolutions of the consultative councils had the force only of recommendations. [Although they represented the Conferences, to which in theory the local people's governments were subordinate, they had no power to command the governments, their relations with them being based on "cooperation and mutual aid". As the consultative councils sat only four times a year at provincial level and once a month at city and county level it seems obvious that the Conferences can have exercised only minimal control of the governments, especially of the government of the province. -Ed.]

With the beginning of the first Five-Year Plan in 1953 the Conferences ceased to answer the demands of the developing society and were replaced by Assemblies of People's Representatives elected by general suffrage. General elections were held in 1953-4.

[The electoral law of the CPR provides for greater representation of the urban population than of the rural population, the proportion of urban to rural representatives rising from 4 to 1 in local Assemblies to 8 to 1 in the All-Chinese Assembly. Apart from this peculiarity, however, representation is proportionate. Only the representatives of towns (poselki), rural areas, national rural areas and of regions (rayon) of cities and of cities not divided into regions are directly elected by the people. The higher Assemblies, from county up, are elected by the lower Assemblies. These higher elections take place by secret ballot; the lower ones may take place by secret ballot or by show of hands. In the first general elections in Sinkiang, according to Kotov, they took place by show of hands. -Ed.]

Although candidates for election could be put forward by the Communist and democratic parties, by people's organizations and by electors not represented in these parties and organizations, however, "as a rule the nomination of candidates was made by the parties, organizations and electors jointly, which testified to the solidarity of the Chinese[sic] people around the Communist Party." Candidates chosen in this way were put before a local electoral commission which made up a list. The list was then discussed by "groups of electors" and published.

The election, which was carried out in stages, covered 69 autonomous counties, administrative counties and cities and 2,175 inhabited points. The remaining four autonomous districts, 14 counties and 247 inhabited points lay in mainly livestock-breeding areas where there had been hardly any "socialist transformations" and were consequently not affected by the elections. In these areas, instead of Assemblies, Conferences of People's Representatives were called. The Sinkiang Provincial Assembly contained: 231 Uygurs, 48 Kazakhs, 45 Chinese, 14 Dungans, nine Mongols, four Uzbeks and two Russians. The Provincial Assembly was elected for four years, the others for two. New elections were held in 1956 and 1958. The Regional Assembly sits once a year, county, city and city-region Assemblies twice a year, and rural area, national rural area and town Assemblies three or four times a year. Extraordinary sessions can be called. Proceedings are carried on in Chinese and Uygur, with translations for deputies of other nationalities. In the Assemblies of national rural areas the language of the local nationality is spoken.

The Assemblies' executive organs are the People's Committees, which are responsible both to their Assembly and to the superior People's Committee, either of which organizations can annul their measures.

According to Article 48 of the Statute on Sinkiang's Autonomy, the People's Committees of region, county and city Assemblies can appoint special organs in their districts, areas and quarters respectively, to which they delegate their authority in these areas. "At the present stage of the construction of society" this system is becoming superfluous in Sinkiang. So, at the end of January 1956 "the directorate of the specially empowered Ili district was abolished and its functions transferred to the People's Committee of the Ili-Kazakh autonomous district." The territory of the former Ili district was split between the Ili-Kazakh autonomous district and the Baratalinsk-Mongol autonomous district. In August 1956 directorates were similarly liquidated in the districts of Southern Sinkiang and Yarkand, and in May 1958 the Urumchi administrative area was abolished and its territory split between the Sandzhiy autonomous district and the city of Urumchi.

[For information on the administrative system in region, autonomous district, city and county see accompanying diagrams at end. -Ed.]

Administrative divisions

Kotov devotes section 3 of Chapter II to administrative and territorial divisions. Unfortunately his account contains less detail than is to be found in CAR, Vol.IV, No.4, pp.437-41. He does, however, give the name of one extra rural area - the Azat-Avat Tadzhiik rural area, Kaglyk county.

Trade and industry, 1949-57

In contrast with the Kuomintang period when Chinese merchants, local feudal lords and "compradore" bourgeoisie plundered the working masses, now trade is in the hands of the State. In the first half of 1957 in Sinkiang there were nine State trading establishments of oblast scale, 78 of district and city scale and 645 of county scale. Prices of agricultural produce have been stabilized and the State trading organizations serve the most remote parts of Sinkiang.

The growth of village cooperatives, which buy their members' produce and sell consumer goods to them at market price or lower, is also playing a big part in stabilizing local prices. The peasants are getting more tools, draught animals, pest-killers, plants and seeds.

As State trade increases private trade diminishes: between 1954 and 1955 its share in the retail trade of Sinkiang fell from 42.1 to 31.3 per cent. By the end of 1956, 23,875 private trading organizations (95.64 per cent of the total) underwent "socialist transformation".

During 1947-50 the workers of Sinkiang not only rebuilt their destroyed industry but even developed it. With Soviet help a steel mill, a machine-tractor station, a cement factory, an electric power-station and a coal-mine were built. Textile, flour-milling and vegetable oil factories have also been built. In 1956 six cotton-cleaning factories were completed in Kashgar. Others are to be found in Kashgar, Miralbash, Yarkand, Fayzabad and Merket counties. Finally there are non-ferrous metal mills, an oil industry and the "October" car repair factory, which is especially important in a region where the truck is the basic form of transport.

In all there are more than 400 industrial undertakings in Sinkiang. Sinkiang's oil is now processed in Sinkiang itself and the refinery built in 1953 with Soviet help supplies Sinkiang with petrol, paraffin and diesel fuel.

Owing to Soviet help oil refining, the mining of non-ferrous and rare metals and open-cast mining are all carried on with the latest equipment.

Industrial production in 1957 was 6.62 times more than in 1952 and its value had increased by 164.12 per cent. In 1958 nine times more iron ore was produced than in 1957, 1.4 times more steel, 2.2 times more coal, 47 per cent more electricity and 272 per cent more oil, and the value of 1958's industrial production was 66.71 per cent above 1957's. Estimated production increase for 1959 is: industry - 116.2 per cent, agriculture - 109.3 per cent.

In 1958 there were 125,000 workers in Sinkiang, many of non-Chinese nationalities, while the number of managers and technicians of minority nationalities is growing: in the Dushan'tsy oilfield six natives hold the post of deputy director and deputy section-chief; the drilling section has trained more than 300 engineers and technicians.

The average wage of workers and employees increased between 1952-7 by 27.1 per cent while its purchasing power was more than doubled.

Material welfare and culture

In 1959 there were 1,218 secondary and 4,534 primary schools. The number of primary school pupils, 307,000 in 1952, had risen to over 718,000 in 1958-9. Corresponding numbers for secondary schools are: 1952 - 16,162; 1958-9 - 146,000. Children of all nationalities receive education in their native languages; and textbooks and educational aids are published in these languages.

Special committees have been formed to combat adult illiteracy. To teach Chinese workers, a special system has been worked out by which sufficient ideograms can be learned in 300 hours to make reading possible. In 1957, 500,000 people were attending literacy courses.

In July 1954 in the Kyzyl Kirgiz autonomous area a committee was formed to develop a Kirgiz national alphabet. "Having studied the experience of the Soviet Union in the working out of national alphabets, this committee worked out a Kirgiz national alphabet numbering 30 characters." (See CAR, 1958, No.1, pp.81-82.)

In order to produce "cadres" an Academy of National Minorities has been founded. In 1956 this Academy had 1,240 students. Agricultural, mining and Russian language institutes have also been established. The Urumchi Medical Institute, built in 1956, had 399 students in 1957 and will have 3,000. There are also mining, stockbreeding, forestry and technical institutes and nurses' and teachers' training colleges. In 1956 there were 24 such special educational establishments.

As a result of these improved educational facilities the number of "national cadres" is increasing: in 1957, 61,700 natives were employed in State organs (54 per cent of the total), and 3,000 natives were chairmen of People's Committees. In the same year 44,000 natives were members of the regional Communist Party (47 per cent of the total membership), 4,900 of whom were women.

Thirteen regional newspapers and 31 county newspapers are published in Uygur, Kazakh, Chinese, Mongolian and Sibo. Also since 1947 more than 2,000 poems, 170 short stories and novels, and 50 plays and scenarios have been published by native writers and a Sinkiang section of the Chinese Writers' Union has been set up.

In 1958 a new 1,200-seat theatre, the "People's Theatre", was built in Urumchi. Sinkiang now has eight theatres, 63 cinemas, 100 houses of culture, 185 mobile cinemas, and libraries and museums. A television transmitter is to be built in Urumchi in 1959 and the radio-relay network is being extended.

To teach hygiene and improve public health a large number of establishments have been set up to train doctors, medical orderlies, nurses, etc., several tens of thousands of whom have already been trained. Sinkiang now possesses 63 maternity hospitals, and every national area has its own hospital and out-patients department. Medical treatment is free.

The workers' material welfare has been improved by the liquidation of unemployment, the introduction of the 8-hour day, the establishment

of a fair wage, paid according to the amount of work done, with equal wages for women, a scheme of State insurance which provides sick-pay, holidays with pay and the extension to workers in private industry of all the rights enjoyed by those in State enterprises, including the right to join trade unions.

Kotov's book also contains a section on the collectivization of agriculture. This section would have added little to Bakhamov's article, which was dealt with in CAR, 1960, No.3, pp.332-3, and has consequently been omitted. The book as a whole suffers from insufficient concentration on problems which are specifically those of Sinkiang: many of Kotov's observations apply equally to any other part of China. The sections of which this is most true are those on the establishment, organization and method of work of the People's Courts and Department of Public Prosecutions (prokuratura), which accordingly have also been omitted. -Ed. CAR.

D I A G R A M S

1. The Organs of Self-Government of the Sinkiang-Uygur Autonomous Region

DEPARTMENTS

- Agriculture ————
- Public Health ————
- Culture ————
- Education ————
- Interior Affairs ————
- Social Safety ————
- Justice ————
- Control ————
- Finances ————
- Foodstuffs ————
- Industry ————
- 1st Dept. of Trade ————
- 2nd Dept. of Trade ————
- Irrigation ————
- Stockbreeding ————
- Forestry ————

Roads &
Railways

Deputy
Deputy

Regional Assembly
of People's
Representatives

Regional People's
Committee
Chairman

Secretariat

1st Deputy
Deputy

Regional People's
Court of the
Highest Degree
Chairman

DIRECTORATES

Communications
City Construction
Statistics
Domestic Industry
Exterior Trade
Labour
Meteorology
Virgin Lands
"Cadres"
Post & Telegraph

COMMITTEES

Planning
Construction
Physical Culture
and Sport
Study of Language
and Script
(Commission)


SECTIONS

Foreign Affairs


Religious Affairs

Radio Trans-
missions


2. The Organs of Self-Government of the Ili-Kazakh Autonomous District



3. The Organs of State Power and State Direction of the City of Kuldja



4. The Organs of State Power and State Direction in the Counties



THE BORDERLANDS IN THE
SOVIET PRESS

Below are reviewed reports on the Borderlands countries appearing in Soviet newspapers received during the period 1 July-30 September 1960. Owing to the large amount of material it has been found impracticable to include Soviet reports on India.

AFGHANISTAN

The Kabul festivities marking the 42nd anniversary of Afghanistan's independence were widely reported in the Soviet press. King Muhammad Zahir Shah was quoted (P. 25.8.60) as declaring that Afghanistan's policy was one of neutrality and non-attachment to military blocs; Afghanistan, having herself struggled for a century against colonialism, was glad that many peoples of Asia and Africa were gaining their freedom, but "the Afghan people cannot remain indifferent to the fate of their brother Pushtuns", who were still continuing their struggle for freedom. The Prime Minister Muhammad Daud was quoted as expressing his gratitude for Soviet economic and technical aid. (SK. 26.8.60), in a report on the parade in Kabul, said that "for the first time this year the uncovered faces of Afghan women can be seen".

A two-year agreement on the sale of Soviet equipment to Afghanistan (P. 13.8.60), includes tractors, shop equipment, washing machines, radio equipment, cinema and photographic apparatus, refrigerators, bicycles and tyres, to a total value of \$300,000. Afghanistan is to supply mainly fruit to the USSR under the agreement.

At a national industrial exhibition in Kabul various products of the Soviet foreign trade organizations AVTOEXPORT, MASHINOEXPORT and VOSTOKINTORG were on view. (P. 25.8.60)

P. of 28.8.60 reported without comment the signing on 26 August of the treaty of friendship and non-aggression between China and Afghanistan.

PAKISTAN

Pakistani violation of Afghan and Indian air space

A Tass dispatch from Kabul (P. 16.8.60) on a "violation of Afghan air space" by Pakistan, reported that the Afghan Minister of Defence had complained that two Pakistani aircraft had intruded into Afghanistan; they had been forced to make a landing at the Kandahar aerodrome, and the pilots were under examination. The Afghan Foreign Ministry had protested to the Pakistani Chargé d'Affaires.

TI. of 25.8.60 quoted an Indian press report alleging Pakistani violation of Indian air space. Quoting a correspondent of THE STATESMAN of Srinagar it said: "In the Legislative Council of the State of Jammu and Kashmir it was stated yesterday that in 1959 and the first seven months of 1960 there were 144 flights originating from Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir. As a result of the flights 18 persons were killed. In addition, during the same period more than 100 bombs were exploded, killing nine persons. In the opinion of the State Government, all the explosions were organized by persons connected with Pakistan."

Soviet aid in oil and mineral production

Pakistan's acceptance of a Soviet offer of aid in prospecting for and extracting oil and minerals was publicized in the Soviet press. In 1958, in an exchange of views with the Pakistani Government, the Soviet Union had declared its readiness to offer aid in this direction. Recently the discussions were continued, and President Ayub Khan had been informed that the Soviet Union was ready to examine the question of providing credit for the setting up of Soviet equipment in Pakistan, the payment of the services of Soviet specialists and the training of local Pakistani technical personnel with the aim of conducting prospecting work. It was proposed to send a group of Soviet experts to Pakistan to study Pakistan's wishes and to determine the scope of the operations. Pakistan's agreement with the Soviet proposal was conveyed to the Soviet Government on 2 August. (P. 10.8.60)

P. of 14.8.60 said that the discussions had aroused great interest in Pakistani business circles and among the general public. Pakistani newspapers had noted that, in offering aid, the Soviet Union did not lay down any political conditions. IMROZ had noted that the Soviet proposals were directed to providing assistance for those sectors of Pakistan's economy which most needed it; Pakistan's present oil output supplied only one-sixth of the country's needs, and in 1959 Pakistan spent 70m. rupees on coal imports.

PV. of 10.9.60, said that the Soviet Union was offering Pakistan a loan at 2.5 per cent, whereas "the Western powers are demanding six or seven per cent".

The Indus waters agreement

IZ.(21.9.60) commented on the agreement reached between Pakistan and India on the distribution of the waters of the Indus basin. The agreement "solves still one more argument left to India and Pakistan as a vestige of Britain's colonial domination". The settlement was of huge significance for the agricultural development of the two countries. The paper noted that settlement of the Indian-Pakistani dispute was achieved through the good offices of the World Bank.

A Soviet journalist's impressions of Eastern Pakistan

KT. of 10.9.60 published an account by M. Metkin of a visit to Eastern Pakistan. A main theme of this was the contrast between the living standards of the privileged classes and those of the simple workers and peasants. In a description of Dacca University Metkin remarked on the high scale of fees demanded of students, including examination fees, which in 1958-9 accounted for almost 25 per cent of the revenue of the university. Another theme was the lack of development of local industry. Foreign capital, said Metkin, took no part in the development of the jute industry; the USA, Britain and Western Germany, being the largest consumers of Pakistan's raw jute, were interested in Pakistan remaining an exporter of the raw commodity, and did not wish it to be processed locally. At the largest jute factory, in Adamji, "the working day is 10 hours, and there is no system of ventilation". A pencil factory in Chittagong was not working at full capacity because of restrictions on imports of timber, which came from California; as a result, foreign currency had to be spent on imports of pencils. The population of Eastern Pakistan, said Metkin, was greatly interested "in the conditions of life and work in the Soviet Union, in the system of education, and in solving of the nationality question".

NEPAL

A parliamentary delegation from Nepal, headed by the chairman of the upper chamber of the Nepalese Parliament, Dumar Bahadur Singh, arrived in Moscow on 23 September (IZ. 24.9.60), on the invitation of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Bahadur Singh thanked his hosts for the invitation, and expressed his hope that their trip to the Soviet Union would strengthen the friendly and economic collaboration of both countries. Prior to their arrival, they stopped in Uzbekistan for a two-day visit.

PERSIA

Western reports of unrest in Persia were quoted in the Soviet press. P. of 22.7.60 published a report that 146 Persian officers had been arrested, including five brigadiers, 56 colonels and other senior officers. On 5 August the paper quoted an Italian correspondent's report that the Shah's fear of a revolution was such that he had in permanent readiness, "at a secret aerodrome", a squadron of aircraft laden with his personal belongings.

IZ. of 12.8.60 published under the heading "I do not want to serve the American lackeys", a statement by Persian army officer Reza-zadeh Hasan Tagi ogli, of the First Training Regiment of the Persian Army, stationed in the town of Khorramabad, who had left Persia and sought political asylum in the Soviet Union. He declared that the subjection of the Persian Army to American control had become intolerable, and that the burden of militarization was creating unemployment, misery, starvation and disease among the population; "all in Persia regard the Americans and the Shah with loathing." Many patriotic officers had been executed, but the Shah and his "mercenary generals" could not suppress the fighting spirit of the young officers and patriotic soldiers.

Throughout August the Soviet press published reports on what it called the "election mockery" in Persia. It said that the police and gendarmerie were being used to intimidate voters; that voters were being handed ballot papers with the names of Government candidates already marked; and that the elections were being boycotted by voters on a large scale, and a flood of complaints was reaching the Shah and the Government. Prominence was given to reports of a clash between the police and opposition elements, in which 400 persons were said to have been injured.

Initial Soviet comment on the resignation of Eqbal's Government represented it as a blow to the Shah's regime. One comment (IZ. 31.8.60) said that Eqbal had been compelled to resign by the outcry over the scandalous conduct of the elections. "In accepting the resignation of his Prime Minister the Shah pretends that he is not responsible for the actions of the Government which have aroused widespread displeasure in the country. But, of course, nobody believes this. In reality the Shah is now dismissing a Prime Minister who organized fake elections precisely as his sovereign wished.

Persian press forecasts of a possible improvement in Persian-Soviet relations following Eqbal's resignation were quoted in Soviet newspapers. A Tass report from Tehran, published in IZ. and KZ. of

1.9.60, noted that certain Persian newspapers had expressed satisfaction at the fall of the Government: DAD and AJANG had expressed hopes of a less unpopular foreign policy and a settlement of differences between Persia and other countries, and KEYHAN had expressed the view that the improvement of Persian-Soviet relations was now almost a foregone conclusion.

BK. of 27.9.60 noted that at his press conference the Shah had emphasized "the most urgent problem of the Persian community, the problem of the improvement of Persian-Soviet relations. . ." He had said that "friendship with all countries, especially with our neighbours and the neighbour which has such an extended common frontier with us, is a component part of our general policy"; but he had implied that an improvement in relations depended mainly on the Soviet Union. Further, in saying that Persia would not accept any "threat" to her sovereignty as a price for the strengthening of good-neighbourly relations, he was trying to justify the former position of the Persian Government.

